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ABSTRACT
The issue of Japan's heavy dependence on Middle Eastern oil has attracted a lot
of attention in the political and academic circles for the reason that Japan is the second
biggest consumer and the largest importer of oil in the world. Consequently, any action
by Japan would not only have a major impact on petroleum markets, but also on
international relations, security and on the Middle East itself.
In the late 1960s Japan began negotiations with Iran, her biggest oil supplier at
that time, about the establishment of a petrochemical joint venture. These negotiations
led to the creation of the Iran Japan Petrochemical Company (UPC) in 1973.
This study examines the different reasons why the main partners, Mitsui Bussan
of Japan and the National Petrochemical Company of Iran as well as their respective
governments, were so interested in the idea of a joint venture. It traces the troubled
history of UPC from the preliminary negotiations in 1968, through two decades which
saw the Iranian Revolution and the setting up of an Islamic state, the Iran-Iraq War, and
two oil crises, until its dissolution in 1990.
The research reveals conflicts of interest between Japanese and Iranian
motivations behind the venture, between the goals of the privately owned Mitsui Bussan
and the state-run National Petrochemical Company as well as their contrasting
organisational and managerial styles, which led to the failure of UPC and its eventual
dissolution.
Using the case of IJPC as an example, the study argues that the setting up of a
joint venture of this nature was an inappropriate response to the main purposes of each
nation, i.e. the Japanese desire for a stable oil supply and the Iranian desire for rapid
industrialisation and transfer of technology. Finally, it suggest alternative policies through
which each country could achieve its respective ambitions.
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iINTRODUCTION
1.0- Objectives of the Study
This case study has four objectives. First, it attempts to analyse the reasons which
led to the establishment of the Iran Japan Petrochemical Company (UPC), the joint
venture between Mitsui Bussan of Japan and the National Petrochemical Company
(NPC) of Iran. In this regard, the emphasis of the study will be on the oil connection. It
is widely believed that the heavy dependence of Japan on Middle Eastern and
particularly Iranian oil in the 1960s, the unique make-up of the former's domestic oil
industry and the weakness of Mitsui Bussan in the oil business, were the main factors
behind the Japanese enthusiasm for a joint venture with Iran. The issue of Japan's heavy
reliance on Middle Eastern oil has attracted a lot of attention in the West and in Japan
itself. Many academics, politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen have addressed this
issue from political, military and economic points of view and have made
recommendations as to how Japan should reduce and/or stablise her oil supplies from
that volatile region. One specific action that Japanese governments and business leaders
have taken has been to enter into joint ventures, especially in petrochemicals, with major
oil producing countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia in the hope that this would bring
about a secure and steady flow of oil to Japan. So, two chapters will be devoted to this
subject to analyse how and why Japan has become so dependent upon imported oil,
particularly from the Middle East, to fuel her spectacular economic growth since the end
of the Second World War. An attempt will also be made to examine the role that the
oil connection played in the establishment of UPC.
Iran's aspirations for industrial and economic development was another
determining factor in the establishment of UPC. Therefore, the political and economic
ii
development of Iran in the 20th Century, and, in particular, the role of the domestic oil
industry in that process, will be analysed so as to find the underlying assumptions which
led the Iranian government into believing that entering into a petrochemical joint
venture with the Japanese would help them in their endeavour for industrialisation and
economic development.
The second objective of the study is to discover the causes of the failure of UPC.
This is especially important if one considers that the joint venture was Japan's single
largest foreign investment in the 1970s and 1980s (even up to date) and was Iran's
biggest and most important industrial project ever. The failure of the joint venture not
only resulted in huge financial losses for both sides but also seriously thwarted Iran's
industrialisation process which had been based upon the success of the project.
Moreover, the failure of UPC questioned the Japanese assumption that the establishment
and success of such ventures with oil producing countries would automatically lead to
more secure oil supplies. Hence, this study will try to uncover why the project failed and
whether this led to less secure oil supplies from Iran.
The third objective is closely related to the above two in the sense that the study
will try to examine whether it is logical or desirable for Japan to enter into joint ventures
with oil producing countries in the hope that this will lead to a more secure supply of oil.
This is especially important if one considers that such joint ventures are usually between
private Japanese companies with profit maximisation motives and state owned companies
in the Middle East which are mainly concerned with the long-term development of a
particular industrial sector with all the conflicts of interests usually inherent in such
associations. The study will try to explore other means for Japan to contribute to these
countries' industrialisation efforts which would lead to their economic development and
iii
stable oil supplies to Japan without the possibility of a conflict that an unsuccessful joint
venture may engender.
The forth objective is to investigate whether it is appropriate for Iran to pour her
rather limited financial, managerial and technical resources into huge industrial projects
like UPC for which she has to import most of the required inputs: capital, technology,
and managerial skills without any effort to link such projects to other sectors of the
economy.
2.0- Significance of the Study
Apart from a book by a Japanese journalist and news articles in various journals
and magazines, no in-depth academic analysis on why UPC was established and, more
importantly, why it failed have been undertaken. It is hoped that this study, in a modest
way, will contribute to the understanding of the subject and will initiate further studies
into Japanese joint ventures in the Middle East. Moreover, it is the wish of the author
of this study that a wide debate on the lessons that Iran can learn from Japanese
management and organisational practices and experience in the formulation of a dynamic
and appropriate industrial policy, be initiated within Iranian academic and official circles.
It is hoped that the present research study will make a very small contribution to that
debate.
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2.1- In Terms of Japan's Policy Towards the Middle East
As mentioned above, the establishment of UPC was directly connected to the
issue of Japan's reliance on Middle Eastern oil in the sense that Japanese officials and
top business leaders believed that entering into such ventures would lead to a secure
supply of petroleum from that region. However, as this study will reveal, such linkages
have little, if any, effect on the issue of secure oil supplies. In fact, in the likely event of
failure, these connections could have an adverse affect on mutual relationships.
Moreover, Middle Eastern countries put much less emphasis on such linkages than the
Japanese tend to do. It is hoped that this study would demonstrate the irrelevence of this
Japanese policy towards oil producing countries, particularly Iran, and would, in a very
modest way, show how the former can assist the latter to develop economically and, in
the process, bring about a more stable supply of oil to Japan.
2.2- In Terms of Iran's Economic and Industrial Policies
The IJPC project was to be the pinnacle of Iran's industialisation plans in the
1970s. The Iranian government was hoping that the project would induce rapid
industrialisation of the country with many downstream industries being established to
process the outputs of the project. Moreover, the government wanted to use the project
as a conduit for the transfer of technology and as a means of developing an export
oriented petrochemical industry so that revenues generated by the sale of petochemical
products would eventually reduce the country's heavy reliance on crude oil exports.
However, as the forthcoming chapters will show, none of these plans and aspirations
have materialised so far. The UPC project, after consuming nearly $5 billion of the
country's scarce financial resources and after twenty years of construction has not yet
Vbeen completed. What's more, the concentration of most of the NPC's resources on a
single project has caused a severe under-development of the Iranian petrochemical
industry compared to other Middle Eastern oil producing countries.
It is hoped that the present study, by analysing the causes of LTPC's failure would,
in a very small way, contribute to the current debate in Iran over the most appropriate
course for the country to achieve industrialisation and economic development. The
findings of this research are especially relevant when, at the present time, the Iranian
government, after nearly 15 years, is once again promoting the development of heavy
industry. Some of the plans under discussion involve foreign participation (like the joint
venture with the Kobe Steel Company of Japan to produce iron and steel products for
domestic and export markets on Qeshm Island). It is hoped that the findings of this study
would shed some light on the problems associated with the building of large industrial
projects in Iran and would contribute to the decision making process regarding such
projects so as to reduce the risk of repeating the mistakes of the IJPC in the future.
Finally, as this study hopes to demonstrate, there are major difficulties associated
with international joint ventures, particularly when they are between multinational
corporations from industrialised countries and state owned companies of the developing
world. These problems mainly arise from different organisational and managerial
practices and conflicting expectations from such joint ventures. For multinationals, such
ventures are only a part of their global business strategy which quite naturally, is
concerned with profit maximisation. But for state owned companies these joint ventures
are a conduit for the long-term development of a particular industry and as a means of
economic development of their respective country. Obviously, such conflicts of interests
and differing expectations are bound to affect the joint venture itself and cause friction
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between the partners. This study is an attempt to illustrate the difficulties inherent in
such associations and demonstrates that the finding of a suitable partner(s) is a very
complex and intricate process, and companies, especially those from the developing
countries, need to spend a lot of time and effort on finding an appropriate partner for
their proposed joint venture. This point is very relevant as Iran once again is trying to
attract foreign investment into the country and is encouraging the establishment of
various joint ventures with foreign countries, specifically from the developed countries.
Furthermore, it is hoped that this study will contribute to the underestanding of
international joint ventures in Iran and would act as a guide for future joint ventures in
the country so as not to repeat the mistakes of UPC once again.
3.0- Scope and Limitations of the Study
This study has been mainly confined to analysing the major factors behind the
creation and failure of the Iran Japan Petrochemical Company. Due to space limitations,
however, topics like Japanese industrial, environmental, foreign and trade policies,
although directly relevant to the establishment of the joint venture, are not discussed in
detail here. The study has instead concentrated on the Japanese oil industry and
characteristics of trading companies (so go shosha) as these two were deemed to be the
most important factors on the Japanese side for the creation of UPC.
On the Iranian side, the study has been limited to the role of the state, and the
contribution of the domestic oil industry, in the economic development of Iran in the
20th Century. Organisational and managerial aspects of the National Iranian Oil
Company and, in particular Islamic management, are also discussed in great detail. But
subjects such as Iran's foreign and trade policies will not be examined here.
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Particular attention has been paid to events leading to the formation and the
construction of UPC and the financial and managerial aspects of the company in the
1970s and 1980s. Furthermore, the effects of the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the eight
year war between Iran and Iraq on the joint venture are examined in detail. This is
because these two events, together with managerial and organisational factors, are
thought to have played the main role in the dissolution of the joint venture.
The study has three major limitations. First, the review of the features of Japanese
foreign investment has been limited to the period between the 1950s and the early 1970s.
This is because the joint venture with Iran was created in the early 1970s and hence, was
subject to the particular mode of Japanese investment in that period. Undoubtedly, the
mode of Japanese foreign investment has gone through major changes in the 1970s and
1980s, but as these changes are thought to be irrelevant to UPC, they have been
excluded from the study.
Second, the so called Japanese style of management, although quite relevant to
the study and, in the eyes of NPC officials, a main cause of the failure of the joint
venture, will not be studied here. Moreover, no comprehensive comparison between
Japanese and Iranian management styles will be presented. Instead, the characteristics
of Japanese general trading companies which played a significant role in the creation of
the company, and in the opinion of the author were a principal factor in creating
conflicts between the partners and its failure, will be analysed at length.
Third, unfortunately, due to space limitations, it was not possible to present an
in-depth comparison between UPC and Japanese petrochemical joint ventures in other
developing countries, especially the one between the Mitsubishi Group and Saudi Arabia.
This would have made a very interesting analysis, especially in view of the fact that both
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joint ventures were entered into for the same reasons (stable oil supply on the Japanese
side and industrialisation on the Iranian and Saudi Part) and around the same time
(1970s). However, UPC became a spectacular failure but the joint venture with Saudi
Arabia has been an outstanding success. It would make a very worthwhile subject for
interested researchers to study why these two almost similar Japanese joint ventures in
the Middle East have had such contrasting destinies.
Finally, future researchers may also be interested in carrying out a comparison
between Japanese and Middle Eastern managerial and organisational characteristics and
whether some aspects of Japanese management, which is said to be partly responsible
for Japan's economic success, can be transferred to the Middle East whose managerial
style is believed to be a major factor for the region's under-development.
4.0- The Structure and Contents of the Thesis
The thesis is organised into three parts and consists of nine chapters. Part One,
which contains Chapters One to Six, is devoted to laying the background for the research
and discussing the major factors responsible for the establishment of UPC. Part Two,
consisting of Chapter Seven, is the core chapter of the thesis and presents a very detailed
analysis of the history of the joint venture from its formation to its liquidation. Part
Three is the analysis and conclusion and includes Chapters Eight and Nine.
Chapter One sets-up the theoretical framework for the thesis within which the
case study, the Iran Japan Petrochemical Company will be discussed. First, a brief review
of theories of foreign investment will be presented. Then, a detailed analysis of theories
of joint ventures will be given.. Theories on the reasons for the creation of joint ventures
and why some are successful and some not will be explored. In this section, the
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framework for analysing UPC will be established. Lastly, characteristics of Japanese
foreign investment and theories on this subject will be discussed in length.
Chapter Two discusses the Japanese energy industries in the 20th Century. In
particular, the Japanese government's oil policy and the effects of Occupation policies
on the Japanese oil industry and the factors which caused Japan to become heavily
dependent upon imported oil will be examined in detail.
Chapter Three addresses Japan's economic and political relations with the Middle
East in the 20th Century. Particular attention will be paid to the oil connection and how
the former became reliant upon the latter for most of her petroleum imports, especially
on Iranian oil in the 1960s. After a quick review of Japanese foreign investments, her
investments in Iran will be discussed in detail.
Chapter Four analyses the economic and political developments in 20th Century
Iran. Specifically, the role of the state in the industrialisation process, the evolution of
the domestic oil industry, its contribution to the economic development of Iran and its
linkages to other sectors of the domestic economy will be studied at length. Finally, the
factors which are believed to have prompted the Iranian government's decision to choose
the domestic petrochemical industry for expansion are discussed.
Chapter Five traces the historical evolution of Mitsui Bussan, the main Japanese
partner in the joint venture with Iran. The creation of pre-war business groups (zaibatsu)
in Japan, the effects of Occupation policies on them and their dissolution, in particular
that of Mitsui Bussan will be discussed. Then the emergence of post-war industrial
groupings (keitersu), the re-grouping of the Mitsui Group and the re-merger of Mitsui
Bussan (now also called Mitsui & Co.) will be discussed. Also, the roles and functions
of Japanese trading companies (so go shosha) will be analysed. Finally, the managerial
xand organisational style of the Mitsui Group and in particular Mitsui Bussan as
compared to the Mitsubishi Group and Mitsubishi Trading Corporation respectively, and
the reasons for the weakness of Mitsui Bussan in the oil business will be extensively
discussed. The last point is particularly relevant to our study as it is believed to be a
major factor behind Mitsui Bussan's enthusiasm for the petrochemical joint venture with
Iran.
Chapter Six discusses the aspects and the evolution of the Iranian management
style. First, the role of the bazaari merchant in the industrialisation of Iran and their
style of management will be addressed. The influence of foreign management styles on
Iranian management will be analysed. Then, the attributes of Islamic management and
its applicability to modern organisations will be discussed. Finally, the chapter will
examine the organisational and managerial characteristics of the National Iranian Oil
Company.
Chapter Seven is the core chapter of the thesis where the history of the Iran
Japan Petrochemical Company, from exploratory talks in the late 1960s to its dissolution
in 1990 will be discussed. First, the chapter will review the motivations, both on the
Japanese and Iranian sides, which favoured the establishment of a petrochemical joint
venture. Next, the events leading to the formation of the Iran Japan Petrochemical
Company, plus the factors affecting the construction of the project together with
managerial, organisational and financial aspects of INC, will be discussed in great detail.
The influences of the two oil crises in the 1970s, the Iranian Revolution, and the Iran
Iraq War on the fortunes of the joint ventures will also be examined. Finally, the factors
which led to the dissolution of UPC will be analysed.
Chapter Eight discusses the main characteristics of the petrochemical industry
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from an economic point of view. Then, based on this analysis and the findings of
previous chapters, the causes of the failure of the joint venture are discussed. The
chapter will argue that due to various factors, namely, incompatibility of the expectations
of the partners from the joint venture and their organisational and managerial styles
(private versus state), inappropriate choice of location for the project, changes in the oil
markets, cost over-runs and, more importantly, the failure of the joint venture to fulfill
the goals set for it by its parents and changes in the strategy of the latter were the main
determining factors in the failure of UPC.
Chapter Nine considers the lessons that Japan, Iran, Mitsui Bussan, and the
National Petrochemical Company of Iran can learn from the failure of UPC. It argues
that it is more pertinent for Japan to contribute to the overall economic development of
oil producing countries such as Iran than entering into risky joint ventures if she wants
to secure a stable supply of oil from the latter.
The chapter also contends that considering the under-developed state of the
Iranian economy, undertaking huge industrial projects such as IJPC are wholly unsuitable
for the country. This is especially so as these projects do not draw from the the country's
existing resources, relying instead for most of their inputs on imports. Also, they fail to
establish any backward or forward linkages with the rest of the domestic economy.
Furthermore, the case for a dynamic industrial policy that promotes the types of
industries which by establishing links with those sectors of the Iranian economy that have
a comparative advantage, can produce competitive goods for the domestic and regional
markets is argued. The chapter argues that with respect to the failure of UPC and the
Iranian government's plans to introduce private capital into the domestic petrochemical
industry, the organisation of the National Petrochemical Company needs a radical shake-
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up. Various alternatives for such an organisational changes are put forward.
Finally, the factors that multinational corporations and state owned companies
from the developing world need to consider before establishing a joint venture are
discussed.
It is hoped that this thesis makes a small contribution to the understanding of
Japan's oil policy, Iran's industrialisation plans and International joint ventures.
PART ONE
1CHAPTER ONE
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
1.0- Introduction
In this chapter the theoretical framework for analysing the case study, Iran Japan
Petrochemical Company, will be established. First, the motives, benefits, and problems
of foreign investment will be studied. Then, joint ventures as a form of foreign
investment will be discussed at length. Finally, the attributes of Japanese foreign
investment will be analyzed.
2.0- Theories of Foreign Investment
2.1- What is Foreign Investment
If a citizen of one country makes an investment in another country with the
intention of actively managing the physical assets and organisation acquired or created
as a result of that investment, the investment is commonly termed a foreign direct
investment [FDI]. If, by contrast, the foreign investment is such that the investor intends
only to hold the investment with the expectation of financial gain and does not intend
to manage the investment, it is termed a foreign portfolio investment, or simply a portfolio
investment.1
Direct foreign investment can also be termed as the offering of a package to a
foreign country consisting of capital, technology, managerial skills, organisational
capabilities, and markets.
Charles Oman (1984) divides various forms of foreign investments into two
groups: traditional or enclave foreign direct investment, and "new forms of international
investments". The former involves wholly or majority owned subsidiaries in a foreign
2country, and the latter includes joint ventures, licensing agreements, franchising,
management contracts, turnkey contracts, product-in-hand, production sharing contracts,
risk service contracts and international sub-contracting. 2 Furthermore, There are three
types of foreign investment; horizontal expansion (producing the same product as in the
domestic market), vertical expansion (adding a stage in the production process that
comes before or is subsequent to the firm's principal processing activity), or
conglomerate expansion (producing different goods from those for the domestic
market).3
2.2- Causes of Foreign Investment
Usually, the motives for foreign direct investment are classified into resource
oriented, labour oriented, and market oriented investment (which is sub-divided into
trade barriers induced foreign investment and oligopolistic foreign direct investment).4
Generally speaking, theories explaining the causes of foreign investment are
classified into four groups; strictly economic theories, strictly subjective theories, dynamic
theories of foreign direct investment, and generalised theories.
(1) Strictly Economic Theories: These theories argue that economic factors are the only
causes of foreign direct investment. The most widely recognised of these is the 'specific-
advantage' hypothesis which proposes that the cause of foreign direct investment is some
firm specific-advantage that the multinational companies possess which provide them
with a lead over host-country producers. These advantages could include a
technologically superior product or process, managerial skills, multi-plant economies,
internal financial resources, and so on. The most famous of these theories is the Hymer
theory of foreign direct investment. 5 Hymer states that foreign direct investment takes
3place mainly in oligopolistic industries, and at least some of the firms in these industries
possess advantages which enable them to overcome the cost disadvantages associated
with operating internationally. According to Hymer, these advantages include economies
of scale or some sort of "superior" proprietary knowledge
(2) Strictly Subjective Theories: These theories maintain that the behavioural factors
influencing the preferences of the managers of a firm can explain the decision to invest
abroad.
(3) Dynamic Theories of Foreign Direct Investment: These theories advocate that foreign
direct investment is a dynamic process whose pattern changes with time. The most
important of these is Raymond Vernon's theory of 'product-life-cycle', a concept which
he has borrowed from marketing. According to this theory, exporting and foreign
investment are separate stages in the life-time of a product or process by which
multinational firms expand into foreign markets. More precisely, foreign investment
succeeds foreign trade which is undertaken to protect the share gained in a foreign
market by exports. Moreover, the theory adds that this process is inevitable in the life-
cycle of a product or process and cannot be reversed.°
(3) Generalised Theories: These theories combine the above three theories to explain
the foreign investment decision by multinational firms. These theories state that neither
economic nor behaviourial factors can explain the causes of foreign direct investment on
their own and, although they accept that foreign investment does follow exports as
advocated by the 'product-life-cycle hypothesis, they maintain that this theory lacks the
generality required. The most important of these theories is Richardson's Generalised
Model of Foreign Direct Investment.'
42.2.1- Causes of Horizontal Foreign Investment
Several hypotheses have been put forward to explain why corporations undertake
horizontal investments abroad, the most important of which are mentioned below:
(i) the Specific Advantage Hypothesis, 8 (ii) the Capital Abundance Hypothesis, 9 (iii) the
Research and Development Hypothesis, 1° (iv) the Barriers to Entry Hypothesis,' (v)
the Tariff Hypothesis, 12 (vi) the Lower Production Costs Hypothesis (several researchers
however, have shown that actual average production cost is a minor motivation to invest
in a foreign market, and argue that the existence of low-cost investment opportunities
is not a sufficient condition for investing abroad. n), (vii) the Foreign Government
Inducements Hypothesis (such as tax differentials and incentives, depreciation
allowances, favourable interest rates and credit conditions) 14, (viii) the Multinational
Fad Hypothesis 15 , (ix) Vernon's Product-Life-Cycle Hypothesis 16, and (x) Richardson's
Generalised Model of Foreign Direct Investment17
2.2.2- Causes of Vertical Foreign Investment
Vertical investment in a foreign country is primarily undertaken for the production
of a raw material. Firms integrate backward by investing in the exploration, development,
and production (downstream) of raw materials in resource rich foreign countries. The
raw material is then shipped back to the home country (off-shore sourcing) or third
country for processing into intermediate and consumer products.
There are various motives which induce a firm to undertake foreign direct
investment in different stages of the same production process, the most important of
which are outlined below:18
(i) Realisation of Multi-Plant Economies,
5ii) Security of Supplies of Raw Materials located in Less Developed Countries,
(iii) Avoidance of Oligopolistic Uncertainty,
(iv) Avoidance of Business Risk,
(v) Increase in Market Power,
(vi) Increase in Entry Barriers,
It is clear that the above factors are purely economic considerations. However,
subjective factors do affect the decision to invest in a foreign country in order to realise
vertical integration (these subjective factors, as shall be argued in later chapters may
have played a role in the establishment of UPC).
2.3- Characteristics of Multinationals
Many researchers of multinationals believe that companies which undertake
foreign investment (become multinationals) have the following characteristics:
(i) Foreign investment originates from industries which have a differentiated
oligopolistic nature in their home markets and direct their foreign investment to markets
which are also oligopolistic with product differentiation.19
(ii) Multinational corporations are large in size and have exhausted all possible
sources of economies of scale in the home market. They would not undertake foreign
investment if profitable opportunities existed for the exploitation of economies of scale
in production or sales in the home market.
(iii) Multinationals tend to enter foreign oligopolistic markets which are protected
by strong barriers to entry. However, multinational firms have advantages against each
of the major sources of entry barriers. The most important of these advantages are (1)
6product or process differentiation, (2) the ability of the multinational firm to achieve or
exceed the minimum optimal scale of plant in a foreign market, (3) easier access to large
sources of finance both from retained earnings and international capital markets, and (4)
multinationals have significant absolute cost advantages over local foreign competitors
which arise mainly from lower cost of finance, superior technology, and more efficient
and skilled managerial personnel.
(iv) The above advantages should, however, be appraised against the
disadvantages related to operating in a foreign market. These disadvantages are (1)
additional costs of gathering information, (2) exchange rate fluctuations, and (3) political
actions by foreign governments. The above mentioned factors, therefore, make foreign
investment more risky than investment in the home country.
(v) The greater risk of foreign investment can be borne by large firms which partly
explains the large of multinational corporations.
(vi) Due to these additional risks, multinationals require a higher rate of return
on their foreign investment to compensate them for undertaking such risky ventures
abroad.
2.4- The Economic Effects of Foreign Direct Investment
As mentioned earlier, foreign direct investment offers the host country a package
consisting of capital, managerial skills, technological know-how, organisational skills, and
market opportunities (in the investor's home country and third countries). To the extent
that various elements of this package are scarce or lacking in the host country, they
stimulate employment, output and economic growth. Moreover, foreign investment
provides capital for countries short of funds with the necessary foreign exchange for
7imports and investment (this is particularly true of developing countries whose main
source of foreign exchange is earnings from foreign investment i.e. vertical expansion)
in the development of their natural resources. (See Chapter 4 for the case of Iran).
Foreign direct investment is said to have micro as well as macro-economic effects
on the host country although the degree of such benefits is fiercely debated between
proponents and opponents of foreign investment. 20
 The main benefits of foreign
investment to the host country can be summarised as below:21
(i) The revenue from the taxation of profits of the foreign subsidiaries,
(ii) Improvement in skills of the labour force of the host country.
(iii) Increase in the productivity of factors of production in general,
(iv) Improvement in the allocation of resources of the host country from the increase
competition and the ensuing pressure on the prices of commodities,
(v) Speeding-up of the adaptation of technological progress. The economic effects of
horizontal and vertical types of foreign investments are in general similar, although the
latter's impact is smaller than the former's. For instance, extractive subsidiaries are
capital intensive and hence, offer fewer opportunities for training and skill improvement
of the local workforce. Furthermore, these types of industries do not establish strong
backward linkages (see Chapter 4 for definition) with the domestic industry of the host
country, and they buy few local outputs. Moreover, if the foreign subsidiary limits its
operations to extraction of natural resources only and carries out all of the processing
in its home country, no forward linkages (see Chapter 4) will develop with the rest of the
economy of the host country, therefore, impeding the process of industrialisation.
82.5- Problems Created by Foreign Investment
Foreign investment as well as having the above mentioned economic benefits
(although the real value of such benefits is disputed) creates various problems for a
developing country. These problems can be classified into five categories as follows:22
(i) Dependencia Theorem: By accepting foreign private investments from the developed
nations, less developed countries increase their technological and cultural dependency.
(ii) Alliance with Local Elite in Power: Multinationals tie up politically and economically
with the ruling group in the host country. By helping these forces to maintain the status
quo, multinational firms impede political and social change.
(iii) Corrupting Influence: Multinational corporations are accused of failing in their social
and economic responsibilities. These accusations include the introduction of alien
cultural values, and the distortion of the demand for workers and professional staff by
offering higher salaries, thereby, limiting local firms' ability to employ skilled people,
which in turn causes their underdevelopment as compared with multinationals.
Multinationals are also accused of excluding their local employees from the key decision
making process of their subsidiaries, and moreover, frustrating the able local managers'
ambitions to occupy top positions in the subsidiary as well as in the regional and parent
headquarters. Furthermore, tax evasions and transfer pricing by multinationals deprive
the developing countries of adequate tax revenues and put extra strain on their foreign
exchange reserves.
(iv) Reliance on Home Countries: Whenever a dispute develops between the
multinationals and the host governments of developing countries, the former seek the
assistance of their home governments in the form of diplomatic pressure on the host
country. So the acceptance of foreign direct investment tends to bring some degree of
9political dependence on foreign governments.
(v) Extra-Territoriality: Even when multinational corporations do not seek diplomatic
assistance from their home governments, the latter use the former in order to intervene
in their foreign trade and in the investments of their subsidiaries abroad. Therefore, the
home governments (mainly Western industrialised countries) use the multinationals to
interfere in the domestic affairs of the developing countries.
Considering these disadvantages associated with multinationals, why do developing
countries not only tolerate but actively encourage foreign investment? The answer lies
in their ambitions to catch up with the technologically and economically advanced
countries of the West, but they lack some or all of the necessary ingredients for
industrialisation and economic development. These factors as mentioned before are;
capital, technology, managerial skills, organisational abilities and access to export
markets. The developing countries believe that by inviting foreign investment they will
acquire the necessary inputs for industrialisation.
Hence, these countries expect multinationals to fulfil diverse public goals for
them, like creating employment, economic growth, industrialisation and so on. On the
other hand, multinationals are private firms whose only aim is making profits for their
shareholders. They make foreign investments in order to expand their market shares and
achieve economies of scale, and rarely, if ever, are they prepared to fulfil the public goals
of the developing countries at the expense of their own private profits. This
irreconcilable discrepancy between the public and private goals more often than not
results in misunderstandings and conflicts between the two sides.
However, if multinational managers, before making a decision on foreign
investment, endeavour to comprehend the industrialisation goals, as well as the historical,
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social, cultural, and political factors influencing these goals, they may reach a more
objective decision regarding their investment in that country, and avoid potential future
friction with the host goverment. Perhaps, the most important consideration should be
the type of industry suitable for transplantation by foreign direct investment to the
developing country which is compatible with its stage of economic development, taking
into account all comparative costs (construction, labour, raw material, etc).
3.0- Joint Venture as a form of Foreign Investment
As noted in the beginning of this chapter, there are two forms of foreign
investment, traditional or enclave (wholly or majority owned subsidiaries) and "new
forms" such as joint ventures. Moreover, an ownership share of 10-20 percent is generally
used as the dividing line between direct and portfolio investment in the literature on
foreign direct investment.23 As the Japanese investment in Iran (UPC) was in the form
of a joint venture, the next section will only discuss this form of foreign investment.24
3.1- Definition of Joint Ventures
Joint ventures, in the sense in which the term is understood in the business today.
are largely a development of the period since the Second World War. 25 The first book
which appears to deal systematically with what is now described as a joint venture is an
English one by A.H. Boulton26 and does not use the term joint venture at all. The term
'consortium' is still widely used, particularly in the banking world.27
Young and Bradford define a joint venture as an "enterprise, or corporation or
partnership formed by two or more companies, individuals or organisations at least one
of which is an operating entity which wishes to broaden its activities for the purpose of
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conducting a new profit-motivated business of permanent duration. In general the
ownership is shared by the participants with more or less equal distribution and without
absolute dominance by one party'
Otterbeck29 defines joint ventures as those affiliates where the parent has at least
some management control but where there is also one partner or more who also has an
important share of the ownership of the affiliate. A joint venture, therefore, is a company
where each of the two or more firms has a non-marginal equity position and where at
least two parties in some way share the responsibility for managing the joint venture. He
further adds that a joint venture may be designed for a specific task or to fulfil a longer-
term role in the strategy of the founding firms.
Boyle3° describes a joint venture as the creation of a new organisational entity
by two or more partner organisations. In his terminology, the creating organisations are
referred to as the parents, and the created joint venture as the progeny.
Pfeffer and Nowak31 state that the joint venture concept involves the creation
of a new, separate, organisational entity, jointly owned and controlled by the parent
organisations. This new entity can incur debt, sign contracts, or undertake other activities
in its own name, and without consequence to the financial or legal position of the
parents, except to the extent of their investment in the joint venture.
Edstrom and Hogbere argue that a joint venture is one form of inter-
organisational co-operation. They distinguish three forms of such co-operation: contracts,
joint programmes and joint ventures. They define joint venture as a separate
organisational unit which is jointly owned and controlled by the co-operating firms.
It can therefore be infered from the above that a joint venture must be controlled
jointly by it parents and not by one party alone, though management may be and often
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is entrusted to one of them. The share of any one participant is of secondary importance.
What is crucial is the degree of effective control exercised by one of the parents over the
joint venture.
3.2- Classification of Joint Ventures
Generally, joint ventures are classified in four different ways:33
First, they may be related to a single project or a group of related projects or they may
be setting up business on a permanent basis.
Secondly, a joint venture can be classified by the nature of the participants and
their relationship to one another outside the joint venture itself. In many cases, especially
in developing countries, one of the participants is a business concern, usually a large
multinational from the industrialised countries, and the other is the government of the
host country or one of its agencies. In other cases, multinational companies for various
reasons, like sharing research and development costs or restricting competion, etc, may
establish a joint venture in the home country of one or both parents or in a third country.
Thirdly, joint ventures can be classified by the way they are intended to operate.
Some may cover the complete business cycle in their field of operation or they may be
restricted to one or more aspects of a larger business cycle such as R & D, production,
sales, etc.
Fourthly, joint ventures are classified according to the country of their domicile.
Some are established in the country of their parents (i.e. both parents operate in the
same country) while others are international in the sense that they are set up in the
country of one of their participants or in a third one.
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3.3- The Causes of Joint Venture
The wholly owned affiliate, for many years, was regarded as the normal form of
foreign investment by American multinationals (which carried out most of these
investments). However, during the 1950s and 1960s, under strong pressure from the host
governments, especially in the developing countries who restricted ownership of assets
by foreign corporations, and due to other extraordinary circumstances TM, multinationals
began to use other forms of foreign investment. Moreover, larger scale of operations, and
risk-spreading through sharing of technological, commercial, or financial risk are
mentioned as reasons why firms enter into various forms of co-operation with other
firms.
Berg and Friedman 35 state that most joint ventures are born out of sets of
unique circumstances. They also add that joint ventures represent an organisational form
for achieving economic objectives neither parent could normally attain alone. In fact,
most large corporations will, except where the aim is restriction of competition, prefer
a viable alternative (like a wholly owned subsidiary) to a joint venture.
Edstrom et al (1979) have developed a theory called the "resources dependence
model". This model assumes that resources are scarce, and a firm's survival depends on
its ability to acquire such scarce resources. It has to compete with other firms which are
dependent on the same resource (horizontal interdependence), and it also has to
negotiate with firms which control the allocation, access, or use of a scarce resource
(vertical interdependence). Interdependence creates uncertainty, and firms seek to avoid
or reduce such uncertainty. The model espouses that one way of reducing uncertainty is
to negotiate some form of co-operation.'
Pfeffer and Nowak (1976) argue that resource inter-dependence, not resource
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scarcity, explains the creation of joint ventures. Their theory advocates that exchange of
resources between and within industries create inter-organisational interdependence, and
a new organisational entity (a joint venture) is formed to manage such interdependence.
According to Pfeffer and Nowak, two types of organisational interdependence exist:
competitive interdependence (horizontal) and symbiotic interdependence (vertical).37
The former type occurs "only in organisations operating in the same industry which are
functionally equivalent, in that they are attempting to produce similar products and
services for similar marl, L is" and, hence, compete with one another for the same
resources and markets.38 Such organisations, especially the business organisations, do
not like to face unrestrained competition and the uncertainty that results from such
competition and, hence, seek to establish negotiated environments. Joint ventures (as
well as formation of cartels) between these organisations is one way of creating a stable
position in the environment.
Symbiotic interdependence which is defined as "a mutual dependence between
unlike organisations"39, arises between industries which are dependent on one another
for the procurement of their inputs and disposal of their outputs. For example, steel
producers need iron and coal and petrochemical plants need natural gas both as a raw
material and source of energy. These businesses also need marketing outlets to dispose
of their products. Such interdependencies which often cross national boundaries produce
uncertainty which, as noted earlier, is disliked by business organisations. These
organisations attempt to reduce these uncertainties by integrating backward or forward,
and creation of joint ventures is one way of achieving such integrations.
While joint ventures are, arguably, the primary organisational responses to the two
above types of organisational interdependence, there exist other explanations for joint
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venture activities, the most common of which state that joint ventures are organised to
(1) spread the risks of new industrial developments, (2) establish joint or combined
facilities for greater economy, (3) accumulate large amounts of needed capital, and (4)
undertake programmes that are too expensive for individual companies to handle.4°
In their study of 163 joint ventures entered into between 1960 and 1971, Pfeffer
and Nowak find that the general advantage of reducing uncertainty by entering into joint
ventures is a very strong factor in the creation of such new organisations. They also find
evidence for their hypothesis that technological intensity in an industry is strongly
correlated with transaction interdependence.'" Therefore, technological intensity could
be added to organisational (or resource) interdependence as a reason why firms enter
into joint ventures.
Bivens and Lovell (1966) expound that the purpose of a joint venture is to put
together complementary resources of already existing firms.42 Furthermore, many
researchers43 argue that multinational corporations and local firms of foreign countries,
by matching their resources, can:
(1) Reduce the financial risk of operating in a foreign country,
(2) Obtain local personal contacts on a committed basis,
(3) Obtain marketing channels or skills,
(4) Obtain an assured outlet for, or an assured source of, raw materials available only
from an oligopolistic industry,
(5) Obtain access to local cost, market, or technological information.44
3.4- Joint Venture Management
Studies of joint ventures by management oriented researchers have typically been
concerned with the trade off between the need for unilateral control and the need for
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resources. When the latter dominates, joint ventures may be considered. Wells 45 found
that multinational firms enter into joint ventures principally for three reasons:
(1) Need for local marketing know-how,
(2) Need to extend a vertically integrated structure,
(3) Need for resources.
It is difficult to argue that joint venture management is easy. 46 They are expected
to be difficult to manage. Entities internal to the firm can be managed with the help of
formal systems, structures, budgeting processes, norms, traditions, values, sanctions and
rewards that have been built up or have evolved during the history of a company. A joint
venture on the other hand, is not under the control of a single management. It may show
a mixture of the parent company's culture and that of the host country. In joint ventures
two or more companies commit people and resources to something which will become
part of and be influenced by both parents' culture, systems, career paths, norms, etc., as
well as to some extent being an outside supplier, customer, or even competitor. One
should expect to encounter problems in an international joint venture because of cultural
differences inherent in any business activity in which more than one country is
involved.47
3.5- Joint Venture Stability
Lawrence G. Franko (1971) has made a comprehensive study of causes of
instability of joint ventures. His aim was to determine whether a joint venture was stable
or not, stability being interpreted as whether a joint venture remained a joint venture or
a fundamental shift occurred in the relationship between the parent companies. This shift
is indicated by the break-up of the relationship, either by one of the parents taking over
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the joint venture, or by dissolving the joint venture, or selling it to a third party.
The principal argument of Franko is that the major cause of a joint venture's
instability is a change in the business strategy of its parent companies. This change
occurs as a result of a multinational's choosing a strategy of either product diversification
or product concentration. Firms that base their competitive strengths on the development
of new products for many different overseas end-use markets appear to have a high
degree of tolerance for joint ventures.° Firms that have a monopolistic control over
natural resources and that sell products made from such resources also appear to be
highly tolerant of manufacturing joint ventures with foreign partners.
However, firms that constrain their foreign activities to a particular product, or
more precisely, choose to constrain themselves to serving a particular customer-group,
tend to purge themselves of joint venture partners after a time. Such firms find it
necessary to increase demand and to grow by cutting prices (and hence costs) or by
recapturing an escaping monopolistic position by increasing sales expenses. Multinational
cost-cutting usually involves the elimination of competing production facilities ( like joint
ventures with foreign partners), or centralising marketing decision-making.'
Franko's study research seems to indicate that a number of factors are relatively
unrelated to a multinational firm's motivation to change the ownership position in joint
ventures. These factors include cultural differences between partners, whether or not
products produced by joint ventures were sold to consumers or producers, tradeability
characteristics of the products which a joint venture produces, the importance of financial
and other conflicts with joint venture partners, and the profitability of the firm's foreign
operations.'
It can be argued that stability of joint ventures is not necessarily a good criterion
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for success.52 A joint venture may not have been set up because the parents thought it
was important or good to have a joint venture, but rather to fulfil a mission. It is possible
that a joint venture that becomes unstable is very successful in the eyes of one or both
of the parents.53 Although this point is not made by Franko, he nevertheless argues
against focusing on conflict in joint ventures. Franko states that conflict is not a cause
for instability in joint ventures; the important point is whether or not the joint venture
fits into the strategy of the parents.
In order to understand why some joint ventures are successful and some are not,
one must look into the strategy of the parent firms, the reasons for entering into the joint
venture in the first place and the firms' organisational characteristics as well as their
industries.' Success cannot be measured in terms of stability since the purpose of a
joint venture is not to last, but rather to contribute to the fulfilment of the goals of its
parents. Therefore, one must look carefully into what actually goes on in the process of
managing the joint venture."
3.6- Advantages of Joint Ventures56
The advantages associated with joint ventures can be divided into negative and
positive ones. Generally, such advantages are divided into the following four categories:
(1)- Limitation of Investment: This is regarded as a negative advantage of joint ventures
in the sense that when the investment is made in a country with exchange controls,
problems such as repatriation may arise. The costs of the limitation of investment is the
ceding of control over the need for future additional investment and over its provision.
(2)- Limitation of Risk: One of the most distinct advantages of joint ventures is the
limitation of the risk of the failure of the enterprise. When a joint venture is established
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to introduce a range of products into a country by local production, the investment of the
foreign partner may largely comprise the transfer of industrial property rights and the
technological know-how and supply of plant and machinery, with the local partner
providing the entire required finance. This substantially reduces the financial risks to the
foreign investor.
(3)- Overcoming Nationalistic Prejudice: A joint venture with a local partner may help
alleviate nationalistic sentiment and hostility towards foreign investment. In many
countries foreign owned businesses are either not permitted or are subject to prior
approvals which are usually difficult to obtain. A local partner with the right connections
will help speed up the approval process.
(4)- Merging Skills and Strengths: This is probably the most obvious positive advantage
of joint ventures. A joint venture may provide the best means for merging certain skills
and strengths. There may be technical expertise available without financial backing, and
a joint venture between a technically superior and a financially strong partner may be
the best solution. In international joint ventures, the foreign investor benefits from the
local connections and knowledge of the local partner not readily available to him.57
3.7- Disadvantages of Joint Ventures58
(1)- Joint Decision-Making: Joint control of an enterprise obviously means joint
decision making and many top executives find it very difficult to share decision making,
an aspect of management which they consider to be their most important prerogative.
It is however, important to note that it is not only the problem of sharing decision
making but the question of management style itself. These problems are magnified when
the partners' own pattern of organisation and management style and the degree to which
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decision making is centralised or decentralised, differ. This can lead to serious conflict
and stress between the joint venture partners and managers which is partly brought about
by differing time-scales of decision maldng.59
(2)- Conflict of Interest: In any joint venture, conflicts of interest arise between
the partners and between the interests of one or other participant and those of the joint
venture. For instance, a partner may look for benefits that would come to him rather
than to the joint venture.60 (This situation, as we shall see in the next section is
especially true of the Japanese joint ventures in other countries). Moreover, one should
also note that joint ventures are often staffed, at least initially, by seconding the
employees of the partners, and naturally the problem of dual loyalities can easily arise.
Finally, business and the world as a whole are dynamic. The factors that may have
been attractive at the outset and had brought the partners together in the first place may
lose their appeal or disappear all together, or other unforseen situations may arise. This
could clearly lead to conflicts of interests between the partners in the joint venture.'
4.0- Japan's Foreign Investments
Prior to World War II, except for a limited experience during the colonization of
Korea, Taiwan, and Northeast China (Manchuria), Japanese firms had little foreign
operations experience. During the war quite a few Japanese had opportunities to do
business in South East Asian countries in conjunction with military expansion [that is
apart from the normal trading activities].62 Therefore, it was not until the late
1960s/early 1970s that Japanese foreign investment really took off. (For details of
Japanese foreign investments after the war see Chapter 3).
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4.1- Theories on the Uniqueness of Japanese Foreign Investment
Some researchers like K. Kojima (1973) and T. Ozawa (1979) have presented
theories that the Japanese style of foreign investment in the post-war is fundamentally
different from that of Western (mainly American) foreign investment. These theories all
begin with the argument that the "monopolistic theory" or "specific advantage" theory of
foreign investment (discussed in section 2 above) do not explain Japanese foreign direct
investment. Instead, both Kojima and Ozawa present their own theories called
"macroeconomic" theories of foreign direct investment which they claim explain
exclusively the Japanese foreign direct investment.
4.1.1- Kojima's Theory
It was Professor Kiyoshi Kojima who first proposed the "macroeconomic" theory
of foreign direct investment to explain the Japanese style of FDI. Kojima's basic theorem
states " Direct foreign investment should originate in the investing country's
comparatively disadvantaged (or marginal) industry (or activity), which is potentially a
comparatively advantaged industry in the host country. This may be called, in brief, 'the
principle of complementing comparative-advantage pattern' or 'the principle of DFI
originating in the marginal (including sub-marginal) industry'. It63
Kojima argues that this type of foreign investment is "trade oriented" in that it
results in expansion of international trade as each country concentrates on the type of
industries in which she has a comparative advantage, and exports the products of these
industries and in exchange imports the products of industries in which she is
comparatively disadvantaged (international division of labour).
Professor Kojima claims that Japanese foreign direct investment in the 1960s-70s1
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followed this pattern in that Japanese firms invested abroad in industries in which she
had become uncompetitive. These included labour intensive industries (like textiles,
because of increasing shortage of labour in the 1960s), and natural resources
development or processing industries in which, due to lack of indigenous resources,
Japan was becoming almost totally dependent upon foreign supplies.
Moreover, Kojima argues that the American type of foreign investment is "anti-
trade-oriented" as it results in contraction of international trade. This occurs because
American firms undertake foreign investment in industries in which the U.S. has a
comparative advantage and the host country does not (technology intensive industries).
He calls his own theory the "macroeconomic" approach, and others like Vernon and
Hymer the "business administration" approach to foreign direct investment. He reasons
that such a classification is because the former contemplates the wider economic
implications of foreign investment for both the home and investing countries, while the
latter considers only absolute costs and profits of foreign investment from the view point
of multinationals.
4.1.2- Ozawa's Theory
Ozawa's theory, which is essentially an extension of Kojima's theory, is as follows:
" First, the marginally efficient firms that must exit from the contracting
sector are most likely to find it much easier to set up their own line of
business overseas, where factor endowments are more favourable for them
than at home (that is to cross a national border) than to re-establish
themselves de novo in the expanding sector at home ( that is to enter a
new industry). ... Moreover, the macroeconomic forces of international
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trade exert pressure for overseas production in a more suitable factor-
endowments environment on the marginally efficient firms and not on the
most efficient firms. In contrast, the monopolistic theory, the leading firms
(the "technostructures" and "product-life-cycle" firms) are the first to move
overseas.' 164
Ozawa's theory is based on the classical growth theory, the Ricardo-Hicksian trap of
industrial stagnation. 65 According to this theory, an industrial economy cannot expand
indefinitely as sooner or later it will encounter "irremovable scarcities" of key factors such
as land and labour. Ozawa argues that Japan reached this growth barrier in the mid-
1960s by experiencing labour shortages and rising wage rates, and that for Japan foreign
direct investment is an escape from industrial stagnation brought about by increasing
scarcities of natural resources and labour. He further elaborates that this mode of escape
is chosen by collective will or government as the country is committed to re-organising
her industrial structure. For evidence to support his point, he cites the fact that the
Japanese government has used various subsidies to encourage Japanese firms to invest
abroad.66 Finally, Ozawa infers that " one major characteristic of Japanese
multinationals is that they are strongly influenced by the macroeconomic factors of their
own economy and by those of the host countries."67
4.2- Other Theories of Japanese Style of Foreign Investment
The above two theories are, however, not advocated by other Japanese
researchers. Yoshi Tsurumi (1976) and Michael Y. Yoshino (1976), for example, accept
the applicability of "specific-advantage" or "product-life-cycle" theories of foreign
investment to Japanese overseas investments. According to them, Japanese foreign direct
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investment is undertaken for either defensive or aggressive reasons. Such investments,
they point out, are carried out by Japanese companies to expand their markets or to
protect them from protectionism, to reach economies of scale, or to realise specific
advantages accumulated by the parent company. These are really the same reasons used
to explain the American foreign investment, and any apparent difference, they conclude
can be explained by the late development of Japan as an industrial country.68
Other researchers of foreign investment like Chung H. Lee (1980 and 1984),69
H.W. Arndt (1974) 7°, and Peter J. Buckley (1983 and 1985) 71 , however, reject Kojima's
and Ozawa's theories as having no proper theoretical foundation or empirical evidence
to support them. They also maintain that there are no fundamental differences between
Japanese and American foreign direct investments, and any likely divergences are due
to the late industrialisation of Japan and hence her delayed entry into the international
investment scene.72
There is, however, some evidence supporting the Ozawa's proposition.
Ballon(1973) 73 states that contrary to other industrial nations where foreign investments
are largely a matter of corporate policy, in Japan they appear more closely related to a
national policy in line with the "Japan Inc" syndrome.74
 He adds that MITI [in the
1960's] developed a policy called "resources diplomacy" which stressed the vital need for
Japan to guarantee her own supply of resources, while respecting the desires of the less
developed world: its main supplier. According to Ballon, the term "diplomacy" makes it
abundantly clear that the investment in resources development cannot be determined
only as a corporate objective, but it must be integrated in some national policy.75
Moreover, Ballon adds that Japan is also interested in the "international division
of labour" which aims at making use of rich labour resources in the developing countries,
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while at the same time improving the Japanese industrial structure.'
4.3- The Motives of Japanese Foreign Investment
In the last section, different motives for Japanese foreign direct investment were
analyzed from a theoretical perspective. In this section, such motives will be considered
from a practical viewpoint.
As discussed above, Ballon (1973) states that Japanese foreign investment, in line
with "international division of labour" pursues two objectives: search for cheaper labour,
especially in the neighbouring countries, and securing a steady source of raw materials
by establishing processing at or near the exploration site.77
The need to expand overseas markets and secure a steady supply of raw materials
as the main motives of Japanese foreign investment can be clearly seen in response to
surveys carried out by the Export-Import Bank of Japan. In the 1968 survey, only 4% of
"productive" investors (i.e, excluding commercial and financial investors) gave dividends
as the primary aim of their investment. 78
 The main aims stated by manufacturing
investors were, in order of frequency, the development of markets, the protection of
markets, export of components and materials, export to third countries, and export of
machinery. The Bank's 1970 survey showed 71% of investors imported most of their main
materials from Japan. Of extractive investors (agriculture, fisheries, and mining) 71%
gave import to Japan as their main aim in 1968, and this had risen to 78% in 1970.79
Moreover, in the 1968 survey, a large proportion of extractive investors mentioned both
price and security gains as their main motive in undertaking foreign investment.80
Clark concludes that profits from overseas investments (which he states are "trade
oriented"), are realised indirectly by the Japanese investor, in the form of greater security
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and/or price differences in the exports or imports secured. He elaborates that the
Japanese investors' desire to seek much of the return from their investment through
exports or imports can explain their preference for joint venture with foreign partners.81
This perceived Japanese preference for joint ventures will be the topic of discussion in
the next section.
4.4- Forms of Japanese Foreign Direct Investment
As already mentioned, Clark believes that the trade orientation of Japanese
foreign direct investments has an important impact on the form of her investment
overseas. He describes American and (to a lesser extent) British motives for foreign
investments as seeking a financial (dividend) return from the capital and/or skills they
provide, which they are reluctant to share with others. This could, according to him,
explain the high proportion of equity they hold in their overseas investment projects.'
The Japanese share in the equity of their investment projects, however, tends to
be comparatively low. One reason could be that foreign ownership of companies and
assets in the developing countries (where in the 1960s and 1970s most of the Japanese
investments were located) are or were restricted. But even in countries where there were
no restrictions on foreign ownership, the Japanese preferred joint ventures to wholly or
majority owned subsidiaries."
The 1970 survey by the Export-Import Bank of Japan referred to earlier, showed
that [in the 1960s] only 18% of projects under study were fully Japanese owned, and in
41% of cases the Japanese share of the equity was less than 50%.
Based on these findings, Clark argues "Provided the share of the Japanese investor
in the project is sufficient to give him control over the project's purchasing and/or sales
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policies, he hopes through trade gains to draw a return for his contribution to the
venture. And it is in the nature of this contribution that the essential difference between
Japanese and the more traditional forms of direct investment can be found."85
Furthermore, Mason (1980) argues that in comparison with the United States and
Europe, Japan has superior technology in low technology industries and that in
comparison with less developed countries, Japan has superior access to the markets of
advanced countries (including herself). These advantages, according to Mason, are short-
lived, and can explain the frequent use of joint ventures by Japanese investors.86
Lee (1980) also hypothesises that the possession of the location-specific marketing
advantage by Japanese investors is a major factor in Japanese foreign direct investment
in Korea and explains their preference for joint ventures."
Finally, Ballon (1973) expounds that the low level of self confidence of Japanese
investors to undertake foreign direct investment on their own can explain their
preference for joint ventures. He elaborates:" After all, exports are something that can
be directed from inside Japan; investments are an altogether different matter. The
consequence is then that, to the surprise of outsiders, Japanese corporations display a
definite preference for joint ventures rather than wholly-owned subsidiaries."88 Ballon
adds "The Japanese goverment is also advocating joint venture, preferably the 50-50
capital participation, as the ideal form of overseas investment, half local, half
Japanese."89
5.0- The Application of the Above Theories to the Case Study
As stated in the introduction to the thesis, one of the aims of this study is to
analyse the factors and reasons for the establishment of the Iran Japan Petrochemical
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Company. It was also proposed to analyse the factors which led to the dissolution of the
company.
To do so, the theoretical framework set up in Section 3.0 and to a lesser extent
in Section 4.0 shall be applied. More specifically, it was stated that "in order to
understand why some joint ventures are successful and some are not, one must look into
the strategy of the parent firms, the reasons for entering into the joint venture in the first
place, the firms' organisational characteristics as well as their industries. Success cannot
be measured in terms of stability since the purpose of a joint venture is not to last, but
rather to contribute to the fulfilment of the goals of its parents. Therefore, one must look
carefully into what actually goes on in the process of managing the joint venture".9°
In the remainder of this study, the above theory will be applied to the case study
in the following manner:
In Chapters Two to Six, an attempt will be made to determine what factors led
to the establishment of the petrochemical joint venture between the Mitsui Group of
Japan and the National Petrochemical Company of Iran.
It is widely believed that the heavy dependence of Japan on imported oil,
particularly from the Middle East, and the peculiar character of the Japanese oil
industry, atypically influenced by foreign petroleum companies, were the major factors
in the Japanese business interests and the government support for the establishment of
the joint venture with Iran. Therefore, in Chapter Two a detailed analysis of the
charactristics of the Japanese domestic oil industry and her energy policy in the pre- and
post-war periods will be presented. Chapters Two and Three will discuss how Japan
became dependent upon imported oil from the Middle East, particularly Iran, in the
post-war period.
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Chapter Four will argue that Iran's aspirations for industrialisation and economic
and social development played the key role in her decision to establish the petrochemical
joint venture with Japan. That chapter and Chapter Six will discuss the proposition that
the government's and the National Petrochemical Company's strategy to establish an
export oriented petrochemical industry was also a factor in the Iranians' preference for
a joint venture with Japan and particularly with Mitsui Bussan; one of Japan's largest
trading companies.
Chapter Five will contend that it was Mitsui Bussan's desire to strengthen its oil
business that enticed the company's top management to enter into the petrochemical
joint venture. Moreover, it is believed that the trading opportunities created by the joint
venture were also important factors in Mitsui's involvement in the joint venture.
In Chapters Five and Six, the historical development, and managerial and
organisational aspects of Mitsui Bussan and the National Petrochemical Company of Iran
(NPC) will be discussed in detail as they are considered to be of great relevance to the
management of the joint venture itself.
In Chapter Seven, the history of the establishment of the Iran Japan
Petrochemical Company from 1968 to its dissolution in 1990 will be presented. The aim
of that chapter is to find out what actually went on in the management and organisation
of the joint venture and also other external factors in its two decades of life which may
have contributed to its failure.
Finally, in Chapter Eight, a short discussion on the characteristics of the
petrochemical industry will be given. Moreover, a detailed analysis of the factors which
are believed to have led to the failure of the joint venture will be presented. It shall be
argued that the changes in the strategies of the parents (Mitsui Bussan and NPC) and
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the failure of the joint venture to fulfil the goals of its parents were the major factors in
its eventual dissolution.
6.0- Conclusion
In this chapter various theories on the motives of foreign direct investment were
discussed and the benefits and drawbacks of such investments from the standpoint of
developing countries were examined. Next, various definitions of joint venture were
presented, and causes of the establishment of this form of foreign investment were
analyzed. The management and stability of joint venture were also discussed.
Next, the Japanese style of foreign investment was analyzed. Various theories
which postulate that the Japanese style of foreign direct investment is different from that
of the U.S. were discussed. In addition, the opinion of other researchers who reject these
theories and believe that the behaviour of Japan as a foreign investor is not unique were
briefly analyzed. Lastly the motives of Japanese firms and their government for
undertaking and supporting direct foreign investment, and the reasons for Japanese
investors' preference for joint ventures were examined.
Finally, the applicability of the theories on the causes of establishment of joint
ventures and their failure to this case study was explained. The next chapter will discuss
how the dependence of Japan on imported oil and the peculiar characteristic of the
Japanese oil industry became a factor in the establishment of UPC.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE JAPANESE OIL INDUSTRY
1.0- INTRODUCTION
It is widely believed that the paucity of indigenous energy resources, particularly
oil, and the heavy dependence of Japan on Middle Eastern oil and Western petroleum
companies for imports were the main factors in inducing the Japanese government to
support the petrochemical joint venture between the Mitsui Group and Iran. It was
hoped that this would help secure a stable supply of oil from Iran, Japan's biggest
supplier of oil in the mid-1960s.
The Japanese oil industry is the most fragmented, in the sense that there are
almost no integerated oil companies in Japan which are active both in upstream and
downstream businesses. Moreover, the oil industry is the only sector of the Japanese
economy which is dominated by foreign capital. As a result of this situation, successive
Japanese governments (especially MITI) and some business leaders have, for a long time,
tried to regain control of the industry by consolidating it, plus acquiring access to
overseas sources of oil.
It was due to these considerations that the Japanese government provided
financial assistance to the petrochemical joint venture. This chapter will therefore,
examine why Japan has become so heavily dependent on imported oil and will also
discuss the factors which have been influential in shaping the Japanese oil industry.
In order to comprehend the present Japanese oil industry, one needs to know the
history of the Japanese energy industries in the pre-war and Occupation periods. Next
section will, thererefore, look at the Japanese coal, electric and oil industries in the pre-
war years.
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2.0- The Energy Industries in Pre-War Japan
2.1- The Coal Industry
There were three main sources of energy in pre-war Japan: coal, electric, and oil.
Coal was by far the most important of the three, supplying up to 66.2% (1940) of her
primary energy requirements (see Table 2.4). In fact, coal was central to the Japanese
economy for the first fifty years of her industrialisation.
Coal mining began in Japan more than two hundred years ago in Kyushu, and by
the early 19th century Japan had, by the standards of the day, an advanced mining
industry. 1 After the Meiji Restoration of 1868, the government initiated the development
of the coal and metal mining industries and coal exports became a major source of
foreign exchange for the new government. During the 1880s, however,the government,
largely because of budgetory problems, sold off all mines to a few big firms. These mines
which were very profitable helped companies like Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and Sumitomo to
diversify into new businesses and become zaibatsu 2 conglomerates. The biggest of these
mines, the Miike coal mine in Kyushu was sold to the Mitsui group, and according to
Shibagaki Kazuo, "The mining company was the second source of profits after the Mitsui
Bussan Trading Company". 3 The use of mines as a means to accumulate capital for use
in other parts of the zaibatsu had implications for the coal mining industry well into the
postwar period. The mine owners were only interested in the mines as an extractive
industry, and so did not invest their profits in new mining techniques, or advanced
machinery. The mine operators relied mainly on very low waged labour, as well as
market restricting measures to increase their profits. This meant that coal consumers,
principally, electric utilities and steel producers, had to pay high prices for their required
coal. This, coupled with the fact that the Japanese coal was of low quality, persuaded the
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Japanese government and business (including zaibatsu) to seek large supplies of high
quality coal from other Asian countries. The paucity of indigenous energy resources was,
therefore, a major factor in the colonizing of these countries before and during the
Second World War.
2.2- The Electric Industry
Electric power was first introduced into Japan by an engineer who set up the
Tokyo Electric Company in 1883. The company produced electricity for lighting only
using coal as fuel. The engineer, who had the backing of the bureaucracy, failed to win
the support of the zaibatsu, and as a result, the development of electric power was left
to independent entrepreneurs and bureaucrats, a pattern which continued into the post
war period (see Table 2.4). The first electric power installations were coal fired, but
hydro-electricity gradually became more important, supplying up to 32.7% of Japan's
primary supply in 1945. 4 The hydro-electric facilities relied on Japan's only abundant
natural resource: water, to generate electricity. From the start there was intense
competition between various electric companies which forced many of them into
bankruptcy. By 1928 five large generating companies emerged which dominated the
industry, although competition remained fierce between them. By the 1930s, the growing
importance of electricity to the military, especially the munition factories, and the need
to provide electricity to villages induced the bureaucracy to seek a stable and inexpensive
supply of electricity through centralisation and state control. The government's earlier
attempts to control the industry met the fierce resistance of the owners. By the start of
the China war in 1937, however, a new impetus was given to the need to control the
industry. In March 1938, the Diet enacted a law which led to the establishment of
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Nippon Hassoden ICabushild (Hassoden), a state controlled but privately owned company
which generated power and sold it to the transmission and distribution companies.
Furthermore, in September 1941, electric power transmission and distribution companies
were similarly centralised into nine regional privately owned and state controlled
corporations known as Haiden.5 This pattern of private ownership and public control
continued through the war and the Occupation up to the early 1950's when under the
direction of the SCAP, the industry's control reverted back to the private sector.
2.3-The Petroleum Industry
The Japanese oil industry was established in 1869, about ten years after the birth
of the industry in the U.S.A. when the Meiji government invited some American
geologists to prospect for oil in Japan. In 1888, after a few years of failure, the Nippon
Oil Company, established by an entrepreneur, discovered oil in Amase, Niigata, and
Japan's first commercial production started in 1891.6
In the first few years of the oil industry, many companies were established in
Japan but most of them went bankrupt due to intense competition and under-
capitalization. One very important factor which distinguished the Japanese oil industry
from the other two energy industries, coal and electric, or any other industry for that
matter, was that the oil business was from the beginning dominated by foreign companies
and capital.
Two international oil companies, Standard Oil of New York (Stanvac) 7, and
Samuel Trading Company (later becoming a part of Royal Dutch Shell), started to sell
oil products in Japan around 1893. As the imported oil products were cheaper than the
domestic ones, the Japanese oil companies asked for protection and the government
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introduced tariffs on imported oil. The foreign companies responded by setting up their
own exploration, production, and refining arms in Japan. This move caused concern
among the bureaucracy and some of the industry's leaders, and they appealed for the
protection of the domestic industry. Their efforts were, however, not successful, and the
competition continued. Furthermore, the largest oil companies, namely Nippon Oil,
Hoden (a domestic firm), Standard, and the Rising Sun ( the Japanese subsidiary of Shell
Oil) made many attempts to reach some form of sales agreement, but their efforts bore
no fruit. A stable arrangement was impossible because the demand was increasing by
leaps and bounds, as oil was becoming more and more important for lighting, road and
sea transport, and to the military and particularly the Navy.
The oil industry differed from the other two energy industries in other respects
as well. First, it didn't play a major part in the Japanese economy in the pre-war period,
only supplying up to 10.4% of Japan's primary energy requirements in the 1930s (see
Table 2.4). For many years oil was a symbol of modernity, rather than an economic asset,
to be exploited by energy consuming industries. After the First World War, however,
when the Japanese Navy started to convert its fleet to oil powered ships, it became a
strategic commodity, and it (the Navy) became the biggest consumer of oil in the 1930s.
Petroleum had become so vital to the Navy that it went into production on its own in
1921 by building a refinery in Tolcuyama. Total demand, (Army, Navy, and civilian) for
petroleum products rose from around 2.5 million kilo litres in the early 1930s to 5.4
million kilo litres in 1937.
Secondly, only 10 to 15 percent of Japan's petroleum was supplied by indigenous
sources, and hence, imports were far more important than domestic production (see
Table 2.1). Most of this oil was imported from the United States, with the residual from
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the Dutch East Indies. The crude oil and oil products were imported either by the Rising
Sun Petroleum Company and Standard Vacuum Corporation (Stanvac), and sold directly
to consumers, or were sold by these two companies and other U.S independents to
various Japanese oil companies.
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Table 2.1: Domestic Oil production and Imports, 1930-1960
(1,000 Id)
Year Domestic
Production
Imported
Crude
Imported
Products
Total Imports
1930 317 570 1,515 2,085
1935 351 1,322 2,911 4,243
1940 331 2292 1,922 4,214
1941 289 694 197 891
1942 263 560 6 566
1943 271 980 4 984
1944 267 209 - 209
1945 243 - 15 15
1946 213 - 151 151
1947 203 - 1,178 1,178
1948 179 - * *
1949 218 24 2,010 2,034
1950 328 1,541 844 2,385
1951 372 2,844 1,172 4,016
1952 339 4,432 1.022 5,454
1953 334 5,748 2,967 8,715
1954 338 7,440 2,959 10,399
1955 354 8,553 2,386 10,939
1956 350 11,438 1,900 13,338
1957 361 14,833 3,427 18,260
1958 410 16,311 1,986 18,297
1959 454 21,621 1,948 23,469
1960 593 31,116 3,238 34,354
ceJapan Statisticalearboo r me ster s ice, ,pp. . ;19b1,p.ZU.i.
Notes : *= not available. For 1941-1946 imported products includes only gasoline,
kerosene, and lubricating oil.
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As a result of the combination of these factors, the need to control the flow of
imported oil, as well as the overseas sources of oil in neighbouring Asian countries,
particularly the Dutch East Indies became apparent to the Japanese planners and the
military, and the latter became the most vociferous voice calling for the consolidation
and state control of the industry.' The military and the bureaucracy and the Japanese
oilmen were very concerned with the domination of the industry by the two international
oil majors which were supplying well over 50% of the country's oil demand. Their efforts
to reduce, or contain the two companies' share of the Japanese market met fierce
resistance from the two which, from time to time, sought the protection and help of their
respective governments. Furthermore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was fearful
of an oil embargo by the United States, tried to restrain the actions of the military and
other sections of the bureaucracy.
Due to the intense competition, many smaller Japanese oil companies went out
of business, and by the mid-1920s, the oil sales business had been narrowed down to 6
companies, only some of which refined in Japan. These companies included: Rising Sun,
Stanvac, Mitsubishi Shoji, Mitsui Bussan, Nippon Oil, and Ogura Oil Company.
More important than the consolidation of the industry was the recognition of the
fact by the Japanese officials and the oilmen that the domestic reserves were very small
compared to the newly discovered oil fields in the Middle East, U.S.A., Latin America,
Russia, and the Dutch East Indies.
Until 1925, the government's petroleum policy for the civilian economy was
passive, and largely ineffectual.9 In that year, however, the Navy established a study
group for petroleum policy (Sekiyu Chosakai) which was mainly concerned with military
planning. One year later, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI) created its Fuel
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Investigation Committee in response to demands from the Japanese oil industry for a
national fuels policy. Moreover, the goverment started to subsidise domestic oil
exploration and production, which stimulated great activity. These efforts, nevertheless,
failed to increase domestic production, for the simple reason that Japan was not oil rich.
An observation which is important to this case study is that the Mitsubishi
zaibatsu, through a capital tie-up, became a 50% partner of the Associated Oil Company
(later Tidewater Oil Company, then Getty) in 1924, and then in 1931 they established
an equally owned joint venture called the Mitsubishi Oil Company, which was the only
Japanese oil company to have foreign capital participation before the war. This set an
important precedent for the Japanese petroleum industry. Mitsubishi Oil imported and
refined oil in Japan, and, therefore, had a major presence in the industry before the war.
The Associated company's role was to supply crude and technology to the joint venture.
In contrast, the Mitsui zaibatsu refused to enter the oil refining business, and
instead concentrated on importing and selling oil products in Japan. This was probably
due to the fact that the Mitsui group was the biggest producer and importer of coal in
Japan. So it either did not see the need to have a large oil company, or it considered oil
as a threat to its traditional and most profitable business and decided to concentrate on
the coal business.
This state of affairs had major implications for the two groups, and is a factor in
the postwar weakness of the Mitsui Group in the oil business vis-a-vis its long time rival,
the Mitsubishi Group, which is a major player in today's Japanese oil industry. (There
are other factors responsible for the post-war weakness of the Mitsui Group in the oil
business, namely the dissolution and fragmentation of the zaibatsu by the SCAP during
the occupation, and this will be discussed in Chapter Five.)
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As mentioned earlier, the efforts of the Japanese bureaucracy and oil executives
in the 1920s to bring some order into the oil market, and to increase the domestic
production largely failed, and the intense competition between oil companies, particularly
from the two international oil giants, almost wiped out the profits of the domestic oil
firms. The MCI officials and the oil industry leaders called for the regulation of the
industry and an end to the excessive competition, especially from the foreign companies.
Imperial Navy, which was the biggest consumer of oil, became yet again concerned about
the security of supplies and the domination of the industry by foreigners. So in early 1933
it established the inter-ministerial National Oil Policy Council which was charged to
examine the disorder in the market and foreign domination of the Japanese oil industry
and market. 1 ° The Council which was attached to the MCI's Mining Bureau produced
two alternative plans:
The first plan called for the nationalisation of the entire oil industry, that would
give the state a monopoly on all crude production, refining, trade, and sales, which in
turn it would then delegate to a semi-private, semi-public corporation. The most
controversial part of the plan was the call for the expropriation of all the assets of the
foreign oil companies in Japan.'
The second plan, which was much less radical than the first one, gave the MCI
the power to licence crude oil imports, refinery construction, stockpiling, and other
upstream and commercial activities related to oil. It also provided the MCI with funds
to subsidize oil supplies from fields outside the Anglo-American influence.12
The two plans were debated within the bureaucracy and with the private sector.
The MOFA, which was worried that the first plan may lead foreign governments to
introduce an oil embargo and other economic and diplomatic measures against Japan,
47
opposed the first plan. Furthermore, some officials within the MCI and the military
expressed same concerns over the possibility of an oil embargo, when the country was
not prepared for war.13
The debate finally led to the introduction of the Petroleum Industry Law (PLL),
based on the second plan, which was passed by the Diet in March 1934.
As discussed earlier, an important aim of the Pit was to limit the dominance of
the two foreign oil firms, Stanvac, and the Rising Sun. The law tried to achieve this by
requiring all oil companies to have stockpiles of oil based on 50% of the previous years
imports, and, furthermore, it attempted to reduce the market share of the two
international firms by introducing quotas. The first measure was especially harsh for the
two, as they imported 100% of their oil.
The two international oil companies strongly objected to these two provisions of
the PIL, and in order to keep up the pressure on the Japanese, they tried to entice the
American independent oil firms into not selling crude oil to Japan and her colonies and,
furthermore, sought the help of their governments. The former action did not achieve
any results, although the American government did ask the Japanese for the protection
of the Stanvac interests but refused to make any threats regarding an oil embargo as
requested by the company. This intervention by the American government on behalf of
an oil company highlighted to the Japanese the strategic importance of oil and the power
of the international oil companies.14
As a result of their efforts and intervention by their governments, the two foreign
oil companies succeeded in mitigating those two harsh [in their view] measures of the
PIL, namely, the oil stockpile requirement, and the quota adjustments 15 . Therefore, the
Japanese bureaucracy and oil industry leaders did not succeed in curbing the influence
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of foreign oil companies, and the two international giants managed, despite the PIL, to
maintain their presence and profits in the Japanese market.
The Petroleum Industry Law, nonetheless, succeeded in consolidating domestic
oil refining, which by the end of the war, comprised eight major firms, most of which are
today Japan's most important oil companies. These firms were: Showa Oil, Maruzen Oil,
Daikyo Oil, Nippon Oil, Koa Oil, Mitsubishi Oil, Toa Nenryo Kogyo, and Nippon Kogyo
(Mining) Companies. (Note the conspicuous absent of Mitsui in the list). The PIL and
other laws and interventions of the state before and during the war also helped to
consolidate (although with less success) the transport, storage, and distribution parts of
the downstream sector of the oil industry.
With the start of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the Japanese government took
steps to encourage domestic oil exploration and production. The most important of these
steps was the passing of the Imperial Fuel Industry company Law in 1937, which gave it
the power to subsidise the development of domestic oil reserves. However, it soon
became clear that this alone was not going to stimulate exploration activity at a
satisfactory level, and a more radical action was needed. So in July 1940, the Teikoku
Petroleum Company Law was passed which established The Imperial Oil Resources
development Company (Teikoku Sekiyu Shingen Kaihatsu KK). All of the largest
exploration firms which had not had much success in oil exploration partly due to the
shortage of public funds joined the new company which guaranteed dividends at 6% .16
But these companies were still not prepared to accept the formal consolidation of the
industry.
The government further tried to spur the production of synthetic oil and the Navy
had already started research in this area. Nevertheless, these measures largely failed as
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domestic oil production increased only slightly, and synthetic fuel development bore no
significant results (its production by the end of the War stood only at 500 barrels a
day). 17 These efforts, however, sharpened the officials' and the businessmen's feeling
that the paucity of the indigenous resources was a threat to national security. These
failures further persuaded the military to seek overseas sources of oil.
Japanese fears over their oil susceptibility were well founded, as the British and
the American officials, with the participation of Shell and Stanvac, had discussed the
imposition of an oil embargo on Japan in 1934. However, the Americans were wary
about imposing an oil embargo on the Japanese as they feared that this action may force
the latter to seize the Dutch East Indies. The first restrictions on oil sales to Japan were
introduced in July 1940, and required licences for aviation fuel and scrap metals. The
move was interpreted as an attempt to check Japan's economic and military power. The
Americans, nevertheless, allowed the two oil companies to make new contracts for the
sale of oil to Japan in the autumn of 1940 and tensions were reduced, as that time few
people in Japan, especially the Navy, felt ready for war. In August 1941, however, the
U.S. officials who believed that the Japanese were about to invade the Dutch East
Indies, introduced a defacto embargo against the latter by erecting bureaucratic barriers
and freezing funds. The Japanese, who believed that oil was the main issue, decided that
war was the only way to gain access to oil, and so invaded the Dutch East Indies and at
the same time attacked Pearl Harbour, and so the Pacific War began.18
As Takehiro Sagami, a former vice-minister at the Japanese Ministry of Finance
has observed:
"our first oil shock was in 1940, not in 1973. At that time America stopped
shipment of heavy oil because of what we had done in Manchuria and
Shanghai. The U.S. boycott turned around the Navy that had opposed war
with America, and forced it to move for Indonesia. From that lesson, we
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learnt that an oil cut-off may have unforeseen political consequences....and
may mean the difference between life and death."19
With the imposition of the oil embargo and the start of the Pacific war, anxiety
over the security of oil supplies rose dramatically among the Japanese officials and oil
industry leaders. So in September 1941, after intense debate and cajoling between the
MCI and Nippon oil, the largest domestic oil company, an agreement was reached
between the two and other domestic producers over the creation of a new national policy
company. As a result of this agreement, the Imperial Oil Company (Teikol.0 Sekiyu
K.K.) was established in September. The company was owned equally by the state and
the private sector, and Nippon Oil held nearly two-thirds of the private sector's allotment
(which allowed Nippon Oil to dominate it). The new company absorbed the assets of the
Imperial Oil Resources Development Company and the production departments of all
major oil companies.
The reason for the separation of oil production from other activities of oil
companies, and their integration in to Imperial Oil was that the oil firms were strongly
opposed to a merger of their downstream business, which would have meant the total
loss of control and their independence to the state, and possibly nationalisation. They
were willing, however, to allow Imperial Oil to absorb their upstream business as, after
the embargo, there was no oil to be produced, apart from the meagre domestic reserves,
and there was no crude oil available from international suppliers either. The new
arrangement allowed the Japanese oil companies to concentrate on the profitable
downstream business, while at the same time transferring all the risk of exploration and
production to the state, especially as Imperial oil was offering guaranteed dividends,
exemption from corporate taxes, and other incentives.
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The Imperial Oil Company was, however, effective in achieving its raison d'etre,
i.e. the consolidation of domestic and colonial exploration and production. It controlled
95% of domestic production from the beginning of its operations, and this rose to 98%
by the war's end.2°
The Imperial Oil Company's creation had, however, a far more enduring influence
on the Japanese oil industry. It formalised the existing structure in the Japanese oil
industry, i.e. the separation of upstream and downstream activities. This separation still
exists today, and is believed to be the major, if not the only, cause of the weakness of the
Japanese oil industry.
It needs to be stated at this juncture that there are other equally important factors
responsible for the separation of the Japanese oil industry. First, Japan has had no
indigenous oil reserves of any significance. Second, Japan was a late starter in the
exploitation of overseas oil reserves (beginning with the colonisation of Southeast Asia
in the late 1930s) as compared to other industrialised nations. Therefore, the Japanese
oil companies had no opportunity or reason to enter exploration or production
(upstream) in a massive way as did the oil companies of other industrialised nations like
the U.S.A (where the oil industry was born in the mid-1890s and had huge domestic
reserves as well as access to oilfields in Latin America) or Britain and France who
exploited the oil reserves of Iran and Algeria in the early 20th century (see Chapter Four
for the case of British Petroleum in Iran). These factors, plus the fact that Japanese oil
companies could buy as much crude oil as they needed from the Western petroleum
companies (mainly American) in the pre-war period (before the oil embargo) and in
post-war years, can explain the separation of downstream and upstream activities of the
Japanese oil industry.
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2.4- The Energy Industries During the War
The Japanese energy industries were put under heavy pressure during the war
years as they literally had to drive the engines of the military and the industries supplying
it.
The coal industry received the greatest pressure as it had to meet an increasing
demand regardless of its rapidly depleting resource base. Under the banner "Coal is the
source for planes, warships, and bullets", domestic coal production was increased during
the war, but at the price of lowering ultimate recovery rates. Coal production peaked in
the 1941-43 period. However, as many miners were taken to the battle fronts, and no
new investment was made, and tools, due to wide-spread shortages had became scarce,
coal production dropped in 1944, and plummeted in 1945 (see Table 2.2).
The electric power industry fared rather better than coal during the war, although
thermal power stations became mainly inoperative due to intensive bombings and neglect
of the equipment. But hydroelectric sites which were located in isolated rural areas
largely escaped the destruction of the war. Therefore, the industry was able to meet the
demands of the military and industry for electricity during the war years.
The Japanese petroleum industry, however, faced major problems during the war
which had long term implications for the industry:
First, domestic production which had peaked at 351,000 kilo litres in 1935,
dropped to 243,000 Id in 1945 (see Table 2.1) due to depleting oilfields and shortage of
personnel. The shortage of workforce occurred as oil engineers and workers were
transferred to the richer oilfields of Southeast Asia. 21 However, as the sinking of oil
tankers and ships by the Allied forces had greatly reduced the capacity of the Japanese
merchant fleet, an acute dearth of oil supplies (among other raw materials) developed
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in Japan. So, from the end of 1943, the Japanese desperately attempted, with little
success, to revive domestic oil production. Similarly, their endeavour to develop oilfields
in Manchuria, Sakhalin, Formosa, and other territories nearer to Japan suffered from the
same problems of transport and did not help to satisfy Japan's oil demands. Inadequate
supplies of oil became so serious towards the end of the war, that the Japanese Navy was
forced into extracting flammable pitch from pine-tree roots under the slogan, "Two
hundred pine roots will keep a plane in the air for an hour".22
Dearth of oil supplies had handicapped the military to the point that training for
pilots had almost stopped by the end of the war, and furthermore, more and more
strategic decisions were being based on the availability of petroleum rather than military
or political considerations. The lack of adequate oil supplies had become the Achilles
Heel of Japan, as had long been recognised by both the Japanese and the Americans.
The nightmare of the pre-war Japanese planners had come true: Japanese power was
only as great as its supply of petroleum- and that could be withheld by the Americans.23
As Table 2.1 clearly demonstrates, after the imposition of the oil embargo by the United
States in 1941, imports of crude oil and petroleum products started to fall sharply, and
came to an almost complete stop in 1945. This fact was not lost on the American
occupiers and officials who realised that the best way to curb Japanese militarism and
expansion in Asia was to control her oil supplies. (This point will be discussed in more
detail in future sections).
The second problem that the Japanese oil industry faced during the war was the
immense damage inflicted upon domestic refineries by U.S. bombings and the general
disrepair of facilities. Oil refineries, which had been identified by the American as prime
contributors to the Japanese war making machine, were particularly and heavily bombed,
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so much so that American officials in charge of reparations found no refinery suitable
for dismantling and transferring to war affected countries in Southeast Asia.
Finally, some statistics may help demonstrate the severe shortage of energy in
Japan at the end of the war and beginning of the Occupation. By the war's end coal
production had dropped to 36%, electric power to 66%, and oil imports to a meagre
0.004% of their pre-war peaks. 24 This severe scarcity of energy exasperated the harsh
economic conditions which existed at the end of the war, and clearly, the revival of the
Japanese economy was impossible without first finding a solution to the energy crisis.
Table 2.2: Coal Production in Japan, 1930-1960
(1,000 metric tons)
Year Coal
Prod'n
Year Coal
Prod'n
Year Coal
Prod'n
1930 31,376 1941 56,472 1952 43,359
1931 27,987 1942 53,540 1953 46,531
1932 28,053 1943 55,500 1954 42,718
1933 32,524 1944 52,945 1955 42,423
1934 35,925 1945 29,879 1956 46,555
1935 37,762 1946 20,382 1957 51,732
1936 41,803 1947 27,234 1958 49,674
1937 45,258 1948 33,726 1959 47,258
1938 48,684 1949 37,973 1960 51,067
1939 51,111 1950 38,459 * *
1940 56,313 1951 43,312 * *
Source: Japan Statistical Yearbook, Prime Minister's Office
1954, P.214, 1961, p.142
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3.0- The Energy Industries During the Occupation Period
After the destruction of Nagasaki and Hiroshima by nuclear bombs, the Japanese
were forced to accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, which ended the war, and
gave the Allied countries the right to occupy Japan. The Occupation of Japan was almost
exclusively carried out by the Americans, led by General MacArthur who set up his
headquarters in Tokyo known as the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers (SCAP)
or GHQ, although other Allied powers played no major part in it.
The Americans declared at the beginning of the Occupation that they would
assume no responsibility for the revival of the Japanese economy which had been
shattered by eight years of war in China and four years in the Pacific, and it was a matter
for the Japanese government and people to tackle. SCAP officials announced, however,
that they would take the necessary steps to end the excessive concentration of economic
power in hands of zaibatsu and other oligopolies, and introduce free competition into the
Japanese economy. Their decision was based on the argument that the concentration of
economic power in a few zaibatsu, and their influence over the bureaucracy was an
important factor in the rise of Japanese militarism and the subsequent invasion of
Southeast Asia and, therefore, it was imperative for these oligopolies to be broken up
as they were obstacles to a peaceful, democratic Japan.25
The Americans adopted two policies to reform Japanese society in general and
political and business institutions in particular. These two policies were demilitarization
and democratization. These policies were to have a deep impact on all aspects of
Japanese life and profoundly affected her future. They also had a great influence on the
Japanese energy industries.
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3.1- Demilitarization and Democratization Policies
Demilitarization and democratization policies of SCAP not only affected the
military and political institutions, but more importantly, (from the perspective of the rise
of Japan to an economic superpower) the economic and business institutions as well.
Indeed many argue that the most long lasting influence of SCAP policies during the
Occupation years were in the economic sphere. Demilitarization meant not only the
disbanding of Japanese armed forces and repatriation of Japanese soldiers from the
occupied territories, but also banning, or controlling those industries which had military
significance. This policy was based on the belief that Japan had acquired its status as the
most industrialised country in Asia by the economic exploitation of the countries it had
invaded in the region, and she had to relinquish that position.
The best way to achieve this in the short-run, according to a report produced by
a commission set up by the Americans in late 1945/early 1946, was to set up a reparation
programme to transfer most of Japan's industrial plants and equipment to countries that
had suffered as a result of Japanese aggression. This would not only compensate these
countries for their losses, the commission members argued, but would also bring Japan's
level of industrial development down to the average Asian and the 1930-1934 average
Japanese standard of living.26
In order to stem any future domination of the region either militarily or
economically by the Japanese, the commission contemplated prohibiting the development
of heavy industry in Japan and promoting an economy based on light industry, such as
the manufacture of porcelain and toys made from indigenous materials, and export of
these goods and also raw materials such as tea, silk, and lumber. The commission,
nevertheless, recognised the need for Japan to export in order to be able to import some
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essential goods, but it emphasised that imports must be limited drastically by increasing
food production in Japan.27
These recommendations were strongly opposed by Japanese officials and
businessmen, who resisted its implementation for several years. With the start of the
Cold War, and especially the Korean War, however, the United States began to consider
Japan as her ally rather than foe and, as a result, made a drastic policy reversal towards
the latter and actively supported the development of Japanese industry.
The oil industry is a good example of this policy shift. Oil was considered to be
a strategic rather than an economic commodity, and a major factor in the Japanese
invasion of Southeast Asia, and, therefore, liable to be affected by the demilitarization
policy. So, from the beginning of the Occupation and for several years, the SCAP, with
support from Washington, prohibited imports of crude oil into Japan, although the
importation of petroleum products was allowed. Furthermore, the Japanese oil refining
installations were targeted for reparations. This policy was, however, dramatically
changed in 1948/1949, when the Americans not only freed crude oil imports (see Table
2.1), but actively supported the development and modernisation of the oil refining
industry in Japan.
The democratization policy had political as well as economic objectives. In the
political field, the policy introduced such reforms as the promulgation of a new
constitution, which demoted the Emperor to a lesser status of the "symbol" of the state,
and renounced war as a sovereign right of the nation. Other democratization measures
initiated by the SCAP included the legalisation of leftist parties, universal franchise,
bureaucratic reforms, purge of militarists, politicians, and officials, and reform of the
education system, etc.28
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As discussed above, the Americans were not concerned with the shattered state
of the Japanese economy at the end of the war, but with the excessive concentration of
economic power in a few zaibatsu and other holding companies. Therefore, as a part of
the democratization policy, the SCAP officials promoted various measures to end this
concentration and introduce competition into the Japanese economy and, in general,
change the business environment in Japan to an American style one. These measures
included land reform, the establishment of rights for organised labour, economic
deconcentration of industry, and a purge of businessmen who had co-operated with the
military.
The economic deconcentration's aim was to democratize the Japanese economy
and spread the principle of competition in all sectors of the industry. The policy tried to
achieve this by dissolving the zaibatsu and other large holdings. The Americans believed
that the excessive concentration of economic power in the hands of a few zaibatsu was
an important factor in Japanese aggression in Southeast Asia and, furthermore, the great
influence of these companies was a major obstacle to the development of political
freedom in Japan and friendly trade with other countries.
On the basis of this thinking, in October 1945, SCAP officials ordered the four
largest zaibatsu; Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda to dissolve. The scope of the
dissolution was later on widened to cover any business enterprise that was considered to
be an excessive concentration of economic power. Other important outcomes of this
policy were the enactment of the Anti-Monopoly Law in April 1947, which led to the
establishment of the Fair Trade Commission, and banning of all holding companies.29
The deconcentration policy broke the Mitsubishi and the Mitsui zaibatsu into 136
and 175 smaller companies respectively, and furthermore, led to the fragmentation of the
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Mitsubishi Shoji and Mitsui Bussan, the trading arms of their respective zaibatsu.
3.2- The Energy Industries and the Occupation Policies
The Japanese energy industries were probably affected more than any other by
the Occupation reforms. The policies that influenced the energy industries most were the
demilitarization, deconcentration and labour reforms.
All three energy industries: coal electric, and petroleum, as mentioned before, had
been severely affected by the war, and the continuous shortage of energy at the end of
the war was frustrating economic recovery. No revival of the Japanese economy was
possible without first solving the energy crisis. Furthermore, the SCAP policies were
posing various problems for these industries. SCAP officials wanted to change the energy
mix in Japan so that the country would rely more on domestic sources: coal and
hydroelectricity, and less on imported oil. This policy was based mainly on strategic
rather than economic considerations, as oil was not yet an important source of energy
for Japanese industry, but had major military significance. The Americans believed that
access to the sources of overseas oil was a prime factor in the Japanese invasion of
Southeast Asian countries, and they were hoping that by the banning of crude oil imports
into Japan (although allowing for the importation of some oil products), and forcing the
Japanese to use their indigenous sources, they would be able to kerb future Japanese
aggression in the region.
3.2.1- The Coal Industry
The demilitarization policy, in a peculiar way, had a positive affect on the
Japanese coal industry. The industry was considered by the SCAP not to have had any
links with Japanese domination of the Southeast Asia. Furthermore, domestic coal, in its
opinion, was a means of making Japan self sufficient (in addition to hydroelectricity) in
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energy, and hence, reducing the risk of future Japanese adventures in the region. This
energy mix, in SCAP officials' opinion, was adequate to meet the demands of the
Japanese economy based on light industry.
Based on this thinking, the SCAP officials made coal production the main focus
of their economic programme from the very early days of the Occupation. In two
directives issued in September 1945, they asked the Japanese government to do
everything within its power to boost domestic coal production which had fallen sharply
by the end of the war/beginning of the Occupation. 3° The goverment followed these
directives by raising wages and other incentives for mine workers, and took steps to
facilitate production and transportation of coal. Nevertheless, SCAP thought these
measures inadequate, and on several occasions sent harsh communiqués to the Japanese
government criticising it for its lacklustre attitude. These measures did help coal
production to rise gradually from January 1946 onwards.31
The economic deconcentration and labour reforms had as much, if not more
effect on the coal industry. The former led to the division of Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and
Sumitomo mining companies into separate coal and metal mining businesses. This greatly
reduced the profitability of the three industry leaders which used to use incomes from
either enterprises to help the other in times of difficulty. Probably, the more serious
impact of the deconcentration on the coal industry was the dissolution of Mitsui Bussan
and Mitsubishi Shoji. These two trading firms not only bought coal from their own
group's mining companies, but also acted as distributors for many smaller mining firms.
With their disappearance, the coal distribution system was severely disrupted, and small
companies found it difficult to sell their coal.
Of all Occupation reforms, the labour reform was the one which radically
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transformed the Japanese coal industry. From the establishment of the coal industry in
Japan in Tukogawa Shoganate until the end of the Second World War, the industry
relied heavily on massive exploitation of labour to extract coal from otherwise small and
unprofitable mines. (There were many large mines as well, like the Mitsui's Miike, and
they too relied on very cheap labour). Coal miners were so cheap, to the point of almost
zero cost to mine owners, that the latter refused for many decades to invest in the
mechanisation of mines, or to use modern mining techniques. The conditions of mine
workers were so bad in Japan that, on several occasions before the war, international
labour organisations made strong protests to the Japanese government. But as mine
owners were the most powerful businessmen in Japan, these protests did not have much
affect on the workers lives. As a matter of fact, with the invasion of Southeast Asia,
exploitation of miners intensified as colonial workers and POW's were brought in to
work in the mines.32
Considering these harsh conditions, it was, therefore, no coincidence that after the
introduction of labour reforms by the Occupiers which legalised unions and gave mans
rights to the workers, that the miners were the first group to form unions and ask for a
fairer return for their labour. This newly gained right gave mine workers strong
bargaining power vis-a-vis their employees, and changed the economics of coal mining
in Japan for good.
12.2- The Electric Industry
SCAP had two rather different sets of policy on the Japanese electric power
industry. Hydroelectricity was singled out for further development for the same reason
as domestic coal. It relied on Japan's most abundant natural resource: water, and
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therefore, an indigenous energy source which would reduce the risk of future Japanese
aggression in the region.
In contrast, about half of the thermal power stations were designated to be
shipped overseas as part of the reparations programme, since, in the American officials
opinion, a smaller economy would not need so much power. The electric industry leaders
vigorously resisted the dismantling of their plants, which they insisted were essential to
the power system.' However, huge increases in demand for electricity both from
households and industry, and acute power shortages, plus the fact that the American
policy towards Japan had shifted to the economic development of the latter, led the
SCAP in 1949, to approve plans for the major development of the electric power
industry, including the thermal plants.
The deconcentration policy had a severe impact on the industry, as all electric
power companies were designated as excessive concentration of economic power and,
hence, liable to fragmentation. An intense debate ensued over the structure of the
industry, and finally, in May 1951, nine private electric companies were created.
Electric power industry employees, were among the first group of workers to
establish unions, and by the end of 1947, 67% of them had organised themselves into
unions. One important aspect of this unionisation was that as there were only major 10
electric companies (before being reorganised into 9 by SCAP reforms), and the unions
were enterprise unions, the workers gained strong bargaining positions against their
employers. The electric workers used this strength to demand higher wages and better
working conditions for themselves as well as a say in national economic planning. This
created a hostile environment which hampered the early development of the industry.
The Occupation reforms delayed the early development of the electric power
iese
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industry, which had been damaged by the war. So when in the late 1940s/early 1950s the
economic boom created by the American shift of policy toward Japan and the Korean
War increased demand for electricity, a severe shortage of power developed and was not
resolved until 1962.
3.2.3- The Petroleum Industry
The demilitarization policy affected the Japanese oil industry more than any other.
It could even be argued that the policy was initiated in the first place to deal with the
petroleum industry which, in the Americans' opinion, had strategic rather than economic
significance. In fact they (the Americans) were right on this point. Petroleum had not
played an important role in pre-war and war-time Japanese economy, supplying at most
10% of her energy requirement, with the military and especially the Imperial Navy
consuming most of it. Moreover, the Americans believed that the paucity of indigenous
oil resources (as well as coking coal) had led Japan to invade the Southeast Asian
countries which were rich in these strategic sources of energy. The most abundant
sources of oil and coking coal in the region were the Dutch East Indies and Manchurka
respectively, and these were the countries (among others) that the Japanese imaded m
order to secure a stable supply of these two vital commodities. Based on
considerations, SCAP decided to slash Japan's war making potential and remove an.li
chances of her future aggression in the region by severely curtailing and controlling
Japanese oil industry. The question of oil supplies to Japan was so paramount in U.S.
strategic thinking that SCAP oil policy making was assigned to a civilian body attached
to G-4, a military unit, rather than to the Economic and Scientific Section which was in
charge of coal, electric, and other industries?'
64
As a result of these strategic considerations, in October 1945, SCAP banned crude
oil imports to Japan, and ordered that all of her Pacific refineries must cease operations
once the crude oil already in stock had been refined. They, however, allowed refineries
on the Sea of Japan Coast to stay in business to process domestic crude.
SCAP limited Japan's refining capacity to the level of the domestic crude
production, and earmarked the excess capacity for reparations. The war time bombings,
however, had destroyed around 85% of refinery installations in Japan, and the remaining
facilities were in a very bad state due to neglect and outdated technology. So much so,
in fact, that the SCAP officials in charge of reparations found no refinery worth
transferring abroad.
Under the economic deconcentration policy, SCAP, in the space of four months,
from October 1945 to January 1946, dismantled most laws and controls regulating the
oil industry. The Petroleum Industry Law which had been the linchpin of the oil industry
from 1934 to the end of the war, was abolished in December. Furthermore, most oil
firms were designated as being excessively concentrated in early 1946, and many of the
industry's top executives were purged. Imperial Oil, however, was not affected at that
time, as it was producing more than 98% of Japan's domestic crude, and was the only
company capable of increasing indigenous oil production and, hence, compatible with the
Americans strategy of making Japan reliant on her domestic sources of energy.
Imperial Oil was not, however, successful in its endeavour to boost domestic
production because of shortage of personnel and lack of adequate exploration activities.
To make matters worse, in February 1948, Imperial was designated an excessively
concentrated firm, and was required to dispose of its shares in other companies, and
release all of oil fields not under active exploration. Furthermore, the Finance Ministry
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was asked to reduce its holding in the company.
SCAP labour reforms did not have much influence on the petroleum industry, as
it did not employ large number of workers. The only labour unrest in the industry took
place in March 1948 by repatriated personnel working for Imperial oil, which forced the
SCAP to intervene and was ended by the sacking of 3000 employees.35
It is critical at this juncture to evaluate the SCAP and, generally, the American
policy towards the Japanese oil industry, as these policies are regarded by many as being
very instrumental in forming the structure of the industry in postwar Japan, and even a
factor for its weakness.
There were two sets of people, or groups, who made decisions on the Japanese
oil industry affecting both its short and long term prospects. These two were the U.S.
State Department officials who were interested in the industry from a strategic
perspective, and SCAP, which was in charge of day to day running of it. There was close
coordination between the two, and the latter followed the former's instructions, although
some disagreements arose from time to time. Furthermore, on several occasions, private
individuals and companies were commissioned by either of the two to prepare reports
or make recommendations on the Japanese petroleum industry.
An important point which needs to be mentioned here is the composition of the
SCAP's unit which was in charge of the oil industry. As mentioned above, in October
1945, SCAP set up a unit called the Petroleum Advisory Group (PAG) to deal with
issues regarding petroleum supplies. This body was made up entirely of representatives
of major international oil companies, some of which had owned substantial oil businesses
in pre-war Japan. To be exact, PAG had the following composition: three from Stanvac,
four from Shell (parent of pre-war Rising Sun in Japan), and one each from Cahex,
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Tidewater (pre-war partner in Mitsubishi Oil), and Union Oil. As the list
demonstrates, the American oil interests almost totally dominated the PAG. The only
exception was Shell (the Anglo-Dutch oil company), whose British delegates were
allowed to join the PAG as an exception to policy limiting SCAP jobs to Americans.37
What's more, the salaries of these executives were being paid by their own companies
while on loan to the SCAP.
Hein (1990), Samuels (1987), and Roberts (1971) argue that the commercial
interests of the foreign (American) oil companies comprising the PAG did have a
profound effect on the Japanese petroleum industry in the short and long term.
Furthermore, they all state that the U.S. official policy on Japan seems to have closely
followed the wishes of the Majors.38 They site as evidence for their arguments the
radical shift in American policy in 1948 in which SCAP not only reversed its earlier
policy of banning crude imports to Japan, and ended the reparation and closing down
of oil refineries, but enthusiastically supported the development and modemi ation of
the petroleum industry in Japan. This shift in policy looks to have closely followed the
change in the global strategy of international oil companies.
For example, from 1945 to 1948, when no large international markets existed for
petroleum products, and large oil companies were "long" 39 , they, through their
representatives on PAG, persuaded the American (or SCAP) officials to close down most
of Japan's refineries, and ban imports of crude oil into the country.
From 1948 onwards, however, the international oil markets began to tighten, and
especially the U.S., the principal supplier of oil products to Japan, became an importer
of oil herself. Furthermore, with the discovery of huge oil reserves in the Middle East
(which were under the control of Majors), and construction of larger oil tankers, it was
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cheaper for the Majors to transport this crude to, and process it at the point of
consumption.
By that time (1948), Japan had become an attractive country for the locating of
oil refineries. First, her domestic market was expected to grow substantially in the next
few years (which it did), and as she had very small foreign exchange reserves, it made
sense to international oil companies to build refineries there to process the Middle
Eastern crude.
Secondly, Japan was politically the most stable country in Southeast Asia and, with
the civil war in China and other parts of the region, she was the safest place for the
American capital. With building refineries in Japan, the oil companies reasoned, they
could not only supply her domestic market, but also other countries in the region.'
Finally, the start of the Cold War, coupled with social and political changes that
had taken place under the Occupation, forced a U-turn on U.S. policy towards Japan.
She was no longer considered as an enemy, but as an ally of the United States. This
qualified Japan for economic assistance from America, which she had been denied until
then. Indeed, from then on, the revival of the Japanese economy became a priority for
the SCAP.
Considering these developments, the American oil companies reversed their
strategy on the Japanese petroleum industry, and actively supported its expansion and
modernisation, provided they were given the lion's share of the market. This change of
attitude was translated into a new official U.S. policy towards the Japanese oil industry.
In January 1948, General MacArthur announced that the Japanese oil industry
would be revived, and in February all eight major refining companies were designated
excessively concentrated firms. Next month the Strike Report was issued which warned
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of the dangers of an economically weak Japan, and recommended that the reparations
programme should stop. It also advocated the scrapping of refining installations and
imports of petroleum products by oil companies. Soon after, the Johnston report came
out, which argued against the dismantling of refineries, and called for their
modernisation and expansion.41
The American concerns over Japan's access to oil reserves had by no means
diminished. With this new policy, they had merely shifted their control over the Japanese
oil industry from downstream to upstream. The United States was prepared to allow
Japan to import as much oil as she wanted , provided she had no control over oil
reserves. They believed that there was no security problem as long as Japan had no
access to major reserves of overseas oil. This meant that the Japanese oil industry could
develop downstream but not upstream. This statement can be supported by remarks of
George Kennan, a State Department official, who in October 1949 pronounced:
"If the United States created controls.., foolproof enough and cleverly
enough exercised really to have power over what Japan imports in the way
of oil and other things as she has got from overseas, then we could have
veto power over what she does need."42
These remarks suggest a possible long term agreement between the American
government and the international oil companies to deny Japan access to sources of oil
outside her territory.
This state of affairs benefitted the major oil companies as well. With the discovery
of huge deposits of oil in the Middle East, the Majors were looking for outlets that could
consume a large portion of their production from these oilfields, and Japan was the best
market. Furthermore, with the international oil markets glutted, they (the Majors) did
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not want others (like the Japanese) to develop more oilfields and destabilise the market.
This new development in the U.S. policy was not lost on the Japanese oil
companies, who saw co-operation with foreign capital as the only means of survival. The
international oil companies were prepared to provide capital and technology to otherwise
defunct Japanese refineries whose facilities had been almost totally destroyed by the war
and neglect. So once permission was granted by the SCAP in July 1949 for the
development and modernisation of the oil industry, the Japanese petroleum companies
rushed to conclude agreements with American (Shell being the only exception) oil
companies. The patterns of the agreements were almost the same: foreign companies
agreed to supply crude on a long term basis, plus technology and capital for the
construction of new refineries and oil storage facilities in exchange for a controlling
(usually 50%) stake in the Japanese oil firms (see Table 2.3). As soon as Japanese oil
companies reached agreements with their foreign partners, they were removed from the
list of excessively concentrated firms, and were allowed to re-open their Pacific Coast
refineries.
Rebuilding of the refineries proceeded quite quickly and, by the end of 1951,
crude throughput was greater than the pre-surrender peak, at 94,539 barrels per day, and
oil refining became one of Japan's most technologically advanced industries.' This was
made possible, because unlike most other industries, the oil refiners had access to
plentiful and endless capital from the international oil companies.
Thus, the petroleum refining industry became the first and the most important
industry in postwar Japan to attract foreign capital, receiving 65% and 30% of all
foreign investment in 1951 and 1952 respectively, and no other industry has, since then,
come closer to its degree of domination by foreign interests. The dorninaace of
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overseas capital in the oil industry has remained strong even today when Japan has
aquired economic superpower status.
Finally, in April 1951, SCAP handed over the responsibility for oil policy to the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). The Treaty of San Francisco, signed
in September 1951, formally ended American control of the oil industry. Japanese
companies, however, continued their relations with the international oil companies in
order to ensure a stable supply of oil for their refineries.
Table 2.3: International Oil Companies' Capital Participation in Japanese Refining
Companies (December 1952)
Company Affiliated With Ratio Affiliation Date
(%)
Mitsubishi Oil Tidewater Oil 50 February 1931(a)
Toa Nenryo Standard-Vacuum 55 March 1949
Koa Oil Caltex Oil 50 November 1950
Products
Nippon Petro-
leum Refining
Caltex Oil 50(b) May 1951
Showa Oil Anglo-Saxon 50 December 1952
Petroleum (Shell)
Source: Hein (1990) p.212.
Notes: (a) Reaffirmed March 1949.
(b) Other 50% is held by Nippon Oil.
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3.3- The Rationalisation Policy and the Energy Industries
The rationalisation policy which was introduced by the Japanese in 1949 in
response to the American austerity measures, involved using technological advances to
improve both domestic standards of living and industrial productivity: 45 Initially, two
industries, namely steel and coal, whose recovery and modernisation were considered to
be essential to any general economic recovery were chosen for rationalisation. The policy
did have some effects on the steel industry, but almost completely failed in the case of
the coal industry. 16 The rationalisation policy in the energy industries in general meant
the expansion of domestic coal and electric power, while relegating petroleum to the
secondary position as a service to other more important industries.
With the adaptation of the rationalisation policy, Japanese officials hoped to
increase the international competitiveness of Japanese industry by introducing new
technology, and providing low cost materials including energy while keeping wages
reasonably high. The coal industry was to supply industry with a plentiful and cheap
source of energy and at the same time save on scarce foreign exchange.
However, due to several factors, some of which were outside the industry's
control, coal failed to respond to the government's rationalisation measures and began
to lose its market to other sources of energy, especially oil. (See Table 2.4). First, there
was the problem of depleted reserves. Secondly, there was the issue of low quality
Japanese coal which was not suitable for the steel industry. Thirdly, due to the lack of
earlier investments in mines and mining techniques, the price of Japanese coal was far
higher than American and European prices (or indeed higher than international markets'
prices). Finally, the antagonistic relations that had developed between the miners and
operators since the end of the war was causing disruptions to a stable supply of coal to
72
its major consumers. The long and protracted miners strike of 1952, especially, convinced
coal users that the industry was not able to supply them with a stable and cheap source
of energy. This happened at a time when oil prices were plummeting in the world
markets, and the petroleum companies were offering a plentiful, secure, and high quality
source of energy.
The rationalisation policy which started with the coal industry, and the revival of
domestic coal production at the centre of its plans, exposed the fundamental weakness
of the industry. As a result, during the 1950s more and more coal consumers switched
to oil, and the long slide of coal began (see Table 2.4). Perhaps the biggest contribution
of the rationalisation policy to the Japanese economy was the energy revolution that it
ushered by facilitating the switch from coal to oil. On the contrary, the oil industry which
was neither targeted by the government for expansion, nor was offered special incentives
under rationalisation became a leading sector of the economy, and contributed greatly
to the rapid growth of other industries and the Japanese economy in general.
The electric power industry which had been handicapped by reorganisation
disputes until the early 1950s, began to modernise and expand from then on, although
its success was due more to other unanticipated factors rather than the rationalisation
policy.47
In the early 1950s, with the active encouragement of U.S., the Japanese officials
and business leaders began to promote the development of heavy and chemical
industries. The Americans wanted to make Japan the powerhouse of Asia as a way of
containing communism in the region, and this necessitated the development of heavy
industry. The Korean War provided both the Americans and the Japanese with an
impetus to carry out their plans. The Americans, with their military purchases for the
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war, provided the Japanese with the market, technology, and the foreign exchange to
develop their industries, particularly heavy industry. Heavy industry, however, needed
plentiful and cheap energy, something that the petroleum industry was able to provide
but the coal industry, for the reasons mentioned above was incapable of. It was from
then on, that the importance of oil to the Japanese economy grew year by year, and
finally, in 1962, it became the dominant source of energy for the Japanese economy.
There were, nonetheless, other factors for the rapid expansion of the heavy and chemical
industries in Japan and these will be discussed in future sections.
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Table 2.4 Japan's Primary Energy Supply Structure (%), 1935-1960
Year Hydroel-
ectric
Domestic
Coal
Imported
Coal
Petrol-eum Other
1935 18.1 52.5 9.2 10.4 9.8
1940 16.1 54.2 12.0 7.0 10.7
1945 32.7 48.1 0.9 0.9 17.4
1946 40.6 42.1 - 2.1 15.2
1947 35.5 45.8 0.2 3.7 14.8
1948 33.6 46.2 2.7 4.5 13.5
1949 34.3 48.4 2.1 4.3 10.9
1950 32.7 49.6 1.6 6.2 9.9
1951 28.3 50.5 3.6 8.7 8.9
1952 28.9 45.9 5.4 11.4 8.4
1953 29.4 43.5 5.2 13.7 8.2
1954 30.2 41.7 3.8 16.5 7.8
1955 30.5 40.3 3.7 17.9 7.6
1956 29.0 40.3 4.2 19.7 6.7
1957 27.8 38.9 5.5 21.6 6.2
1958 30.3 36.8 4.1 22.5 6.3
1959 27.6 32.2 4.7 39.4 5.1
1960 22.7 31.9 6.2 34.7 4.5
Source: Hein (1990), p174.
Note:"other" consists of lignite, natural gas, charcoal, and firewood.
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4.0- The Petroleum Industry in the 1950s
As noted before, the SCAP in April 1951, handed over responsibility for the oil
industry to the MITI. Before this change over, however, the former had dismantled all
laws and regulations relating to the industry in the hope of creating a free market in the
industry (as well as preparing the ground for the domination of the industry by American
oil companies), and so when MITI took over the supervision of the petroleum industry,
it had no means of regulating it. But MITI used a completely unrelated law, namely the
Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law of December 1949 to manage the oil
industry. This law empowered the government to establish an annual foreign exchange
budget in order to protect its balance of payments, and MITI was put in charge of
implementing it. The Foreign Exchange Law gave MITI what Johnson calls "absolute
control over the use of all foreign means of payment". 48 As almost all of Japan's oil
requirements had to be imported, the law provided MITI with unprecedented control
over the petroleum industry in several ways. First, as MITI considered oil as a service
to other industries rather than an industry on its own right, it employed a complex
currency allocations system to ensure that oil became one of the cheapest factors of
production for the consuming industries. (Although this point is disputed by others who
argue that MITI raised tariffs on imported oil on several occasions, and therefore, the
price of oil was not a major consideration to the Ministry.)49
Secondly, as MITI was concerned with the domination of the Japanese oil industry
by a few large international (mainly American) petroleum companies, it used the
Foreign Exchange Law to weaken the industry by allowing many independent Japanese
oil companies (i.e not affiliated to foreign firms) to enter the refining business, thereby
creating a competitive environment in the sector. The Japanese independents which had
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no long term agreement for the supply of crude with the Majors, used their foreign
exchange allocations to buy the cheapest oil available on the spot markets and, hence,
put further pressure on the price of oil products in the domestic market. The price wars
that emerged as a result of the intense competition between the petroleum companies
made conversion to oil more and more attractive to industries which were using coal as
a source of energy or raw material (e.g. fertiliser manufacturers).
At the same time, however, two other developments were speeding up the
transformation of the Japanese economy to an oil based industrial structure as well as
accelerating the demise of the coal industry:
First, the new technology that was being rapidly introduced into Japan at that time
was American and based on oil. Japanese industrialists who realised that oil was much
more efficient than coal in terms of price and burning quality eagerly started to convert
their machinery and technology to run on oil.
Secondly, with the launch of the petrochemicals as a national policy industry in
July 1955, the Japanese, probably not realising its long term implications at the time,
committed themselves to an economy based on oil. The petrochemical industry which
uses higher octane oil products like naphtha and liquid petroleum gas (LPG) required
rapid development of the refining facilities, and the refinery operators responded with
enthusiasm. They applied for and received permission to build petrochemical facilities
alongside their refineries. This way, they could apply for and receive more foreign
currency allocations for the importation of larger volumes of crude oil (as well as
receiving other incentives related to the petrochemical industry), and at the same time
find an outlet for their surplus petroleum derivatives.
These developments were undermining the very existence of the coal industry, as
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well as undercutting the goals of the rationalisation policy for the industry. From around
1954, coal-mine owners who enjoyed considerable political clout, in conjunction with
miners unions, began to lobby for the protection of the industry. Both sides argued that
as oil supplies were coming from overseas resources under the control of international
oil companies and foreign governments, and especially as the Japanese petroleum
industry was dominated by international majors, it was in Japan's national security
interest to protect the domestic coal industry. They also cited regional destitution if coal
mines were to be closed as a result of the competition from foreign oil. Their contentions
that coal was as competitive as oil in terms of calorific value, however, did not gain any
grounds with the officials and business leaders, and so the mine operators relied
primarily on the first two arguments to ask for the protection of their industry.
The mining industry's lobbying for protection initiated an energy debate within
Japan which questioned the rationality of letting imported oil become the major source
of energy, and of allowing the domestic coal industry to shrink to the point where it
would no longer be able to supply a major part of the country's energy requirements.
This debate resulted in the 1955 energy settlement and the enactment of the Boiler Law
of 1955 which restricted the conversion of coal burning facilities to oil. The law also
provided various measures for closing down small and uneconomic mines and gave
subsidies to large mines for modernisation under the "scrap and build programme".
The Boiler Law's guidelines were not strictly adhered to by both the MITI and
the industry as the former gave permission for the construction of ten oil burning power
stations in late 1950s, and the latter continued with its adaptation of oil based
technology.
Although the coal industry and its customers had conflicting interests, they agreed,
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for their own reasons, on one point. They both opposed the formation of a powerful
cartel in the oil industry and therefore, they supported MITI's policies to keep the
petroleum refining industry crowded and fragmented.
Another component of the 1955 energy settlement was the commitment to atomic
energy. The policy was to rely primarily on coal, use petroleum for the short term and
develop atomic power for the long term. Notwithstanding, this policy did not succeed for
several reasons. First, as noted above, coal failed to respond to the rationalisation
measures and, as a result, lost its position as the main source of energy. Secondly, the
development of independent atomic energy was very slow. The Japanese had originally
planned an ambitious nuclear energy programme. But financial and technical problems
dampened their expectations, and by the late 1950's, they realised that nuclear energy
was a long term solution, when an immediate solution was needed to the problem of
sudden decline in coal production. Finally, the gradual decline in oil prices (see Table
2.5 for the average value of crude oil in Japan), and dramatic discoveries of oil reserves
in the Middle East made the Japanese realise that oil was the best solution to their
persistent energy problems, in spite of its implications for dependence on foreign sources
of energy and governments and international petroleum companies.
Even in those early days of conversion to petroleum, the Japanese were concerned
about the security and stability of oil supplies. Furthermore, they were worried that the
rapid increase in the world consumption of petroleum would lead to the early depletion
of oil reserves.50
 Their fears over the security of supplies materialised in 1956, when as
a result of the Arab-Israeli War and the closure of the Suez Canal, oil supplies to
Europe were temporarily cut off. Their worries over dwindling reserves were unfounded
as huge oilfields were discovered in the Middle East and other parts of the world,
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Table 2.5: Average Value of Landed Crude In Japan
Fiscal Year C.i.f value C.i.f value Exchange rates
$/barrel yen/kl yen/$
1956 3.23 7,333 360.00
1960 2.30 5,213 360.00
1965 1.97 4,488 360.00
1970 1.83 4,147 360.00
1975 11.36 22,142 296.87
1980 32.27 47,206 227.65
1981 37.29 51,387 219.10
1982 35.00 54,383 247.28
1983 30.73 45,861 237.27
1984 29.36 43,713 236.66
1985 28.07 42,373 239.97
1986 16.40 18,169 176.12
1987 17.78 16,550 145.89
1988 15.60 12,550 127.93
1989 16.71 14,450 137.47
Source: Tetsuo Hamauzu (1993), p.70.
In order to lessen reliance on overseas resources, MITI took steps to increase the
domestic oil exploration and production. After much wrangling with the Ministry of
Finance and private oil companies over the finances and structure of a new body with
the responsibility to strengthen the domestic upstream activities, MITI succeeded in the
creation of the Japan Petroleum Exploration Company (JAPEX) in July 1955 by an act
of the Diet. JAPEX was a national policy company modelled after the wartime Imperial
Oil Company, and was owned equally by the state and the private sector. The
reorganised Imperial Oil was the largest private shareholder and the refining firms
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comprised the rest of the equity holders.51
JAPEX began operations in December 1955 and produced its first domestic crude
in 1958. The corporation, however, did not succeed in substantially increasing domestic
production as originally hoped and, at its peak in 1962, domestic crude production
satisfied only 2% (including non-JAPEX production) of Japanese total oil demand.
In 1960, JAPEX announced plans to extend its activities to overseas fields, which
would have required substantial infusion of capital. The refining companies which had
by that time realised that JAPEX would not be able to supply them with large amounts
of crude and, further, believed that it was more profitable to spend their capital on
refining expansion rather than on risky JAPEX adventures in overseas exploration,52
announced that they would cease capital cooperation with JAPEX after 1961. Plentiful
crude oil was available from the Majors and, furthermore, refiners feared that JAPEX
activities may jeopardise their relations with them.
In the meantime, an entrepreneur, Taro Yamashita, who had connections with the
pre-war military, and was concerned with the security of oil supplies, decided to seek
overseas oil resources under Japanese control. Consequently, he reached agreements with
the governments of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to explore the Neutral Zone between the
two countries and eventually discovered oil in the Khafji field. Upon finding oil there,
he established the Arabian Oil Company (AOC) in 1958 and started production in 1960.
His arrangements with the Kuwaitis and the Saudis for profit sharing was revolutionary
for the time, as he gave them 57% and 56% of all profits (including transport and
refining) respectively, at a time when 50% of profits on the oil production alone was the
best oil producing countries could expect.53
Yamashita, nevertheless, had great difficulty in finding finance for his venture as
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neither oil companies nor the Japanese government were willing to back him up
(although both Caldwell and Brown argue that strong behind-the-scenes support existed
within the MITI).54 However, at the urging of the Keidanren chairman, Ishizaki,
Yamashita received considerable backing from the electric power companies and the
entire Japanese financial community.
As the JAPEX and Yamashita cases show, the Japanese, particularly the oil
industry, were not very concerned with the issue of national control of the petroleum
resources and supplies in the 1950s. For example, the Japanese refining companies did
not make any serious efforts to move into the upstream activities of exploration and
production overseas during that decade. Lack of capital was a handicap which prevented
them from doing so. Only few years had passed since they had been allowed to resume
their operations and, hence, they had not had enough time to accumulate enough
internal capital. More importantly, the intense competition that had been spurred on by
the MITI was forcing them to invest all their capital in refining and distribution capacity
expansion. Therefore, they were not in a strong enough financial position to engage in
the risky business of exploration and production abroad. In fact, this lack of capital,
coupled with outmoded refining technology, had forced them in the late 1940s/early
1950s, to enter into long term agreements with international oil companies for the supply
of crude. Hence, they had no worries about inadequate crude supplies. Moreover, as a
part of the Majors', or probably even the American strategies, the Japanese were not
persuaded or even allowed to move upstream.
Besides, as discussed in previous sections, with the creation of the Imperial Oil
Company in 1941, the separation that had long existed between the upstream and
downstream sectors of the oil industry was formally recognised and continued after the
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war, even strengthened by the SCAP's policy. This division still exists today in the
Japanese oil industry.
Another important factor was that, traditionally, major Japanese financial groups
had invested in coal mining and considered oil as a competitor, and therefore avoided
investing in the industry. However, when oil began to become the dominant source of
energy, these groups began actively to invest in petroleum refining.
Finally, with the discovery of huge oil reserves in the Middle East and plummeting
oil prices, exploration and production by the relatively inexperienced Japanese was a
risky business. There were no major oilfields left to explore any way, as almost all of the
promising areas of the world had already been assigned to the international oil
companies under the "concession system".
5.0- The Petroleum Industry in the 1960s
1960 was an epoch-making year for Japan. It was the beginning of the high growth
decade and the energy revolution. By that year, Japanese bureaucrats and businessmen
had recognised that oil would soon become the dominant source of energy and coal
would lose its pivotal position, and that is exactly what happened. Between 1961 and
1973, the year of the first oil crisis, petroleum consumption nearly quadrupled, increasing
over 11% annually. Gasoline sales increased 400%, and oil's share of Japan's primary
energy supply increased from under 40% to almost 80%. 55 (See Table 3.11 for Japan's
oil consumption from 1950 to 1989.)
This major shift in Japan's energy mix provided a great opportunity for the
Japanese refining companies to expand capacity and for the new ones to enter the
market (see Table 2.6 for the expansion in the Japanese refining capacity in the 1950-
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1990 period). This boom in investment and the intense competition that ensued,
fragmented the oil industry even more, and caused the domestic oil companies to plunge
deeper into debt. For example, in 1961, the Japanese oil refiners could provide for 56%
of construction costs from internal funds, but only 36% in 1963 and a meagre 15% in
1964.56 This situation created an opportunity for American oil companies, which were
more than willing to supply funds to capital starved refining companies, to increase their
domination of the Japanese oil industry. Indeed, by the early 1960s, the difference
between affiliated and non-affiliated companies had become one of degree rather than
of kind. For instance, by 1962, the foreign petroleum companies held long-term supply
contracts for 90% of Japan's crude oil imports, had a major interest in about 75% of her
refining capacity, and owned 25% of the industry directly. 57 Also, during this decade,
the share of the Middle Eastern crude (supplied by majors) in Japan's total oil imports
strongly rose and reached 90% of the total (see Table 3.11).
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Table 2.6: Japanese Crude Oil Refining Capacity (barrels/day)
Year
end
Crude
distilation
Catalytic
reforming
Catalytic
cracking
Direct
desu'n*
Indirect
desu'n*
1950 90,000 _.. -- -- --
1955 285,000 10,300 12,100 -- --
1960 743,490 41,450 48,800 -- --
1965 2,057,640 198,500 79,100 -- --
1970 3,668,800 358,800 175,600 112,760 256,000
1975 5,860,360 593,800 329,100 289,000 910,500
1980 5,940,360 578,300 358,600 459,000 981,700
1985 5,940,350 571,500 441,000 459,000 928,200
1990
+
4,551,000 591,900 649,600 414,000 166,080
Notes: *- Direct and Indirect Desulphurisation.
+- Figures for March 1990.
Source: Tetsuo Hamauzu (1993), p.64.
This almost total dependency on foreign sources of oil, and particularly the
dominance of the market by a few large foreign companies, was causing great concern
to the Japanese government and especially the MITI officials over the security and
stability of supplies.
To make matters more complicated, the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
asked Japan in 1960 to implement Article IV of the Fund and liberalise her foreign trade
in order for her to be accepted as a full member of the Fund. This meant that the
Foreign Exchange Control and Foreign Investment Law of 1949 had to be abolished.
There was by then, however, no problem with shortage of foreign currency, thanks to a
rapidly growing overseas trade. But, as discussed before, this law had, throughout the
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1950s, given MITI great power over the oil industry and it had used it to spur
competition in the industry and nurture the domestic refining companies. Rather, MITI
was concerned that liberalisation without protection would seriously undermine the weak
Japanese oil industry, and would lead to the total domination of foreign capital.
Therefore, MITI felt that it needed some form of control over the oil industry in the free
trade era.
To find a solution to the above problems, MITI formed the Energy Roundtable
in August 1961 to advise it on issues regarding oil. The committee reported back in
December 1961, offering two alternatives: creation of a national oil champion like ENI
of Italy/CFP of France, or the promulgation of a new petroleum industry law.58
The report countered strong opposition from the business community who argued
that the establishment of a state owned oil company was an encroachment of the free
trade principal. The strongest resistance came from the domestic oil companies, both
upstream and downstream, which saw the proposed national champion company as a
means of consolidation of and the state control of the industry. So did foreign oil
companies which regarded it as an attack on their presence in the Japanese market.
MITI was divided over the issue as well. The section which was in charge of the
refining industry opposed the formation of an integrated company, while the section
responsible for oil exploration and production supported it. The oil industry was,
however, split over the second proposal: i.e. the introduction of a new industry law, and
some firms believed that the new law would protect them against the onslaught of
foreign companies after the liberalisation.
After intense debate within the government as well as with the industry, MITI
dropped its plans for the creation of a national oil champion, although it was still
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committed to the creation of one, and instead opted for a petroleum industry law.
The second Petroleum Industry Law (PIL) which was modelled almost directly on
the 1934 law, was passed by the Diet on 5th May 1962 and, like its predecessor, gave
MITI wide -ranging powers over the industry including: oil imports, licensing authority
over refinery construction and expansion, refinery production, the domestic marketing
and pricing of refined products, allocation of market shares, mergers and acquisitions.
MITI was also required to draw up an oil supply plan for each year.59
One important concession of the PIL to the industry was the creation of the
Petroleum Council, an advisory body attached to the MITI, made up of industry
representatives. MITI was to base its projections for demand and allocation of market
shares on the advice received from the Petroleum Council. MITI was, nonetheless,
frequently challenged by the oil industry represented on the Council over its allocation
of the market shares, and some in the industry blamed the Law for the problems that
afflicted the industry.60
Although some argue that the PIL succeeded in its aim of enhancing the position
of the domestic companies vis a vis international oil companies, Caldwell states that it
merely protected the status quo.61
 Under the PIL, expansion of the domestic firms was
given priority over the foreign affiliated ones. However, it did not stop the latter from
increasing its capacity before the implementation of the Law. By 1974, under the
protection of the PIL, domestic firms had expanded their capacity by 516.1% while
foreign affiliated ones had increased theirs by 374.5%. (See Table 2.7). It should be
remembered that almost all of this expansion took place during the high growth era, at
a time when demand for oil products was increasing by 11% per annum. This rapid
expansion however, exposed the weakness of the domestic oil firms during the high price
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oil period that followed the first oil shock. In fact, the foreign affiliated companies fared
better than domestic ones.
Furthermore, the divisions within MITI, as well as the historical separation
between the upstream and downstream sectors hindered (up to today) the
accomplishment of the main aim of the PM: i.e. the consolidation of the downstream and
upstream sectors of the Japanese oil industry. These divisions reached such a point that
the Arabian Oil Company was refused a licence to build and operate its own refinery in
Japan and the existing refineries were refusing to buy the AOC's crude beyond a token
level.
Table 2.7: Changes in Licenced Japanese Refinery Capacity
(Unit = 10,000 barrels/day)
Capacity
Before PIL 1974 Growth Rate
Domestic Firms 48.25 (8) 297.25 (15) 516.1%
Foreign Affiliates 64.90 (9) 307.95 (13) 374.5%
Total Refineries 113.15 (17) 605.20 (28) 434.9%
Source: Petroleum Association of Japan.
Note: Number of firms in brackets.
In the downstream sector, MITI was rather more successful. It managed to create
Kyodo Oil in August 1965 by the merger of the sales and storage facilities of three
domestic refiners, Asia Oil, Nippon Mining, and Toa Oil. The new company was
established as a joint sales firm with public financial assistance to strengthen the sales
activities of domestic firms. MITI was anticipating that the creation of Kyodo Oil would
be the first step towards an integrated national oil company. These hopes were frustrated
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when the three companies refused to merge their refining operations and, more
significantly, larger domestic firms refused to join the new company.62
As noted before, despite the promulgation of PLL, MITI did not given up its
aspirations for the creation of a Japanese national oil company. It tried again three times
in the early to mid- 1960's to initiate plans for a state corporation to promote crude oil
development by Japanese oil companies, and each time it encountered opposition from
the industry as well as the Ministry of Finance. The former opposed such plans on the
basis that it would enhance the state control, and the latter was apprehensive about the
creation of a new goverment agency, although it was willing to increase funding for
JAPEX.
The situation began to change, however, from the mid-1960s onwards because of
an apparent shift in the position of oil consuming industries. 63
 The Comprehensive
Energy Division (which had replaced the Petroleum Council) of the Industrial Structure
Council began to call for the stabilisation of crude oil supplies through the diversification
of sources, construction of a Japanese tanker fleet, increased stockpiles, and further
development of domestic fields.64 Keidanren supported these calls by arguing for
increased financial assistance by the state to firms engaged in oil exploration and
production.65 The industry was asking for risk free funds for oil development under
Japanese control without state control, and the state wanted an integrated industry. So,
probably for the first time, there was a chance for the institution of some kind of
national oil company.
In September 1966 MITI published its plans for the creation of Japan Petroleum
Development Corporation (JPDC), and was accepted by the Keitianten. The new body
was a compromise between the upstream and downstream divisions within MITI and was
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considered by the latter not to be a threat to relations with the Majors which, in its
opinion, were supplying a very cheap factor of production to Japanese industry. The new
corporation was also a compromise with private industry, in which the state agreed to
supply risk free funds to the former without having a commercial (and hence competitive
) role in the market.
The Diet passed the proposed legislation in July 1967 and the Japan Petroleum
Development Corporation was established as a 100% government owned company and
began operations in October of that year.
The JPDC was modelled directly upon banks rather than European national oil
companies (as MITI had originally sought). The corporation was authorised to provide
loans and equity, guarantee loans to private firms engaged in oil exploration and
production, and also to provide services such as technology procurement and sharing,
machinery leases, exploration subsidies, and other forms of support. JPDC was, however,
explicitly prohibited from undertaking exploration on its own and was further required
to dispose of its holdings in any firm which started producing oil. Furthermore, the
corporation was prohibited from importing, selling, or allocating crude or refined
products.66
At long last, MITI had succeeded in establishing a Japanese oil company engaged
in the development of overseas oil reserves, although it was far from the model it had
originally envisaged. Indeed, major Japanese financial and industrial groups responded
enthusiastically to the creation of the JPDC by forming multifirm consortia to develop
overseas oil.
The JPDC has had a mixed success in achieving its aim of stimulating overseas
oil exploration and production by domestic oil firms (see Table 2.8). Notwithstanding its
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success in increasing oil production under Japanese control, there is evidence that it has
achieved this with much higher costs, and a lower success rate than comparable
production by international oil companies. Furthermore, it has failed in its implicit aim
of consolidating the Japanese oil industry, and has probably even deepened the gap. This
is due to the way that JPDC finances oil exploration.
JPDC, as willbe shown in Chapter Seven, played a key role in persuading the
Mitsui Bussan to offer the petrochemical joint venture to Iran as an inducement so that
the Japanese consortium in which it was a major shareholder could win the bidding
Lorestan oil. Moreover, JPDC offered various incentives such as low cost finance to the
Japanese consortium to enable it to search for oil in that area.
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Table 2.8: Oil imported from developments supported by JNOC*
Company	 Cumulative production, 1961-1990
(millions of barrels)
Arabian Oil Company 2,164
Japan Oil Devt. 709
Indonesian Petroleum 278
Abu Dhabi Oil 115
United Petroleum Devt. 73
Zaire Petroleum 43
Angola Japan Oil 26
Mitsubishi Petroleum Devt. 16
Japan Peru Oil 14
Indonesia Nippon Oil Corp. 13
Mitsui Oil Exploration 10
WED Gabon Oil 9
Sumitomo Petroleum Devt. 9
Inpex Sumatra 7
Japan China Oil Devt. Co-operation 6
Mubarras Oil 5
Egyptian Petroleum Devt. 5
Total+ 3,052
Notes: *- In late 1970s JPDC changed its name to Japan National Oil Company (JNOC).
+ - Table covers only companies with cumulative production in excess of Sm bbl.
A number of other, smaller developments have been financed by JNOC.
Source: Paul McDonald (1992), p.42.
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6.0- Conclusion
This chapter set out to trace the history of the Japanese oil industry, from its
inception in the latter half of the 19th century to the end of the 1960s, and to analyze
the causes of its fragmentation and weakness. The Japanese oil industry has three distinct
features which sets it apart from its counterparts in other industrialised countries, or
from other industries in Japan:
First, Japan has the second most fragmented oil industry in the world after the
United States (though it should be recognised that the U.S. is a major producer of oil
and also hosts four of the six largest oil companies in the world). More significant still,
the Japanese petroleum industry is the only one of its kind in the world where there is
a clear distinction between upstream and downstream sectors, and where participants
have constantly refused, or been prevented from, integrating downstream or upstream
(depending on their original positions). Second, the oil industry was, from the beginning,
unlike any other Japanese industry (including coal and electric power), or indeed the oil
industries of other industrialised nations, dominated by foreign (chiefly American)
capital.°
Many put the lack of political leverage (until 1960s), and the fragmentation of the
Japanese petroleum industry down to deliberate state policy in order to restrain the
domineering influence of foreign capital (Hein 1990). Hein further believes that after the
Second World War, the Americans, for strategic (as well as commercial) considerations,
prevented the integration of the Japanese oil industry. She adds that, in order to prevent
the total domination of the industry by American capital, as well as to supply the
cheapest factor of production to the energy consuming industries, the Japanese, with the
help of the Foreign Exchange Law and other measures, kept the industry deliberately
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weak and competitive.
Samuels (1987) also believes that the presence of foreign equity in the Japanese oil
industry has made it less influential vis-a-vis the state and consumers. But he also
postulates that the traditional strength of the Japanese capital, and what he calls the
politics of reciprocal consent, 68 have precluded the state from acquiring a commercial
presence in the domestic markets, including energy markets, as well as deflecting its
efforts to consolidate the industry.
Probably, it is safe to conclude that a combination of all above factors: the
American strategic considerations, the Japanese government's fear of domination of the
industry by foreign capital as well as its desire for providing domestic industry with a
cheap factor of production, the traditional power of Japanese capital, and lastly the
dynamism and the competitiveness of the oil industry itself, have produced a weak,
fragmented and unconsolidated oil industry in Japan.
It has to be stated, however, that it may be be of no consequence to other
industries or the Japanese economy as a whole that the domestic oil industry is
fragmented or weak as long as it can supply them with a cheap, efficient, and reliable
source of energy and raw material, something that the oil industry has achieved with
startling success since the end of the Occupation. Moreover, the lack of access to major
overseas oil reserves has not prevented Japanese oil companies from buying oil on
favourable terms from major oil companies or directly from oil producing countries. The
only occasions when oil supplies to Japan were threatened were the two oil crises of the
1970s. However, Japanese oil and general trading companies managed to purchase
adequate amounts of oil in the international markets although at highly inflated prices.
These shortages occured not because of oil embargoes against Japan, but because of the
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Western petroleum companies' decision to divert supplies destined for Japan to their
own home countries. So one can underestand the Japanese officials' concerns over the
country's heavy reliance on major oil firms for oil imports. This situation has now
considerably changed as Japanese oil companies and general trading companies purchase
a significant share of Japanese oil imports directly from the oil producing countries.
The Japanese oil industry has, however, since the end of the high price oil era
(1986), taken some tentative steps towards consolidation. But it is safe to assume that
the Japanese oil industry will never achieve the degree of consolidation enjoyed by its
counterparts in Italy, France and Britain. When two world wars and three oil crises have
failed to consolidate the industry, one wonders what else can achieve that aim?
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CHAPTER THREE
JAPAN'S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN
(WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO OIL)
1.0- Introduction
In this chapter Japan's economic relations with Iran will be discussed. The
emphasis will be on the oil connection as it forms the crux of the commercial and even
diplomatic relations between the two countries. Moreover, as hypothesised in the
introduction, it was the Japanese desire to gain access to Iran's oil reserves which enticed
its government and business community to support the petrochemical joint venture
between the two countries.
These relations will be analyzed within the context of the historical relations
between Japan and the Middle East, as it is imperative to know about the origins of such
connections in order to understand the current situation.
2.0- Early Contacts
Contacts between Japan and the Middle East go back many centuries. The history
of these relations can be divided into two periods: before and after the Meiji Restoration
of 1868.
Japan began to have indirect contacts with the Middle East mainly through the
Chinese in the first millennium. Among the treasures of the Shosoin in Nara, for
example, medicines, glassware and musical instruments are found that were apparently
transmitted from the Middle East. The Shosoin treasures are known to have been mainly
bequeathed by Empress Shoma who died in 756.
The first Japanese to leave some evidence of direct contact with a Persian is the
Buddhist priest Kyosei from Kyoto. In 1217 Kyosei visited a Persian trade ship at the
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Port of Quanzhou (Chuanchou) in China's Fukien Province. The two rubai poems' that
the Kyoto priest was given then have survived, and the French Orientalist, Paul Pelliot,
who had examined these quatrains concluded that they are "the oldest written Arabic
[Persian] document remaining in the Far East."2
The first Europeans that came to Japan were the Portuguese who landed there
in 1545. After them came the Spanish, then the Dutch, and other Europeans, bringing
waves of knowledge and information totally new to the Japanese at that time. Through
these contacts with Europeans of the Sixteenth Century, the Japanese learnt a great deal
about the Islamic Civilisation. In an article written in 1940, entitled "The History of
Cultural Exchange Between Japan and the Islamic World; Pre-Meiji Japanese Knowledge
about Islam and its World", Dr Hajime Kobayashi traced the process by which the
Japanese acquired, directly or indirectly, knowledge about that part of the world and its
culture.'
The Islamic people, too, learned of Japan through Chinese intermediaries. As
early as the Ninth or Tenth Century A.D, Japan appeared for the first time as "Wag
Waq" in Persian and Arabic writings. Waq Waq is believed to have been derived from
the Chinese characters for the Kingdom of Wa by which Japan was known in China.4
The people of the Middle East do not seem to have developed any knowledge of
Japan beyond the level of legend, for the fall of the Islamic Empire followed by Mongol
and Timur invasions, split the Islamic world apart and weakened it, making any further
contact very difficult. Contacts were further strained by the Tokugawa Shogonate
decision to close Japan's doors to outsiders in the Seventeenth Century. So, it was not
until the beginning of the Meiji period (18684912) that anything more than indirect,
vague knowledge of many parts of the world, including the Middle East developed.
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After more than two hundred years of national seclusion, Japan began to direct
its attention to the outside world. An increasing number of Japanese started going
abroad but their interest was focused on absorbing the cultures of Europe and North
America to formulate a model for their country's modernisation. By this time, most of
the Middle East had not yet been liberated from colonialism, and the whole region
remained in a period of cultural and economic stagnation. Due to the above reasons, the
Middle East was largely ignored by the Japanese people until very recently.
3.0- Japan's Relations with the Middle East After the First World War
Before the First World War, there was little, if any contact between Japan and
the Middle East. After the war, however, some Japanese scholars were attracted to the
rich but forgotten cultures of the Middle East and began to study the region, and some
Japanese converted to Islam. Diplomatic relations between Japan and some countries of
the region were also established in the interwar period.
Moreover, Japanese businessmen, especially textile manufacturers, started to
penetrate the Middle Eastern markets which until then been dominated by big Western
powers like Britain, France, and Russia.
Japanese interest in the Middle East and especially the Islamic culture started to
grow after the First World War, when political, economic and military relations with
China and Southeast Asia, the home of many muslin's, and also her relations with the
Axis Powers began to grow. Around the same time, European works on the religion and
the world of Islam began to be translated into Japanese. Fact finding surveys were
organised, and study programmes in Arabic and other languages of Islamic countries
began.
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3.1- Diplomatic Relations5
Prior to the First World War, Japan had little contact with the Middle East either
politically or economically. The Japanese government had, in fact, attempted to establish
relations with some Middle Eastern states, notably Turkey (the Ottoman Empire) and
Iran, before the war. Likewise, these two countries themselves wanted to establish
relations with Japan. Abdulhan-ild II, the Ottoman Empire's Caliph, in particular, was
very much in favour of such links. However, attempts by both countries to establish
relations were frustrated by the fact that they were both bound by capitulation. Similarly,
Japan and Iran attempted to establish relations with each other before the war, but their
efforts failed, largely again due to the problem of capitulation.
It was, therefore, not until the postwar years that Japan began to set up
diplomatic offices in the Middle East. The first Japanese Consulate in the region was set
up in December 1919 in Port Said (Egypt) mainly for security and protection of Japanese
shipping through the Suez Canal.
In the immediate postwar years, various peace conferences were held in Europe
to decide the destiny of the Ottoman Empire, and Japan, as a victorious power,
participated in them. It was these conferences that provided Japan with the opportunity
to become familiar with the economic and political conditions of the various Middle
Eastern nations for the first time in her history. She also became aware of these states
as potential markets for her manufactured goods but there were no diplomatic or trade
facilities available to her merchants. So after the Treaty of Lausanne, Japan signed a
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation on a "most favoured nation" basis with Turkey, and
in 1925 she established the first and only embassy in the entire Middle East in the inter-
war period at Istanbul, followed by a Consulate-General at Alexandria (Egypt) in 1926.6
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3.1.1- Diplomatic Relations with Iran
In the early postwar years some attempts were made by Iran and Japan to
conclude a commercial treaty but because the latter insisted that any Irano-Japanese
treaty ought to include extra-territorial rights for the Japanese in Iran, a proposal which
was unacceptable to the Iranians, no agreement was reached. It was, therefore, not until
after 1928, when Iran managed to abolish the capitulation, that the two countries entered
into fresh talks. Eventually, the first Irano-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation
was signed on the 31st May 1929, and the Japanese Legation was established in Tehran
on 1st August of that year.
3.2- Trade Relations Between Japan and the Middle East
As noted earlier, prior to World War One, the Middle East had been little known
to Japan either politically or economically, although small quantities of such Japanese
products as silk goods, porcelain and lacquer wares had been exported to Egypt and
Turkey, mainly through India or Europe.'
By the time Japanese cotton goods started to find their way into the Middle East,
British goods had already been known in the region for more than a century.
Furthermore, British merchants were benefitting from the security, protection and market
intelligence provided by their British diplomatic offices in the region. They also enjoyed
credit and transport facilities provided by British banks and shipping companies vb. ho had
a strong presence in the region. None of these facilities were available to Japanese
merchants. The only advantage Japan had over her European competitors at that time
was that as the standard of living in most of the Middle Eastern states was not very
different from that of Japan, what she produced for domestic consumption could mostly
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be sold to the consumers in these countries, whereas her European competitors had to
manufacture low quality, low priced goods specifically for poor consumers abroad.8
Although certain quantities of Japanese goods, textiles in particular, found their way into
the Middle East in the first half of the 1920s, the volume of these goods did not increase
substantially. The two main obstacles in the way of Japan's trade expansion in the Middle
East were transport difficulties and the insistence of Japanese exporters on cash
payments.
Under strong representation from exporters and some persuasion by Japanese
diplomats in the Balkans and Turkey, a conference on the Balkans and the Middle East
was held in Istanbul in April 1926. The conference decided to adopt four main
resolutions to put forward to the Japanese goverment. These were the establishment
of a direct Japan-East Mediterranean shipping route under government grants, the
appointment of Japanese commercial consulars or secretaries to key cities in the Balkans
and the Middle East, the establishment of commercial museums in those cities, and the
creation of an export compensation fund for insurance against export losses incurred in
cultivating new markets in the region. To these resolutions, the Japanese Foreign
Ministry added a number of other promotional measures including the formation of
export guilds of traders, the holding of circuit sample fairs, and the establishment of a
branch of the Yokohama Specie Bank in Istanbul.
During the inter-war years, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI) played
a major role in facilitating Japan's trade expansion into the Middle East. Even before
the trade conference of 1926, MCI had appointed Overseas Trade Correspondence in
1925 to Port Said. In the 1930s a Trade Correspondent was also appointed to Tehran
whose jurisdiction comprised Iran, Iraq, and Caucasia. 9
 The Ministry adopted few other
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measures to promote Japanese goods in the Middle East like dispatching commercial
travellers to take sample goods to various countries and establishing commercial
museums and trade agencies in the region. In mid-1927 the first Japanese commercial
museum was set up in Cairo, followed by a second one in Istanbul in March 1929.
Furthermore, a commercial exhibition centre attached to Japan's Legation in Tehran was
set up in 1935. However, it was closed down in 1937 together with the commercial
museum in Cairo, because the Japanese goverment considered them ineffective in trade
promotion, and instead set up trade agencies in Beirut, Alexandria, and later Baghdad.
As Japan's exports to the Middle East rose enormously, she bought practically
nothing from the region in return and, as a result, she began to accumulate huge trade
surpluses with the countries in the region (it is interesting to note that today's situation
is quite the opposite, whereby oil producing countries in the Middle East have large
trade surpluses with Japan). This allowed Japan to obtain valuable foreign exchange to
pay for her import of raw material from other parts of the world. Needless to say, this
situation caused trade frictions between some Middle Eastern countries and Japan and
a few of them resorted to protectionism and setting up trade barriers against imports of
Japanese goods.
It is important to note that in the inter-war period, the great 'oil boom' had not
yet arrived in the Middle East, and the economies of all the countries were based largely
on agriculture but Japan found it much cheaper and easier to buy her foodstuff and
other raw materials from countries which were big producers of such goods like the U.S.,
rather than the smaller ones in the Middle East (see Tables 3.1, 3.2 & 3•3).1°
1929
2.1
3.3
0.7
(e)
6.7
0.1
2.2
1934 (a)
1.8 (14)
11.8 (2)
8.4 (6)
20.4 (2)
15.3 (2)
3.9 (6)
11.3 (2)
Turkey
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Aden
Palestine
Syria
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Table 3.1 Japanese Exports to the Middle Eastern States
(1,000 yen)
1920 1929 1931 1933 1935 1937 1939
Turkey 736 2,551 3,790 2,432 3,241 2,753 876
Egypt 30,550 31,252 22,830 55,608 53,800 32,772 15,666
Iran - - - - 9,591 2,629 19,332
Iraq - - - - 22,073 23,644 24,334
Aden - - 4,809 7,193 13,208 14,177 10,002
Arabia - - - - 4,576 4,827 3,748
Total 31,286 33,903 31,429 65,233 106,489 80,802 73,952
Note: Arabia comprises Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Trucial Oman, Oman, Qatar, and North
Yemen.
Sources:Japan Statistical Yearbooks, 1949, pp.480 and 483; 1950, pp.217 and 220;
1955/56, p.249.
Table 3.2: Japan's Shares in the Total imports of the Middle Eastern States (% of Total
Values)
Notes:	 (a) The numbers in brackets refer to the order of importance as exporter
to the countries concerned.
(b) Not available.
Source:	 Shimizu, H., in "The Japanese Approach to the Contemporary Middle
East", SOAS, 1990, p.7.
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Table 3.3: Japan's Imports form the Middle Eastern States
(1,000 yen)
1920 1929 1931 1933 1935 1937 1939
Turkey 604 202 374 976 1,036 2,818 2,918
Egypt 13,263 25,824 13,568 26,456 51,305 74,118 50,312
Iran 729 1,589 6,587
Iraq 1,257 9,028 3,690
Aden 22 10 364 1,356 2,291
Arabia (a) 434 546 9
Total 13,867 26,206 13,964 27,442 55,125 89,455 64,898
Note: For Arabia see Table 3.1.
Source: Same as Table 3.1.
3.2.1- Trade Relations with Iran
Like most other Middle Eastern countries, cotton piece goods were the largest
single item of imports into Iran in the inter-war period, and accounted for a fairly large
part of her total imports.
Up until the close of the 1920s, only small quantities of Japanese cotton goods
had found their way into Iran, and the competition in that market had been mainly
between Russia, U.K., and India. In addition, cotton goods were also very important to
the principal exporters to Iran (excluding Germany): Russia, U.K, India and Japan, and
as Table 3.4 shows, these goods constituted a fairly high proportion of their total exports
to the country. In the case of Japan, as much as 76.7% of the total consisted of cottons
in 1931-1932. Therefore, if any of the four increased her market share for these goods,
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she could greatly improve her overall trading position in Iran and vice versa (see Table
3.4).
The Iran-Japan Treaty of Commerce and Navigation was signed in Tehran on 31st
May 1929 on a 'most favoured nation' basis. Moreover, in the early 1930's, a Japanese
trade correspondence was appointed to Tehran, while the two largest Japanese trading
companies: the Mitsui Bussan and the Mitsubishi Shoji, set up their own trade
representative offices in Tehran. According to an Iranian Ministry of Finance official,
these two firms worked on the policy of "large sales, small profits and quick retums."11
Thus, by the early 1930's most of the basic factors for Japan's trade expansion into Iran
were in place but one major problem remaining was the absence of direct Japan-Persian
Gulf shipping. This problem was also rectified when a direct shipping line between the
two countries was established in January 1934.
In Iran, like other Middle Eastern countries, Japanese cotton goods were much
cheaper than similar European products in the 1920s. Cheap Japanese goods became
even cheaper with the depreciation of the yen against gold which followed the
abandonment of the gold standard by Japan in December 1931. This helped Japanese
goods to become around 40-50% cheaper than similar European ones.
By 1933-34, Japan had become the second largest exporter of general merchandise
to Iran, coming only after Russia, her total export amounting to 82 million rials, as
compared to the latter's 145.1 million rials. 12 Japan would have become Iran's biggest
trading partner before the mid-1930s, had it not been for the latter's economic
difficulties, like large trade deficits and a depreciating currency. The trading position of
Japan was further weakened in March 1936, when the Iranian government reimposed the
foreign exchange control which it had abandoned in February 1932. The reimposition of
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the foreign exchange control helped to facilitate Iran's trade with Russia and Germany,
both of whom had in 1935 concluded special trade agreements with the country.
Trade with Russia was favoured by the Iranian government and merchants
because, under the barter trade agreement, Russians bought Iranian goods, especially
agricultural products, as Russia had always been the biggest customer for these products.
The relatively better transport facilities in Iran's Northern Provinces which border Russia
also greatly helped trade between the two countries.
When the Trans-Iranian Railway was completed in August 1938, she was in a
good position to transport her agricultural products from the Northern Provinces to
countries other than Russia. According to the Japanese Minister13 in Tehran, the new
railway provided Japan with a good opportunity to supply the Northern provinces of the
country with cotton piece goods, as well as matches and sugar, the bulk of which had
until then been supplied by Russia. 14 As Table 3.5 shows, Japan's share in Iran's foreign
trade jumped from 2.5% in 1938-39 to 10.5% in 1939-40, partly because of transport
facilities provided by the railway, and partly because of the change in Iran's foreign
policy.
When in August 1938 the Russo-Iranian commercial agreement of 1935 expired,
Iran did not renew it, as she wanted to move away from Russia in favour of other
countries, particularly Germany. The combination of these two factors helped Japan to
become the largest supplier of cotton goods in 1938-39.
In October 1939, the Irano-Japanese treaty of Commerce and Navigation was
signed in Tehran, although its ratification by the two governments was delayed until May
1941, largely due to Iran's economic crisis. The Japanese were hopeful that they would
continue to supply Iran with large quantities of cotton goods in the absence of Russian
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competition. But Irano-Japanese economic and political links ended when Iran was
occupied by Allied forces in August 1941.
Table 3.4:
	 Proportion of Cotton Piece Goods in the Total Exports to Iran by Her
Major Trading Partners (% of total value)
1921/22 1927/28 1931/32 1934/35 1937/38
U.S.S.R * 27.4 46.5 37.8 35.8
U.K. 40.0 (a) 41.4 63.9 12.0 36.4
India 10.6 29.8 9.1 15.7
Japan * * 76.7 75.0 68.7
Notes: *- not available.
(a)- includes India.
Source: Shimizu (1986), p.241.
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Table 3.5:	 Percentage shares of Principal Trading Nations in Iran's Foreign Trade,
1930/31-1939/40 *
Russia U.K.
+
U.S. Germany Japan France Others Total
1930/31 37 25 9 6 4 3 16 100
1931/32 39 25 9 8 2 2 15 100
1932/33 28 23 12 8 5 2 22 100
1933/34 22 22 12 13 9 2 20 100
1934/35 34 21 11 9 6 2 17 100
1935/36 39 23 11 14 6 3 14 100
1936/37 36 16 10 21 3 1.5 12.5 100
1937/38 34 13 8 27 4 2 12 100
1938/39 11.5 18 6.5 41.5 2.5 1 19 100
1939/40 0.5 17 9.5 39 10.5 2 21.5 100
Notes: *- excludes oil and non-dutiable items.
+ - includes India.
Source: Hachemzadeh (1943), Table 34, p.93.
3.3- The Oil Connection
Although oil had been discovered in the Middle East for quite some time, the
Japanese government did not make any attempts, save one, to purchase oil from the
region. As a matter of fact, oil was discovered in Iran in 1908, and in the 1920-30s in
Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain. However, oil exploration and production was
monopolised by the Anglo Persian Oil Company in Iran (renamed Anglo Iranian Oil
Company), and Iraqi Oil Company in Iraq, both of which were controlled by the British.
The Americans also won total rights over the Saudi oilfields in the 1930s. On the other
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hand, the bulk of Japan's crude and heavy oil imports came from the U.S., largely
because of low prices prevailing in California, while a large part of her refined products
were imported from the Dutch East Indies. 15
 However, Japan did import certain
quantities of crude oil from Bahrain in the second half of the 1930s 16, and Mitsubishi
Shoji made an import contract of 200,000 tonnes of Iranian oil products in 1939 and
imported 40,000 to 50,000 tonnes in 1939. 17 But this was an exception as the Anglo
Iranian Oil Company, which was the sole producer and distributor of Iranian oil had
neither import agents nor local distribution and sales networks in Japan. 18
 (AIOC might
have kept away from the Japanese oil market in accordance with the Achnacarry
Agreement which restricted competition between international oil companies.)19
However, as Japan's relations with the Allies gradually deteriorated towards the end of
the 1930s, she had to seek new sources of supplies.20
In March 1938, a major field was discovered by the Americans in Saudi Arabia,
and Japan, upon learning about it, sent a delegation in April 1939 to obtain an oil
concession from the Saudis. Although the Japanese offered various inducements to the
Saudis, no agreement for an oil concession was reached between the two and, hence,
Japan did not succeed in its one and only attempt in the inter-war period to gain access
to the Middle East oil reserves.
According to K.S. Twitchell, although the Japanese terms were "as tempting as
they were fantastic", the Saudi authorities took his advice that the Japanese were after
territorial concessions and their motives were political, not commercia1.21 However,
according to a secret Japanese Foreign Ministry document, the terms of a Saudi
concession were not acceptable to the Japanese.22 Japan also tried in the late
1930s/early 1940s to buy oil from Saudi Arabia and, according to Japan's trade statistics,
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in 1940 she imported 1,619,000 yen worth of crude from 'Arabia' which included Saudi
Arabia as well as other Arab states in the Arabian Peninsula. In the following year the
figure was 1,189,000 yen. As Japan imported 352,460,000 yen worth of crude oil in 1940,
76.7% of which came from the U.S. alone, 'Arabia' was responsible for a mere 0.46%
of her total oil imports in that year. 23 Therefore, in sharp contrast with the postwar
period, oil did not constitute the bulk of the Middle Eastern exports to Japan in the
inter-war years (in fact Middle Eastern countries hardly had any exports to Japan during
this period).
3.4- Japan's Direct Investments in the Middle East
In the inter-war period, Japan contemplated investing in the Middle East, but no
actual investment took place. First she considered the possibility of establishing cotton
textile mills in Turkey which was in desperate need of capital for the development of the
local textile industry. Both the Japanese and Turkish governments were in favour of the
plan, but it never materialised.'
Moreover, in the late 1930s, Japan planned to set up a tinned-food factory and
start the cultivation of cotton in Iraq. The proposal for these plans was made by the
Japanese government to its Iraqi counterpart in the hope that the latter would remove
the trade restrictions imposed on Japanese goods in 1936. However, the Iraqi
government rejected these proposals.25 As a result, in the inter-war period, Japan did
not make any direct investments in the Middle East.
3.5- Japan's Islamic Policy
Besides her rapid trade expansion in the late 1930s, Japan became increasingly
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interested in political and strategic aspects of the Middle East. Ever since the First
World War, there had been a number of events which seemed to have caused her to
move closer to Germany and Italy in the second half of the 1930s. First, when in 1911
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance Treaty of 1902 expired, the British refused to renew it in
favour of closer co-operation with the United States in the Pacific region. Then in 1931,
Japan invaded Manchuria but the League of Nations refused to recognise it. So the
Japanese goverment announced in March 1933 that she would leave the League in two
years time. Similarly, when Italy invaded Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in October 1935, the
League of Nations declined to acknowledge it either. However, by mutual agreement,
Japan recognised Italy's position in Abyssinia while the Italian government gave its
recognition to Japan's position in Manchuria.
Germany also announced its intention to leave the League of Nations in October
1933. As a result of these developments, Japan, Italy and Germany, in late 1937, by
means of two treaties, created the informal 'Tokyo-Rome-Berlin' alliance. These treaties
were followed by a formal military pact in September 1940. However, as Japan and her
Axis partners were located in the Far East and Europe respectively, and as the main
communication routes passed through the Middle East, Japan became increasingly aware
of the strategic value of the various Middle Eastern states. Since all the countries in the
region were Islamic, she also became interested in Islam as well.
Furthermore, Japan began to consider the possibility of mobilising muslim forces
to fight against China, Russia and the U.K., in various parts of Asia, particularly after
the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937.
In furtherance of this policy, Han Wakabayashi who was closely associated with
the militarists in Japan, in 1924 sent Ippei Tanaka, a Japanese muslim convert on
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pilgrimage to Mecca for the first time. 26 At that time only a few Japanese supported
him. But gradually several influential men in the government including the War Minister,
General Araki, began to give their support to him. In 1933, Wakabayashi invited Rashid
Ibrahim, a renowned muslim from Turkey, to settle down in Tokyo to promote Islamic
activities in Japan. Also in the 1930s a group of Japanese were sent to Mecca several
times by him, and the expenses for these trips were often borne by large Japanese
firms."
As the Sino-Japanese War progressed, the Japanese government itself began to
implement the pro-Islamic policy and various measures were taken by the authorities to
promote Japan's Islamic activities both at home and abroad. These measures included:
setting up several associations and societies for the study and promotion of Islam, which
in turn published many journals on Islamic affairs. Other measures were: the
establishment of a Committee on Jewish and Islamic Questions in 1938, bringing
overseas muslirns to Japan under direct government control, providing subsidies and tax
exemptions for setting up mosques in Tokyo and other places, inviting Islamic religious
leaders and scholars to visit Japan and finally, the legalisation of the Islamic religion.28
Japan was now looking for ways to implement her pro-Islamic policy with
reference to the Middle East. The Japanese Ambassador to Istanbul, and the War
Minister, both contended that, on account of the strategic importance of the Arab
countries, it would be necessary for Japan to formulate two sets of Islamic policy: one
specifically for the Arab states mainly against the British, and the other one for the
countries bordering Russia (Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan).
So, the Japanese authorities were becoming more and more interested in
mobilising the muslim forces against the Chinese, Russians and the British, while moving
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closer to their Axis partners in the late 1930s. But as Japan began to be engaged in the
Pacific War in 1941, she had no resources left for the implementation of her Islamic
policy in the Middle East. Nevertheless, during the Pacific War, the Japanese made use
of their Islamic policy in Southeast Asia, notably the Dutch East Indies.29
3.6- End of Japan-Middle East Relations
After the collapse of France in 1940 and the declaration of war on the Allies by
Italy, the war intensified in Europe and soon spread to the Middle East. As Japan was
one of Axis partners, the Suez canal was closed to Japanese Shipping and, thereafter,
only limited quantities of Japanese goods could be imported to the Middle East through
the Port of Basra. Several Middle Eastern countries severed their relations with Japan
and it was then that Japanese goods began to disappear completely from these markets.
The new pro-British government of Iraq severed her relations with Japan on 16th
November 1941, followed by Egypt on the 8th December the same year. Iran was
invaded and occupied by the Russians in the north and by the British in the south in
August 1941, and severed relations with Japan under strong British pressure.
4.0- JAPAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE MIDDLE EAST AITLR WORLD WAR TWO
It was from the early 1950's onwards that relations between Japan and the Middle
East which had been broken during the Second World War began to be re-established.
During the war, however, there was great admiration for Japan because she was in
conflict with the countries that were the main colonial powers in the Middle-East.
Support for Japan also stemmed from pride that a 'non-white' country had taken on the
dominant 'white' order and done well.
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Towards the end of the war, Japan was occupied by the Allied forces (American)
and remained so until 1952. During the Occupation, the Americans implemented two
policies namely demilitarization and democratization, which were to have long term
effects on Japan in the politico-economic spheres (these two policies are discussed in
chapter Two, with especial emphasis to their effects on the Japanese energy industries).
Moreover, in 1951 Japan signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Japan-
US Security Treaty. These treaties too, had a decisive impact on Japan's future, making
her security dependent upon the politico-military and economic systems of the free world
for whose maintenance the U.S. was primarily responsible. Since then, in political and
security fields, Japan's relations with the United States has been the cornerstone of her
foreign policy, including her policy towards the Middle East. This set-up enabled Japan
to concentrate almost exclusively on economic activities, some argue to the determent
of an active foreign policy. Japan's foreign policy during the 1950s and 1960s which were
decades of high growth was characterised by 'passive diplomacy' and 'low posture' and
placed a heavy emphasis on external economic relations.
4.1- Japan's Diplomatic Relations with the Middle East
During the years immediately following the Second World War, the Japanese
were too preoccupied with their physical survival and with national reconstruction to pay
much attention to the Middle East. With the conclusion of a formal peace treaty in 1951,
however, Japan began to rebuild her pre-war network of foreign ties as part of a long-
term policy designed to rehabilitate her international image and develop overseas trade.
Nonetheless, re-establishing relations with the southeast Asian countries which Japan had
occupied during the war was not easy as they regarded her efforts with suspicion. But the
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countries of the Middle East had not engaged in warfare with Japan and did not fear any
resurgence of Japanese activity, so diplomatic relations were re-established with little
difficulty.'
4.2- Japan's Trade Relations with the Middle East
With the attainment of full independence, coupled with nationalisation of their
oil resources, and the subsequent increased revenues from it after the war, many Middle
Eastern countries, particularly the oil producing ones, began to implement economic
development programmes. Many of these programmes called for large-scale increases in
imported capital goods from the industrialised countries, and Japan, in many respects,
was in a good position to meet these demands. Probably, the most important factor was
that Japan did not have a legacy of imperialism and intrusion in the Middle East. In
addition, Japan's apolitical image of technical proficiency without the 'political baggage',
made her a less politically obtrusive and controversial partner in development than was
the case for other developed countries. Furthermore, the Japanese model of development
was attractive for these countries which were hoping to follow her example. So the
Middle Eastern countries were as eager as Japan to deepen their mutual economic ties.
Therefore, immediately following the re-establishment of diplomatic relations, Japan
opened sales offices in Cairo, Beirut, Tehran and other Middle Eastern cities, made
economic agreements, exchanged trade delegations and participated in Middle Eastern
trade fairs and exhibitions.
As the pace of economic development and expectations of higher living standards
in the Middle East, particularly the oil producing nations, increased, so did the import
of goods from abroad, including Japan. Big trading firms, as in the pre-war period,
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exported capital as well as consumer goods to the region which were sometimes financed
by Japanese banks and manufacturers. Textiles again became the leading Japanese
export commodity to the Middle East. During the early and mid-1950s, cotton, rayon,
synthetic fibre and woollen fabrics constituted over two-thirds of Japanese exports to the
region, with annual sales exceeding $75,000,000. 31 However, the pattern of exports
started to change during the 1960s, and goods, including capital goods, became a major
export to the region (see Table 3.6). Sales of Japanese machinery (excluding such
'precision goods' as cameras and binoculars) in the Middle East multiplied 8.5 times
between 1955 and 1965, from $10 million to $85 million. By the end of 1972, sales
increased almost five times more to $400 million. 32
 While the value of Japanese exports
to the Middle East each year between the 1950s and early 1970s never exceeded 5% of
Japan's overall foreign sales, they nevertheless surged ahead substantially, from 6,493
million yen ($18 million) in 1950 to 58,38 million yen ($162 million) in 1960 and to
330,433 million yen ($1.1 billion) in 1972 (see Table 3.7). Japan quickly became and
remained one of the single most important sources of foreign made commodities for
Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (Table 3.7).
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Table 3.6: Structure of Japan's Exports to the Middle East in 1960 and 1972 (% of total
values)
Textiles Chemicals Metal & Metal
Products
Machinery &
Equipment
Egypt 1960 2.4 2.6 13.9 29.0
1972 3.2 4.7 51.0 31.1
Iran 1960 48.6 0.0 9.4 26.8
1972 17.5 2.9 33.3 33.0
Iraq 1960 60.6 0.2 3.8 17.8
1972 8.5 3.2 35.4 47.0
Kuwait 1960 42.2 1.8 12.7 19.1
1972 21.8 1.5 12.6 50.2
Saudi 1960 34.0 1.3 33.2 11.2
Arabia 1972 15.0 1.0 29.3 43.0
Sources: JETRO, 1969, pp.44, 75, 96, 127, & 285.
Japan Statistical Yearbook 1973/74. pp.298-99.
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Table 3.7: Japanese Exports to the Middle Eastern Countries (in millions of yens)
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1972
Turkey	 49 1,272 2,160 4,019 5,727 11,850
Egypt	 955 5,124 7,336 6,973 4,448 5,294
Iran	 1,202 8,072 12,476 21,016 64,350 99,088
Iraq	 706 7,756 6,762 8,748 5,738 9,559
South
Yemen	 2,665 3,461 5,627 10,959 7,362 3,543
North
Yemen 15 65 1,334 4,915
Saudi
Arabia	 273 2,372 5,612 17,453 30,167 73,238
Kuwait	 171 2,265 8,067 14,681 33,968 35,805
Bahrain	 54(a) 644 1,622 2,037 5,034 7,963
Muscat
& Oman	 14(a) 150 100 278 847 2,124
U.A.E. (b) (b) (b) (b) 29,654
Qatar (b) (b) (b) (b) 4,978
Trucial Oman &
Qatar 716 1,688 2,846 13,284 (c)
Syria	 173(d) 2,502 2,489 3,592 5,804 9,878
Lebanon	 209(a) 434 2,111 5,974 10,613 14,712
Jordan	 10(a) 637 1,421 2,358 3,963 4,409
Israel
	
12 533 902 7.573 7.190 13.423
Total	 6,493 35,938 58,038 108,572 200,099 330,423
Notes: (a) 1951. (b) included in Trucial Oman & Qatar.
(c) included in U.A.E. & Qatar. (d) 1951 and does not include Latakia
Source: Japan Statistical Yearbook 1951, p.196; 1966, pp.294, 295, 297; 1975, pp.288-90;
Institute of Developing Economies 1973, pp.18-24.
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Even more significant for the growth of Japanese-Middle Eastern trade relations
during the 1950s and 1960s were Japanese imports from that region which rose from
13,261 million yen in 1950 to 1,066,545 million yen in 1972 (see Table 3.9). The bulk of
these imports comprised crude oil and Japan, in sharp contrast with the pre-war years,
began to have large trade deficits with the Middle Eastern countries. The region's share
in total Japanese imports rose sharply from 3.8% in 1950 to 7.6% in 1955, 11.7% in 1965,
and 14.8% in 1972.33
There were also significant changes in the composition of the Middle Eastern
countries' exports to Japan from the pre-war period. Before the war, raw cotton made
up the bulk of the region's exports to Japan. Although it remained the main export item
for some Middle Eastern countries like Egypt, Turkey and Syria, it was oil which
constituted the bulk of the region's exports to Japan. For example, in 1967 mineral fuels
(mainly crude oil) accounted for 98.2% of Iran's total exports to Japan, 99.2% of
Kuwait's, 99.6% of Saudi Arabia's, and 97.8% of Iraq's.34
This steep rise in Japanese imports from the Middle East was not, however, in the
view of some countries in the region, sufficient. For instance, Iraq was unhappy with
Japan's meagre purchases of her agricultural products like raw cotton and especially
dates, and on several occasions imposed heavy tariffs on, or even banned imports of
Japanese goods, in order to force the latter to increase her imports of these commodities.
Likewise, Iran, which did not consider the sale of her oil by the international Majors as
her own exports to Japan, imposed heavy duties on Japanese products, so that the latter
would increase her direct purchase of Iranian oil. (This point will be discussed in detail
in future sections.) On the other hand, countries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which
did not have indigenous industries to protect, or did not have any other commodities
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other than oil to offer, did not place any restrictions on Japanese goods and even
encouraged such imports.
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Table 3.8: The Middle Eastern Countries' Exports to Japan (in millions of yen)
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1972
Turkey 42 396 1,010 1,338 1,206 6,327
Egypt 4,392 10,643 6,711 10,071 17,042 10,227
Iran 78 7,920 8,988 88,898 353,308 458,818
Iraq 2,334 2,055 23,798 26,030 66 1,698
South
Yemen
364 1,159 494 3,345 6,741 2,246
North
Yemen
26 (a) 424 339 171 648 467
Saudi
Arabia
3,922 35,169 37,971 83,290 156,634 277,571
Bahrain 186 (a) 360 2,959 6,368 9,119 8,066
Muscat
& Oman
324 2 23,385 39,641
Kuwait 741 5,914 73,890 109,981 110,989 168,868
U.A.E. (b) (b) (b) (b) 69,563
Qatar (b) (b) (b) (b) 1,454
Trucial
Oman &
Qatar
709 421 5,329 42,290 (c)
Syria 1,166 (d) 1,425 959 401 6,026 2,072
Lebanon 37 199 156 621 584
Jordan 356 238 51 881
Israel 460 599 9,004 10,017 18,062
Total 13,261 67,351 158,388 334,622 752,141 1,066,545
Notes: (a) 1951
(b) included in Trucial Oman & Qatar.
(c) included in U.A.E. & Qatar. (d) 1951, and does not include Latakia.
Sources: Same as Table 3.7.
125
4.2.1- Trade Relations With Iran
Japan's trade relations with Iran were re-established after the war on a moderate
scale. The main reason for this was the oil nationalisation dispute between Iran and the
U.K. which lasted for two years from 1951 to 1953, bringing oil exports, Iran's main
source of foreign currency earning to an almost complete halt. However, with the
resolution of the dispute by means of the August 1953 military coup, her oil exports were
resumed in 1954 by the newly formed Iranian Consortium which was made up of Major
international oil companies. (This point will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.)
The Consortium members rapidly increased the sale of Iranian oil to Japan and,
as a result, Japan's trade balance with Iran went into a deficit in 1961 and has continued
up to now (see Tables 3.7, 3.8, & 3.9). This situation was quite the reverse of the pre-war
situation when Iran's trade with Japan was in chronic deficit (see Tables 3.1 & 3.3).
As mentioned before, crude oil accounted for 98.2% of Iran's exports to Japan.
However, Iran did not consider oil exported to Japan by the Consortium as her own
export and, therefore, believed that she had a trade deficit with the latter. Furthermore,
Japan, due to the limited range and low quality of Iranian goods (other than oil), did not
import large quantities of Iranian commodities. These two factors propelled the Iranian
government into imposing import restrictions on Japanese goods in the 1950s. In order
to remove these restrictions, the Japanese government decided in 1960, to grant Iran a
loan of US$17 million. This offer of a loan probably contributed to the conclusion in
October 1960 of an Iranian-Japanese trade agreement which was valid for one year and
renewable. Under the terms of the agreement, Japan agreed to purchase US$12 million
worth of Iranian produce (other than crude oil).35 Japan, however, failed to buy
products to the agreed amount so Iran refused to renew the trade agreement and re-
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imposed restrictions on Japanese imports. In January, she replaced the restrictions with
a monopoly tax (cif 5%) on Japanese imports. This tax was removed when, in July
1964, a new trade agreement, valid for one year, was signed between the two countries.
This agreement was renewed for only one more year because Japan did not accede to
the "Iranian demands for the purchases of US$8 million worth of non-oil commodities
and US$4 million worth of crude oil from the National Iranian Oil Company."37
Finally, in order to resolve these commercial disputes, Japan, in November 1968
sent a large trade delegation to Iran. This delegation which was made up of officials as
well as leading businessmen, succeeded in concluding a new trade agreement with Iran
under which Japan agreed to import 240,000 tons of Iranian liquified petroleum gas
(LPG) per year starting from 1970 in return for the non-discriminatory treatment of
Japanese imports in the Iranian market.38 The new trade agreement seems to have
finally settled the trade disputes between Iran and Japan, as from then on no major
commercial conflicts arose between the two.
It was during the above mentioned Japanese trade delegation's visit to Iran that
the idea of a petrochemical joint venture was first discussed between the Misui & Co's
Chairman (a member of the delegation), and the National Petrochemical Company of
Iran.
127
Table 3.9: Japan's Trade with Iran, (1960-1990)
(US$ 1,000)
Year Export Import Year Export Import
1960 34,656 24,968 1976 1,706,560 4,448,077
1961 42,007 44,286 1977 1,926,416 4,242,932
1962 25,325 88,716 1978 2,691,082 4,243,623
1963 36,111 137,625 1979 925,392 4,271,331
1964 46,831 202,366 1980 1,529,530 4,100,950
1965 58,379 246,939 1981 1,485,520 1,920,062
1966 71,885 362,152 1982 934,904 2,566,883
1967 77,057 528,795 1983 2,819,888 4,231,432
1968 136,689 623,445 1984 1,692,123 2,868,849
1969 157,458 817,582 1985 1,347,653 2,505,828
1970 178,749 995,301 1986 1,144,486 1,383,258
1971 237,546 1,361,353 1987 1,043,202 1,555,595
1972 321,715 1,489,668 1988 807,836 1,164,199
1973 484,170 1,921,643 1989 922,435 1,792,294
1974 1,013,556 4,766,182 1990 1,617,000 3,460,000
1975 1.854,296 4.977.849
Source: Ministry of International Trade and Industry.
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4.3- Japanese Oil Imports from the Middle East
As discussed in Chapter Two, before the Second World War, Japan relied on coal
and hydro-electric power for energy. Crude oil and oil products, which comprised about
only 10% of her energy requirements were mainly imported from the U.S and the Dutch
East Indies. From the beginning of the 1950s onward, however, for various reasons, a
large scale shift within Japanese industry from coal to heavy oil and electricity took
place. These reasons included a protracted strike by coal miners in 1952, the importation
of oil based foreign technology, availability of stable oil supplies at low prices, and so on.
By 1960, a large number of heavy industries like iron and steel mills found it much
cheaper to replace their coal burning units with heavy oil burning ones. Many thermal
electricity-generating plants shifted to heavy oil as well. Japans petrochemical industry
also grew very fast during this period, while the rapid rise in Japanese living standards
was accompanied by increased car ownership and by the use of kerosene instead of
charcoal for heating, cooking and lighting. Petroleum became the fastest growing industry
as well as the leading source of energy for Japan. In both oil consumption and total
refining capacity, Japan soon became the third most important nation in the world, after
the United States and the Soviet Union.
However, as discussed in Chapter Two, Japan was most deficient in crude oil
reserves and production. The domestic oil industry was at best only capable of supplying
1 to 2% of the country's total needs and, hence, Japan's imports of crude oil escalated
as her pace of life accelerated. In fact, long before OPEC raised it's price of petroleum,
these imports had become the single largest drain on Japan's foreign exchange reserves.
In general, Japanese oil imports can be affected by three main factors: First,
economic and political factors in oil producing countries such as the discovery of major
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new oilfields, pricing of crude oil by the producers, revolution, war, coup d'etat, oil
export bans to Japan, and oil price disputes; Second, mainly economic and, occasionally,
political factors in Japan including implementation and abolition of the foreign exchange
quota law, tightening of air pollution control standards, fuel changes in the power
generation sector, and import bans or restrictions on particular suppliers in co-operation
with United Nations sanctions and in sympathy with U.S. sanctions; Third, other external
factors such as policies and activities of international oil companies. 39
 These three
factors, singularly or jointly have affected oil supplies to Japan from the beginning of the
industry right up to now and will continue to do so in the future (few examples of the
affects of these factors are discussed in Chapter Two).
Here the second one, namely the Japanese domestic factor will be discussed in
detail. As oil has the following economic and political characteristics, the Japanese
government (principally MITI) has been compelled to assume powers to regulate the
domestic petroleum industry. First, from the beginning of the 1960s, oil became the most
important energy source and industrial raw material, the single largest import item in
terms of value and volume, and also the single largest source of indirect tax.4° Second,
as noted in the previous chapter, despite its strategic and economic importance. Japanese
petroleum imports were being controlled by foreign oil companies. MITI feared that
these companies might impose monopolistic prices on Japanese oil firms and, hence,
make the Japanese industry as a whole uncompetitive in international markets.
Accordingly, MITI aspired to consolidate the domestic oil industry and strengthen the
position of Japanese oil firms vis-a-vis international oil companies. MITI has tried to
achieve this objective by first utilising the Foreign Exchange Law, then by the enactment
of the Petroleum Industry Law (1962), and in the 1970s-80s by the the extensive exercise
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of its administrative authority on capacity expansion and oil imports. (See Chapter two
for details).
Probably, among the Japanese factors that affect oil imports, the most important
one is the oil strategy adopted by MTTI, i.e. its consistent policy to reduce the import
price of oil. For example, until 1962 , when the Foreign Exchange Law was in operation,
MITI made full use of it to encourage importers to buy oil more cheaply by adopting
actual imported volumes as a basis for allocating foreign exchange. Refiners reacted to
this incentive by shifting part of their imports to cheap heavy crude available from the
Middle East. As a result, according to M.A. Adelman "until 1962, crude prices to
Japanese buyers were probably the lowest in the world". 41 Moreover, ever since the
enactment of the Petroleum Industry law in 1962, MITI has tried to prop up the
domestic oil industry and increase production of overseas oil under Japanese control in
order to weaken the hold of international oil companies over the supply of this vital
commodity to Japan.
Another domestic factor which affects Japanese oil imports are environmental
protection laws. During the 1950s and early 1960s the lack of industrial pollution control
measures persuaded oil consumers to use the cheapest types of oil available. This usually
meant burning of heavy crude oil imported from the Middle East (mainly from Kuwait),
and heavy fuel oil. However, by 1962, when industrial pollution had became very serious,
MITI adopted various measures to reduce the emission of harmful gases and sulphur into
the air. This resulted in switching to crudes with lower sulphur contents which in turn
caused a change in sources of supply (to Iranian crude).
Finally, the other main domestic factor which affects Japan's oil imports is the
change in the pattern of demand for oil products. For instance, in the 1950s and the
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1960s, unlike other major industrial nations, industrial demand was far greater than other
demands for oil. This in turn precipitated a refining pattern dominated by fuel oil.
Japanese refiners responded to this particular pattern of demand by importing more
heavy crude than refiners in the United States and Western Europe. Nevertheless, ever
since the first oil shock of 1973, there has been a marked change in the pattern of
Japanese demand for oil products in which the industrial demand has been steadily
falling and private, especially transport, demand has been increasing. There were three
main factors behind this change in the pattern of oil consumption. First, a change
occured in Japan's industrial policy whereby the emphasis shifted from heavy and energy
intensive industries to promoting knowledge intensive industries such as electronics and
computers.42
 Second, Japanese industry and businesses, with active encouragement of
the goverment (such as financial and tax incentives) developed and adopted various
energy conservation technologies and methods. 43
 Third, with the huge expansion of the
GNP in the 1960s and the rise in incomes and living standards, demands for public and
private transport rose substantially. These changes have resulted in a reduction in the
demand for lower distilates such fuel oil and increased consumption of higher distilates
such as diesel and gasoline.
Another domestic factor, as will be explained later, was the tight environmental
regulations which severly restricted burning of high sulphur oil by the industry.
These shifts in demand have in turn caused a drop in the imports of heavy crude
and a rise in the import of light ones into Japan, which in turn have influenced sources
of supply.
Now, the other two factors which affected imports of oil into Japan in the 1950s
and the 1960s will be briefly examined. First, oil production in the Middle East rapidly
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increased after 1945 with the expansion and development of oil fields in Iran, Iraq,
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The expanded production coincided with Japan's growing
demands for oil. As a result, Japan became quickly dependent on Middle East for
around 80% of her petroleum needs (see Table 3.11). Imports of crude oil from the
Persian Gulf doubled in value every few years, from $93 million in 1953 to $175 million
in 1956 and $369 million in 1960, and from $917 million in 1965 to 1.86 billion in 1970
and $3.3 billion in 1972. 44 Throughout most of the 1950s, Saudi Arabia was Japan's
leading supplier of crude, but Kuwait assumed the lead in 1959, and in turn was
succeeded by Iran in the early 1960s.
Several factors precipitated the almost total dependence of Japan on Middle
Eastern oil. First, the development of vast oil reserves throughout the Persian Gulf
region made it the most important oil exporting area in the world to which the Japanese
could easily turn. The second reason was that it was preferred for purely commercial
reasons. Production costs were relatively low, and price reductions during the 1950s and
1960's, including large discounts extended to Japanese purchasers by Major oil
companies, made Middle Eastern exports competitive in the Japanese market. The third
factor was that rapid advances in shipbuilding technology dramatically reduced
transportation costs between the Persian Gulf and Japan's Pacific coast. As noted earlier,
it was MITI's policy to reduce the price of oil which is a basic factor of production to
Japanese industry (although this point is disputed by some, see Chapter Two). As the oil
from the Middle East was the most competitive in terms of price and, moreover, as oil
from that region suited the particular demand pattern prevalent at the time in Japan,
imports of oil from the Middle East rapidly increased in the 1950s/60s. However,
probably the most significant factor was the creation of close ties between the leading
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Japanese oil refineries and major Western oil companies. In fact, the seven largest
international oil companies known as "Seven Sisters" which directly or indirectly supplied
the major part of the Japanese oil imports in the 1950s/60s, controlled 77.1% of total
OPEC oil production in 1972.45
As a result of these factors, Japan had, by 1962, become the Middle East's
second most important oil market after the U.K. During the following decade she was
also the leading customer for the three largest oil producing states in the region: Iran,
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
After the Second World War, the import of Saudi oil which was being produced
by the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco), and whose member companies were
present in the Japanese market, rapidly increased, peaking at 53.4% in 1951. This was
the largest share ever attained by any single country. However, imports from Kuwait
raised swiftly after 1956 and overtook imports of Saudi oil in 1959. These two countries
maintained a dominance in the Japanese market, accounting for more than 50% of its
oil imports throughout the 1950s. The rapid increase in demand for Kuwaiti oil in the
late 1950s can be attributed to two Japanese factors: the foreign exchange quota law,
which encouraged imports of cheap oil, and the peculiar Japanese demand pattern for
heavy fuel oil. Kuwaiti oil had a high sulphur content which was suitable for the
production of industrial fuels, as well as making it cheaper than other types of crude. The
combination of these two factors made Kuwait the largest supplier of crude oil to Japan
from the early to mid-1960s (see Table 3.10).
While these countries did not become dependent on Japan for the sale of crude
oil, revenues from the oil exports to Japan played a significant role in financing their
development programmes and covering related import costs.
134
Although Japan purchased most of her oil from the Middle East through
American, British and Dutch-controlled companies in the late 1950s and early 1960s, she
also tried to bypass them whenever suitable opportunities arose, in order to secure a
diverse and stable supply of oil. Japan negotiated long-term petroleum import contracts
directly with non-Middle Eastern oil producing countries, and also sought to establish
Japanese-owned supplies of crude oil through the development of overseas oil
concessions. In 1957-1958, the Japan Petroleum Company secured the exploration rights
to the 7200km offshore area of the Saudi-Kuwaiti Neutral Zone on behalf of its
subsidiary, the Arabian Oil Company (AOC).
The early 1960s were marked by Japan's efforts to stabilise her supply of crude
oil within the Middle East by purchasing significantly larger amounts of oil from Iran.
While Iran had consistently ranked only fifth as a source of oil imports in the late 1950s
(after Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Indonesia), by 1966 she ranked first (far ahead of
Kuwait), and by 1970 nearly half of all crude oil shipments passing through the Straits
of Hormus and bound for Japan originated from Iran. There were two reasons for this.
First, Japan sought to minimise the negative impact of any future Arab-Israeli war on
their oil supplies. And second, it was due to the Shah's pressure on the Consortium to
sell more Iranian oil to finance a massive and expensive programme of national
development (as well as to purchase sophisticated arms from the West).
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Table 3.10(a): Crude Oil Imports into Japan by Countries of Origin (in 1,000 barrels a
day, b/d)
(% of total in brackets)
1960 1965 1970 1975
Middle East 452 (80.1) 1,338 (89) 2,859 (84.7) 3,541 (78.2)
Saudi
Arabia 110 (19.5) 292 (19.4) 490 (14.4) 1,156 (25.5)
Iran 23 (4) 329 (21.7) 1,470 (43.5) 1,122 (24.8)
U.A.E. 8 156 (4.6) 418 (9.2)
Kuwait 218 (38.7) 356 (23.7) 287 (8.5) 387 (8.5)
Neutral
Zone 29 (5.1) 248 (16.5) 349 (10.3) 232 (5.1)
Oman 97 (3.0) 129 (2.8)
Iraq 70 (12.4) 96 (6.4) 94 (2.0)
Qatar 2 12 4 3
Pacific
Basin(a) 83 (14.7) 108 (7.2) 449 (13.3) 850 (18.8)
Others(b) 29 (5.1) 57 (3.8) 68 (2.0) 137 (3.0)
Total 564 (100) 1,503 (100) 3,375 (100) 4,528 (100)
Notes: (a) Includes Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, China, and Australia.
(b) Includes Africa, Venezuela, and USSR.
Source: Campbell 1985, p.134.
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Table 3.10(b): Crude Oil Imports into Japan by Countries of Origin (thousands of barrels
a day)
Source 1980 1985 1989
Middle East* 3,066,487 2,338,532 2,939,301
Iran 97,613 236,237 439,915
Saudi Arabia 1,416,724 459,342 803,076
Neutral Zone 231,704 206,109 143,439
Kuwait 152,338 57,389 77,921
Iraq 237,504 108,019 181,510
UAE 630,297 754,581 878,589
Qatar 148,834 214,903 246,354
Oman 150,559 301,952 262,662
N.Yemen 914+ -- 5,835
S.E.Asia 870,787 570,165 696,598
China 164,103 219,642 267,229
Africa 76,331 43,801 16,753
USSR 1,884 2,637 958
Others 114,725 224,518 188,754
TOTAL 4,294,317 3,399,295 4,109,593
Notes: *- The figures for the Middle East refer to the total
of all the countries in rows 3-11.
+ - Bahrain
Source: Hamauzu, in Japan in the Contemporary Middle East (1993), p.60.
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3.3.1- Oil Imports from Iran46
As discussed earlier, Japan, with one exception, did not import any oil from Iran
in the pre-war period. After the war, six out of seven major international oil companies
established or re-established their presence in the Japanese market by setting up joint-
ventures with Japanese oil companies, or entering into long-term agreements for the
supply of crude to independent oil firms. Anglo Iranian Oil Company (A10C), the other
Major, which was the sole producer of Iranian oil, however, stayed out of the Japanese
market. So when in 1950, Japan resumed imports of crude oil, no Iranian oil entered her
market. Nevertheless, the path for the export of Iranian oil had already been opened
since in 1947 and 1948, ATOC had signed long term agreements with Standard Oil of
New Jersey (Exxon) and Socony-Vacuum respectively. But only a small quantity of
Iranian oil was imported into Japan in 1951 before the production and export of Iranian
oil came to a complete halt in June 1951 with the nationalisation of the Iranian oil
industry by the goverment of Dr Mossadeq.
The nationalisation sparked off a prolonged conflict between the Iranian
government on one side and the AlOC and the British government on the other, and
resulted in the boycott of Iranian oil by all Major oil companies. The Iranian government
tried to sell crudes and products directly but there were no buyers because of the risk
of legal disputes with ATOC. The only exceptions were a few Italian and Japanese
companies which purchased a small quantity of oil from Iran. In the case of Japan,
Idemitsu Kosan, an independent oil company which then had no refinery, bought 130,261
kl of motor gasoline and 49,376 Id of diesel oil in 1953. Apart from this, no Iranian oil
was exported to Japan in 1952 and 1953.
After the coup of August 1953 which overthrew the Mossadeq government,
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Iranian oil was put under the control of a consortium that comprised the seven Majors
and CFP of France. Later on some American independents also joined the consortium.
The establishment of the Iranian Consortium whose members, with the exception of
British Petroleum (the new name of AIOC) and CFP, had their own outlets in Japan,
provided Iran with a big opportunity to cultivate the ever expanding Japanese market.
Even BP and CFP made long term agreements with Japanese non-affiliates for the
supply of Iranian crude. Furthermore, Gulf Oil, which did not have its own refinery in
Japan, signed a long term contract for the supply of its share of Iranian crude production
with Idernitsu Kosan, which had the largest product market share in Japan.
Although Iranian oil exports to Japan began soon after the establishment of the
Consortium, her share of the market remained very small until 1960. Iran's share of the
Japanese oil market, however, rose sharply from 4% in 1960 to 43.5% in 1970 and
continued to rise until 1973. She overtook Kuwait in 1966 as the largest suppl i er of oil
to Japan and maintained that position until 1975 when she was supplanted by Saudi
Arabia. Iran was in effect the largest crude supplier to Japan during her high economic
growth period of the 1960s and early 1970s.
Many factors, domestic as well as external, contributed to the dramatic rise in the
import of Iranian oil into Japan in that period. The two most important domestic factors
were the tighter control of SO, emission from factories and the demand pattern for
petroleum products in Japan.
With the development of heavy and chemical industries and the rapid increase in
power generation, Japanese oil consumption sharply increased from 34,000 barrels a day
(b/d) in FY1950 to 625,000 b/d in FY1960. As a result of the increasing use of oil, Japan
faced serious air pollution and extensive environmental damage in industrial areas. The
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situation had deteriorated so much that even the government which had given top
priority to industrial production and economic development became concerned, and by
the end of the 1950s was forced to take action to protect people. In 1962, the
government introduced a law which regulated the emission of SO, from factories. 47 This
law had a profound impact on Japanese crude imports as refiners and industrial users
of oil, particularly electric power companies, had to comply with the new law by
increasing imports of crude with lower sulphur contents. The weak financial positions of
refiners did not allow them to invest in desulphurisation plants fast enough, and so they
had to rely increasingly on imports of lower sulphur oil to meet the rapidly rising
demand.
Iranian Heavy crude oil had the characteristics to meet the requirements of the
law, and so was favoured by the refiners. Its sulphur content was much lower than the
Arabian Heavy and Kuwaiti crude, and even lower than the Arabian Light, yet the
consortium priced it very competitively compared with its rivals. The economic value of
that crude sold at heavy oil's price was highly appreciated by Japanese buyers, who
rapidly increased their purchases from Iran.
As a result of the enactment of the first law concerning the control of SO,
emission, imports of Iranian oil more than doubled from 40,000 b/d in 1961 to 98,000
b/d in 1962. Imports of Iranian oil rose from 20,000 b/d in 1960 to 1.649 million b/d in
1973 when it peaked. The rate of increase in the imports of Iranian Heavy into Japan
during that period was particularly impressive. It rose strongly during the 1960s from
3,000 b/d in 1960 and peaked at 1.12 million b/d in 1971. Imports of Light and other
types of Iranian oil also increased during this period, although at a lower rate (see Table
3.12). The Iranian crudes became so important to Japanese refiners that they built
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refineries solely for them in order to maximise operating ratios and yields from them.
Also during this period, the unique Japanese demand pattern for industrial fuel
oil changed very little which further helped the Iranian crudes.
There were external factors as well which greatly contributed to the exports of
Iranian oil to Japan. First, the Iranian Consortium was constantly being pressed by the
Shah to increase production and export of oil so that his government would receive
enough foreign exchange to carry out developmental programmes as well as to enable
him to purchase sophisticated arms from the West. Due to these pressures, and for the
political stabilisation of the Shah's regime which was in their own interests as well the
West's, the Consortium vigorously promoted Iranian oil in foreign markets. The Japanese
market was the most appropriate candidate for this purpose because her demand for
crude oil was increasing by leaps and bounds and, moreover, her market was large
enough to absorb increasing amounts of oil from Iran without reducing exports from
other sources. So the Consortium members granted Japanese refiners loans at
concessionary rates in order to expand their capacity, in exchange for accepting Iranian
crude on a long-term basis. Second, the international oil Majors whose main profits lay
in upstream, i.e. oil production, and not in refining, found the expanding Japanese
market the most suitable outlet for their crude produced in the Middle East and
especially Iran. The other attraction of the Japanese market for the majors was that in
the 1960s the U.S. government introduced restrictions on the imports of foreign oil into
the country and, thereby, denied them the world's largest oil market. So the majors
increasingly turned their attention to the second biggest oil market in the non-communist
world, i.e. Japan.
In conclusion, domestic as well as external factors helped Iran to capture the
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largest share of the Japanese market for oil in the 1960s/early 1970s. However, as noted
in the previous section, the Iranian government did not consider the oil exported to
Japan by the Consortium as her own exports and on several occasions pressed Japan's
government to buy oil directly from the National Iranian Oil Company. But as Japanese
refiners (affiliates and non-affiliates alike) were bound by the terms of their contracts
with the Majors to buy oil only from them, they were not in a position to do so. This is
one of the biggest anomalies of the Japanese oil industry. On one side the government
was trying to expand production of oil under Japanese control and reduce the
dependence of Japan on the Majors for oil, and on the other hand was not able or
willing to accept untied oil from Iran. This was probably due to pressure from the Majors
which did not want Japan to have independent access to overseas oil reserves and,
moreover, did not want to lose their shares in the huge Japanese market. It could also
have been due to Japanese fears of jeopardising their relations with the Majors, which
in their opinion were providing Japanese industry with a very cheap factor of production
(see Chapter Two).
After the first oil shock of 1973, Iran, which had assumed nominal control over
her oil production and marketing, adopted an inappropriate (in the Japanese buyers'
opinion) pricing policy which made her crude more expensive than other producers.
Furthermore, with the enactment of new stricter environmental laws, the Iranian Heavy
lost favour with Japanese refiners and its market share rapidly deteriorated as different
oil which met the new SO, emission standard was imported. Finally, in 1975, Iran lost
her position as the top oil exporter to Saudi Arabia.
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Table 3.11: Japanese Imports of Iranian Crudes (1960,1980)
(1,000 barrels a day b/d)
Year Light Heavy Sassan Rostam Ferdun Other Total
1960 17 3 -- -- -- 20
1961 21 19 -- -- -- 40
1962 23 75 -- -- -- 98
1963 38 121 -- -- -- 159
1964 44 196
_
-- -- -- 240
1965 56 238 -- -- 3 297
1966 79 394 -- -- 3 476
1967 134 595 -- -- -- 729
1968 219 669 -- -- 9 897
1969 266 918 21 1 -- 12 1,218
1970 339 1,071 45 5 -- 9 1,469
1971 470 1,120 37 5 -- 5 1,637
1972 547 1,014 20 10 -- -- 1,591
1973 652 975 15 4 -- 3 1,649
1974 450 773 3 11 -- 7 1,244
1975 416 674 16 14 1 2 1,123
1976 322 569 13 12 16 -- 932
1977 239 541 10 5 21 4 820
1978 250 493 13 -- 22 7 785
1979 168 259 20 9 18 5 497
1980 96 118 13 4 27 8 266
Notes: Sassan, Rostam, and Ferdun are the name of Iranian oilfields whose oils have
special characteristics in terms of sulphur contents, gravity, etc.
Source: Petroleum Association of Japan.
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4.4- Japanese Investments In the Middle East
4.4.1- The Background
In comparison with other developed countries, Japan did not begin foreign
investment of any significance until the second half of the 1960s. From the start of the
1970s however, such investments expanded rapidly and increased especially during 1972-
73. In 1973, the year of the first oil shock, foreign exchange licences and notifications for
foreign investments reached $3.5 billion.48 (See Table 3.12 for statistics up to 1970).
The history of Japan's overseas investments can be divided into three periods:49
(1)- 1951-1958: Small-scale investments (but major for Japan at that time) were made
in Portuguese Goa and Malaya for the development of mines. In addition, some trading
firms established affiliated companies in advanced countries.
(2)- 1959-1964: Domestic demand for resources directed investments into resource
development, with petroleum getting the lion's share (Saudi Arabia and Kuwait).
Investments were also made in South East Asia, Europe, and Africa.
(3)- After 1965: The huge growth of the domestic economy boosted the need for natural
resources. Investments were made in Latin America, Canada, Africa and Australia.
Labour shortages and wage increases at home combined with an improved investment
environment in Southeast Asia directed further investment into the region.
During the 1960s two new developments necessitated further foreign investments.
First, due to the end of the post-war baby boom and also because more school-leavers
were going into higher education, further labour shortages accrued. Second, later in the
decade the goverment, due to the unexpectedly rapid increase of the surplus on the
balance of payments, changed its policy on foreign investments and actually began to
promote it.8°
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By March 1971, one-third of Japan's foreign investments were in the development
of natural resources industries, of which one half was accounted for by mining alone.51
(See Table 3.13). Due to the dependence on overseas sources of oil, the largest mining
investment ($328 million) was in the Middle East (by the Arabian Oil Company), from
where Japan imported most of her oil. (See Table 3.14).
With few exceptions, Japanese investments in the Middle East did not really start
to increase until after the first oil shock of 1973. As mentioned before, the domestic
demand for resources directed Japanese investments into resource development with
petroleum getting the lion's share. The bulk of "direct investments" or "overseas direct
operations" until 1971 went into two oil concessions in the Middle East. (See Table 3.15).
By the end of 1969, Japan was the second biggest investor in the Middle East (far
behind the U.S) with total investments of $306 million. (See Table 3.16).
The first major Japanese investment in the Middle East was in the form of the
Arabian Oil Company (AOC) which was a subsidiary of the Japan Petroleum Company.
The AOC won the exploitation rights to the 7200 km 2 offshore area of the Saudi-Kuwaiti
Neutral Zone in 1957-58. Japan won these rights by offering precedent-setting terms: the
Saudi and Kuwaiti governments received a 56-44 and a 57-43 division of the profits
respectively. This occurred in an era when a 50-50 split of the profits between the Middle
East and Western oil companies had only recently become standard. Furthermore, the
Saudi and Kuwaiti shares were to be based on all profits earned by the AOC, from the
production and the transportation of the oil to its refining and marketing, rather than on
the profits from the crude oil sales alone.52
Apart from the AOC, there was no other Japanese investment in the Arab oil
producing countries between the end of the WWII and the oil shock of 1973.53
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Table 3.12: Japanese Overseas Investments (approved), by Number of Cases and Amount
by Year (1951-1970)
_
Fiscal Year Cases Amounts
(US$ 1,000)
1951-1958 445 143,192
1959 123 53,062
1960 151 92,729
1961 133 164,811
1962 179 99,425
1963 223 125,977
1964 193 120,291
1965 209 156,739
1966 253 227,008
1967 306 274,868
1968 384 557,174
1969 568 667,579
1970 768 913,449
Total 3,935 3,596,306
Note: Fiscal year, from April to March.
Source: Ballon, Roberts, in Aussenwirtschaft, Vol, 28.3/4,
Sep/Dec 1973, p.130.
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Table 3.13: Japanese overseas investments by industry and number of cases (approved
by March 1971),
(US$ 1,000,000)
Industry Amounts % Number of Cases
Development : 1,210 33.7 385
Mining 1,126 31.3 195
Agriculture
& forestry 57 1.6 94
Fisheries 27 0.8 96
Manufacturing 962 26.8 1,391
Commerce 370 10.3 1,112
Banking
& insurance 321 9.0 115
Construction 37 1.1 32
Branches 32 0.9 380
Others 658 18.3 520
Total 3,596 100.0 3,935
Source: Same as Table 3.12.
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Table 3.14: Japanese Overseas Investments by Selected Industries and Regions (approved
by March 1971)
(US$ 1,000,000)
Region Mining Manufacturing Commerce
North
America
117 239 293
Latin
America
87 273 17
Middle &
Near East
328 4 0.5
Red-Asia 268 334 18
Europe 6 36 28
Africa 58 24 0.6
Oceana 200 49 11
Total 1,126 962 370
Source: Same as Table 3.12.
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Table 3.15: Japanese Overseas Investments, by Region and Type,
(Approved by March 1971)
(US$ 1,000,000)
Region Stock
Aquis'ion
Loans Overseas
Direct
Operations
Branch Total
(%)*
North
America
500 369 33 7 911
(24.4)
Latin
America
289 264 3 1 558
(15.5)
Asia 334 419 8 16 779
(21.7)
Europe 109 522 0.5 5 638
(17.8)
Near &
Middle
East
5 --
328 0.1
334
(9.3)
Africa 31 60 0.1 0.3 92
(2.6)
Oceana 62 217 -- 0.1 280
(7.8)
Total (%)* 1,334
(37.1)
1,854
(51.6)
375
(10.4)
32
(0.7)
3,596
(100)
Note: * Percentage of the total in brackets.
Source: Same as Table 3.12.
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Table 3.16: Distribution by Industry and Region of Foreign Investments by Selected
Countries by the End of 1969 (US$ 1,000,000)
U.S. U.K.
a
West
Germany
Japan
b
Total 70,763 13,405 4,814 2,683
By Industry:
Mining 5,635 1,054 200 892
Petroleum 19,985 (4,200) 102 892
Manufa-
turing
29,450 7,067 3,558 722
Others 15,693 5,284 954 1,070
By Region:
W.Europe 21,554 2,347 2,675 303c
North
America
21,075 3,089 799 720
Latin
America
13,811 1,083 896 513
S.E.
Asia
3,363 1,521 103 604
Middle
East
1,829 65 29 306
Africa 2,970 2,558 259 79
Oceana 3,099 2,654 53 158
Others 3,061 88 --- ---
Notes:
a- Balance at the end of 1968, excluding petroleum, banking, and insurance. Petroleum,
balance at the end of 1966.
b- Balance of approved investments.
c- This figure includes a very small amount in East Germany.
N.B: Classification varies slightly from country to country.
Source: Same as Table 3.12.
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3.4.3- Japanese Investments in Iran
Contrary to the situation in other Middle Eastern countries, Japan did make
investments in Iran before the 1973 oil crisis. In all about 20 cases of investment were
made before the crisis, (see Tables 3.17 & 3.18) mainly in banking and trading and a few
in manufacturing of electrical goods. The first investment was by Marubeni Corp, which
set up a wholly owned subsidiary in August 1956. 54 Furthermore, in 1968, the Japan-
Iran Investment Council was established to assist Iran's economic development.55
The Japanese investments in Iran, like those in other developing countries, was
a response to her import substitution industrialisation programme. Unlike Asian
countries, however, which aimed at export-oriented industrialisation, Iran had not built
any free trade zone that allowed one hundred percent ownership by foreign export
industries. Nevertheless, it also did not impose compulsory export quotas, local content
ratio, or mandatory employment of local staff at any level on the foreign investor.56
Therefore, Japanese joint ventures in Iran were not worried about localisation problems,
which were common in most developing countries. In fact, the Iranian government
encouraged the employment of foreign manpower in order to cope with a shortage of
managers, engineers and technicians especially after the first oil shock. Furthermore, the
Iranian partners in Japanese joint ventures generally liked to employ Japanese rather
than Iranian factory managers, engineers, and technicians because the cost of their
employment was cheaper in consideration of their experience and skill. The Iranian
partners often commissioned factory and production management by the Japanese so that
their initiative and influence in management, in particular production management, was
by far greater than their minority holdings.'
Japanese investments in Iran greatly increased after the oil shock of 1973, and the
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latter became virtually the only country which hosted Japanese manufacturing
investments in the Middle East.
Table 3.17: Number of Foreign Investments in Iran
Country of Origin 1950s 1960s 1970s Total
United States 3 20 22 45
United Kingdom 1 6 20 27
France 1 3 14 18
West Germany 0 10 17 27
Switzerland 0 4 6 10
Japan 0 5 15 20
Others 1 16 14 31
Multinational 0 5 12 17
Notes:
(1) Foreign investments up to August 1976 are included.
(2) Classified by the date of decree.
Source: Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance.
List of Foreign Investments in Iran.
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Table 3.18: Flow of Foreign Private Capital and Loans through the Centre for the
Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investments. (IR million)
Country
of Origin
1968/69 1969/70 1970/71 1971/72 1972/73
U.S.A 855 2696 560 502 349
West
Germany
178 125 720 295 131
U.K. 242 118 331 268 29
France 68 99 117 127 102
Japan -- 10 129 55 221
Others 241 216 461 225 504
Total 1583 3264 2318 1472 1336
Source:Bank Markazi Iran, Annual Report and Balance Sheet 2535
3.5- Japan's Involvement in the Politics of the Middle East
Japan had not shown much interest in the politics of the Middle East until she
was struck by the world-wide oil embargo that came immediately after the outbreak of
the Fourth Middle East War in October 1973. Before that, Japan's concern with the
Middle East problem, including the Palestinian issue, had been secondary, both at
government and private levels, although economic ties with the region had been growing
steadily.58 But the 1973 Arab oil embargo pinpointed the paradox in Japan's foreign
relations with the Middle East. Tokyo had a policy toward the Middle East, but it lacked
a diplomacy to give that policy a recognition in the area. Prior to November 1973, the
Japanese government had adopted two interrelated positions on the Arab-Israeli conflict:
With the United States and Western European countries, Japan had backed U.N.
Resolutions 242 (Nov 22,1967), which called on Israel to withdraw from areas captured
during the October 1967 War.
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Japan had also supported Resolution 2628 (Nov 4,1970), which equated respect
for Palestinian rights with a just and lasting settlement of the situation in the Middle
East.59 Senior officials had constructed these two elements of the Middle East policy,
believing that they would be the minimum requirements for peace in the region. But they
had failed to put these two elements into one comprehensive statement. Furthermore,
Japanese officials had informed only one Persian Guff leader, King Faisal of Saudi
Arabia who visited Japan in May 1971, of their views on Israeli withdrawal and the
Palestinian issue. As a result, the "Arab countries were largely unaware of Japan's
recognition of the legitimate right of Palestinian self determination".'
The lacklustre Japanese policy on the Middle East was not inconsistent with her
interests in the region. Until late 1973, Tokyo had regarded Major Western oil
companies as the main channel for the import of Middle Eastern crude oil into Japan.
However, even before the 1973 War, Japan found itself linked to the Middle East
problem, when in 1972, shootings by young Japanese terrorists left 26 dead at Israel's
Ben Gurion Airport.' From October 1973, however, when the first oil crisis followed
the Forth Arab-Israeli War, it was no longer possible for Japan to ignore the link
between oil and the politics of the Middle East.
3.6- Conclusion
The preceding pages demonstrate that, contrary to common belief, Japan's
connections with the Middle East go back a long way. These links, however, before the
Meiji Restoration were indirect and of no great significance. But after World War One,
and especially during the 1920s/ 1930s, diplomatic and trade relations between the two
flourished, and Japan became one of the biggest trading partners to some of the
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countries in the region. Furthermore, with Japan's joining of the Axis Powers in the
1930s, her political and strategic interests in the Middle East also grew, and she adopted
an active Islamic policy in order to both deepen her ties to the region as well as to use
it against her enemies like the Great Britain, Russia and China in Asia. With the start
of the Pacific War, she no longer had the resources to implement this policy and,
moreover, her links with the Middle East were severed by the Allies who had occupied
the region.
After the end of the Occupation, Japan, which no longer had any imperial
ambitions and anyway was bound by the terms of various treaties with the United States
to relinquish such ambitions, relied on the latter for her security and followed the U.S.
policy on international affairs. Japan instead, concentrated on her economic
development. As a result of the industrial strategy which she adopted after the war, and
the types of technologies and industries that were imported into the country, she became
increasingly dependent upon imported oil as a source of energy and industrial raw
material.
On the other hand, with the development of huge petroleum reserves in the
Middle East by the major international oil companies after the war, that region became
the largest and cheapest source of oil in the world. These oil companies which dominated
the Japanese oil industry as a result of American policy towards Japan, as well as their
own business strategies, imported Middle Eastern oil into Japan in massive quantities.
Consequently, Japan became heavily dependent on the region for her most vital imported
commodity. However, as this oil was brought to Japan by international Majors and as she
had no active foreign policy, she grossly neglected political developments in the region.
It seems that successive Japanese governments believed that their support for the Arab
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cause in the U.N would be sufficient for Japan to be considered as a friendly nation by
the Arab world. The Japanese officials were actually shocked when in the course of the
oil embargo against the Western countries (mainly the United States and the
Netherlands) Japan was was termed as an "unfriendly" nation. To remedy this situation,
the government of Japan took various diplomatic and economic measures, including
issuing statements in support of the Arab countries and condemning Israel, and offering
various aid and financial packages.' One such package, as Chapter Seven will show,
offered to Iran in 1974, included a large, low interest loan for the petrochemical joint
venture between the two countries which by then, because of inflated construction costs,
had ran out of the money. It was hoped that by offering such incentives, Japan would
receive secure oil supplies from Iran, who had not participated in the oil embargo.
Japan, by the 1960s had become aware of her acute dependence on foreign
countries for almost all of her raw materials and so began vigorous investment in the
development of overseas resources, and the single biggest investment went to the Middle
East for the development of oilfields in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
Furthermore, Iran, which by the 1960s had become the largest supplier of oil to
Japan, became the only destination for Japanese manufacturing investments in the region
as the latter responded positively to the former's policy of import substitution
industrialisation. Japanese companies set up joint-ventures with local partners in Iran.
These investments became quite important both in terms of numbers and their
contributions to the industrialisation of Iran. However, Iran was not happy with the
structure of her trade with Japan and on several occasions imposed restrictions on the
imports of Japanese goods. These differences were solved by a group of Japanese
officials and businessmen who visited Iran in 1968. It was during the visit of this group
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that the idea of a petrochemical joint venture was first discussed between the two
countries. The study of the formation and dissolution of this joint-venture will form the
basis of this research and will be discussed in detail in forthcoming chapters.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE ROLE OF OIL IN THE INDUSTRIAL
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF IRAN
1.0- Introduction
In Chapter One, it was hypothesised that in order to understand why business
joint ventures are entered into, one needs to look at the strategy of its participants and
the goals that they hope the enterprise will fulfil for them.
It was argued in the last chapter that it was access to Iranian oil reserves which
enticed the Japanese to support the petrochemical joint venture with Iran. This chapter
will argue that it was for reasons of industrial and economic development that Iran
considered expanding her petrochemical industry. However, as she lacked the necessary
inputs, such as capital, technology and access to foreign markets, she sought the co-
operation of a foreign partner(s) who could offer her such advantages.
In the following, therefore, the development of the Iranian petroleum industry
which the petrochemical industry is a part of, will be discussed. Moreover, the impact of
oil revenues on the economic development of the country, and the role that the industry
has played in Iran's industrialisation will also be analyzed in detail. The role of the state
in process of the industrialisation and its industrial policy will also be examined. Finally,
the chapter will discuss why the petrochemical industry was chosen as the basis of Iran's
industrial and economic development.
In general, three different phases can be distinguished with regard to the
industrial development of Iran and the role that the state played in such a process. The
first phase, which extended from the early Nineteenth Century to the early 1920's, was
a period of gradual disintegration of the traditional state and the almost total lack of
concern on the part of the state for the economic development of the country. The main
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feature of the transformation of the Iranian economy during this period was the
integration of the national economy into the world market under a free trade system.
The inter-war years, which formed the second phase, was a period of development
of the modern national state, and the start of state intervention in the national economy
and support for the industrialisation process. In this phase, oil revenues' contribution to
the economic and industrial development of Iran was very small. The third phase, which
began with the conclusion of a new oil agreement with the Consortium in 1954, was a
period in which a massive amount of oil revenue and foreign capital flew into Iran and
the state took a much more direct and interventionist approach towards the process of
industrialisation of the country. This phase, however, came to an end with the 1979
revolution.
For the purpose of clarity, using major historical events as dividing lines, the
above three phases will be broken down into the following periods: Nineteenth Century
to 1921, 1921-1941, 1941-1953, and 1954 to the late 1960s.
2.0- Mid-Nineteenth Century to 1921
2.1- The Political and Economic Conditions
On the eve of the 20th Century, Iran, despite her glorious past, was one of the
most backward and impoverished countries in the world. In fact Iran had been in a steep
decline since the late 16th Century, but her problems deepened with the accession of the
Qajar Dynasty to the crown in the 18th Century. During the Qajar rule (mid 18th
Century to 1926), there was a considerable decline in all aspects of the economic life of
the country as compared to the 17th Century, and there was a significant contraction of
foreign trade. 1
 The Qajars' misrule and corruption caused the country to lose large parts
162
of her territory in central Asia and the Caucasus to the newly emerging Russian Empire,
and brought about a gradual disintegration of the state apparatus. This disintegration laid
the grounds for the intervention of major foreign powers, namely Russia and Great
Britain, in Iran's internal affairs.
A major feature which differentiated the medieval society of Iran from Europe
was the existence of pastoral nomadism. Even by the Nineteenth Century, about half of
the population of Iran was composed of nomads. 2 The coexistence of the settled and
pastoral nomads' methods of production which was to a large extent conditioned by
natural and climatic circumstances, exerted an important influence on the overall
structure of the society well into the 20th Century. Moreover, during the medieval period
(from the 11th Century AD to the 19th Century), the main features of the socio-
economic structure of the country remained more or less intact.3 So, despite few
attempts in the mid to late 19th Century to reform the state, Iran entered the Twentieth
Century with an undeveloped agrarian economy and backward modes of production.
However, the politico-economic system of the country had began to disintegrate
under the impact of Western capitalism during the 19th Century and, by the first two
decades of the 20th Century, important changes had taken place which undermined the
role of the traditional state.
The key factor in this transformation was the integration of the Iranian economy
into the world market, which was highly conditioned by the rivalry between Russia and
the U.K.. The already weak structure of the Qajar state was further shaken by the
interference and rivalry between the two above powers which prevented various reform
movements initiated by the higher ranks of the state adminstration from succeeding.4
Failure of these attempts to restructure the state adminstration created a
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cumulative process of political disintegration which, by the end of the 19th Century, led
to the total breakdown of the central state's authority. Moreover, persistent financial
problems like chronic budget deficits and deteriorating economic conditions played a
major role in this process of disintegration.5
The deepening financial crisis was heightened by the expansion of domestic and
foreign trade and the commercialisation of agriculture towards the end of the 19th
Century, led to the sale of offices and titles, leasing out state departments (like customs,
post, and telegraph) to private individuals, and most important of all, to granting of
concessions to foreigners. 6 The most important of these concessions was that of an oil
concession to William Knox D'Arcy in 1906 which greatly influenced Iranian politics and
economy in the 20th Century.
As mentioned earlier, the main channel of the integration of the Iranian economy
into the world economy in the 19th Century was through foreign trade. In fact, from the
early 19th Century up to the beginning of the First World War there was rapid growth
in foreign trade. Total trade (imports plus exports) in real terms increased by three times
in the first half of the century and four times during the 1860-1940 period.' Although
this rate of expansion in foreign trade was lower than the rate of increase in other
Middle Eastern countries during the same period, it was significant enough to bring
about major changes in the Iranian economy and society.
Iran, like other Middle Eastern countries, had a lopsided trade structure, as her
imports were mostly composed of manufactured goods, mainly textiles, tea and sugar
which formed more than 80% of imports. Her exports, with the exception of carpets,
were largely composed of raw agricultural products. Moreover, her foreign trade was
dominated by Russia and the U.K. who together controlled more than 80% of the
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imports and exports.8 Another feature of Iran's foreign trade during this period was the
system of capitulations which had been imposed on the country since the 1828 treaty with
Russia and other treaties with various trading partners. This system of capitulations
caused the country to lose her tariff autonomy which she did not regain until 1928.9
In spite of rapid growth in trade, there was no foreign direct investment in
productive activities such as plantations or mining, and all of the foreign capital which
flew into the country in the latter half of the 19th Century was directed towards
commerce, banking, road construction, real estate, post and telegraph. 1° However,
during this period a few attempts were made to set up modern manufacturing industries
based on imported technologies, both by Iranian merchants and foreigners. But very few
of these factories actually started production and non could survive for long. 11 The
reasons for the failure of these factories were the small size of the domestic markets, due
both to foreign competition and low income levels, lack of adequate legal and political
protection, insecurity, inadequate transportation, and dumping by Russian companies.12
These unsuccessful attempts are, however, indicative of what became the predominant
trend in the industrialisation of Iran during the 20th Century. More precisely, as the
evolution of indigenous small commodity producers into higher organisational and
technological forms of production were blocked by foreign competition and other
factors, 13 Iranian industrialisation took the form of the transplantation of modern
industry from above, namely, through state intervention, indigenous merchant capital,
foreign capital, or a combination of these, and based on imported technology.
By the turn of the century, Iran was engulfed in a deep political, economic, and
social crisis. The expansion of export cash crops at the expense of subsistence farming,
together with the competition of cheap foreign imports which had diminished the
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livelihood of traditional handicraftsmen, and the failure of the modern manufacturing
industries had created an acute situation of shortages of basic foods and
unemployment.' Moreover, the transformation of the Iranian economy during the 19th
Century had created new functional needs which the semi-tribal/semi-bureaucratic state
was unable to meet. This situation led to a rapid disintegration of the state by the late
19th/early 20th Century and, in fact during this period the state itself had become the
main source of insecurity and instability in the country.'
It was against this background that the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1907
took place. One of the most important factors which united the various social classes
with opposing interests who took part in the revolution was the need to find a remedy
for the deep economic crisis of the country. 16 The revolution did not attempt to replace
the Qajar Dynasty, but instead it sought to restrict its dictatorial powers by the
promulgation of a constitution and the establishment of a parliament (Majlis).
The semi-liberal constitution of 1906 and its supplementary amendments of 1907,
however, failed to undermine the power of the dominant ruling classes, namely,
landowners and the merchant bourgeoisie, or to radically alter the backward structure
of the Iranian economy. As a result, the revolution did not succeed in its main aim of
lifting the economy out of crisis.
In addition, the attempts of the first two parliaments to construct a new
centralised state machinery failed due to strong resistance of internal reactionary forces
led by the newly crowned king, and the interference of outside powers, particularly
Russia. Due to these internal conflicts between 1911 and 1921, the country was subject
to immense political chaos and economic disruption.'
There were, however, two major external developments during this period which
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had significant ramifications for the future course of political development in Iran. The
first one was the 1917 October Revolution in Russia and the second was the rise of the
oil sector as a major source of foreign exchange and government revenue. Both of these
developments contributed in their own way, to the rise of the centralised and
authoritarian regime of Reza Shah.
The October Revolution caused a major shift in Russian policy towards Iran
(during the Lenin's leadership), as the new Soviet government abolished the Tsarist
capitulations, cancelled all loans and obligations of the Iranian government and
recognised the rights of Iran as a sovereign state. Consequently, the British government,
under internal and international pressure, abolished their capitulations, especially the
1919 treaty whose terms were equivalent to the establishment of a British protectorate
in Iran. The old power rivalry suddenly stopped and Iran was freed from its semi-colonial
status. Moreover, the Russian Revolution also strengthened and radicalised popular
movements in Iran which in turn contributed to the rise of Reza Shah's authoritarian
regime.
2.2- The Development of the Iranian Oil Industry
As we mentioned above, the rise of the oil sector as an important source of
foreign exchange and government revenue in the 1920s had major implications for the
course of political developments in Iran and the rise of the Reza Shah's regime. As a
matter of fact, oil had been discovered in Iran long before that, but it took many years
before oil revenues had any impact on the country's economy.
In 1892 the French geological magazine; Annels des Mines, published a report on
the prospects of oil discovery in Iran. This report was based on the investigations of a
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French scientific mission which had been sent to Iran in the early 1890's. This report,
however, did not interest potential investors before 1900, when a senior Iranian civil
servant brought the matter to the attention of European financiers, among whom was
William Knox D'Arcy from Britain. D'Arcy, who realised the great potential of oil
reserves in the south and southwest of Iran, entered into negotiations with the Iranian
government for an oil concession. 18
 The British government, which saw the long term
benefits of such a concession, actively supported D'Arcy by all the diplomatic means at
its disposal.
In 1901 the negotiations resulted in an agreement between the government of Iran
and William Knox D'Arcy which provided for a concession to the latter for a 60-year
exclusive right to "search for, obtain, exploit, develop, render suitable for trade, carry
away, and sell natural gas, petroleum, asphalt, and opzokerite" 19 throughout the whole
the Iranian empire, with the exception of the five northern provinces 20 which were
under the influence of Russia. The concession covered an area of 500,000 square miles-
an area greater than that of France, Great Britain and Germany put together. It also
granted D'Arcy the exclusive right to lay pipelines to the Persian Gulf, 21 a privilege
which proved to be D'Arcy's greatest barrier against potential competitors. Also all land
taxes and import duties were waived.22
In return, D'Arcy and his companies were to pay the Persian 23 Government,
within a month of their formation, twenty thousands pounds in cash and the same
amount in company stock, plus 16% of their net profits per annum. 24
 In addition, a
fixed sum of 2,000 tommans per year was to be paid to the government in lieu of
taxes.25 The most important issue which was embodied in the concession was the linking
of royalty payment to profits. This, as will become clear later, raised numerous problems
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and difficulties. The Iranian goverment was hoping that the industry would be in a
continuous state of prosperity and so the concession would provide it with a steady
income for a long time.
The company, which was set up by D'Arcy to explore for oil in southwestern Iran,
began it exploration activities in 1903, but it was five years before the company found
oil in commercial quantities. During this time D'Arcy ran out of money and began to
search for new capital in London, but no one was interested. At the same time the Royal
Navy was considering the substitution of oil for coal in British ships. As Britain had no
indigenous oil reserves, the Navy was concerned with the security of supplies should the
switch to oil take place. On hearing of D'Arcy's need for capital and in order not to
allow the concession to fall into foreign hands, the British Admiralty persuaded the
Burmah Oil Company to provide adequate capital for D'Arcy to enable him to continue
his exploration.26
After sinking more wells, finally, on 26 May 1908, the exploration company struck
oil in large quantities, and so with this discovery the Iranian oil industry was born. Upon
striking oil, in 1909, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) with capital of 2 million
pounds (mostly held by the Burmah Oil Company), was established to take over the oil
operations in Iran.27
APOC began its commercial exploitation of Iranian oil soon after its formation,28
but the company needed more capital to expand its operations. 29 At the same time,
Winston Churchill, who was appointed First Lord of the Admiralty in 1911, was looking
for ways to secure a cheap and reliable source of oil for the Royal Navy and APOC's
need for capital provided him with such an opportunity. As a result of Churchill's intense
lobbying, the British government in 1914, furnished APOC with 2.2 million pounds cash,
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raising its capital to 4.2 million pounds, and gave the government a controlling stake in
the company.3° This injection of capital by the British government into APOC not only
provided it with a major stake in one of the most profitable and largest oil companies
in the world, but also gave it an opportunity, despite its pledges to the contrary, to
interfere in the internal affairs of Iran.
The British government's shareholding in the Company changed the sprit of the
D'arcy Concession and had a profound impact on its standing within the context of
international relations. 31 The Company, however much it proclaimed its independence,
was considered to be no longer just a private organisation, but a national enterprise for
a national purpose. Most governments, consciously or not, believed that the hidden hand
of the British government was to be detected behind most, if not all, of the activities of
the company.32 The strongest objections to the British government shareholding in the
APOC came from Russia who saw the involvement of the British government as a threat
to its own interests in Iran.33
In order to allay fears over the government's interference in the commercial
activities of APOC from within the Company itself, other oil companies and, foreign
governments, the British government pledged that neither it nor the two government
appointed directors would interfere with the commercial activities or decision making of
the Company.34
The first major dispute between Iran and APOC emerged in 1916 over the issue
of royalty payments and the damages caused to the company's facilities by local tribes.
After four years of negotiations an agreement called the "Armitage-Smith Agreement"
was signed in December 1920 between the two parties which in effect limited the net
profits attributable to Iran to profits of the producing companies operating in that
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country. 35 This agrement, however, settled the issue of royalty payments only
temporarily, and it was to resurface many times in the years to come.
3.0- The 1921-1941 Period
3.1- The Political Developments
In February 1921, less than three months after the signing of the Interpretive
Agreement, Colonel Reza Khan, commander of the only organised standing army which
numbered only 3,000 men, staged a military coup in which he took control of Iran. Reza
Khan initially became the War Minister and later the Prime Minister. The new
government relied for support mainly on conservative social forces and the British
government for gaining power and the construction of a strong centralised state.36
During these years, the state took a series of measures to rationalise and expand its
central adminstration. The most important of these measures was the creation of a
unified and centralised army which could end the political autonomy of the various
regional governors and tribal chiefs, and suppress radical political movements in the
north.' By 1925, the army was the most powerful and centralised institution in the
country and Reza Khan, as the commander in chief of this newly created army could
extend his authority over almost all the country. By controlling the military, Reza Khan
emerged as the most powerful man in the country. The power of military-bureaucratic
establishment which upheld the ideology of national interests and modernisation soon
overtook the power of the conservative alliance which had initially supported Reza Khan
to consolidate his position.
By using the army to manipulate the elections for the Fifth Majlis, Reza Khan
managed to install his own supporters in the parliament. 38 By 1926 he emerged as Reza
171
Shah, the founder of the new Pahlavi Dynasty.39
During the latter half of the 1920's, the new regime, with the help of foreign
advisors reorganised the finances of the state took measures to regulate the civil service,
establish new judicial and educational systems, and introduced new commercial laws.4°
Rationalisation of the state adminstration was accompanied by functional and structural
differentiation of the state apparatus and the creation of specialised ministerial branches
which could play a more direct and active role in the economy. Furthermore, in 1928 the
Bank Melli Iran (the National Bank) was established by the state which took over the
accounts as well as the monopoly right of banknote issue from the British owned
Imperial Bank.'
3.2- The Economic and Industrial Policies of the Government
The state's economic policy during the 1921-1941 period was not based on a
coherent and systematic economic ideology." The general tendency was towards the
creation of a "national economy" by providing the basic politico-legal and infra-structural
requirements of a modern economy. With regard to government economic policy two
distinct periods, separated by the transitional years of 1929-30, could be distinguished:"
During the 1920s the state adopted mainly a caretaker role in the economy. The
free trade regime remained in force up to 1928, which led to the revival of foreign trade.
(See Table 4.1.)
However, as Table 4.2 shows, a major change in the pattern of foreign trade
during this period took place, in which, after 1920 the share of oil exports exceeded the
value of total non-oil exports for the first time. The foreign exchange contributions of the
oil sector were in the form of royalties and small domestic expenditures of the APOC,
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As the table demonstrates, total foreign exchange contribution of oil was no more than
25% of the total value of oil exports. Moreover, the proceeds from the oil sector during
the 1927-1941 period were set aside in a special account which was largely spent on arms
purchases.44 The role of the state in this period was mainly limited to reforming the
political and legal institutions and improving the means of transportation.
By the end of the decade, however, it became clear that the much hoped for
commitment of both domestic and foreign capital in Iran's industrial sector was not
forthcoming. Iranian merchant capital had received a severe blow due to the recession
in foreign trade during the First World War45, and foreign capital with the exception
of APOC was not available. In fact during the entire inter-war period there was no long-
term capital inflow of any kind, neither of portfolio nor direct investment, apart from the
above mentioned case. The reason was not lack of interest or lack of encouragement on
the side of the Iranian government, but rather the unavailability of long-term capital in
the inter-war period.46
Despite the above mentioned institutional reforms which took place during the
1920s, by the end of the decade the economic prospects looked even bleaker than the
early 1900s. As a matter of fact, between 1913 and the mid-1920s, prior to the Great
Depression, there was a steep decline in the terms of trade of Iranian primary exports,
while the volume of exports was below pre-war levels.' The Great Depression
intensified the above problem and created two new ones for the Iranian government. The
first one was the sharp fall in the rate of exchange for the silver based karan (Iran's
currency at the time) in the latter half of 1929-30 (Persian ca1ender) 48 which was due
to the depreciation of the value of silver against gold. The other problem which began
in the early 1930's was cut in the profits of oil companies including APOC. But the
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decline in the royalty payment to the Iranian government was more than proportional
to the decline in APOC's net profits or oil production.49 It is worth mentioning at this
juncture that during the 1911-1932 period, the Iranian government received a total of
12.8 million pounds in royalties, whereas the net profits of the company were 51.5 million
pounds and U.K. taxes were 7.7 million pounds for the same period.50
The above problems sharply reduced the foreign exchange reserves of the country,
and brought foreign trade almost to a standstill. The government was forced to introduce
foreign exchange controls and foreign trade monopoly laws in February 1930 and
February 1931 respectively.51
The stagnation in the export sector which was due to slow growth in the world
markets meant that the pre-war pattern of export-led growth with its lopsided structure
was no longer feasible. This factor with the structural rigidities of the Iranian economy
(backward agriculture was a major rigidity) created serious tensions in the economy.52
An important aspect of the structural rigidities of the Iranian economy during this period
was its dependence on imports for basic manufactured mass consumption goods such as
cotton piece goods, kerosene, sugar, and tea which formed more than 80% of
merchandise imports (for details of Iran's trade during this period see Chapter Three).
These fundamental economic problems caused a perpetual deficit in the current
account of the balance of payments during the 1920's which was escalated by the arrival
of the Great Depression. In order to solve these problem, the government, by the mid-
1930s, committed itself to a radical restructuring of the economy by the adoption of a
state centred policy of economic development and a centrally controlled process of
accumulation. Based on this new policy and with the control of foreign trade the
government actively pursued a programme of import-substitution industrialisation.53
174
During the 1930s the government made very effective use of the newly established
state machinery for the mobilisation and central control of economic resources. As Table
4.3 shows, the most important source of income for the state during the 1930's was
indirect taxation and deficit financing which provided more than 70% of the
government's total revenue. More than 40% of total government expenditure during the
1930s/early 1940s was invested, mainly in transportation and industry. About 60% of
government investment was in transportation which greatly reduced the cost and time of
travel and contributed to the integration of the domestic market.54 After transportation,
industry received the largest share of government investment. In fact during this period
the state was the biggest investor, as by 1941 total investment in the industrial sector had
reached 58 million pounds of which 28 million pounds had been invested by the
government, and private investment in the industry really got under way in the latter half
of the 1930s.55 The highly protected home market together with government
encouragement in the form of tariff exemption, preferential exchange premium, and
exemption of transport fees for imported machinery, had made private manufacturing a
highly profitable line of business. 56 As Table 4.4 shows, by 1940 around 265 industrial
plants, employing about 48,000 workers had been established both in the public and
private sectors. As the table demonstrates, light manufacturing industries such as textiles
and sugar, and heavy industry such as chemicals took the lion's share of investments.
Long term foreign capital was not available during the inter-war period, and the
contribution of the oil sector was mainly used for military purchases (up to 47% of the
oil revenues) and government current expenditures. These high rates of investment in
manufacturing or transportation were actually financed from domestic resources, chiefly
indirect taxes and foreign contribution was limited to technical assistance.
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The backward agrarian production and relations (absentee landlordism), were
however, still impeding the growth of the industrial sector during this period.57
Moreover, corruption, and lack of initiative which the highly centralised and bureaucratic
regime encouraged, were hampering the development of a planned and coherent
industrial policy.58
Another important obstacle to the process of economic growth in this period was
the inability of the oil industry to establish linkages with other sectors of the Iranian
economy. The lack of such linkages was due to the backward state of the Iranian
economy which was incapable of producing any goods, or services required by the oil
industry. Moreover, inadequacy of oil revenues, corruption, mismanagement and large
military expenditures prevented the government from initiating industrial and
infrastructural projects.
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Table 4.2: Relative Importance of oil in the Iranian Economy (annual averages)
Year 1923-6 28-30 35-7 45-7 55-7 65-7 75-7
Tot qua'ty of
oil export (m.t)
3.5 5.0 7.8 16.6 23.2 120.2 303.5
Value of oil 13.0 23.7 26.6 38.8 43.9 150.9 1164.0
exports
(fob,m. ) a
(c)
Govnt oil
income (m)a
0.9 1.3 3.8 4.2 20.0 75.0 1133.7
Net forex
gains from oil
(m)a,b
3.2 3.1 6.8 12.0 25.2 81.3 1164.0
Govnt oil
income as a %
of oil exports
7.2 5.4 14.4 10.7 45.5 49.7 97.4
Oil income as a 13.8 15.1 16.8 16.4 45.1 50.8 75.4
% of total
govnt revenue
Forex cont'n of
oil sector as %
of value of oil
exports
25.0 13.3 25.1 31.0 57.4 53.9 100.0
Forex cont'n of
oil sector as %
of tot exports
21.0 22.5 37.3 53.6 65.0 74.4 83.8
Notes:
a- All the values in the table are in 1923-26 pounds sterling.
b- Royalties plus domestic currency purchases of AlOC.
c- For years 1955-67 export values are calculated on the basis of posted prices.
Source: Karshenas (1990), p.82.
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Table 4.3- Sources of Goverment Revenues, 1928-1938
1928
Value %
1935
Value	 %
1937
Valuea
	 %
Indirect Taxes 277 71 693 65 1173 71
State monopoliesb 64 16 320 30 340 21
State industries 27 2 74 4
Customs 112 29 170 16 362 22
Other indirect
taxes' 101 26 176 17 397 24
Direct taxes 50 12 89 8 142 9
Public domains 22 6 27 2 41 2
Oil royalties 28 7 173 16 206 12
Others 15 4 77 7 84 5
Total revenues 392 100 1059 100 1646 100
Total expenditure 392 1238 1916
Deficit financing 179 17 270 16.4
Notes:
a- Value in millions of rials.
b- Year 1928 is the tea and sugar monopoly tax earmarked for railway construction.
c- Includes road taxes, post, and telegraph.
Source: same as Table 4.2, p.74.
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Table 4.4: Manufacturing Plants established during 1930-1940-a
Sector Number of
plants
Value of
capital-b
Installed
horsepower
Number of
workers
Textiles 72 1168 43026 29601
Sugar 8 582 9909 4501
Drinks 40 75 1360 565
Chemicals 11 637 2901 4458
Soap 16 15 85 231
Glass 6 22 574 1043
Leather 11 65 635 608
Matches 26 50 354 4033
Flour and rice
milling 37 89 3072 1376
Cotton
ginning 29 53 1382 590
Tea 9 42 348 339
Total 265 2798 63646 47405
Notes:
a- Excludes government cement factories.
b- Historical cost at current prices in millions of rials.
Source: Statistical Survey of Iranian Industries (1947), Ministry of Labour.
3.3- The Iranian Oil industry in the Inter-War Period
This section will first consider the developments within the oil industry itself and
then role of the oil sector in the economic development of Iran during the inter-war
period will be discussed.
3.3.1- The Developments in the Oil Industry
As mentioned before, with the arrival of the Great Depression in the late
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1920s/early 1930s, royalty payments to the Iranian government by APOC were greatly
reduced. This situation, however, was not acceptable to Reza Shah who needed
increasing amounts of foreign exchange for modernising his army and the expansion of
the state machinery throughout the country. In fact, soon after coming to power, he had
began to challenge the legal basis of the Armitage-Smith Agreement of 1920, and
disputes over the agreement went on for few years, but the reduction in royalty payments
brought the matters to a head.59
The sharp decline in royalty payments enticed Reza Shah to cancel the D'Arcy
Concession on 26 November 1932.60 The British government did not recognise the
Persian government's right to annul the concession unilaterally and brought the matter
before the Council of the League of Nations. Before the Council could announce its
decision, however, a compromise was reached between the two parties in which the
calculation of royalties was to be made on an entirely new basis.61
Under the new agreement which was signed in 1933, the royalty payments were
linked to the volume of oil production. APOC agreed to pay the Persian government the
sum of 4 gold shillings per ton of oil produced. The company also agreed to pay as taxes
the sum of 9 pence (gold) per ton for the first six million tons of oil produced in any one
year for the first 15 years, and 6 pence per ton for the production of oil in excess of six
million tons for the same period. After 15 years these sums were to rise to one gold
shilling and 9 pence respectively. APOC also agreed to pay Persia 20% of the
distribution of its earnings in excess of 671,250 pounds. Moreover, the area under
exploration was to be reduced to 100,000 square miles, and the period of the concession
was increased to 60 years (i.e until 1993).62
The new agreement also required APOC to develop the Naft-e-Shah oilfield in
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western Iran on the Iraqi border, and to process its output for Iran's domestic
consumption in a new refinery to be built in Kermanshah. Furthermore, APOC agreed
to make every effort to increase its Iranian staff, and place some Iranian nationals in
technical and commercial positions.° The new concession also provided for Iran to
receive cheaper oil products by offering 10% and 25% discounts for private and
government use respectively. Finally, the Persian government agreed not to annul or alter
the concession "either by general or special legislation in the future, or by administrative
measures, or any other act of the executive authorities1.64
As Table 4.5 shows, in terms of profitability per ton of oil produced during the
period in which the 1933 Agreement was in force, the Iranian government was slightly
better off than before.
Finally, in 1935, the company in accordance with the Iranian law, changed its
name to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC).
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Table 4.5: Revenues of the Iranian Government and AIOC Profits for Selected Years
(in pounds sterling)
Year Iranian Government
Revenues Per Ton
AIOC Profits
Per ton
1913-14 0.04 0.10
1919-20 0.34 1.34
1925-26 0.23 0.96
1930 0.22 0.64
1931 0.05 0.42
1933 0.26 0.37
1935 0.30 0.47	 (
1940 0.47 0.33
1945 0.33 0.34
1946 0.37 0.50
1950 0.50 1.06
Source: F. Fesharaki, "The Development of the Iranian Oil industry 1901-71", Ph.D.
Dissertation, Surrey University, 1974, chapter 3.
3.3.2- The Role of the Oil Sector in the Economic Development Of Iran in the Inter-War
Period
The role of any pivotal or leading industry or dynamic economic activity in the
development of an economy can be examined from two standpoints: First, there is the
principal or direct value added by the activity itself to the magnitude of the gross
domestic product (direct affects). Second, there are the indirect or ancillary contributions
through additional productive endeavours stimulated by the production, consumption,
and fiscal linkages that the leading sector may establish with other sectors of the
economy.°
Direct linkages dealing with output stimulation, are split into backward and
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forward links. Backward linkages refer to the stimulus given to upstream or supplying
activities: for example, demand for human resources, materials, goods, services, and
capital from other sectors of the economy. Forward linkages refer to the potential of
stimulating downstream operations like the use of the industry's output and end-products
as inputs of other industries and activities.
Fiscal effect (or linkage) is the most important indirect effect (in case of export-
oriented mineral extractions like oil), and relates to the manner in which the government
(i) appropriates the surplus of the leading sector through ownership or taxation, and (ii)
allocates the proceeds through (a) the expansion of the public services, (b) new public
investments at home or abroad, or (c) negative indirect taxes and subsidies.66
The Iranian oil industry has been the leading sector of the domestic economy for
most of the 20th Century, and accordingly, the following two sub-sections, will analyze
the industry's direct and indirect influences on the national economy in the inter-war
period.
3.3.2.1- Direct Effects
The direct impact of the oil industry on the Iranian economy in the inter-war
period can be considered through forward and backward linkages that the industry
established with other sectors of the domestic economy. This will provide an insight into
the degree of integration of this leading sector with the national economy and the extent
to which the oil sector stimulated growth in other sectors.
Backward linkages, or flow of resources from the national economy to the oil
sector can be divided into: (a) Participation of Iranian capital markets or individuals in
providing equity capital for the industry; (b) Providing employment for Iranians in the
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industry at all levels including technical and managerial jobs.
(c) Purchase of domestic industries' products and other domestically produced goods for
input into the industry and consumption by its employees. This in turn can be subdivided
into demand for fixed assets required for the expansion of the industry, and demand for
current resources to meet the routine requirements of the industry.
AIOC (or APOC) had decided from the beginning to remain exclusively in British
hands. The company did not offer any shares on the domestic market ( it should be
noted, however, that in the inter-war period capital markets in Iran had not yet
developed, and no stock exchange existed). Nevertheless, the Iranian government's
attempts to purchase a few shares out of a new issue of 130,000 in 1920 were blocked
by the British government.°
As far as employment opportunities were concerned, AIOC's activities had a
major impact on the unskilled workforce in southwestern Iran. The employment of many
tribesmen by the Company caused them to change their nomadic life-style to a settled
and industrial one. However, with regard to senior or managerial jobs, opportunities
were very small. This was mainly due to the fact that in the inter-war period the literacy
rate was very low in Iran and the domestic economy was primarily based on very
backward agrarian relations. As a result, skills levels in Iran were very low and there
were very few Iranians, especially in southwest of the country with skills useful for
industrial occupations. As a result, the majority of Iranians employed by APOC occupied
unskilled positions within the Company. As Table 4.6 shows between 1919 and 1932 the
majority of APOC's workforce was composed of Iranians, mainly in unskilled jobs.
The situation, however, began to change after the conclusion of new concession
in 1933. Under the new agreement the APOC initiated various vocational courses and
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apprenticeship schemes for its Iranian employees in order to upgrade their skills and
prepare them for higher positions within the Company. Furthermore, in 1939 Anglo
Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) 69 established the Abadan Technical Institute for training
Iranians in various technical and commercial courses and sent Iranians on a regular basis
to Britain for higher education."
It was hoped that these programmes would reduce the proportion of non-Iranians
holding skilled jobs from 17.5% in 1936 to 13.5% in 1939. 71 As a result of these
initiatives the number of Iranians holding skilled and managerial jobs increased rapidly
in the latter part of 1930s and early 1940s. Nevertheless, because of the start of the
Second World War and the enforced curtailment of AIOC's investment plans and lack
of trained staff and equipment due to wartime shortages, the Company did not manage
to increase its number of skilled Iranian employees as demanded by the Iranians. This
real or perceived discrimination against Iranians became a major source of resentment
in Iran against the Company and was a major factor in Iranian demands for the
nationalisation of AIOC assets in Iran in the latter part of the 1940s.
According to a study by ILO, in 1949 less than 1% of the Iranian workforce was
employed by the AIOC. Only 9% of these employees were among salaried staff, and the
rest were wage earners or unskilled workers." Among the salaried employees, the
number of "graded" (high ranking) Iranians was about one-third of the British staff. On
the other hand, the ratio of "non-graded" employees was five Iranians to one foreigner,
most of them Indians. According to this study, There were no Iranians assigned to top
managerial positions within the company.' Table 4.7 presents data on the employment
level within the Iranian oil industry between 1939 and 1951. As the table shows, total
employment in the industry was 17,783, of which just over 15,000 were Iranians and the
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rest foreigners (as AIOC was the only oil company operating in Iran, these figures can
be taken as the number of AIOC's employees). Total employment in the oil industry was
reduced to 13,065 in 1941, as nearly 3,000 Iranians lost their jobs which was equal to
almost all of the industry's reduction in labour force that year.
As discussed above, the purchases of domestically produced goods can be divided
into demand for fixed assets and demand for products which enable the sector to carry
out its routine operations. Demand for fixed assets include demand for machinery and
plant, construction materials, buildings, land, etc, needed for the establishment and/or
expansion of the industry, as well as contracts with engineering and construction
companies for the building of plants buildings and so on.
As the Iranian economy was underdeveloped in the period under study, and oil
is a very capital intensive industry it (the economy) was unable to provide the industry
with plant and machinery required for the industry's operations. Moreover, no
contracting companies existed in Iran at the time which were capable of building oil
installations for AlOC. 74 However, according to two Iranian observers, 75 AIOC was
not prepared to purchase those goods which were being produced in Iran. These goods
included cement, other building materials, food and drinks, which despite being
competitive both in terms of price and quality with comparable foreign goods and in
spite of Iranian demands, the company imported in huge quantities from abroad. In their
opinion AIOC was abusing the customs privileges that it had been granted in the oil
concessions agreements. Therefore, as far as the purchase of locally produced goods were
concerned, AIOC offered no stimulus to the Iranian economy. % Whatever the causes,
as Ferrier writes: "There was little local linkage" with the rest of the Iranian economy as
there were few "local contractors" available.
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Forward linkages include the use of the leading industry's outputs as inputs in
other domestic industries, or the participation of that industry in the latter through
investment in by-product ventures. In the case of oil industry, these could include the use
of oil and oil products by various sections of the domestic industry as a source of energy,
or as raw materials, or participation by the oil industry with the local industry through
investment in by-product ventures linked to oil production and refining and
petrochemicals, as well as diversification into non-oil activities, or the sale of oil
products.
The evidence suggests that AIOC, during the period under study, was not involved
in any local venture in Iran, apart from its own operations. The company's annual reports
show that such matters were never seriously considered by the management. The only
significant forward linkage was the consumption of oil products in Iran during this
period7 It is interesting to note that oil products consumed by the Iranians during the
period under study were not all supplied by AIOC. In fact, there were three major
sources of supply, the AIOC's own sales of its domestically produced and refined
products, AIOC's imports from abroad, and imports from Russia. 78 As Table 4.8 shows,
until late the 1920s, more than three-quarters of the oil consumption was imported, and
until 1937, Soviet Union exports accounted for the bulk of oil consumption in Iran. But
as the table demonstrates, imports fell sharply in the late 1930s and 1940s. The main
reason for imports of such large quantities of petroleum products by Iran, at a time
when she was the biggest oil producer in the Middle East and Abadan Refinery was the
largest of its kind in the world, was the fact that the oil production region and Abadan
Refinery were located in the southwest, while the main centres of consumption were in
the northern and central parts of Iran, with distances of at least 1,000 krns between them.
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Lack of adequate transportation in Iran in the 1920s and early 1930s exacerbated the
problem. As the main petroleum consuming regions were nearer to Russia and
transportation was relatively better in those parts, it made it easier for the former to
dominate the Iranian oil market for a while. Moreover, as the domestic oil market was
small (see Table 4.8), AIOC was not willing to invest in domestic transport facilities.
With the improvements in the Iranian transport system in the latter half of the 1930s,
however, AIOC rapidly expanded its operation in Iran, and by the early 1940s became
almost the sole supplier of oil products in the country.
Considering the above discussion, it becomes clear that the direct effects of the
oil industry on the Iranian economy during the 1921-1941 period were meagre. There
were practically no forward (with the exception of a small consumption of oil products)
or backward linkages with the rest of the Iranian economy, as AIOC did not buy
domestically produced goods, or invest in local industry. The fact that AIOC was a net
purchaser of rials from the Iranian government shows that domestic sales of petroleum
products were not large enough to meet the company's local currency expenditures (see
Table 4.2).
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Table 4.6: APOC staff and Labour in Iran 1919-32
Year Persians Indians Others European Total
1919 3,979 2,641 47 117 6,784
1920 8,447 3,616 35 244 12,342
1921 9,009 4,709 51 271 14,040
1922 18,441 4,285 2,940 490 26,156
1923 20,762 4,715 849 644 26,970
1924 18,384 4,731 648 738 24,501
1925 15,820 4,890 7,201 994 28,905
1926 15,843 3,588 6,042 1,020 26,493
1927 17,887 3,272 7,009 1,055 29,223
1928 16,382 3,050 5,365 1,000 25,797
1929 15,245 2,158 5,273 980 24,016
1930 20,095 2,411 7,549 1,191 31,246
1931 14,797 1,675 3,178 989 20,639
1932 10,343 1,420 2,346 744 14,853
Source: BP reports to Imperial Commissioner and BP 78/63/1-205. Printed in Ferrier
(1982), p.401.
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Table 4.7: Employment in the Iranian Oil Industry, 1939-51
Year Iranians Non-Iranians Not Specified Total
1939 15,060 2,723 n.a. 17,783
1940 13,380 2,273 n.a. 15,653
1941 10,980 2,079 n.a. 13,065
1942 11,654 1,803 n.a. 13,457
1943 16,389 2,864 n.a. 19,253
1944 16,485 3,380 n.a. 19,865
1945 21,781 4,030 12,143 37,954
1946 24,899 4,520 12,461 41,870
1947 28,221 4,228 11,065 43,514
1948 29,917 4,306 12,189 46,412
1949 32,011 4,477 16,410 52,898
1950 31,875 4,500 n.a. n.a.
1951 50,662 4,271 12,951 67,884
Note: The figures for 1939-44, are incomplete due to lack of information on contract
labour, and hence, the total figures for this period are smaller than the actual ones.
Source: L. Nahai and C. Kimble, "The Petroleum Industry of Iran", U.S. Department of
Interior, Bureau of Mines, 1963, p.20.
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Table 4.8: Production, Exports, Consumption, and Imports for Selected Years (metric
tons)
Year Production Imports Total
Consump-
tion
Exports Imports as
% of
Consump-
tion
1912 82.0 38.4 38.4 37.0 100
1917 911.8 45.2 48.1 623.0 94
1922 3,006.5 23.4 27.4 2,604.0 72
1927 5,443.7 40.0 52.5 4,754.4 77
1932 6,449.2 56.5 40.0 6,006.3 --
1937 10,329.8 44.5 162.3 9,302.0 28
1942 9,546.7 6.7 265.2 8,030.2 2
1947 20,518.9 34.6 595.2 17,725.1 6
1951 16,885.7 6.4 941.0 14,032.3 0.7
Note: In 1932 imports are larger than consumption implying some re-exports to
neighbouring countries.
Source: Fesharalci (1976), p.35.
3.3.2.2- Indirect Effects
In section 3.3.2, a brief definition of the term "indirect" or fiscal effects of oil
revenues on the economy of a producing country was presented. Basically, the effects of
these revenues is to increase the current spending power (ordinary budget) of the state,
to provide the principal financing for development programmes and (along with the local
expenditure of concessionaire companies brought into the country in the form of foreign
exchange) to finance imports and other debit items in the balance of payments.79
However, one important point which needs to be cleared here is that oil revenues are
chiefly denominated in foreign currency, and as such are different from other sources of
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state revenue, say indirect taxes on locally produced goods. 8° The former enables the
government to buy any tradeable goods available on the international market, while the
latter can only be spent on locally produced goods and services. This distinction is
important as oil revenues enable the producing countries (or any other raw materials
producer for that matter) which are generally underdeveloped with no other export
industries, to purchase goods and services for current consumption or development
purposes, an option which would not have been available to them had the oil reserves
not existed. The point being made here is that the availability of oil revenues in the form
of hard currencies, removes one of the main rigidities (i.e. shortage of foreign currency)
facing the developing countries, and enables the producing nations to carry out their
development programmes at a much higher rate. However, as shall be shown shortly, this
option was not available to Iran in the inter-war period.
To understand the significance of oil revenues, they can be examined in three
different contexts. First, they can be compared with the total revenues of the Iranian
government during a certain period, or second, the foreign exchange contribution of oil
revenues can be shown as a percentage of total exports. Thirdly, they could be contrasted
with the total value of oil exports during the same period.
During the Qajar regime, oil revenues received by the Iranian government were
mainly used to pay for the private expenses of the court. When Reza Shah took power
in Iran, these revenues were incorporated in to the general budget. 81 (Data on
government budget is only available from 1923. See Table 4.2.)
As Table 4.2 shows, during the 1923-26 period, the total value of oil exports was
13 million pounds, of which the Iranian government received 0.9 million pounds, or 7%
of the value of oil exports. The net foreign exchange proceeds from the oil sector for the
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same period was 3.2 million pounds (which included domestic currency purchases of
AIOC), and represented 21% of total foreign exchange receipts by Iran. This 3.2 million
pounds provided the government with 13.8% of its total revenue for the same period. In
the 1935-37 period, AIOC exported 26 6 million pounds worth of oil of which it paid the
Iranian government 3.8 million pounds in royalties that represented 16.8% of the latter's
total income. At the same time, net foreign exchange proceeds from the oil sector
amounted to 6.8 million pounds which was 37.3% of total foreign currencies obtained by
Iran.
As can be observed from the above analysis, the contribution of oil exports to the
Iranian government budgets was small compared to its revenue from other sources.
Now, the impact of oil revenues on the economic development of Iran during the
inter-war period will be discussed. One problem with evaluating such impact is that until
1949 Iran operated only one annual budget, which included both current and
development expenditures. 82 Since no separate development budget was prepared, it is
difficult to accurately measure the contribution of the oil revenues to the development
expenditure. Fragmentary budget data shows that up to 1927, all receipts from the oil
sector were included in the consolidated budget. From 1927 to 1942, however, some 94%
of oil revenues were set aside in a special reserve account for non-routine
expenditure." Some 47% of income in this account was used to purchase military
hardware, and the rest was used for the construction of the Trans-Iranian Railways and
the establishment of some industries.84 From the available data, one can estimate that
in the 1930s development expenditure accounted for 30 to 40% of the annual public
budget."
Considering the arguments and data in the present section, it becomes clear that,
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the combined effects (direct and indirect) of the oil industry were too inconsequential
to influence the pace or direction of Iran's economic development in the inter-war
period.
4.0- The 1941-1953 Period
4.1- The Oil Nationalisation Dispute
With the outbreak of the Second World War and the start of the Russo-German
War, the Allied Powers decided to open a new line to supply the beleaguered Russian
forces, and Iran was the best route. Meanwhile, Reza Shah who was being accused by
the Allies of sympathising with the Germans, had lost favour with the British. So instead
of relying on him, after a short war in August 1941, the British and Americans occupied
southern Iran, and the Russians invaded the north of the country. Reza Shah was forced
to abdicate and left the country, and his son Mohammad Reza became the new king (the
Shah until 1979). The occupation, which lasted until 1946, greatly disrupted the fragile
economy of Iran and brought high inflation, and immense poverty and hardship for the
people.
With the fall of Reza Shah, the 16-year period of his authoritarian regime came
to an end. The disorganised paralysis of the state apparatus resulting from the occupation
and absence of a "strong man" brought about a period of relative openness and a re-entry
of the masses into Iranian politics in the post-war era. 86 The people saw the occupying
forces as perpetuating and strengthening the political domination of the British
government and AIOC over Iran, and, with the departure of these forces, AIOC became
the focus of opposition.
The fact that AIOC's profits had risen tenfold compared to a fourfold increase
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in Iranian royalties in the 1940-1950 period highlighted the alleged exploitative nature
of the oil agreement and led to the Majlis's (the parliament) demands for a revision of
the structure of the concession. The nationalistic sentiments of the people forced the
goverment to introduce a bill in October 1947 which proposed a ban on the award of
any new oil concession by the government without prior approval by the Majlis and,
furthermore, instructed the government to investigate and renegotiate the terms of the
AIOC concession.87
Around the same time, the principal of 50-50 profit sharing was accepted by
Venezuela. Following these developments, AIOC in 1948 submitted its "Supplemental
Agreement" to the Iranian government in which a rise in royalties from four to six
shillings (gold) plus an increase in tax of 9 pence to 1 shilling was proposed. Moreover,
the agreement stipulated that sums equal to 20% of those placed to the Company's
general reserve should thereafter be paid annually to Iran and an immediate payment
exceeding 5 Million pounds being made in respect of allotment to general reserves since
1947. The agreement also stipulated that AIOC's annual payments covering Iran's share
of divisible profits and allocations to reserves should never fall below 4 million pounds
and that oil products prices for iran's domestic consumption should further be reduced.
It was also agreed that the arrangement made under the 1933 Agreement to compensate
Iran for fluctuations in the gold sterling exchange rates should remain operative. The
Chairman of AIOC stated that this agreement would give Iran the same benefits as a 50-
50 agreement.89 The agreement was, however, rejected by the oil committee of the
Majlis, headed by Dr Mohammad Mossadegh as being unacceptable. 9° Around the
same time (1949), the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) concluded a 50-50
profit sharing agreement with Saudi Arabia. 91 AlOC offered to conclude an agreement
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with Iran on the same line as that between Saudi Arabia and ARAMCO but Iran
rejected this proposal as wel1.92
Following these events, in February 1951, Dr Mossadegh submitted a draft
legislation to the Majlis for the nationalisation of the oil industry and all of AIOC's
properties in Iran. The Iranian government was opposed to the nationalisation and four
days after the introduction of the bill, the Prime Minister, General Razmara, was
assassinated, and on 28 April 1951, Dr Mossadegh was elected as the new Premier. On
the 30th of that month the Majlis approved Mossadegh's proposal to nationalise AIOC's
properties.93
The British government took the matter before the International Court of Justice
in the Hague, but the Court ruled in July 1952 that it had no jurisdiction over Iran.'
AIOC however, succeeded in persuading other international oil companies to boycott
Iranian oil which was now being produced by the newly established National Iranian Oil
Company (NIOC). Furthermore, AIOC threatened legal action against any company or
country which bought "stolen" Iranian oil. These AIOC tactics were very successful in
denying Iran the opportunity to sell her oil in the international markets. Iran managed
to sell only two small quantities of oil to the Japanese and Italians (see Chapter Three).
The oil boycott was preventing Iran from earning enough foreign exchange to pay for
much needed imports, which in turn caused a deepening economic crisis and chaos in the
country.95
The Americans who initially supported Iran became concerned over the effects
that the Iranian nationalisation may have on their own oil interests in the Middle East
or, indeed around the world. Particularly, the large American oil companies on whose
support Dr Mossadegh was counting refused to handle the Iranian oil, as they believed
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that a successful oil nationalisation there may endanger their own interests in the region.
With the election of the pro-big business former General Eisenhower as the U.S.
President in 1952, the Americans turned decidedly against the Iranians.
Winston Churchill, who had once again become the British Prime Minister, (note
that it was him who in the first place persuaded the British government to buy a
controlling stake in APOC back in 1914) adopted a much tougher attitude against Iran,
and moreover, managed to convince his war-time ally, President Eisenhower, that the
Iranian nationalisation was not in American, as well as British interests. Furthermore,
he argued that with the ensuing Cold War, the Russians may take advantage of the
turmoil in Iran and invade the country.
These arguments succeeded in winning over President Eisenhower, and he agreed
to help the British to reverse the oil nationalisation in Iran. So the Americans, with the
help of the British, and more crucially with the support of Iranian conservative classes:
landowners, merchant bourgeoisie, high clergy, and some sections of the armed forces,
arranged for a coup in August 1953 to remove Dr Mossadegh from premiership, and
install someone who was sympathetic to Western interests in Iran.
The coup succeeded in toppling the Mossadegh government and installed General
Zahedi as the new Prime Minister. The Shah returned to power and a new phase of
ruthless suppression of all democratic forces began. Although the new government did
not dare nullify the nationalisation law for fear of the people's adverse reaction, it
nevertheless concluded a new agreement in August 1954 with a consortium of major oil
companies which in effect destroyed the process of nationalisation.96
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4.1.1- The 1954 Consortium Agreement
Although the Consortium Agreement recognised the nationalisation of the Iranian
oil industry, it clearly specified that Iran had no right to interfere in the running of the
concession. The area covered by the agreement was about the same size as the area in
AIOC's concession of about 100,000 square miles. Kermanshah oilfield together with the
Kermanshah Refinery were taken over by NIOC, and the company was given the
ownership of all producing, refining, auxiliary installations operated by AIOC and the
future facilities of the Consortium members.97
Under the agreement, NIOC was to take over the "non-basic operations" which
included health, housing, and education. (In fact NIOC did not take over these functions
until 1959, and then only partially with financial contribution from the Consortium.) The
agreement was to run for 25 years with the provision of three 5-year renewals at the
Consortium option.'
Payments to the Iranian government took the form of royalty payments and 50-50
net profit division. Royalties were fixed at 12.5% of total production. The 50-50 profit-
sharing arrangement meant that the net profits of the producing stage should be divided
equally between the Consortium and NIOC.99
The 50-50 profit sharing device meant that Iran's oil revenues more than tripled
from 1950 to 1956 despite a decrease in average daily production from 660,000 to
540,000 barrels.m However, the agreement between Iran and the Consortium was in
essence no different from those concluded earlier between other oil producing countries
and major oil companies.101
According to Stocking the Consortium Agreement gave Iranians "the shadow of
what they sought while retaining for the British the substance of what they had" .1°2
200
Moreover, the nationalisation dispute, apart from tripling Iran's oil revenues caused long-
term damage to the Iranian economy and particularly its oil industry, resulting in Iran
losing her dominant position in the Middle East.103
5.0- The 1954-1973 Period
5.1- Political Developments
With the military coup of 1953 the period of open politics in post-war Iran came
to an end, and the second stage of modern authoritarianism in which the Shah assumed
an increasingly larger role in the affairs of the state began. The conclusion of the
Consortium Agreement in 1954, initiated the third phase of economic development and
industrialisation with oil becoming the predominant source of financing.
However, while in the second phase, the main role of the state was the
mobilisation of resources in an agrarian economy (through the collection of indirect
taxes). In the third phase, there was a reversal of roles, in which the state accepted
responsibility for the distribution and allocation of the already centralised economic
resources in the form of oil revenues. This period can be broken down into two sub-
periods: divided by the crisis years of 1960-1963.
5.1.1- The 1954-1960 Period
During these years, the Shah relied on the support of a conservative coalition of
bazaar bourgeoisie, landowners, and high clergy to strengthen his position and destroy
the democratic and radical opposition movements. During this time, the Shah, with
massive help from the Americans, rebuilt and unified the military-bureaucratic state
apparatus under his own control. Once this task was over, he became increasingly
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independent of the conservative coalition which , anyway, did not last long.
The rapid inflow of oil revenues after the 1954 oil agreement created a boom in
imports and economic activity for a short time. By 1959-1960, strong inflationary
pressures were building up which, together with the depletion of foreign reserves, forced
the government to adopt economic austerity measures. 1°4 The severe economic
situation created strong internal and external pressures for social reforms and change of
the government economic strategy. 105
In responding to these pressures, the Shah, in February 1963, announced a six
point reform programme which he called the "the White Revolution". The most
important part of this programme was the land reform which sought to eliminate
absentee landowners, an important element of the coalition which had supported the
Shah and his regime since early 1950 (or more precisely since the establishment of the
Pahlavi Dynasty in 1926).106
The coalition did not accept this historical break without a fight. Together with
other sections of society it organised wide-spread opposition to the Shah's rule which
culminated in the violent confrontation of June 1963. The brutal suppression of the June
demonstration also ended the political compromise with the bazaar bourgeoisie (which
had benefitted immensely from the regime's liberal trade policies in the 1950's), and the
clergy. 107
5.1.2- 1963-1973 Period
The quelling of the opposition and the break with the traditional coalition marked
the beginning of the second period of the post-1953 authoritarian rule and accelerated
the process of bureaucratization and centralisation of power which had been taking place
202
since 1953. Specifically, the economic bureaucratic controls were greatly expanded and
the state, in order to redirect capital into industrial activities, abandoned its semi-liberal
economic policy and adopted an active interventionist strategy."
The new government economic strategy took the form of the creation of new
organisations, the expansion of existing ones like specialised banks, the Plan Organisation
to provide long-term subsidised loans to private industry, the implementation of diverse
investment programmes both in industry (public and private) and the country's
infrastructure, and the introduction of high tariffs and trade barriers against competing
foreign goods.' Two of the most important economic institutions in this period were
the Plan Organisation (In the early 1970s it also assumed responsibility for the general
budget and was renamed the Plan and Budget Organisation) and the Industrial and
Mining Development Bank of Iran (IMDBI). (This chapter is only concerned with the
activities of the PO, as this organisation was (is) responsible for the drawing up and
implementation of development plans.
5.2- The Role of Oil in the Economic Development of Iran after the 1954 Consortium
Agreement
5.2.1- Indirect Effects111
After the Consortium Agreement of 1954, Iran's oil income increased from $34.4
million in 1954-55 to $5,066.6 million in 1973-74, an increase of nearly 150 times.112
However, this oil income was not large enough to cover the government's spiralling
current and development expenditure and it had to resort to large scale foreign
borrowing and grants to make up for the shortfall. It is important to note that Iran's
ability to borrow in international markets was dependent on her ability to repay these
loans from her oil revenues which was like mortgaging her future oil income. Therefore,
)110
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the effect of oil revenues on the government's expenditure were well above the actual
receipts from the oil sector for any given year. In fact, the oil sector, in complete contrast
to the inter-war period, played a pivotal role in the economic development of Iran. Table
4.9 illustrates the importance of foreign exchange receipts from the oil sector to the four
development plans, especially the Third and Fourth ones, and to the foreign exchange
reserves of the country. Furthermore, Table 4.10 manifests the degree of the country's
dependence in the post-war period on the oil sector for development expenditure. As the
table shows, from the Third Development Plan onwards, at least 60% of the oil revenues
were allocated to the Plan Organisation for development purposes.
Table 4.9: Iran's Foreign Exchange Receipts (Millions of Dollars), 1949-73
pLAN
OIL SECTOR NON-OIL FOREIGN TOTAL
Reve-
nues
Purch-
ases
Goods Servi-
ces
Loans Grants
PLAN
First 176 182 416 45 79 99 997
Second 1670 481 640 342 651 160 3944
Third 2958 716 700 425 677 -- 5476
Fourth 7506 620 1423 1150 5184 -- 15883
Total 12310 1999 3179 1962 6591 259 26300
Source:J. Amuzegar (1991), p.45.
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Table 4.10: Division of Oil Revenues Between the Treasury General and the Plan
Organisation, 1963-73 in billions of rials.
OIL
REVENUES
SHARE OF TREASURY
GENERAL
SHARE OF PLAN
ORGANISATION
YEAR Amount Amount % of Tot Amount % of Tot
1963-64 27.7 11.4 41.2 16.3 58.8
1964-65 36.4 14.1 38.7 22.3 61.3
1965-66 50.0a 12.4 24.8 37.6 75.2
1966-67 47.4 13.3 28.1 34.1 71.9
1967-68 54.0 14.5 26.8 39.5 73.2
1968-69 61.8 15.0c 24.3 46.8d 75.7
1969-70 70.0b 14.7 21.0 55.4 79.0
1970-71 83.8 17.6 21.0 66.2 79.0
1971-72 150.3a 34.0 22.6 116.3 77.4
1972-73 178.2 36.6 20.5 141.6 79.5
1973-74 311.2 91.2 29.0 220.0e 71.0
Notes:
a- Includes oil bonuses of 10.5 billion rials and 3.5 billions rials in 1961 and 1971.
b- Excludes 6.3 billion rials advance payment by the Consortium.
c- Includes 2 billion rials transfer from the PO oil revenues for the implementation
of the new civil code.
d- Excludes 2 billion rials mentioned in (c).
e- Estimated.
Source: Fesharaki (1976), p.135.
5.2.1.1- Development Planning in Iran
Development planning started in Iran in 1949 after the parliament passed the Plan
Organisation Act, establishing a machinery for planning and implementing development
projects in Iran.113 From 1949 to March 1973, four development plaxs. were executed
in Iran114 (See Table 4.11 for data on revenues and expenditures of the four plans.).
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The Fifth Development plan which was started in March 1973 was extensively revised
in 1974 as a result of the huge increases in Iran oil revenues and became known as the
revised Fifh Plan.
In the First Seven Year Development Plan (1949-1955) some infra-structural
projects were started and half a dozen new industrial plants were established. This plan,
however, only managed to implement around 20% of its intended projects as it was
disrupted by the oil nationalisation dispute of 1951-53 which stopped the flow of oil
revenues to the Plan Organisation.115
The Second Seven Year Plan (1956-62) was drafted soon after the oil agreement
between the Iranian government and the Consortium, and as Table 4.11 shows over 73%
of its revenues were to come from oil sales and the rest was to be mainly financed by
foreign borrowing. The Second Plan mostly followed the First and tried to complete
activities already started. This plan nevertheless coincided with the economic recession
in the early 1960s and a severe drought affecting agriculture which greatly restricted its
implementation. 116 During the Second Plan, about 8% of the total outlay was spent on
development of the domestic industry (mainly textile mills, sugar refineries, and cement
plants). Overall, total development expenditure of the plan was 84%, with the balance
going to social services and repayment of foreign loans (see Table 4.11).
The first two plans, apart from being interrupted by external events were marred
by lack of statistical information, little prior experience with economic planning, the
multitude of urgent needs, rivalry between various government departments, and political
pressure by vested interests. The period covered by these two plans are referred to as
"pre-take-off' period.117
The Third Development Plan (1963-67) projected a total public expenditure of
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IR232 billion ($3.06 billion)" 8, 66% of which was to be financed by oil revenues. The
rest of the expenditure was to be financed by foreign borrowing and domestic sources.
The Plan Organisation's share of the oil revenues (rising each year with the increase in
oil receipts) averaged around 70% during the Third Plan (see Table 4.10). Moreover, the
Plan forecast private investment of about IR150 billion ($2 billion) which, together with
public investment, was to produce 6% annual real growth of the economy.119
The significance of oil revenues in the implementation of the Third Plan can be
readily seen from Tables 4.9 to 4.11, and these ever increasing revenues helped the Plan
to finish its term with most of its components exceeding their growth rates. The average
annual growth rate of GNP rose to 8.8% and per capita GNP increased 6.5% a year,
while inflation was kept at a low rate of 1.4%. The oil sector had the highest rate of
growth of 13.2% a year, followed by industry and construction (13%). 120
Public investment in the Third Plan took a marked shift away from light industry
and towards the establishment and expansion of heavy industry as the state financed the
construction of a steel mill, several machine tool plants, a tractor assembly, an aluminium
smelting plant, and three petrochemical plants. The reason for the government's massive
investment in capital intensive-heavy industry was that it was well beyond the private
sector's capacity to do so. The latter, sometimes with the participation of foreign capital,
concentrated chiefly on light industry like footwear, foodstuffs, plastic ware, textiles,
construction materials, home appliances, radio and television receivers and so on. The
private sector, however, did make some inroads into heavy industry by investing in
vehicle assembly, engineering materials, and small scale chemical and petrochemical
plants.'
The capital intensive nature of public investments, however, hiruiesed the Plan's
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target of creating one million new jobs during its life time and in fact, with the net
addition of about 1.8 million to the labour force, the urban unemployment problem was
gravely aggravated. Furthermore, with the agricultural sector achieving only a 3.4%
growth rate (compared to the projected 4.1%) 122 food shortages became a major
problem which forced the government to use oil revenues to import massive amounts of
food from abroad.
The Fourth Development Plan (1968-72) was to be financed by $7 billion
projected foreign exchange receipts from oil, gas, and petrochemical exports, and was
initially projected to increase real GNP by 9.3% per year and to create one million new
jobs. In effect, the Plan managed to spend IR610 billion of which IR385 billions or 63%
came from the oil sector (see Table 4.11).
The Fourth Plan's total outlay was 2.6 times that of the Third Plan, thanks to huge
increases in oil production, exports and prices. Revenues from the oil sector rose from
nearly $3000 million in the Third Plan to over $7500 million in the Fourth, of which up
to 79% was allocated to the Plan Organisation (see Tables 4.9 and 4.10).
Investment in industry and mining rose from 17.1 billion rial in the Third to 113.1
billion rial in the Fourth Plan, growing from 7% to 19% of the total disbursements
respectively (Table 4.11). This demonstrates the government's determination to push
ahead with the industrialisation process which now had been facilitated by improvements
in the country's infra-structure during the previous plans. More precisely, over 22% of
the Plan's outlay was spent on continued investments in iron and steel, petrochemicals,
machine tools, and metallurgical plants./
Due to such factors as more sophisticated planning, better intra-governmental
relations, relative socio-political stability, and higher oil revenues, the Fourth Plan was
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a success. Real GNP grew by 11.6% a year, and the employment target of 1 million new
jobs was exceeded by a quarter of a million workers.124
Against this background, however, an almost exclusive reliance on oil whose
production capacity was reaching its peak, began to worry the government over the
economic prospects of the country in the long-term. This was in fact one of the main
reasons behind the state's wish for rapid industrialisation of Iran, especially the
development of the petrochemical industry, export refineries, and gas exports to gain
added value from the fast depleting oil reserves.
The 1962-73 period, covered by the Third and Fourth Development Plans is
referred to as the "take-off' or "steady growth" period, and represented the high point of
Iran's post-war economic development. The country's annual growth in real terms was
8.8% for 1962-68, and an extraordinaryly high rate of 11.6% for 1968-72 which matched
that of Japan during her high growth period. This growth which is termed as "perverse
growth"; 125- i.e. a process of growth which is not viable in the long-run and is subject
to sharp cyclical fluctuations in the medium-run, however, created a few economic
problems (especially shortage of foreign currency) towards the end of the 1960s/early
1970s which were temporarily alleviated by increases in oil prices from 1971 onwards. (In
fact, the massive inflow of oil revenues after 1973-74 intensified these problems and
created many bottlenecks in the Iranian economy, which severely disrupted the
development process and created various social and political tensions.)
The Fifth Development Plan (March 1973 to March 1978) was an ambitious
document itself.' 26 It called for a total fixed investment (private and public) of 2,460.4
billion fiats of which 62.9% was the public sector's share and the remaining the private
sector's share of investment, with the largest allocation (20.4%) going to the industry.127
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Few months after the implementation of the plan, and following the Arab oil
embargo of October 1973, in December of that year an OPEC conference was held in
Tehran to discuss the new developments in the oil markets. At this meeting, largely at
the instigation of the Shah, in what became known as the Tehran Oil Agreement, the oil
prices rose sharply.'
As a result of this agreement, Iranian government's oil revenues rose from $1.85
to $7 in 1973 and by the end of 1974 it had jumped to $10.21 per barre1. 129 More
precisely, Iran's oil revenues increased from $2,399 million in 1972 to $4,858 million in
1973 and to $18,523 million in 1974.130
Following these massive increases in Iran's oil revenues, the government, or more
accurately, the Shah adopted a "big push" strategy for the rapid industrialisation of the
country. 131
 The Shah wanted to use these oil revenues to make Iran the fifth industrial
power by the turn of the century, and dreamed of Iran reaching the gates of the "great
civilisation" by then.'
Soon after the oil price hikes, the original Fifth Plan was abandoned in favour of
a new and greatly expanded plan. The new plan assumed that during its lifetime (1973-
78) gross national product (GNP) would rise by 25.9% in real terms per annum, from
1,165 billion rials in 1972/3 to 3,686 billion rials in 1978/9. 133 The plan also called for
a 25.9% annual real growth rate for the GDP in the same period, with the oil sector and
industry contributing 15% and 18% respectively.134
The Revised Fifth plan anticipated the total government revenue during the plan
period to be about 8,296.5 billion rials, of which 79.8% was projected to be the share of
oil and gas revenues, 14.6% direct and indirect taxes and 1.7% foreign loans.'
Total government expenditure were also set at 8,2965 billion rials, 40.9% of which
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was allocated to current expenditure, 43.3% to domestic fixed capital formation, 4.8%
to repayment of foreign loans and credits and 10.9% to social services.'
Moreover, the plan proposed a total fixed capital formation of 4,698.8 billion rials,
of which the public sector's share was 3,118.57 billion rials (66.4% of the total) and the
balance, 1,580.23 billion (33.6%) being provided by the private sector.137
The level of investment in industry was projected to be 780.1 billion rials of which
the share of public sector was 36% and the remaining 64% was the private sector's
share.138 Out of the total government funds for the industry of 368.09 billion rials,
metallurgical industries were to absorb over 85 billion rials (23%), chemical and
petrochemicals 76.44 billion rials (20%0) with the rest going to mechanical, electronic,
electric, automotive and various other industries.139
Table 4.12 shows that the metallurgical industries absorbed the largest share of
allocated fixed investments, out of a total of 780.14 billion rials they absorbed 232.57
billion rials (29.7%) and were followed by the chemical and petrochemical industries
with the allocation of 163.14 billion rials (20.8%). It is obvious from this table that heavy
and capital intensive industries were singled out as the basis of the rapid industrialisation
of Iran in the Revised Fifth Plan.
This industrial strategy based on the expansion of capital intensive industries was
adopted at a time when Iran's absorptive capacity had already reached a saturation point.
As table 4.13 demonstrates, already in 1974 Incremental Capital Output Ratio (ICOR)
had reached 9.22 rials. In other words, for every extra unit (rial) of output, 9.22 rials of
investment were required'; a very high rate by any standard. As a result of the
implementation of the revised Fifth Plan, the already overheated Iranian economy was
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put under such an strain that in 1976, ICOR reached an all time high of 11.17 rials and
actually became negative in 1977. This means that in that year, as a result of the
implementation of the Revised Fifth Plan, for each additional unit of investment, output
actually fell by 2.33 rials (see Table 4.13). This was a very undesirable outcome and very
much against the expectations of the government for constantly increasing output.
The adaptation of the 'big push" strategy for rapid industrialisation and economic
development of Iran with emphasis on the expansion of heavy and capital intensive
industries required the availability of large numbers of skilled and semi-skilled workers
and a well developed physical infrastructure, both of which were in severe shortages at
that time. But these realities were ignored by the Iranian government, particularly the
Shah who had set out to reach the gates of the "great civilisation" by the year 2000.
In fact the Plan and Budget Organisation (PBO) had identified the shortage of
manpower and inadequate infrastructure as the as the two most important problems
hindering the implementation of the plan, but it was overruled by the Shah who wanted
Iran to develop as rapidly as possible. With regard to manpower, the PBO had estimated
that during the plan the total shortage of labour could be as high as 721,200 with skilled
and semi-skilled industrial workers, skilled construction workers and education personnel
accounting for the most shortages.141
The implementation of the Revised Fifth Plan did indeed put severe strains on
the already over-heated Iranian economy in the latter part of the 1970s. The greatest
problems were an over-stretched infrastructure, manpower shortages, fall in food
production'', shortage of foreign currency (at a time of high oil prices), large foreign
borrowing, and high inflation rates, with retail and whole prices increasing by 25.1% and
14.1% respectively in 1977.143
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The enormous increases in the governmental and private expenditure and
investment during the Revised Fifth Plan (1973-78) which resulted from large increases
in oil prices and Iran's oil revenues not only caused severe strains for the already over-
stretched Iranian economy with the resultant shortages of many basic items and high
inflation rates, but in the opinion of a few observers led to social, economic and political
stability and was a major factor in the downfall of the Shah's regime and the Islamic
Revolution of 1979.1'
It is clear from the preceding pages that the indirect effects on the Iranian
economy of the oil industry after nationalisation, in sharp contrast to the inter-war
period, were immense, and in some respects, she was well served by the ever increasing
oil revenues. However, it could equally be argued that the oil revenues were squandered
by a corrupt elite on arms purchases, luxurious life style for the Imperial Court, and
more importantly on inefficient industries. This last point becomes clear as in the next
section the direct effects, i.e. backward and forward linkages of the oil industry on the
Iranian economy in the same period will be analyzed.
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Table 4.11: Revenues and Expenditures of the Four Development Plans, 1949-73
(billions of rials)
PLAN FIRST SECOND THIRD FOURTH
REVENUES Amo't	 % Amo't % Arno't % Amo't %
Oil 7.8 37 61.0 73 153.0 66 385.0 63
Other (b) 13.2 63 22.2 27 79.0 34 225.0 37
Total 21.0 100 83.2 100 232.0 100 610.0 100
EXPEND'RE
Agri'ture 5.25 25 17.4 21 47.3 20 92.5 15
Transport
& Comu'n
5.75 28 27.3 33 53.8 23 113.8 19
Fuel
& Power
1.0 5 c -- 32.0 14 94.8 16
Industry
& Mines
3.0 14 7.0 8 17.1 7 113.1 19
Social
Services (d)
6.0 28 9.3 11 33.3 15 38.9 6
Other
Projects (e)
-- -- 9.0 11 21.1 9 53.7 9
Total
Devl'mnt
21.0 100 80.0 84 204.6 88 506.8 84
Non-
Devl'mnt (f)
-- -- 13.2 16 27.4 12 103.2 16
Total 21.0 100 83.2 100 232.0 100 610.0 100
Notes:
a- Only 20% of the planned expenditure was actually disbursed.
b- Includes foreign and Domestic borrowing.
c- Included in industry and mines.
d- Includes health, education, and social welfare.
e- Includes housing and construction, municipal and regional development and
statistics.
f- Includes repayment of foreign and domestic loans and administrative expenditures.
Source: Fesharaki (1976) p.137.
co	 0
0
cIe)
0
cY)
*
4-1 1--1
0 RS
4-)
O\00
E-1
N
•
co
01
•
1/41:1
S
•
co
CO
.
0
N
S
•
cr)
N
1/40
•
d'
d•
•
d'
S
•
cr
Cn
•
00
in
•
in
.
0
I-I
0
.
0
0
H
nD
.....-
+
e•-•.
Cl
......
—
i--.
••--
CT)
•
cn
1/4.0
VD
%.0
•
Cl
Ln
01
s
•
N
lC)
•ct,
H
.
Cl
nD
H
r-
in
•
N
CI
N
r-
in
•
VD
CI
In
In
•
in
CI
Cl
H
.
S
Cl
0
•
Cl
NCl
•
d'
CO
.4.
.
N
CO
d'
H
.
0
co
S
....,
Ln
.....-
+
•zr
---
......,
%.0
-----
0
•
0
•zi•
0
•
CO
•:).
0
•
0
in
0
.
d'
co
0
.
0
Ln
H
0
•
k.D
0
•
N
N
0
•
ln
N
0
•
Cl
I
I
0
.
in
S
0
Cl
0
in
IX
0r_,
U
Cal
ci)
lal
P
Ft4
>
HZ
a.
.-.
in
......
0
•
0
,...1
0
.
0
,__I
0
•
1----
0
•
0
N
0
•
CI
N
0
•
N
0
•
N
0
•
nD
I
II
I
0
•
00
N
0
0
H
.-..
./.
—0
0
.
Cl
0
•
CO
Cl
0
•
Cl
d'
0
•
-,:t.
MD
0
.
r-
N
1-1
0
•
•zr
0
•
0
N
0
•
01
H
0
•
Cl
I
I
0
•
in
in
0
Cl
0
•zr
---.
N
—
+
.,._
H
...--
—
Cl%
•zr
01
Cl
N
co
1/40
•
in
cn
S
•
N
H
•zr
H
.
o)
S
s
in
•
N
Co
sv
Ln
•
0
Cl
Ln
Ln
•
Cl
H
Cl
H
.
N
H
I
I
N
Cl
•
d'
CO
•zr
S
•zr
H
N
0
Cl
IX0
E.,
C.)
41
tf)
0
Hi_
14
la.
...-..
...-
NO
o
•
Ln
1-1
o
in
•
0
0
Cl
•
0
0
0
•
•Q•
I
I
0
in
•
Cl
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
0
s-
•
H
0
o
Ln
N
.---
H
—
-4'
0)
•
CO
CID
H
•
in
CS)
d'
•
s
I-I
-4,
I-1
.
in
S
N
In
•
N
Co
..r,
0
•
S
N
in
in
•
Cl
H
ci
I-1
•
N
Hi
I
I
N
ci
•
•zr
CO
N
.
in
•zr
H
N
in
N
,
LI)
C)
•,-,
4-)
U)
0
r0
C
H
TS
0
0
Li-i
u)
a)
H
-,1
4-)
X
W
E-I
Qs
W
u) tp
o a
H •H
4_)
,i c
H -H
1:1 -1
0 P.
1--1
RI
L-Is	 c..)
-.-1
Ul
H a)
RI 4
00
- H O
e
0.)	 4-)
,	 CL)
U 04
1--1
(u
u
-H
r.71
Z
H
H
(0
4-)
a)
X
H
ro
U
-H
C(:1
4
C.)
a)
X
Qs
HO(U -H
U
-HO
..1
4.i4
a)	 a)
,--1 ,-1
Lil	 LI)
0000
a)
>
-H
4-)
0
4.)
i'‹
u)
•	H
X
0
HO
RI C
0(0
H 4-)
CU)
 4H
U U)Q)	 U)
EI <
C.)
H
H
(CI	 VI
4H
W al
..1
IC)
C
OH
Z
H
co
4-)
0
El
(z5
4-)
C
0
a lc
nnn•
O ..-.
ic
Z71 cv
H
•
• RI
u)
Q.,
O 4-)
M co
• CT)
(1.)
ca,
O
• 
04-4
• 0
Li4
•zr.
n0
N
IX	 I	 W
0 Cl >
C.) L-- 4
HO
H
h
CV
•
n0
LT
N
ch
H
in
Lr)
H
•:),
Cl
N
nC)
H o\o
m r)
co	 •
CV CO
•	 rq
0
Or)
(7)
H
•
0
Cl
.
0
CO
N
01
H
CO
Cl
CV
m
op
In
CO
cn 0\0
Ln Ln
CV	 •
HC'.I
•	 1—I
0 1
I
0)
ko
CV
•
0
Cl
01
.
0
N
N
01
H
(N
0
h
Cl
CI
co
0
H
N o\c'
s co
CV	 •
0 N
.
0
tr)
CV
01
CV
.
0
Cl
Cl
•
CV
I
%.0
N
CA
H
CV
0
n.0
Cl
Cl
CO
0
H
CA o\c,
OH
Cl •
H rn
•	 1-1
0
M
01
0
Cl
•
0
N
H
.
H
H
Lf)
S
01
H
u-)
CO
H
Cl
..*.
N
01
in 0\o
01 01
H	 •
0 H
0
,--I
0
01
(V
0
CV
CV
.
N
Tr
N
01
H
Tr
CV
H
Cl
N
1.0
Lf)
¼O o\°
(NI r)
1.0	 •
0 '.D
o
C1
01
N-
H
o
CV
N
.
al
Cl
S
01
H
0
cr
cA
CV
No
in
cr
N. ow
Ln nD
1-1	 •
H1-1
•	 ,--1
0
.1.
Lf)
Lf)
H
•
0
CO
Tr
•
CV
CV
N
01
H
LI)
Cl
n0
CV
0
H
•zr
I
I
nID
Ln
Ls-)
H
0
I
I
4-)
W
..
H	 (0	 L13
'''''	 (1)
0
p4 4) - ,-1
Z ocl
CD s-- C2.1
..---.
N
.......
*
fa-,
C.)
1.1-1
C=1
P.,
W -.....,
4J
	
.4J
cc(-1}.4 -.—
4 P4
4-) Z
3 CD
0
44
CD 0
.--,
4..)	 Cl
a 0 ,--
a)	 .,..1	 .......,
4-)	 (15	 CV
V) f:4 ---
Q)	 II
a Z .4.
H CD •—•
.......
Cl
-.......
•Cr
P4	 II
C.)	 Lc)
H'—'
216
5.2.2- The Direct Effects
The framework for the analysis of the direct effects of the oil industry on the
Iranian economy was set up in section 3.3.2. This section will only look at the backward
and forward linkages that the industry established with the rest of the economy during
the 1954-73 period.
5.2.3- Backward Linkages
As discussed before, backward linkages of the leading industry with the rest of the
economy can be divided into demand for capital, employment, and purchases of goods
and services.
The Consortium that was set up after the 1954 oil agreement to run the Iranian
petroleum industry was composed of the seven Major oil companies, CFP of France, and
five independent American oil companies. These companies were huge multinational
firms whose capital was largely provided by American and European capital markets
(with the exception of CFP whose shares are mainly held by the French government),
and neither the Iranian government or public held any shares in these companies.
Moreover, these companies offered no shares for sale in the Iranian capital markets
(which were underdeveloped anyway). As a result, the participation of Iranian capital in
the Consortium, Iran's biggest oil producer was 'Ill.' s However, NIOC which was
wholly owned by the state did withdraw from the indigenous capital sources in the form
of disbursements allotted to it by the Plan Organisation which in turn had been mainly
provided by the oil industry itself. Apart from this, NIOC's other sources of finance were
from internally generated funds and long-term loans (although it is not clear whether
these loans were raised domestically or in international markets, most probably in the
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latter).' So one can assume that NIOC had a small effect on the Iranian capital
market.
The other important backward linkage of the oil sector is the employment of
Iranian nationals in the industry. Due to its capital intensive nature, the total
employment level between 1958 and 1972 actually fell in the petroleum industry. This
fall accrued in the manual labour category (almost all Iranians), while there was an
increase of nearly 60% in the number of Iranian employees categorised as staff (see
Table 4.14). This reduction in the industry's workforce took place at a time when oil
production was rising at very high rates which indicates greater automation of production
and refining activities, and raising of productivity levels. As Table 4.14 shows, between
1958 and 1972, oil production rose from 47,767 to 294,100 cubic meters, while the total
employment level fell from 62,033 to 41,812 respectively, showing an increase in
productivity from 0.77 to 7.03 thousands of cubic meters per employee.
In 1973-74, the total active force in Iran was 8.3 million, 7.6 million of whom were
employed. In that year, the number of the industrial labour force was around 2
rnillion147. As Table 4.14 demonstrates, in 1972 the oil industry employed 41,812
people, which indicates that just over one-half of 1% of the employed workforce, or 2.1%
of the industrial labour force were employed in the industry. Although no accurate data
exits on the outflow of trained manpower from the oil industry, Fesharaki states that his
inquiries "point to some transfer of technical and managerial skills from the oil industry
to the national economy." Obviously, this transfer of skills to the rest of the economy
would have been of great benefit to a country like Iran which was suffering from an
acute shortage of trained labour force in that period.
The other important backward Enka?, is the leading iridustry's demands for goods
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and services produced by the domestic economy, which can be divided into demand for
fixed assets and demand for current resources.
In the 1954-73 period, demand by the Iranian oil industry for domestically
produced fixed assets which were needed for the expansion of the industry were very
weak (like the inter-war time). The main reason was that the oil industry is a very capital
intensive industry, with the degree of sophistication and automation increasing over time.
The Iranian economy, still at a very early stage of industrialisation during that time, was
unable to supply the type of capital equipment that the oil industry required. Moreover,
the Consortium's local investment, like the construction and expansion of Khark and
Mahshahr terminals, were very modest and highly automated, offering little or no
demand for domestic labour and capital goods.149
The only major part played by the domestic economy in supplying the oil industry
with capital goods was the construction of Ahvaz Pipe Mill in 1968. The mill, which is
a subsidiary of the NIOC, produces pipelines for product and crude oil transportation
across the country. 150
The most important part played by the oil industry in forging backward linkages
with the Iranian economy during the period under study was the current expenditure of
the industry on locally produced goods and services. These included the purchase of
electricity from the national grid system, food supplies, industrial equipment, and wage
payments for labour. According to a study, 151 during the 1961-68 period, the purchase
of foreign goods by the Consortium, Iran's largest oil producer until the 1970s, rose by
25 times, while their purchase of domestically produced goods did not show any
significant change during the same period. In comparison, NIOC's purchases of
domestically produced goods rose in the same proportion as its foreign purchases.
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However, in that period, the NIOC's activities were to a large extent peripheral to oil
operations, as it was mainly responsible for "non-basic operations". These operations,
which were financed by the Consortium and carried out by the NIOC, included housing,
medical services, leisure services, and adminstration.
The above paragiaphs show that the oil industry offered little inducement to the
Iranian national economy by way of establishing backward linkages with other sectors of
the economy. The other direct effect, namely forward linkages that the petroleum
industry established with the Iranian economy were, to the contrary, of much greater
importance and will be discussed in the following section.
Table 4.14: Employment and productivity in the Iranian Oil Industry in Selected Years
YEAR
STAFF Manual
Labour
Contr-
actor
(a)
Total Produc-
tion
1000cm
Produc-
tivity
(b)Iranian Foreign
1958 8,139 693 48,477 4,724 62,033 47,767 0.77
1961 10,188 847 39,638 1,619 52,292 68,581 1.30
1964 9,888 474 31,564 727 42,653 98,343 2.30
1967 11,659c -- 29,426 1,385 42,740 150,681 3.50
1970 12,547c -- 26,952 1,917 41,416 222,180 5.40
1972 12,831 497 24,931 2,766 41,812 194,100 7.03
Notes:
a- Excludes foreign employees of the contractors.
b- Productivity in thousands of cubic meters per employee.
c- Including foreign staff.
Source: Fesharaki (1976), p.145.
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5.2.4- Forward Linkages
As discussed in section 3.3.2.1, forward linkages include the use of the leading
industry's products as inputs by other sectors of the economy, or its participation in the
domestic industry by the establishment of plants for the production of by-products. In the
case of the Iranian oil industry this could mean the use of its products by the rest of the
economy either as a source of energy or raw material, and its participation in the
industrialisation effort moving into downstream activities like oil refineries and
petrochemicals.
5.2.4.1- Provision of Energy to the Iranian Economy
As mentioned previously, before nationalisation AIOC did not consider the
Iranian market a very profitable one and, as a result, it did not make any efforts to
encourage the consumption of oil products, construct domestically oriented refineries or
by-product industries etc.
After the nationalisation of the oil industry in 1951 and the establishment of
NIOC, however, the Iranian government, believing that the development of the domestic
economy was directly related to the greater consumption of energy (as the economic
theories assert), put the expansion of the national distribution network at the top of the
list of its priorities. The Distribution Department was taken over by NIOC and was
charged with the responsibility of oil product distribution in Iran. The Department, which
probably until the revolution was the most important organisation within the company,
employed more than half of NIOC's total workforce of nearly 16,000 in 1973. 152 As a
result of the efforts of the Distribution Department, total domestic consumption of oil
products between 1955-73 rose from 1,948,000 to 15,425,000 cubic meters. 153 This
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represents an annual average growth rate of 11.5%. Moreover, in 1973, nearly 70% of
the domestic energy requirements were supplied by the oil industry, and if we add the
supply of natural gas and liquid petroleum gas (LPG), the figure rises to about 90% of
total energy supplies./54
The availability of "associated gas" produced as a by-product of oil production,
most of which was being needlessly flared, encouraged the government to build a 1,100
kilometre pipeline to the Soviet Union. This pipeline served two purposes. First, it was
used to export gas to Russia which in turn paid for the construction of Esfahan Steel Mill
by the Russians, and second, it supplied natural gas (probably the cheapest source of
energy in Iran) to the main industrial and residential centres of the country.
5.2.4.2- Downstream Activities of NIOC155
One of the most important forward linkages of the Iranian oil industry with the
national economy in the post-nationalisation period up to 1973 was the construction of
two new refineries in the 1960s and early 1970s. The first refinery to be built by NIOC
was the Tehran Refinery, with a capacity of 85,000 b/d, which began operations in 1968,
and the second one was the Shiraz Refinery with a capacity of 40,000 b/d which came
on-stream in 1973. These two, together with the Kermanshah Refinery (15,000 b/d) and
MIS Topping Plant (34,500 b/d and operated by the Consortium), supplied the domestic
market. The Abadan Refinery (one of the biggest of its kind in the world, and run by the
Consortium until 1973) was an export oriented refinery. Nevertheless, it supplied a large
part of the domestic requirements for oil products as well.
Furthermore, NIOC in the early 1970's, had under construction or study four more
domestically oriented refineries: a second Tehran Refinery (100,0(X) b/d, completed in
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1975), Esfahan (200,000 b/d), Tabriz (80,000 b/d) 156, and Neka (130,000 b/d, this one
was never started).
As refineries are capital and technology intensive, their construction (although
they were largely built by foreign companies) and operations were bound to help the
diffusion of technology and human skills, stimulating the process of industrialisation in
Iran.
5.2.4.3- The Development of the Petrochemical Industry
The other important forward linkage of the Iranian oil sector was the
development of the petrochemical industry. In the opinion of planners and oil industry
officials, it was an industry in which Iran had a natural advantage, possessing the
cheapest inputs in the form of huge associated as well as natural gas reserves and
refinery products (naphtha). They believed that the best route for the rapid
industrialisation of Iran was the development of the petrochemical industry. Moreover,
the petrochemical industry, having the highest added value within the petroleum industry
was very attractive to a country like Iran whose oil reserves were depleting at a fast rate.
This was based on estimates by experts that with the (then) planned oil production of
around 8 million b/d, Iran's oil reserves would be exhausted by the end of the 1970s,
leaving an adequate amount to satisfy only the estimated domestic demand of around 1.5
million b/d. 157 The Shah and his government were hoping that by the fast development
of an internationally competitive petrochemical industry they would be able to obtain a
steady inflow of foreign exchange for the country when the oil revenues ran out,158
Based on this idea, NIOC began the active development of the industry. The first
petrochemical plant was constructed in 1963 near Shiraz for the production of
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fertilisers.159 Moreover, by an Act of the Majlis in 1965, the National Petrochemical
Company (INIPC) was created as an autonomous subsidiary of the NIOC for the
comprehensive planning and development of the industry. By the end of the 1960s, four
more chemical plants had been established in Abadan, Ahvaz, Bandar Shahpour, and
Khark, which together with the Shiraz plant produced 800,000 tons per year of ammonia
products, phosphatic and compound fertilisers, soda ash and sulphuric acid, 40,000 tons
of PVC, 600,000 tons of sulphur, 15,000 tons of detergent, 20,000 tons of carbon black,
and 30,000 of STPP and other products.16°
Nonetheless, Iran was not satisfied with the development of a domestically
oriented petrochemical industry. For the reasons mentioned above, she wanted to build
a world scale industry which was able to compete in the international markets. However,
Iran only possessed the raw materials (cheap gas and energy) for the production of
petrochemicals but lacked other vital inputs: technology, adequate capital, and access to
large foreign markets. The 1965 Act had foreseen this situation and therefore, had
authorised the NPC to enter into joint venture agreements with foreign companies.
The government, in the late 1960s, was planning to invest about $11 billion within
the Fourth and Fifth Development Plan in the development of petrochemical industries.
This was at a time when oil revenues had hardly reached $1 billion a year Moreover,
the Fourth Plan envisaged that during its lifetime (1968-73), about $600 million worth
of petrochemical products would be exported. 161
 These expectations, however, did not
materialise as the domestic petrochemical industry did not develop according to the
hopes of the government. Iran did not have the technological capability to build any
petrochemical complex on her own, and she had to buy all the necesaary plants and
machinery and the chemical processing technology from advanced countries. Therefore,
224
the participation of foreign companies was vital.
A foreign partner could offer another equally important advantage - large
international markets. The Petrochemical industry is an oligopolistic industry, and in the
1960s/1980s, a few large Western multinationals controlled the market for petrochemical
products. Furthermore, the largest markets in the world like the U.S., Western Europe,
and Japan were heavily protected by high tariffs and trade barriers from imports of these
products (see Chapter Eight). It was therefore, almost impossible for a developing
country like Iran to penetrate these markets, and she needed foreign partners to help her
export petrochemical products back to their home countries. Even if entry into
international markets had not been made difficult by oligopolistic behaviour and
protection, NPC, or any other Iranian organisation, private as well public, did not have
the marketing capability to sell petrochemicals on a large scale in the world markets. So
the necessity of having a foreign partner was even more pressing for Iran. However, the
choice of the right partner was very difficult and it took Iran some time to find what they
believed to be the perfect one. 162 This choice of partner which led to the establishment
of Iran Japan Petrochemical Company (LTPC) forms the core of this research and will
be discussed in detail in Chapter Seven.
5.2.5- Summary
The discussion presented in the preceding pages shows that during the 1954-73
period, the indirect or fiscal effects of the oil industry were far greater than its direct
impact on the economic development of Iran. The goverment, as the main recipient of
oil revenues, managed to increase both its consumption and investment faster than the
private sector. Domestic absorptive capacity, public expenditures, and domestic supplies
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all increased rapidly as oil revenues went up. The growth of oil revenues was however,
due to a fast increase in production and exports of oil rather than increase in price
(which was steadily declining throughout the 1950s and 1960s).
Undeniably, Iran's economic development benefitted immensely from the oil
sector in many ways. These revenues helped the country to greatly raise her national
savings and investment ratios, reduce her chronic balance-of-payments deficits, control
inflation, and raise people's standard of living.
However, the almost total reliance on oil revenues created many distortions to the
economy. First, as oil revenues are in the form of painlessly earned foreign currency, the
need for the mobilisation of national savings in the form of taxes were ignored. Besides,
these revenues allowed both the public and private sector to greatly expand their
consumption (in the form of defence, welfare expenditure and imports) without a
corresponding increase in domestic production and, moreover, reduced the availability
of goods for export. 163
 Second, the huge inflow of foreign currency led to the
overvaluation of the domestic currency (the so-called "Dutch Disease") which in turn
caused the cheapening of imports and made the domestic industry uncompetitive in
international markets.
Finally, the most important shortcoming of the oil sector in this period was its
failure to establish forward and backward linkages with the rest of the national economy.
An input-output table calculated for 1969 showed that for every 100 Ha's of final output,
the oil industry bought 9.9 rials of goods and services from other sectors of the domestic
economy, and in turn supplied them with 16.5 rials worth of petroleum products.164
This clearly demonstrates the low degree of integration of the oil industry with the
Iranian economy in the period under study.
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As the preceding sections showed, while providing the Iranian economy with
cheap energy and raw materials and encouraging the development of such downstream
activities as refining, gas production, and petrochemicals, the oil industry still failed to
play a major role in the industrialisation of Iran, usually something expected from the
leading sector of the economy.
The crucial importance of the contribution of the leading industries such as
textiles, iron and steel, rail-roads and automobiles to the industrialisation process of
some of the Western countries in their early stages of development is well known. But
unfortunately, as we have seen, the Iranian oil industry in the 1954-73 period failed to
play such a role.
6.0- Conclusion
This chapter presented a review of the political development and the role of the
state in the economic development of the country. More importantly, we tried to analyze
the role of oil in the economic development in 20th Century Iran.
It was explained that the oil industry started in Iran in the first decade of the
century with the granting of a concession to William Knox D'Arcy. Later on, the British
goverment having realised the strategic importance of oil took a majority stake in the
Anglo Persian Oil Company which had been set up to exploit Iranian oil. The Iranians
hopes that the Concession would provide the government with sufficient and steady
source of income, however, did not materialise. This caused much friction between the
Iranian government and the Company and between the former and the British
goverment for many years. For various reasons, like the backward state of the Iranian
economy and APOC's (or Al0C) reluctance, no strong forward or backward linkages
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were established with the rest of the Iranian economy. Moreover, due to the small share
of Iran from the company's profits, indirect or fiscal influences of oil revenues were
inconsequential for the development of the Iranian economy. As a result, oil revenues
played almost no role in the economic development of Iran in the inter-war period.
With the end of the Second World War and the change in the international
situation and, more crucially, the weakening of the authoritarian regime in Iran, the
Iranian people began to call for a greater share of oil revenues. These calls led to the
nationalisation of the industry by Dr Mossadegh in 1951. AIOC and the British
government, which were not prepared to allow such a profitable venture to be taken
away from them, arranged, with the help of the Americans, a military coup that led to
the downfall of Mossadegh and the 1954 Oil Agreement between the Consortium and
Iran. This agreement effectively reversed the process of nationalisation, but also
substantially increased Iran's income from her oil resources as compared to the pre-
nationalisation period.
After the 1954, the government, with the help of ever increasing oil revenues,
began a process of rapid economic development and industrialisation of Iran. The major
difference with the pre-war situation was that the huge oil income allowed the regime
to be independent of various social classes and pursue an active interventionist economic
policy. This led to improvements of the country's infrastructure and the establishment of
various heavy as well as light industries.
Yet again, the oil industry, being foreign dominated failed to initiate any direct
linkages with the Iranian economy. The development of such links (especially forward
linkages) fell to N1OC and particularly NPC. The latter which had been set up to
promote the development of the domestic petrochemical industry succeeded in
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establishing a few plants in the 1960's. But in order to build a world scale industry, NPC
needed the co-operation of foreign companies, and hence the search for suitable partners
began.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE HISTORY OF MITSUI BUSSAN
1.0- Introduction
It was stated in the introductory chapter that in order to understand why some
joint ventures are successful and some are not, one needs to look at the management
style and organisational characteristics of its parents. Therefore, in the present chapter,
the historical development, management style, and organisational characteristics of
Mitsui Bussanl, the main Japanese partner in the petrochemical joint venture with Iran
will be examined.' In the next chapter, the managerial and organisational characteristics
of the Iranian partner will be discussed.
The contents of the chapter will be as follows: first, a short history of the
formation of the Mitsui Zaibatsu (conglomerate) 3
 and Mitsui Bussan in the 19th and the
first half of 20th Centuries will be presented. Then the re-merger of the the Group at
the end of the American Occupation which had dissolved the zaibatsu, and the problems
which it faced in this endeavour, will be discussed. The management style and
organisational characteristics of the Group, particularly the Bussan as compared to other
groups and trading companies, will then be analysed. Next, various functions performed
by Japanese general trading companies, and their role, with special refrence to Mitsui
Bussan, in the development of the Japanese petrochemical industry and investment in
the exploitation of overseas resources, will be examined. Finally, the weakness of the
Mitsui Group in oil business will be discussed in detail, as it is believe this was a major
factor in influencing Mitsui Bussan's decision to enter into the petrochemical joint
venture with Iran.
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2.0- The Pre-War History of Mitsui4
The foundation of the Mitsui (meaning three wells) business goes back to the 17th
century. Sokubei Takatoshi Mitsui, a former samurai who had renounced his title and
had joined the ranks of jonin (merchants), established a sake and soy brewery in Ise,
central Japan, in 1615. Later on his eldest son opened a general goods store under the
name of Echigoya in Edo (now Tokyo) from which the now famous Mitsukoshi
Department Store developed. It was, however, one of the Sokubei's younger sons,
Hachirobei (1622-1694) who laid the foundations of the present business by opening
money exchange shops in major cities of Japan.
Throughout the rule of the Tokugawa Shogunate (1603-1868), the fortunes of the
Mitsui family took off as the they were appointed the official purveyors to the Shogunate.
During this period, the Mitsui family was in firm control of the business through an
elaborate system of family members' participation in various aspects of management and
through the "Omotolcata" or the holding company.
With the Meiji Restoration of 1868, the fortunes of the Mitsui family also
changed. Their business, which had been suffering towards the end of the Tokugawa
period, received a major boost as it was again appointed as purveyor to, and tax
collecting agent of the new government. The Meiji Government favoured the Mitsui
family for several reasons. First, the family had contributed generously to their war
efforts against the Tokugawa Shogunate. Second, a few of the Meiji oligarchs had served
as trainees with Mitsui businesses and, therefore, as is customary in Japan, owed their
allegiances to the family. Third, and probably the most important of all, the government
needed the co-operation of the largest and most respected business establishment in the
country to carry out its reforms of the domestic economy which was in a precarious state.
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After the opening of her ports by Commodore Matthew Perry in 1853, Japan had
been forced into signing unequal treaties which took away the government's tariff
autonomy and allowed foreign merchants to completely dominate Japan's foreign trade.
The new government, unhappy with the situation, directed the leading merchants of
Tokyo (including the Mitsuis) to establish the Tokyo Boeki Shosha (Tokyo Trading
Company) with the aim of counteracting ,
 the dominance of foreign trading houses. 5
 The
House of Mitsui also sought to expand domestic and foreign trade through its retail
shops in major cities in 1874. These efforts, however, were not successful, and in 1875
the House, with advice from Inoue Kaoru, an oligarch who had earlier received business
training from the House of Mitsui and now occupied an important position in the
Ministry of Finance6, reorganised their business. As part of this reorganisation, a new
company, Mitsui Gumi Kokusan-kata (National Products Company), was formed to carry
out various trading activities. Various prefectural branches were also reorganised to deal
in various products in the domestic market as well as to carry out exchange transactions
and the sale and transportation of rice which had been collected as taxes on behalf of
the government.'
Kokusan-Kata's first big business came when the company, at the urging of the
government, began to export rice to Europe, and in this way it became the first Japanese
company to conduct foreign trade.
While helping the Mitsuis to set-up Kokusan-kata, Inoue established his own
trading firm, Senshu Kaisha, to export rice and market the output of lead, silver, and coal
mines owned by the government. Meanwhile, In July 1876, the House of Mitsui, with the
persuasion and help of Inoue, set up the Mitsui Bank along modern lines.
Due to organisational problems and lack of information on foreign markets,
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Kokusan-kata was not successful in its export activities. After the establishment of Mitsui
Bank, with the encouragement of the Finance Minister, the Mitsuis merged Senshu
Kaisha with Kokusan-Kata in 1876 to form Mitsui Bussan Kaisha. Initially, Bussan was
capitalised at only 50,000 yen which the Mitsui Family reluctantly provided through a
loan by the Mitsui Bank. With the formation of Bussan, one of the greatest trading
companies of all times, known all over the world as Mitsui & Co was born.
At the start of its operations in 1876 Bussan's main exports were coal from the
state owned Miike mine in Kyushu and surplus rice. The firm also imported blankets and
woollens for the army. The most profitable of these activities was the export of coal
which was being sold to Bussan at cost and which it exported to Shanghai and Hong
Kong at huge profits. The profitable coal export became the biggest source of revenue
for Bussan especially after the Mitsui Zaibatsu bought the Miike mines from the
government at a very cheap price and put Bussan in charge of the marketing of its
output. Undoubtedly, huge profits from the coal business helped the Mitsuis to expand
their range of activities and establish Mitsui Zaibatsu as the most powerful zaibatsu in
the pre-World War Two period.
One other important factor in the creation of the Mitsui Zaibatsu was the
combination of the Mitsui Bank and Bussan, with the former providing credit to the
latter to enable it to expand its trading activities both in the domestic and international
markets. In fact, the combination of three pillars of the Mitsuis' businesses: the Bank,
Bussan, and Mining provided the House with strong foundations for the establishment
of Mitsui Zaibatsu.
As discussed earlier, from its inception, Mitsui Bussan mainly did business with
the government. This business, however, began to decline around the late 1880s. But the
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start of the industrialisation of the Japanese economy in the last decade of the 19th
Century opened new avenues of business for Bussan. From then on Bussan expanded its
operations by taking an active part in the development of the cotton and silk industries.
It provided the cotton industry with imported raw cotton, weaving machinery and coal,
and then exported cotton yarn and cotton cloth, and at the same time it was engaged in
silk export. This was the beginning of the development of Bussan into a general trading
company. 8 Moreover, the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars greatly stimulated
production of the Japanese industries which in turn provided ample trading opportunities
for Mitsui Bussan.
But probably the greatest stimulus for the growth of and the development of
Bussan into a general trading company and the expansion of Mitsui Zaibatsu, came with
the start of the First World War. In fact the Great War provided the biggest impetus to
the development of Japanese capitalism, tripling its GNP from 1914 to 1919 and almost
quintupling its industrial production during the same period.9
Mitsui Bussan was a major benefactor of the war as its sales volume jumped from
400-million yen before the war to 2.1 billion yen in 1919, and its paid up capital was
increased from 20 million yen to 100 million in 1920. The number of commodities
handled by Bussan also rose to over 1,000 items. 1° Mitsui's penetration of the Chinese
market also became very deep during and after the war.'
However, with the rapid expansion of operations, new problems also arose for
Bussan, the most important of which were the emergence of powerful rivals and the
rapid growth of the manufacturing sector. The outbreak of the First World War
generated a huge expansion of trade in raw materials and output of heavy and chemical
industries which in turn led to the emergence of many new trading companies. In 1917
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the Furukawa Zaibatsu established Furukawa Shoji, in 1918 the Mitsubishi Zaibatsu
established Mitsubishi Shoji, and Asano Bussan and Kuhara Shoji were set up in 1918
and 1919 respectively. Suzuki Shoten which had been established in early Meiji period
grew dramatically during the war years and was almost catching up with Mitsui Bussan
(the company, however, went bankrupt in 1927 due to excessive speculation). The rapid
growth of these and numerous other trading companies caused a decline in Mitsui
Bussan's share of Japan's total foreign trade from a peak of 25.6% in 1914 to a low of
10.9% in 1925 rising slightly to 12.1% in 1931.12
Apart from losing its market share, Mitsui Bussan also became increasingly
concerned about the expansion of capital tie-ups between its rivals and manufacturers.
In fact those trading houses that had been separated from trading divisions of their
respective zaibatsu groups like Mitsubishi Shoji, Kuhara Shoji, Asano Bussan, and
Kukuwara Shoji emphasized the products from manufacturers of the same group. And
many of these trading companies established their own manufacturing companies or
invested in manufacturers.
The other problem facing Mitsui Bussan in the post-World War I period was its
relationship with domestic manufacturers. In their early stage of development, Japanese
manufacturers suffered from inadequate financial resources, lack of knowledge of
markets, particularly overseas ones, and unknown brand names. So the manufacturers,
especially the independent ones, became heavily dependent upon Mitsui Bussan to
provide them with almost unlimited financial resources, and extensive international
marketing network, and a prestigious name. The massive sales resulting from the war,
however, provided the manufacturers with large internal funds for further expansion as
well as the establishment of their own marketing networks. The penetration of foreign
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markets during the war also gave them the opportunity to establish their own brand
names in the international markets. These developments gradually eroded the
manufacturers dependence on Bussan for sales of their products.13
In order to counteract the above two problems Mitsui Bussan adopted a new
policy. Traditionally Mitsui Bussan had concentrated on trading on a commission basis
and small scale investment and had avoided long-term fixed investment. But under the
new policy Bussan invested in manufacturing companies by extending advance loans or
purchasing shares, and sent its directors to them and took hold of their marketing by
intervening in their internal management.
As a result of the new policy, Bussan's investments in manufacturing rose sharply
from 1916 onwards. When, in the 1920s, heavy and chemical industrialisation proceeded,
it started to invest in heavy industry and chemical firms. In fact, the Mitsui Zaibatsu had
entered chemical industry earlier. When Japan could not import sufficient quantities of
chemicals during World War I, Mitsui Mining developed its own petrochemical complex
through which Mitsui Zaibatsu entered, for the first time, the field of heavy chemical
production, and hence Japan's petrochemical industry was founded. 14
 Mitsui Zaibatsu
was in fact the biggest investor in pre-war Japan in both domestic and foreign markets.
Among other industries which Bussan made investments in were silk and cotton,
foodstuffs and sundry goods. Many of these investments were made as the price for
agreements involving sales of raw materials or purchases of products. It also invested
heavily in natural resources development overseas mainly in China and in Southeast
Asia. By the beginning of the Showa period, Bussan had invested in joint development
of anthracite coal in Korea, managed the manganese mines in Portuguese Goa,
established affiliate firms in the Philippines to fell lumber, and Borneo Oil Fields.
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Mitsui Zaibatsu together with its arch rival Mitsubishi Zaibatsu were in the
forefront of Japan's industrialisation. There were however, major differences between the
two, both in the types of businesses in which they participated and their management
styles. While Mitsui emphasised trading of raw materials (especially coal) and general
merchandise both within the group and with independent firms, Mitsubishi concentrated
on the production and trading of heavy industrial goods produced within its own group.
This difference of emphasis continued after the war and has persisted to-date.
Moreover, the management and organisational styles of the two zaibatsu were
very different. Mitsui had a decentralised management structure allowing for
entrepreneurial initiative; a tradition which went back to the beginning of the business
in the Tukogawa period. Mitsubishi Zaibatsu, on the other hand, had a tight
centralisation policy which concentrated almost all decision making and initiatives in the
hands of Iwasaki presidents (the founding family and owners of Mitsubishi Zaibatsu until
World War II) and their staff.16
The other main difference between the two leading zaibatsu was the role of their
trading companies within their respective groups. Mitsui Bussan played the main role in
the expansion and development of the Mitsui Zaibatsu into one of the world's greatest
conglomerates. But in the case of Mitsubishi, it was the Zaibatsu which established the
Mitsubishi Shoji as its trading arm with the responsibility of promoting heavy industrial
goods produced by various Mitsubishi Zaibatsu firms (Shoji however, did trade in goods
produced by enterprises outside the Mitsubishi Group).
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2.1- The Demise of the Zaibatsu
The war in China, the colonisation of Manchuria in the 1930s and the start of the
Pacific War in 1941, brought about great business opportunities for the zaibatsu who
were closely connected with the military. As a result of huge military purchases and
mergers of smaller producers in the fields of heavy and military industries under the
guidance of wartime Control Boards, the zaibatsu-related enterprises grew very rapidly.
As the zaibatsu banks and financial institutions could not meet demands for ever
increasing amounts of capital from their respective zaibatsu members to finance their fast
expansion, the latter had to turn to outside sources for funds.
On the other hand, mainly for publicity reasons, the Mitsubishi and Sumitomo
Zaibatsu (the third biggest zaibatsu whose origins go back to the Tukogawa period)
decided in 1937, to change the form of their holding companies into open joint stock
companies. This arrangement, nevertheless, had hardly any effect on the tight control
exercised by the Mitsubishi and Sumitomo families over their respective zaibatsu.17
Mitsui followed with a somewhat different arrangement. It merged its holding
company, Mitsui Gomei, with Mitsui Bussan into one joint stock company in 1940. This
new arrangement once again demonstrated the dominant position of Bussan within the
Mitsui Zaibatsu.18
However, once outside capital entered into the operating companies of zaibatsu,
the exclusive ownership and control of these companies by zaibatsu families was greatly
weakened through the process of fast growth. In order to offset this dwindling ownership
position, Mitsubishi and Somitomo strengthened internal cohesion through tighter
organisation and personal leadership (the strong leadership of Iwasaki Koyata, the head
of Mitsubishi Zaibatsu, is especially notable in this period).
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But Mitsui did not succeed in inserting central authority over the diverse
enterprises of the zaibatsu. Mitsu Bussan, now in control of the entire zaibatsu, was
primarily concerned with the expansion of its own operations and did not pay enough
attention to its role as the zaibatsu's holding company. A case in point is the behaviour
of Toshiba, a major member of the Mitsui Zaibatsu as compared to its equal number,
the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. The former behaved as if it were an independent
zaibatsu, while the latter was kept firmly in control. As a result of these problems, Mitsui
re-established its holding company known as Headquarters Company (honsha).
Moreover, all members of the eleven Mitsui joint families were relieved of any direct
responsibility and influence and became mere shareholders.19
As mentioned before, due to fast expansion during the war, zaibatsu were no
longer able to meet all capital requirements of their operating companies, and so the
latter had to rely increasingly on banks for working and investment capital. At the same
time an unprecedented merger and concentration movement within the Japanese banking
sector took place which reduced their numbers from 498 in 1936 to 228 in 1940 and to
61 in 1945. It was during this time that the 'big six' of the Japanese financial capital:
Sanwa, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Yasuda, Mitsui, and Daiichi (in that order) emerged. In
1943 the last two merged to form the Teikoku Bank which became the largest. By 1944
the 'big four' held 59.6% of all deposits and made 75.9% of all business loans.20
As a result of the increasing role of the big banks as providers of capital, bank-
centred industrial groups emerged, replacing the original zaibatsu concept. In fact, the
big banks replaced the zaibatsu families who had lost their managerial control and
assumed direct managerial responsibilities. These events during the last stages of the war
laid the basis for the dissolution and eventual demise of zaibatsu after the war. When
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these zaibatsu re-grouped in the 1950s, the owner families no longer had any shares or
influence in their former companies, instead, the largest six banks became the cores of
new large financial-industrial groupings which had succeeded the pre-war zaibatsu.
2.2- The Dissolution of Zaibatsu and Trading Companies
After the 1945 occupation of Japan by U.S. forces, a process of democratisation
and deconcentration of Japanese institutions and businesses began. The zaibatsu, which
were accused of co-operating with the militarists and of being centres of excessive
economic, power were especially targeted for reform. Under the provisions of the 1947
Anti-Monopoly Act which was promoted by the Americans, holding companies were
banned, and the process of deconcentration and divestiture of zaibatsu was instituted.
Moreover, both Mitsui Bussan and Mitsubishi Shoji were designated as holding
companies on 28 December 1946 and were placed under the control of the Holding
Company Liquidation Commission. While these two companies themselves had made
plans for splitting up, SCAP issued a memorandum on 3 July 1946 ordering their
dissolution. Under the dissolution provisions, Mitsui Bussan with 7,058 employees was
broken up to about 233 companies, and Mitsui Shoji with 4,086 employees was divided
into about 139 companies.21
The treatment of Mitsui Bussan was particularly harsh. The Company was hoping
for a directive ordering the disposal of shares or reorganisation into a number of smaller
units, but instead, the directive called for the liquidation and dissolution of Bussan.
According to Mitsui, "It [the dissolution order] was much more severe than anyone in
Mitsui Bussan, or anywhere else could possibly have foreseen."22
Soon after liquidation, the progenies of the two big trading companies began to
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regroup themselves again in preparation for grand mergers, but their efforts were
thwarted by the Occupation officials. The boom (and later the bust) created by the start
of the Korean War, however, provided opportunities for the emergence of industrial
groupings along the lines of pre-war zaibatsu, and re-merger of former trading
companies. Mitsubishi Shoji was re-organised on 1 July 1954, while it took Mitsui Bussan
Until 15 February 1959 to re-establish itself.
3.0- The Emergence of Industrial Groupings
From a purely legal point of view, the Americans succeeded in eliminating the
concentration of economic power in Japan. The deconcentration programme, which
ended in 1951 with the disbanding of the Holding Company Liquidation Commission,
also contributed to newly created companies having a real opportunity to flourish in
formerly controlled key industries.23 By circumventing the anti-trust regulation, however,
the former zaibatsu companies regained economic strength, this time in the economic
form of Kigyo Keiretsu or industrial groupings. The process by which the former zaibatsu
members managed to re-group themselves is believed to be as follows:24
In the late 1940s, the top executives of the former three top zaibatsu, Mitsui,
Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo, began to meet regularly in order to discuss the future of the
now dissolved zaibatsu and what could be done to establish close co-operation among
the firms that had once been the main pillars of the zaibatsu. As the zaibatsu banks had
not been affected by the deconcentration policy, they naturally played the key role in this
process. The only exception was the Mitsui Bank, which after separation from the Daiichi
Bank which together had formed the wartime Teikoku Bank, was in a relatively weak
position and was relegated to the 8th position among city banks.'
The Fuji Bank (formerly Yasuda), Sanwa Bank and Daiichi Bank 26 also began
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to establish close relationships with their main client firms, particularly those they had
supplied with large loans during the war period. So by the mid-1960s six major blocks of
industrial groupings appeared: the Mitsubishi Group, the Mitsui Group, the Sumitomo
Group, the Foyu Group (Fuji Bank), the DKB (DaiIchi Kangyo) Bank Group, the Sanwa
Group, the Tokai Group, and the B3J (Industrial Bank of Japan) Group.
The first six groups wield great economic power and cover a broad spectrum of
economic activities, including the exploitation of natural resources, industrial production,
trade, finance, insurance, real estate, transportation and research. Although there are
differences in the pattern, nature and strength of the ties among industrial groups, they
nevertheless share common features without which a kigyo keiretsu could not exist: the
cross-holding of shares, the formation of presidential and directorial councils, the intra-
group exchange of personnel, including the appointment of retired government officials
(amakodari), financing through the respective core bank, the performance of a number
of corporate functions by the group's general trading company (s), and joint investments
in new projects by group companies.'
Another major aspect of keiretsu is the pursuit of "one set policy" by which each
group tries to have a full set of industries within its ranks. Such investment behaviour
resulted in an oligopoly, sometimes referred to as the Japanese form of excessive
competition.28 Various groups displayed their full power in entering the nuclear industry
and construction of petrochemical plants. It was also through these projects that the
trading companies began to play an active role in the post-war development of Japanese
industries. (Later on we shall examine the role of sogo shosha in the development of the
petrochemical industry in Japan.)
The "one set policy", although beneficial by creating a competitive environment,
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has nevertheless led to excessive competition in some industries and has prevented
Japanese companies operating within these industries from becoming major players in
the international scene. The Japanese petrochemical industry is a good example of this
excessive competition by which the largest Japanese petrochemical firm, Mitsubishi
Petrochemicals ranks only 26th among the major international petrochemical companies.
It is very important at this juncture to point out that the post-war keiretsu are not
replicas of the pre-war zaibatsu, and major differences exit between the two: there are
no owner families (as they had all been forced to relinquish their interests in the zaibatsu
by the Occupation reforms), the stockholding in the new industrial groupings are widely
scattered and ownership control is non-existent. Moreover, there are no holding
companies and there is no central authority. All that keeps the groups together is a
common consensus established by the presidents of the independent giant firms within
the presidential or directorial clubs.'
Another important point which must be mentioned here is that a few of the
reconstructed general trading companies, together with major city banks, played a major
role in the establishment of some of the keiretsu in the post-war era.
3.1- The Mitsui Group in the Post-War Period
For various reasons, the re-establishment of the Mitsui Group took longer than
that of other groups. The four most important factors were:
With the splitting up of the wartime Teikoku Bank into Mitsui and Daiichi Banks,
the former was relegated to 8th position among the large city banks, while the other
groups' banks occupied the top five positions in terms of deposits and loans. Therefore,
the Bank did not command adequate financial resources to lead the re-consolidation of
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the Mitsui Group. The Mitsui Bank was so weak financially (compared to the top five)
that it could not even provide Mitsui Bussan with sufficient funds for its reconstruction
and the latter had to rely on Fuji Bank for that purpose.
In addition, Mitsui Bussan which under the deconcentration policy had been split
up into about 233 companies, was in no position to lead the re-consolidation efforts of
the Mitsui Group - as other general trading companies had done for their own groups.
In fact it was not until 15 February 1959 that the two competing trading companies,
General Bussan Kaisha Ltd and Daiichi, which had emerged out of the re-amalgamation
of many splinter firms after the break-up of the old Mitsui Bussan agreed to a merger.
So the new trading company of the Mitsui Group, Mitsui Bussan (or Mitsui & Co), was
established five years later than its closest rival Mitsubishi Corporation (formerly Shoji).
Due to its late start, Mitsui & Co was not able to give the sort of leadership for the
consolidation of the Mitsui Group that other general trading companies had provided to
their groups.
As mentioned before, the pre-war Mitsui Zaibatsu had a decentralised
organisation and provided opportunities for the personal initiatives of its employees. In
contrast, Mitsubishi had a rigid organisational set-up with all the initiatives emanating
from the Iwasaki Family presidents and top managers.
This loose organisational arrangement of Mitsui was to have far reaching
consequences for the re-consolidation of the group after the war. First, during the break
up of the zaibatsu under the Occupation reforms, many businesses were divided not
along product or business lines, as was in the case of Mitsubishi, but on the basis of the
personality of their nulitag,ers. Second, some former zaibatsu member companies,
including major ones like Toshiba, Kanebo Ltd, Ishikawajima Harima Industries, Toyota,
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and General Sekiyu (General Oil Company), refused to join the reconstructed Mitsui
Group. By contrast, the Mitsubishi Group, as in the pre-war period, developed along
lines of much stricter discipline and therefore, soon surpassed all other groups in size and
importance. Probably that's why the anecdote, " Mitsui is people, Mitsubishi an
organisation",3° is used to compare the two group. Nevertheless, efforts to re-integrate
former Mitsui companies in the 'open' Mitsui Group were continued until some results
were achieved. In 1973 Toshiba, Oji Paper, Mitsukoshi, and then in 1984, Toyota Motor
Co. joined the Nimolcu Kai (Second Thursday Club), to which the presidents of the 24
most important Mitsui companies belong.'
Finally, Mitsui had been strong in mining, and when mining (particularly coal
mining) lost importance in the post-war period, Mitsui did not have sufficient funds and
planning to enter early and dynamically into the emerging industries [like oil].32
A measure of the cohesiveness of Japanese industrial groups is the degree of
mutual stock-holdings between core companies of the group. As of 1974, the percentage
of stock of core companies held within the group was as follows: Mitsubishi (30.6%),
Mitsui (17.4%), Sumitomo (27.9%), Fuyo Group (17.4%), DKB (19.2%), and Sanwa
Group (16%). The high degree of mutual stockholding within the Mitsubishi and
Sumitomo groups is a clear sign of closer intra-group cohesion than Mitsui (or any other
group for that matter).
As of 1987, the Mitsui Group consisted of 120 companies, the shares of 87 of
which were traded on the Japanese stock exchanges. The group reports for that year,
however, indicate that the extended circle of Mitsui companies, including related firms,
numbered over 2,000, and that the major companies employed about 250,000 people.33
Moreover, as early as 1974, the 22 most important Mitsui companies alone achieved a
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turnover of US$ 36 billion, which represented 8.8% of the Japanese GNP for that
year.34
3.2- The Overseas Activities of Mitsui Bussan
The Mitsui Group and, in particular Mitsui Bussan, are very active in the creation
of joint ventures between member companies as well as between member companies and
foreign partners. In fact, although Mitsui Bussan has been the number two sogo shosha
since the war, in some areas, like number of foreign offices, foreign affiliates, subsidiaries
and joint ventures, it has surpassed its rival: Mitsubishi Corporation. Both of these two
giant general trading companies, as in the pre-war period, have kept up their fierce
competition, expanding their trade, financing, and ventures. One important cause of
competition for overseas investments between Mitsui and Mitsubishi has been the
struggle to attain the number one ranking position among the top nine sogo shosha in
Japan.
The attainment of number one general trading company not only brings the
prestige associated with such a position but also several other benifits. First, it provides
the number one company with publicity and prominence amongst the Japanese business
community which in turn will bring more trading opportunities. Second, the company
would attract more high calibre graduates who want to work for the top trading firm.
Third, the sogo shosha which accomplishes such ranking will be able to get more finance
at favourable rates from banks and other financial institutions.
The following data may shed some light on the degree of involvement of Mitsui
Bussan in overseas ventures in the 1970's. In 1970 Mitsui & Co was participating in 65
major projects to secure raw material supplies for Japan. These included the mining of
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iron ore, copper, tin, nickel, coal and salt, petroleum exploration, lumber, and foodstuffs,
which required investments to the tune of US$25 billion. 35 In 1977 alone Bussan's net
foreign investments were 247 billion yen, and its number of overseas offices and affiliates
reached 129 in that year?6 It is worth mentioning however, that not all these overseas
ventures have been successful. The faith of the Mitsui & Co's petrochemical joint venture
in Iran, as we shall see in later chapters, is a dramatic illustration of the risks involved
in overseas ventures by Japanese general trading companies (or any other Japanese
company).
Mitsui & Co's greater involvement in overseas investments is not only due to
competition with its arch rival: Mitsubishi, for top ranking. Other equally, if not more
important factors, such as organisational characteristics and historical developments of
the two general trading companies can explain the propensity of Mitsui Bussan for
greater involvement in overseas ventures.'
As discussed in earlier sections, Mitsui's corporate culture has long focused its
attention on the individual initiatives of "Mitsui persons" as shrewd traders and
entrepreneurs. As a result of this organisational set-up, Mitsui employees often cultivate
business opportunities inside and outside Japan with relative freedom from the formal
boundaries of business tasks and responsibilities assigned to other internal organisations.
In its matrix-organisation of product-wide and area-wide profit responsibilities, Mitsui
distinctly emphasises the business area-wide profitability and business volume. The
Mitsubishi Corporation on the other hand, places its emphasis upon the vertical links of
product-wide groups cutting across various geographical areas. Mitsubishi, moreover, has
a rigid organisation which de-emphasises individual employees' action beyond what is
assigned to the formal organisational unit within the firm. Therefore, it is quite likely
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that Mitsui people stationed abroad react more urgently and quickly to the host
countries' moves of import substitution by commencing manufacturing operations. The
response of Mitsubishi, on the other hand, is quite likely to be to change the product mix
to overcome import restrictions by developing countries.
Moreover, compared to the Mitsubishi Group, the Mitsui Group has lacked a
strong orientation towards shipbuilding, heavy industrial machinery and equipment. The
Group, for the most part (with the exception of the Toray Group who produced synthetic
fibres) has concentrated on small to medium sized firms engaged in the production of
standard consumer and industrial products. On the other hand, the Mitsubishi Group's
strength is based on a few large manufacturers of ships and industrial equipment,
particularly the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries.
As a result, the export of manufactures handled by Mitsui were more likely to be
singled out as the targets of import substitution moves by the developing countries than
those exports handled by Mitsubishi.
When the above factor, coupled with differences in corporate culture, and the fact
that, from the very beginning, Mitsui Bussan has acted as the key organiser and creator
of the Mitsui industrial group while the Mitsubishi Corporation has been mainly the
marketing arm of the Mitsubishi industrial group, is taken into account, it is not
surprising that Mitsui & Co has led Mitsubishi and other large trading companies in
overseas investments. A substantial part of Bussan's investment overseas is for the
development of overseas natural resources for importation into Japan. As dependence
of Japan on imported oil is of special interest to us, the involvement of Mitsui Bussan
in the oil business and its efforts to develop overseas oil resources will be discussed in
the following section.38
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3.3- The Involvement of Mitsui Bussan in the Oil Business
As discussed in Chapter 2, the Mitsui Group has never been as strong as the
Mitsubishi Group in the oil business. Even in the Pre-World War II period, during which
mining was one of the most important businesses of the Mitsui Zaibatsu, it still lagged
behind the Mitsubishi. In fact, the latter had entered the oil business in a big way in 1934
by establishing the Mitsubishi Oil Company in association with the Tidewater oil
company of U.S.A. Mitsui Zaibatsu, on the other hand, had confined itself to trading in
oil products in the inter-war period (see Chapter Two for more details on the oil
businesses of the two zaibatsu) and, instead, had concentrated on coal mining.
In the immediate post-war years, the powerful commercial rights in the oil
business which had been held by the pre-war Mitsui Bussan were transferred almost
intact to the General Sekiyu (General Oil Company) and, therefore, neither Daiichi
Bussan nor any of the companies it had annexed had any way of entering the oil
business.' As business was prospering for General Sekiyu, the company felt no
inclination to merge with Daiichi Bussan. Even after the grand merger of 1959, mainly
because of personal differences between the presidents of General Sekiyu and the then
president of Mitsui Bussan, Tetsuzou Mizukami, the former refused to re-join the new
Mitsui Bussan.4° Moreover, attempts during the 190's for a rapprochement between the
two also failed due to General Oil's reluctance.41 Therefore, the oil business continued
as one of the weakest trading areas in Mitsui & Co. In those circumstances, and under
the strict official controls on trade and foreign exchange, it was difficult for the Company
to expand its oil business, for oil for bonded bunker use and for domestic sales depended
greatly on securing stable supply sources and also on expanding them. Many steps were
taken to resolve these problems before growth could be realised, and in the interim
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Mitsui & Co had no alternative but to act as an agent for other companies.
Meanwhile, in the early 1950s, the Mitsubishi Oil Company re-established it ties
with Associated Oil (formerly Tidewater), which had been broken during the Pacific
War, and once again became one of the top five oil companies in Japan. In addition,
Mitsubishi Corporation also strengthened its oil business and became one of the biggest
oil traders in Japan.
As mentioned in Chapter Two, in the 1950s, petroleum was fast replacing coal
as the largest source of energy for Japanese industry. Moreover, the modern
petrochemical technology which was being rapidly introduced into Japan used naphtha,
an oil product, rather than coal as its main feedstock. So coal, upon which the Mitsui
Zaibatsu had been built and which was still occupying an important position in Mitsui's
turnover in the immediate post-war period was fast losing its market.
Under these circumstances, especially as the Mitsui Group was the first keiretsu
to establish a modern petrochemical plant in Japan in the 1950s, and as the Group
planned to enter the oil industry in a big way, it (Bussan) decided to develop its oil
business.
The trade and foreign exchange liberalisation of the late 1950s/early 1960s
provided Mitsui Bussan with an ideal chance to improve its oil business. In 1959 and
1960, the Fuel Department with the responsibility for oil trading, worked on finalising
the Company's plan for all-out entry into the oil business. The Chiba Plan, as it was
known, called for the construction of an oil refinery, a naphtha cracking centre, and
facilities for sales of petroleum products on the Chiba Prefecture coast.
The Plan, however, ran into many difficulties. The only part of the plan which was
realised on time was the establishment of Mitsui Oil Supply Company Ltd in 1961.
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Moreover, Mitsui Bussan with the co-operation of a number of the Mitsui Group firms
set-up a joint venture called Kyokuto Petroleum Industries Ltd. with Mobil Oil
Corporation in June 1963. The new company, as required by the Petroleum Law of 1962,
applied for a licence to construct an oil refinery. But the highly competitive nature of the
Japanese oil industry made it extremely difficult to obtain a licence. 42 And when the
government finally granted its approval for the oil refinery in August 1965, Mitsui & Co's
original plans were far behind schedule.
Furthermore, the Kyokuto's plans for marketing its oil products had to be revised
on the objections by the Toa Nenryo Kogyo. Under the revised plan, Mobil Sekiyu (the
Japanese subsidiary of Mobil Oil Corporation) would become the oil sales company
authorised by MITI for marketing the products of Kyokuto Petroleum Industries, and the
former would then turn over half of these products to Mitsui Bussan. In addition, Bussan
and Mobil Sekiyu would each supply Kyokuto Petroleum with half of its crude oil needs.
The last arrangement was highly unusual since it was normal practice in a joint venture
in the oil refining business for a foreign partner with 50% capital participation to have
100% control over the supply of crude oi1.43 This arrangement, nevertheless, forced
Mitsui & Co to look for stable supplies of crude oil from overseas.
Although Bussan, through the Chiba Plan, succeeded in entering the oil refining
business, it was forced to abandon its plans for marketing oil products in Japan as the
MITI refused to grant the Company the authorization to become an oil sales company
in the face of opposition from established firms in the oil business. Without such official
recognition, it was impossible for Bussan to participate effectively in the decision making
process in the industry, or surpass companies that were already active in the oil industry.
In later years Mitsui Bussan participated in oil development projects overseas to
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make up for its weakness in the oil industry, and succeeded in establishing an overall
system of oil production, refining and sales. But the company has "never really overcome
the handicap of having begun late in the oil business".44 Moreover, "there has probably
been nothing more painful to Mitsui & Co. than its late decision to enter the oil
business".45
It was due to this weakness in the oil business as compared to other large sogo
shosha that persuaded Mitsui Bussan to look for opportunities for the exploitation of
overseas oil resources with eagerness. Such an opportunity arrived in 1968 when the
Iranian government invited Japanese companies to bid for the exploration and
development of the Lorestan oil field, the "last unexplored oilfield in the Middle East
not tied to any concessions to major Western oil companies' 46 in western Iran. Mitsui
Bussan enthusiastically entered the bidding for the oilfield. However, the acceptance of
a bid for the oilfield was conditional on Bussan agreeing to enter into a joint venture
with Iran's National Petrochemical Company to build a large petrochemical complex in
southwestern Iran. Mitsui Bussan, anxious to make up for its weakness in the oil
business, accepted the condition. And so Mitsui & Co.'s involvement in Iran Japan
Petrochemical Company, a project which dragged on for nearly twenty years without ever
being completed, and a project which proved to be disastrous both for the Company and
Iran, began. (The entry of Mitsui & Co.'s into oil exploration and its involvement in the
Iran petrochemical project will be the subject of later chapters.)
4.0-The Functions of Sogo Shosha and Their Role in the Development of the Japanese
Petrochemical Industry and Overseas Natural Resources
In this section, the role of the general trading companies, particularly that of
Mitsui Bussan, in the development of the Japanese petrochemical industry and in
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overseas investments with emphasis on natural resources will be discussed. As a matter
of fact, any analysis of Japanese foreign investment would be incomplete without
mentioning the commanding position the trading companies have in overseas
investments. The top six sogo shosha (Mitsui Bussan, Mitsubishi, C.Itoh & Co, Sumitomo
Corporation, and Nissho-lwai) constantly appear in the list of the top ten Japanese
foreign investors, with the first two leading the list. Furthermore, the nine sogo shosha
(the above six plus Tomen, Kanematsu Gosho, and Nichimen Jitsugo) are among the top
twenty five Japanese investors.
In this section, the terms sogo shosha and general trading companies will be used
interchangeably, and refer to the top nine Japanese general trading companies
mentioned above. In order to have a better understanding of their activities, it would be
appropriate first to discuss the business and functions of the sogo shosha.
4.1- The Business of the Sogo Shosha
The business of the sogo shosha can best be defined as intermediation in space
and time, for those two factors create the uncertainties and risks associated with supply
and demand.47
The larger the geographical space that economic activities span, the greater the
barriers to communications and transportation, and the greater the need for warehousing.
Similarly the longer it takes to complete an economic transaction, the greater the risks
involved, mainly in the form of unforeseen changes and gaps in supply and demand
conditions. Trading companies, the willing bearers of, and capitalizers on, these
uncertainties and risks, perform three "basic" (or primary), and three "extended" (or
auxiliary) functions. The three basic functions are: trading (transaction intermediation),
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financial intermediation (quasi-banking), and information gathering. And the three
extended functions are: technology transfer, resource development, and organising.49
It is important to emphasis that the above mentioned functions are closely
interrelated and cannot be easily separated. However, for the ease of explanation, they
are divided into such categories.
4.1.1- The Basic Functions
4.1.1.1- Trading
Trading is the core business and the most basic function of the trading companies,
who stand between the suppliers and users of commodities and facilitate the flow of
commerce between the two entities at home and abroad. An important point about the
sogo shosha is that about 80% of their total transactions consist of dealing in raw
materials and producers goods.' The reason why the general trading companies deal
in raw materials and producer's goods mainly is because their trading commission is very
low, about 2% or less of their total transactions. Therefore, they need to trade in large
volume type of commodities, like raw materials (grains, oil etc), and intermediate goods
like metals or petrochemicals.
It is very important at this juncture to point out that although the sogo shosha own
hundreds of small subsidiaries and large joint ventures in Japan and all over the world
which are engaged in resource development, manufacturing and processing, construction,
financing, leasing, and subcontracting, they are all run for one primary purpose: to
support the core business of buying and selling, and to generate new businesses.51
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4.1.1.2- Financial Intermediation
The second basic function of the sogo shosha is financing. The financing activities
of the trading companies can be classified in two ways:
One, used by Mitsui & Co, breaks down the financing activity into "trade credits"
and "loans and guarantees". The trade credit is extended for the purpose of increasing
the trade volume by which credit is given to both sellers and buyers of goods and
services. The loans and guarantees are mainly for investment purposes and around 80%
of the total are extended to small and medium sized companies.52
Yet another classification breaks down the financial intermediation of the trading
companies into short-to medium term loans and equity capita1. 53 The former is used in
connection with the sogo shosha trading activities, whereas the latter type is used for
investment in the development of natural resources, manufacturing, and the opening of
overseas branches.
The equity participation by a trading company in a venture is not for the purpose
of investment and receiving dividends per se, but rather as a conduit for trading
activities. As long as an investment project leads to intermediating activities that generate
commissions, the trading companies are content to accept a low rate of return on the
investment itself. Indeed, they earn only a very low rate of return, ranging from 1.2 to
3.1% on their investments, hardly an attractive rate by any investment standard.'
4.1.1.3- Information Gathering
For the trading companies, speedy and reliable information is important not only
to develop new business opportunities, but also to build a good relationship with the
customers. There are two types of information which the sogo shosha are interested in:
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The first type of information is related to trade and commercial activities, and the second
type is information on the general economic, political, and social environment to support
the decision making of the management.
4.1.2- Extended or Auxiliary Functions
4.1.2.1- Technology Transfer
The sogo shosha not only trade in commodities, but also in non-commodities or
intangibles like technologies or information. Through their worldwide networks, the
trading companies introduce superior technology to Japan, and Japanese technology to
foreign countries. By introducing technology to Japan, the general trading companies
establish new industries, and help upgrade Japan's industrial structure. On the other
hand, the sogo shosha, transfer technology which will contribute to the development of
Lesser Developed Countries (L.D.C.'s) labour intensive (textiles, fibres), and heavy (iron
and petrochemicals) industries.55
 At the same time, by the transfer of such technologies
to the developing countries, the trading companies help to upgrade the Japanese
industrial structure which can concentrate on higher added value and more knowledge-
intensive industries, as well as helping to clean the environment in Japan.
4.1.2.2- Resource Development
One of the most important extended functions of the sogo shosha overseas is their
role in resource development. As mentioned in section 4.1.1.1, around 80% of the trading
companies' transactions consist of dealing in raw materials. This, combined with the fact
that Japan's import percentage rate for many raw materials is quite high; 99.8% for oil,
coal 83.4%, iron ore 99.6%, bauxite 100%, and cotton 100%,56 makes a very strong case
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for the trading companies to want to invest in overseas natural resources.
The sogo shosha engage in large investments in the development of overseas
natural resources on their own or in co-operation with domestic or foreign companies.
Their resource development projects cover the full range of basic materials, like iron ore,
coal, non- ferrous metals such as copper, zinc ore, uranium,bauxite, oil, LNG, wood,
salts, agricultural and marine products of all types all over the world.
One important point is that it was a policy of the Japanese businesses, with the
active support of the goverment, to import resources in raw form and then process it
in Japan. There were two reasons for this policy. First as Japan was very short of foreign
currency during the 1950s and 1960s, it was much cheaper for her to import the low
value raw materials rather than the processed ones and, hence, make big savings of
scarce foreign exchange. This policy had the added bonus of encouraging the expansion
of heavy and chemical industries: the prime target industries of successive Japanese
governments' economic plans in that period.
Until the mid-1960s Japan relied mainly on the spot markets for the purchase of
raw materials. However, when the dependence on overseas resources reached a critical
point, the inadequacy of spot markets became clear, and Japanese business interests, with
the full support of the government, started to search for investment opportunities in
overseas resources. So from the mid-1960s onward there was a dramatic increase in
Japan's participation in overseas resource development and import (D & I) projects, both
those involving loans only and equity participation also. As time went by, the number and
scale of overseas projects increased, so did the capital requirements and the size of
Japanese participation.' However, the big resource processors in Japan were not
interested in having a direct role in overseas projects. They lacked sufficient capital and
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experienced personnel to deal with foreign governments and companies. They preferred
to have the general trading companies as their partners or even as the sole Japanese
representatives on overseas projects.
As a matter of fact, the sogo shosha with their extensive networks of offices and
branches worldwide which gave them access to up-to-date information regarding the
availability of natural resources all over the world, capital markets: domestic as well as
international, were in a position to act as the overseas arms of the Japanese raw material
processors by investing in the development of resources that the latter required.
4.1.2.3- Organising
The third extended or auxiliary function of the sogo shosha is "organising". An
observer of the general trading companies states: "it (organising) is the very function that
will determine the very raison d'etre of the general trading companies in the future".58
However, the organising function is not one function, but the combination of all the
functions discussed above. The sogo shosha put together all of their functions to organise
and co-ordinate the different types of business activities such as manufacturing,
construction, engineering, and resource development in international joint ventures.
Indeed, the reason that the sogo shosha can undertake international joint ventures is
their ability to provide many functions together.
Throughout the 1960s and 70s, the number, scale and complexity of overseas
resource development projects in which the Japanese participated increased. Therefore
the necessity emerged to co-ordinate the activities of Japanese participants, provide
adequate information, and negotiate with the Japanese government, host governments,
and foreign firms. Only the general trading companies with their global information
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gathering capabilities, commercial networks, their personnel, and above all their ability
as organisers were in a position to provide these services. 59 This led them to play an
increasingly central role as the forerunners of the Japanese international investors.
4.2- The Role of Sogo Shosha in the Development of the Japanese Petrochemical
Industry
In the pre-war period and up to the mid-1950s, Japan relied mainly upon coal,
carbide, and fermentation processes as sources of materials for organic chemicals. The
manufacture of high-octane gasoline in the United States during the war for use in
aeroplanes, however, revolutionised the post-war petrochemical industry by utilising
waste gases from the cracking process. 6° Moreover, as immediately before and during
the war the Japanese industry had concentrated all its resources on production, it
therefore had few resources for innovation and technological development, in particular,
Japanese technology in petroleum refining and petrochemical production was far behind
that of America and Germany in the war-time and immediate post-war years.61
In order to make these industries, in the shortest possible time, competitive with
their counterparts in the advanced Western nations, the Diet passed a law in 1954 on the
promotion of the petroleum and petrochemical industries. MITI was given the
responsibility for drafting detailed plans and establishing standards for these two
industries. 62 To achieve these objectives, MITI worked out a plan for importing
technology, allocating foreign exchange, and offering loans, tax benefits, and tariff
exemptions to industrialists. Under such favourable conditions, four major groups were
established and began to build naphtha cracking centres in 1957.
The first integrated plan to start operating was that of Mitsui Petrochemical,
formed by Mitsui Chemical, Bank, Mining, Daiichi Bussan, Toyo Rayon, Toyo Koatsu,
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and several other Mitsui companies, together with Koa Oil. Located at Iwakuni, a former
military oil depot, the complex began operations in 1958, with Koa Oil supplying
naphtha, and Bussan serving as distributor. 63 The other three petrochemical centres
established under phase one of the industry's expansion were by Mitsubishi
Petrochemical, Sumitomo Petrochemical, and Nippon oil on the former government oil
depot sites in Yokkaichi, Nihama, and Kawasaki respectively. In later phases, and again
under the guidance of MITI, more centres were added in Chiba (the Mitsui complex
discussed in the previous section), Sakai, Mizushima, Tokuyama and a few other places
where several large oil refineries and petrochemical plants joined and formed what the
Japanese call kombinato, petrochemical complexes.'
In the earlier phases of the development of the industry, almost all the required
technology had to be imported, and the general trading companies naturally played
important roles in this transfer of technology. First, their opinions on the corporate
strategy as to what product lines should be emphasised, were usually adopted because
of their long experience in marketing various petrochemical goods. Second, in
introducing foreign technologies, the information gathered by their overseas networks
provided them with the critical knowledge about new technologies and processes being
developed in other advanced countries.°
The sogo shosha played other equally important roles in the development of the
Japanese petrochemical industry. For example, in phase one of the development, in
connection with the founding of the naphtha centres, Mitsubishi Shoji invested in and
sold the products of Mitsubishi Yuka (Chemicals); and Daiichi Bussan and Sumitomo
Shoji were put in charge of marketing the products of Mitsui Petrochemical and
Sumitomo Kakagu respectively. Marubeni Iida was one of the investors for Showa Yuka,
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which was established mainly by Showa Denko of the Fuji Bank Group.'
Trading companies also served as mediators on several fronts. In the first place,
one they acted as organisers of intra-keiretsu syndicates for investment in petrochemical
companies. Secondly, they acted as intermediaries in the development of suitable
industrial sites and the formation of Kombinatos to reduce the costs of such
developments. And thirdly, they acted as mediators between foreign companies who
possessed the technology or processes required by Japanese petrochemical companies.
The best example of the role of trading companies as mediators is the formulation and
implementation of the Chiba Plan by Mitsui Bussan. As discussed before, Bussan was the
instigator in the development of the industrial site in the Chiba Prefecture. On this site
a huge tract of land was developed for a petrochemical complex consisting of around
thirty Mitsui companies involved in the integrated operation with Mitsui Petrochemical
at its heart, and a refinery for Kyokuto oil.'
The other contribution of the general trading companies to the development of
the petrochemical industry was their involvement, as traders, in all stages of the industry,
from procurement of raw materials to the sales of final products.
Production of petrochemicals involves a long chain of processes to reach the end
products, and demand for intermediate products is six times as large as that for final
products.68 Sogo shosha involved themselves precisely because of this big intermediate
demand, as well as the huge trading opportunities created by the long chain of processes
needed to reach the end product in this industry.69
Finally, the sogo shosha contributed to the development of the Japanese
petrochemical industry by helping it to ride the domestic business cycles by expanding
domestic demand during boom times and increasing their exports during the recessions.
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This allowed for continuous operations and achievement of economies of scale which are
vital for the industry's profitability and competitiveness.70
4.3- Sogo Shosha's Investment in Overseas Natural Resources
As stated before, the sogo shosha's business can be defined as intermediation in
space and time, for these two factors create the countless uncertainties and risks
associated with supply and demand. Trading is their core business and all other activities
(like manufacturing and resource development) only have a supporting role, i.e. to
facilitate, expand, and create new opportunities for trading. In general, the trading
companies have two roles: export agents and procurement agents. The former causes
them to participate in labour-intensive manufacturing investments overseas on a limited
scale, while the other, the procurement-agent role, entices them to invest in extractive
ventures on a relatively large scale.71
It is worth emphasising again at this juncture that the general trading companies
do not produce any goods themselves, but specialise in intermediating between buyers
and sellers of goods. Space and time are the two dimensions in which they operate, and
they profit from the movement of goods and services, and trade intermediation rather
than foreign investment is their major source of income. As far as the trading companies
are concerned, as long as an investment project leads to intermediating activities that
generate commissions, they are apparently content to accept a low rate of return on the
investment itself. 72 The role of the sogo shosha as financial intermediators can perhaps
be likened to the British merchant banks and the German universal banks. But the
important difference is that the Japanese trading companies are willing to accept an
extremely low rate of return on their financial investment in overseas joint ventures in
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exchange for other business transactions, like sales of plants and machinery, import of
raw materials or intermediate goods produced by the venture to Japan or export to third
countries, sales of the processed products in domestic as well as foreign markets, which
enable them to earn commissions. The financing services (loans, equity investments) of
the trading companies can be likened to what in marketing jargon is called a "loss
leader", which is used to attract customers to other items the store sells. 73 In other
words, they use the "cross-subsidy" or "transfer pricing" methods to generate trading
opportunities which is the core of their business. Indeed, there is evidence of such
behaviour in a case which is of particular interest to us, namely the UPC, the joint
venture between the Mitsui and the Iranian government. According to a Mitsui
publication, the petrochemical joint venture was classified as sales of plants and
machinery rather than as an investment.74
There is one further difference between the motives of the Japanese trading
companies and the Western companies (mining and oil) for investment in overseas
natural resources. In this regard Professor Kiyoshi Kojima states that Japan's pattern of
resource development imports, in contrast to the U.S and European pattern
(independent development aiming at earnings from upstream and downstream
integration), meets Japan's national interest as well. It satisfies the resource nationalism
of the host country and benefits from the technologies and capital of Western mining and
engineering concerns. It also guarantees a large Japanese market on a long term basis
which makes possible huge resource development projects and large scale transactions,
both of which are good business opportunities for the sogo shosha.75
As discussed in the previous section, it was in the mid4960's that the sogo shosha
became involved in the development of overseas natural resources. Ever since then, the
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general trading companies have aimed at becoming global natural resource development
project organisers. In the beginning, the trading companies only got involved at the
invitation of the Japanese processors. However, as they gained experience and
confidence, they started to take the initiative themselves and now play a central role
through their organising function.
A measure of the trading companies' efforts is the size of their direct foreign
investment in resource development and its weight in Japan's total direct foreign
investment. For example, during the financial year (FY) 1975 Mitsui & Co invested
33.6% of its direct investment abroad (both equity investment and loan) or 55% of its
foreign equity investment (excluding loans) in natural resource development.' The
other top eight trading companies have not invested as heavily in absolute value and
percentage share, but their investments also have been sizeable. 77 As a matter of fact,
Mitsui has always been a leader in overseas development projects. For example, the first
opportunity for the general trading companies to participate in a huge overseas resource
development-import project came in 1966, when Australian mining and commercial
interests extended an invitation to Japanese steel manufacturers to have a 10% financial
participation in a $252 million iron ore development at Mount-Newton in northwestern
Australia. The Japanese steel makers recommended two sogo shosha: Mitsui & Co, and
C.Itoh & Co, rather than themselves, as participants in the project. The project has
turned out to be the biggest source of iron ore for the Japanese steel industry, which in
turn has been the largest consumer of the project's production.'
Finally, Table 5.1 gives an indication of the role of the trading companies in
Japan's foreign investment_ As of 31 March 1986, the total value of the Japanese foreign
investment was Y15,233.6 billion, of which the share of the general trading companies
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was Y1,908,026 million (both equity investment and loans), or almost 13% of the total.
Table 5.1- Overseas Investments and Loans of Nine Major Trading Companies (As of
31 March 1986). Unit: Million Yen
Investment Loans Total
MITSUI 206,081 124,741 330,822
MITSUBISHI 203,281 323,838 527,119
C.ITOH 138,175 51,408 189,583
MARUBENI 232,534 110,240 342,774
SUMITOMO 98,294 43,294 142,131
NISSHO-IWAI 89,973 24,237 114,210
TOMEN 84,525 10,156 94,681
KANEMATSU 40,100 59,435 99,535
NICHIMEN 39,117 28,054 67,171
Total 1,132,080 775,946 1,908,026
Note: Total Japanese Direct Investment: 15,233.6 Billion Yen
(As of 31 March 1986).
Source: Mitsui & Co (undated).
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5.0- Conclusion
In this chapter we looked at the establishment and evolution a the Mitsui GI oup,
and in particular Mitsui Bussan. We learnt that the original business was set up in the
early seventeenth century and the House of Mitsui made steady but strong progress
during the Tokugawa and Meiji periods mainly because of the initiatives of its managers
and close relations with the government. Mitsui, moreover, by setting up various
manufacturing subsidiaries, importation of raw materials and exports of manufactured
goods, became heavily involved in the industrialisation of Japan in the late 19th/early
20th Century. A major difference, however, between Mitsui and other emerging zaibatsu
like Mitsubishi was that the former concentrated on mining and general goods as its
main line of business while the later relied on the promotion of heavy industry for
expansion. This differences of emphasis still persists today.
Three other major differences separate the two giant groups. First, in the case of
Mitsui, Mitsui Bussan was instrumental in the establishment and expansion of the Mitsui
Zaibatsu and exerted considerable influence over the various Zaibatsu enterprises. While
in the case of Mitsubishi, Mitsubishi Shoji was established mainly as the trading arm of
the Zaibatsu, in charge of the promotion of goods produced by the latter's numerous
zaibatsu enterprises especially the heavy industrial goods. Second, the Mitsui Group has
had from the very beginning (17th Century) a decentralised organisation with
considerable leeway for personal initiatives of its employees. Although this organisational
set-up has enabled the Group to respond quickly to business opportunities worldwide,
especially in the field of foreign investment, it has nevertheless impeded the greater
intra-group cohesion enjoyed by other Japanese industrial groupings. This was a
particularly serious problem in the post-Occupation efforts for re-consolidation of the
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pre-war Mitsui Bussan and other former Mitsui Zaibatsu enterprises.
Mitsubishi on the other hand, has had a strong centralised organisation with
authority for decision making concentrated in the hands of top management, and as a
result, managed to re-unite its numerous companies into the new group with relative ease
in the post-war years.
The other major dissimilarity between the two groups has been the historical
weakness of the Mitsui Group in the oil business as compared to the Mitsubishi Group.
In the inter-war years, as we saw in Chapter Two, coal was the most important source
of energy and raw material in Japan and hence Mitsui quite understandably,
concentrated on coal mining and paid little attention to oil whose contribution to the
country's energy needs was less than 10%. The Mitsubishi Zaibatsu, in contrast, took the
oil business very seriously and its subsidiary, Mitsubishi Oil Company, became one of the
largest oil companies in pre-war Japan. With the introduction of modern technology
which was oil based and the relative decline of petroleum prices compared to coal in
post-war years, however, the former soon passed the latter as the most important sources
of energy as well as the feedstock for the fast expanding Japanese petrochemical
industry. The Mitsui Group, although belatedly, perceived this change in trend and tried
to enter the oil business, but several obstacles thwarted the Group's attempts to become
a major player in that industry. These barriers were: (a) the refusal of General Sekiyu
to re-join the Group in the 1950's; (b) the Foreign Exchange and Trade Laws which
greatly hampered the entrance of new companies into the oil business; and (c) the
objections of established oil companies who were not prepared to share the fast growing
and competitive Japanese petroleum market with new entrants.
The Mitsui Group, and particularly Mitsui Bussan, which once again had assumed
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a central position in the Group, "regretted" its weak position in the oil business compared
to other industrial groupings especially Mitsubishi whose oil company had once again
become a major player in the Japanese oil industry. To overcome this shortcoming,
Mitsui Bussan made strenuous efforts, particularly in the development of overseas oil
resources. One result of this oil policy was that Mitsui & Co became one of the main
contenders for the development the of Lorestan oilfield in Iran which was offered to
Japanese companies for exploration in the late 1960s. The involvement of Mitsui Bussan
in the Lorestan oilfield and the petrochemical joint venture, whose construction was
apparently a condition for the acceptance of the bid, will be the subject of Chapter
Seven.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE HISTORY OF NIOC, AND THE IRANIAN MANAGEMENT STYLE
1.0- Introduction
This chapter has two aims. First, to trace the historical development of the Iranian
management style and second, to discuss the establishment, managerial and
organisational aspects of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). The reason for
discussing the organisational characteristics of NIOC is that it was the first large scale
and capital intensive company to be established in Iran and the first one to utilise
modern managerial and organisational methods. Moreover, NIOC transferred most of
its managerial and organisational characteristics as well as some of its management and
technical personnel to its subsidiary National Petrochemical Company (NPC), the Iranian
partner in the petrochemical joint venture with Mitsui Bussan. Furthermore, as more
information is available on the organisational characteristics of NIOC than NPC, a more
detailed analysis can be presented.
2.0- The Development of Iranian Management and Organisation
2.1- The Inter-War Period
As discussed in Chapter Four, in the inter-war years, due to the weakness of
domestic private capital and lack of foreign investment (apart from Al0C), the state
assumed the leading role in Iran's industrialisation by establishing small scale
manufacturing plants in the country. Also some factories producing light consumer goods
were set up by wealthy bazaar merchants. As a result, the Iranian management style was
from the very beginning influenced by bureaucratic and mercantilistic behaviour. This
situation caused the managers of these enterprises to be more concerned with achieving
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state objectives and providing the bazaar merchants with goods to sell in the heavily
protected domestic market than with efficient operations and the long-term development
of their respective organisations. In fact, none of these firms managed to develop their
own technology or management skills and remained totally dependent on foreign
companies and personnel for such inputs.
The under-development of indigenous technology and management talent was
compounded by AIOC: the largest company active in Iran (in terms of employment,
capital, and output) at the time. The Company, as we saw in Chapter Four, refused to
integrate with the domestic economy or employ Iranians in sufficient numbers in
managerial or technical jobs. AIOC practised a very rigid and hierarchical style of British
management and did not allow any participation in the decision making process by the
few Iranians who had relatively senior positions in the company.
Moreover, the newly established higher education system did not offer any courses
in management or business studies. One can therefore infer that no distinct Iranian
management method worthy of name existed in Iran in the inter-war period and in fact
in the immediate post-war years.
2.2- The 1950s to 1970s
In the 1950s several developments took place which had implications for Iranian
management. First, immediately after the oil nationalisation in 1951, the National Iranian
Oil Company was established to take over the activities of AIOC. The board members
of NIOC and its top management had all been educated at British universities and had
worked for the now defunct AIOC in various capacities. Therefore, they adopted the
British style of management and organisation for the running of the new company. This
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was probably the first time that an Iranian company had consciously employed the
management methods of a foreign company or country for its organisation.
Second, after the 1953 coup, the Iranian regime which had until then been pro-
British adopted a pro-American stance. This had two repercussions for Iranian
management. For one, many American companies started to establish joint ventures with
Iranian partners in many sectors of the economy like oil, petrochemicals, automobiles,
and other consumer goods. As a result, by the 1970s, the United States had become the
largest foreign investor in Iran in terms of number of joint ventures (45) and total value
of investments (see Tables 3.17 and 3.18).
Closer links with the United States also provided opportunities for the Iranians
to continue their education at American universities instead of British and other
European ones.
Third, the University of Tehran with the co-operation of the University of
Southern California, established the Institute of Administrative Science in 1954 to train
managers for both private and public sectors. At this institute, which was the first of its
kind in Iran, a variety of courses including accounting, public and business adminstration
were taught by American lecturers.
The combination of the above three factors facilitated the wide adaptation of
American management style by Iranian managers both in the public and private sectors
throughout the 1960s and much of the 1970s.
Finally, after the 1954 Consortium Agreement, Iran's oil revenues tripled. This
enabled the goverment to initiate ambitious development plans and take the leading
role in the country's industrialisation. Many joint ventures were established with
American, British, German, French, and later with Japanese companies in heavy and
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light consumer goods industries. These joint ventures, naturally, adopted the management
practices prevalent in the home countries of the foreign partners. In the post-war years,
the managerial and organisational facets of many Western industrialised countries were
imported into Iran with the American method being the dominant one.
However, the situation began to change from the early 1970s onwards as Japanese
companies became actively involved in establishing joint ventures, particularly in
manufacturing, with Iranian partners. Although the Japanese partners usually had a
minority interest, due to three main factors, they exerted almost complete influence over
the management of these joint ventures. First, although Iran did not allow foreign
investors 100% ownership of companies, on the other hand it did not impose compulsory
export and indigenous elements ratio, or localisation of personnel at any leve1. 1 Second,
the Iranian government in fact encouraged the employment of foreign manpower in
order to cope with a shortage of managers, engineers, and technicians. Third, Iranian
partners in Japanese joint ventures generally liked to employ Japanese factory managers,
engineers and technicians as the cost of their employment was cheaper than Iranians in
consideration of their experience and skill. They often commissioned factory and
production management to the Japanese so that their initiative and influence in
management, in particular production management, was by far greater than their
minority holdings suggested.2
Due to better management, Japanese manufacturing joint ventures (13 in all)
became very successful in Iran: so much so that they surpassed their American and
European rivals both in terms of market share and quality of their products.' However,
because of several factors, Japanese management practices were not widely diffused
throughout Iranian manufacturing industries. First, Japanese companies were newcomers
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in Iran (early 1970s) and, therefore, other Iranian manufacturing companies had little
time to observe their operations and emulate their methods before the 1979 revolution
forced all of the Japanese partners to pull out of Iran.
Second, very few Iranians chose to study in Japan as the majority of them
preferred to be educated at American and European educational establishments. As a
result, there were very few Iranian graduates who had either studied or observed
Japanese management methods and organisations.
Third, Iranian business or commercial schools which had grown in numbers in the
1960s and 1970s, had links with American and European universities which supplied the
former with lecturers as well as study materials. Hence, the dominance of Western,
particularly American management theories, over the training of Iranian managers was
continued right up to the revolution. (This dominance is still present today).
Fourth, quite logically, the Japanese joint ventures, with two exceptions, were not
prepared to share their most valuable assets, i.e. their superior management and
production techniques with their rivals in the Iranian market. In one case, Pars Toshiba
Lamp Company; a joint venture between the Toshiba Electric Company and Iranian
interests, extended its managerial and technical assistance to its only rival, an Irano-
Dutch company, to enable it to increase its production so as to stave off government
threats to open up the heavily protected market to imports to satisfy the rapidly rising
demand for electric bulbs.4
In another instance, due to the poor performance of the Ghazvin Glass Company,
the American partner withdrew from the joint venture. The main factors behind the
failure of the joint venture were mis-management by the American partner and the
supply of outdated technology. The Iranian partner asked the Nippon Sheet Glass Co.
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for technical assistance. The technical aid was so effective that the company's production
rose sharply. The increase in production and rising domestic demand for glass persuaded
Nippon Glass to take a 26.4% interest in the company. As a result of Japanese
participation, Ghazvin Glass became the biggest and most profitable glass manufacturing
company in Iran.5
Although almost all Japanese manufacturing joint ventures were very successful
in their operations in Iran, there is no evidence to suggest that any serious efforts were
made, either by Iranian managers or business schools, to learn about Japanese
management practices.
2.3- The Pattern of Iranian Management in the 1950-1970 Period
In the preceding pages it was stated that in the 1950-70 period, British, American,
and, to a lesser extent Japanese management methods were imported into Iran with the
second one exerting the largest influence. However, it would be a great mistake to
assume that these styles of management were adopted without any inputs by the Iranian
managers themselves. In fact, the peculiar pattern of Iran's industrialisation, namely, the
extensive intervention of state and the role of bazaar merchants in that process, were to
have a profound impact on these imported management techniques, resulting in the
emergence of a distinctive Iranian management style. The use of the term "distinctive
Iranian management style" may not be entirely correct as no such style exists as in the
case of say Japanese or American management. However, it is believed that Iranian
factors discussed below wielded sufficient influence on the imported management
techniques so as to create a "distinctly" Iranian management method. Unfortunately, to
date no extensive studies on Iranian management has been carried out and, therefore,
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this study has to rely on general observations to discuss the subject.
2.3.1- The State Intervention
Chapter Four discussed how the Iranian state, due to weakness of the domestic
private sector and lack of foreign investment, took the leading role in the country's
industrialisation process in both inter and post-war periods. This state intervention has
had a major impact on the character of Iranian management in the sense that the
managers in charge of companies established by the state have been more bureaucrats
than professional managers. These managers have been concerned with fulfilling the
state objectives such as industrialisation and creation of employment, etc, rather than
running their companies as commercial concerns. In fact, almost none of the enterprises
established by the state in the four decades have developed into viable commercial
companies able to compete successfully in both domestic and foreign markets. Most state
owned companies are being managed more like a government department rather than
commercial entities, with their managers being bound by bureaucratic controls. These
managers have been more concerned with discharging their legal duties than with
planning, decision making, or organising as would be expected of professional managers.
This situation has impeded the evolution of a class of professional managers
capable of spearheading Iran's industrialisation and establishing competitive industries.
State intervention, however, is not the only cause of the underdevelopment of
managerial talent in Iran. Another factor, namely, the role of the merchant bourgeoisie
in Iran's industrialisation efforts is also as important.
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2.3.2- The Role of Bazaar Merchants
Generally speaking, there are two types of merchants in Iran: those engaged in
domestic trading like buying and selling locally produced agricultural and manufactured
products as well as imported goods, and those active in imports and exports. The latter,
due to their contacts with the outside world, were relatively the most progressive section
of Iranian society in the latter part of the 19th and first half of the 20th Centuries. They
played a leading role in the 1906 Constitutional Revolution whose main objective was
the abolition of feudalism and creation of a modern democratic and capitalistic state
along European lines. The uprising, however, did not succeed in achieving its aim and
large landowners continued to exert great influence on Iran's economic policy. Some of
the wealthiest merchants, nevertheless, began to establish small scale consumer goods
factories catering for the domestic market.
Iranian merchants possess several characteristics which have had decisive
implications for the country's economy as well as the management system. First, almost
all trading activities have been one-man or family operations. Usually, a person with a
good instinct for business would establish a small trading shop dealing in a few goods.
If he manages to establish a good reputation and creditworthiness for himself in the
bazaar, he would be able to expand his business and become an important and
respectable merchant. In some cases, other members of the family, usually the merchant
son(s), would help him in running the business and would take over the business after
his retirement or death. The merchant himself, however, would assume all responsibility
for running the business, delegating little responsibility to either his employees or family
members. The major fault of this type of one-man operation is that the merchant's
experience would never be documented or transferred in a systematic way to his
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employees or other prospective businessmen. As a result, when the merchant dies, all his
experience and knowledge would also perish with him.
Second, although Iranian merchants are clever businessmen, few have had much
education, particularly in higher or university establishments. Consequently, they have
not been able to utilise the latest scientific and technological developments in their
business operations.
The combination of the two above factors have resulted in the underdevelopment
of business organisations and the non-emergence of a class of professional managers in
Iran. This is particularly more pertinent as one considers that trading's contribution to
national wealth generation is second only to agriculture. This situation contrasts sharply
with that in Japan, where merchant families such as the Mitsuis established large and
dynamic trading companies, which in turn became instrumental in Japan's
industrialisation and expanding foreign trade.
Some progressive Iranian merchants, however, for commercial as well as
nationalistic reasons began to establish small scale manufacturing plants from the
beginning of the 20th Century. The earlier efforts mainly ended in failure as the
unavailability of a skilled workforce, inadequate infrastructure and lack of tariff
autonomy hampered the construction, operations, and profitability of those plants.
With the regaining of tariff autonomy in 1928, improvements in infrastructure,
especially transportation, and direct state intervention in the domestic economy and its
support for industrialisation, some merchants began to set up manufacturing operations
to produce goods for the heavily protected domestic market. So in the 1930s, wealthy
merchants, in conjunction with the state spearheaded the industrialisation of Iran. The
reason why merchants and not other sections of the society entered manufacturing was
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that only the former had the capital, knowledge, and connections necessary for entering
into such high risk ventures.6
Iran's industrialisation process came to an end in 1941 when the country was
occupied by the Allied forces. It was not until the mid-1950s, after the signing of the
Consortium Agreement, that the goverment once again resumed its industrialisation
efforts by directly establishing various plants and persuading the private sector to assume
a larger role in that process.
The merchants' involvement in Iran's industrialisation became even more
omnipresent after the 1963 uprising when the Shah's regime broke ties with its traditional
supporters, i.e. landowners and bazaari merchants. Many wealthy merchants sensed the
new opportunities created by the government's new import substitution policy and
eagerly began to convert their commercial capital to industrial capital. The 1963-78
period was the golden age of Iran's industrialisation as many consumer goods industries
were established by the merchants and nouveau riche groups who had connections with
the regime. As the private sector was not yet strong enough, state assumed the
responsibility for setting up the heavy and chemical industries. All these industries
enjoyed goverment support which supplied them with cheap and easy-term finance and
erected prohibitive tariff and non-tariff barriers to protect them against foreign
competition.
Because of heavy protection and lack of any export performance or local content
requirements, many of these industries became very inward looking and mere assemblers
of imported intermediate goods, with no product innovation or indigenous R & D. This
resulted in the emergence of an inward looking and passive management with little
regard for human resources management, product and process innovation, or marketing.
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The merchants brought their style of management into the companies they
established: i.e. they adopted a mercantilistic attitude towards manufacturing. They
occupied the posts of chairman and chief executive of their respective enterprises and
delegated little responsibility or decision making to subordinates. In fact, throughout this
period (1950-1979), the lack of separation between ownership and management impeded
the capitalistic development and formation of a class of professional managers in Iran.
Even when in the early 1970s owners of manufacturing companies were forced by the
government into selling a portion of their shares to the public, the former continued to
dominate their enterprises by offering only limited number of preference shares with no
voting rights.
The control of owner-managers over their companies was almost total as
employees were not allowed to form workers councils or participate in the decision
making process. The only trade unions in Iran were the strictly controlled state sponsored
ones which were more of a control mechanism than workers representatives.
Another aspect of the Iranian state owned and private companies was the
preference of top management for employing people with academic qualifications rather
than those with business initiative and experience.
The combination of all the above factors not only hindered the development of
management talent in Iran, but also caused the alienation from their workplace of
workers who had little company loyalty. Most workers regarded their job as a source of
income rather than as a means of fulfilling their goals or ambitions.
This state of affairs has had implications for the industrial and economic
development of Iran. Almost none of the manufacturing companies established in the
1950s to 1960s managed to pass the assembly stage and have remained as dependent as
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ever on imported technology and intermediate inputs for the production of the limited
range of goods that they produce. Moreover, none of these enterprises have managed to
enter the export markets in a big way as they have concentrated on catering for the
protected home market with inferior products.
2.4- The 1979 Revolution and the Emergence of Islamic Management
The revolution of 1979 had several effects on the process of industrialisation and
management style in Iran. For one, the new goverment, which regarded foreign
investment as a means of outside domination or interference, nationalised or purchased
foreign interests in Iranian companies (excluding LTPC). Moreover, around 80% of
private companies, whose owners were accused of co-operating with the Shah's regime,
were also nationalised. As a result, the private sector was to a large extent excluded from
participation in the manufacturing sector. All the nationalised companies were put under
the control of newly created state organisations such as the Deprived Foundation and the
Nationalised Industries Organisation. So the state gained almost total influence over the
management of manufacturing enterprises. The new regime also pronounced that it
intended to implement Islamic management style in all state organisations:
manufacturing, as well as bureaucratic.
Furthermore, after the revolution, workers, who had been librated from the
oppression of the former regime, demanded a greater say in the running of their
companies and, for a while, gained total control of the nationalised companies. After
some time, however, the new regime asserted its authority over these enterprises through
the creation of Islamic Councils, exerting great influence over the affairs of their
organisations, and, leaving little room for the new management to exercise its prerogatives.
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2.4.1- The Definition of Islamic Management7
Islamic management is a distinct form of leadership which is based on Islamic
ideology, beliefs, and laws. Before explaining this style of management, it is necessary to
define management and Islam and who is considered to be a muslim.
In the Persian and Arabic languages, management is defined as" doing things
through and by others". Accordingly, management science is described as "the science
which provides a person with the knowledge to do things through and by others".
Furthermore, management traits are defined as "those traits which enable a person to
do things through and by others".8
Islam simply means submission to God, and a muslim is someone who submits
himself to the will of God and obeys His instructions and laws in all aspects of his or her
daily life. According to this definition, the most fundamental principles of leadership,
which Islamic management style is a distinct form of, are equity and justice. Hence, in this
style of management, achieving justice and equity and not personal or even the group's
materialistic motivations, guide a muslim manager's actions and decisions.
In the Islamic value system, ends do not justify means Consequently, a muslim
manager must avoid any action or decision which may undermine the rights or well being
of humans or religious instructions for the sake of attaining his organisational objectives.
The most fundamental principles of Islamic management, which distinguishes it from
other styles of management, therefore, is that a muslim manager must do what is right
in the eyes of God and, if necessary, sacrifice materialistic gains for the sake of realising
equity and justice. To accomplish this, a muslim manager must possess certain
characteristics which can be called the principles of Islamic management.
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2.4.2- The Principles of Islamic Management
The holy Qur'an has laid down the principles of leadership from which the Islamic
management style is derived. According to these principles, a muslim manager must
possess the following five characteristics:9
(1)- Mental and Intellectual Capacity,
(2)- Ability to Facilitate,
(3)- Ability to Communicate,
(4)- Ability to Choose Appropriate Associates,
(5)- Spiritual Aspirations.
The first principle is the most important of all and, in fact, the accomplishment of the
other four is conditional on first possessing or acquiring mental and intellectual capacity.
Accordingly, most of the section on Islamic management will be devoted to explaining
this principle.
2.4.2.1- Mental and Intellectual Capacity
This is the human's capacity to comprehend everything that happens around him.
In other words, it is the mental and intellectual capability to learn sciences, distinguish
between good and evil, analyze events that take place around a person and the ability
to respond to them. Obviously, the higher the mental and intellectual capacity, the higher
the person's ability to learn and understand the events surrounding him and the quicker
his response to them. The Qur'an differentiates between the capacity to discern between
divine and materialistic deeds. And this is where a muslim manager can be distinguished
from a non-believing manager. Many may be management scientists and actually be very
good managers but only those discharging their responsibilities towards the achievement
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of religious aims, rather than materialistic gains, are considered to have the Islamic
mental and intellectual capacity to be considered as muslim managers.
The Islamic mental and intellectual capacity provides a manager with the
competence to manage his organisation according to Islamic rules and towards the
attainment of divine goals, i.e. justice and equity. A non-believing manager on the other
hand, however competent he may be, will direct his organisation towards achieving
materialistic benefits for himself as well as his masters (his shareholders). And this is the
essential difference between a muslim and a non-muslim manager. It is important to note
that non-muslims does not necessarily mean those who do not believe in Islam, but
rather those who pursue materialistic rather than godly objectives. There may be muslim
managers who pursue materialistic aims and non-muslim managers who run their
organisations with the intent to attain divine goals, i.e. justice and equity. In the Qur'an,
the former are considered as insincere or fake muslims and the latter as muslims.
A muslim manager must have six traits, namely: acumen, diplomacy, a congenial
manner, firmness and determination, magnanimity and flexibility, and be open to
criticism. The more a devout a muslim, the higher the mental and intellectual capacity
to have the above mentioned traits.
(a)- Acumen is the trait which enables a manager to utilise his employees and
organisation towards achieving his goals. Many may have the scientific knowledge about
management, but what is crucial for a manager, is to have the business acumen to enable
him to utilise the knowledge and services of others for achieving his aims. A good
manager must treat every individual employee according to that person's capacity,
intelligence and knowledge. This is called the art of management The way that acumen
develops in a manager separates muslims from non-believers. The Islamic mental and
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intellectual capacity discussed above, grants the believer with the acumen to guide his
organisation towards the attainment of divine goals, whereas the non-believing manager
uses his acumen for materialistic ends.
(b)- Diplomacy is an indispensable tool of management. Only a person capable of
perceiving the political environment will be able to manage his organisation and
employees competently. The political environment not only includes national or
international politics, but more crucially, the political scene and power play within the
organisation itself. In fact, the larger the organisation, the greater the need for political
skills. The Islamic mental and intellectual capacity provides the muslim manager with the
talent to master political skills and he in turn uses these skills to lead his organisation
towards realising his religious duties, i.e. justice and equity. In other management
systems, however, the manager uses his political skills towards achieving his personal
ambitions, such as his own career advancement and/or the furtherance of his
organisation's goals such as increasing profits or expanding its market share. This is
another difference between Islamic and other management systems.
(c)- Congenial manner: In Islamic management, human resources management is
considered to be the most important function of a muslim manager and has far greater
priority over other management functions such as finance, production, marketing, etc. At
the beginning of this section, management was defined as "doing things through others".
So, having a congenial manner and good temper is a prerequisite of Islamic management.
A muslim manager must have a pleasant, persuasive, courteous, and positive attitude
towards his employees in order to influence them to perform their duties towards
achieving the organisational goals. In other words, he should be a charismatic leader who
uses the language of persuasion rather than aggression to lead his employees towards the
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realisation of his objectives. In Islamic management, the use of aggression and harsh
language towards employees is forbidden, unless it is realised that they are abusing the
congenial attitude of management to disobey orders.
The Qur'an states that a leader (manager), in order to command the respect of
his employees, must have a pleasant and positive attitude towards them, and consult
them in all aspects of the business. It also states that, even if employees make mistakes
in the course of doing their jobs, the manager must not lose his temper but try to point
out their errors with calmness and composure. Moreover, employees must not be
punished for their blunders but be given the opportunity to rectify their mistakes
(positive conditioning). This should be done to the extent that these mistakes do not
undermine the whole organisation or the well-being of other employees. The Qur'an
takes this style of human resources management, i.e. positive conditioning, very seriously,
as it instructs leaders (managers) to always remind employees of positive aspects of their
personalities and the contribution they make to the organisation, and avoid unnecessary
criticism of their weaknesses.
The Qur'an pronounces that only those with high mental and intellectual capacity
possess the good temper to treat the people around them with respect and dignity.
(d)- Firmness and determination: The Qur'an interprets firmness as the ability to lead
one's organisation with total commitment and determination towards its goals while
paying due respect and consideration to employees. In Islamic management, a good
manager is the one who, does not hesitate in making and implementing decisions
necessary for the running of his organisation, and the one who with total determination
and resolution, eliminates all obstacles in the way of realising his organisational goals.
It is therefore, true to say that from the holy book's viewpoint, lack of firmness is far
299
more harmful to the organisation than making a few mistakes.
However, in Islamic management, firmness is devoid of aggressive, unpleasant,
and insultive behaviour. In fact, the Qur'an states that firmness should be conducted in
a courteous and polite manner. In this system of management, if the firmness of a
manager is to be effective, it must be implemented with some degree of flexibility and
consideration for the people who are affected by it Imam Ali, the first leader of Shi'at
muslims, asserts that in order to achieve his goals and have strong management, a
muslim manager should mix firmness with flexibility and cordiality. 1° He adds that
application of absolute firmness or absolute flexibility will lead to disastrous results for
both the manager and the organisation under his contro1. 11
 According to the holy book,
only those with high mental and intellectual capacity are capable of being both firm and
flexible at the same time.
(e)- Magnanimity and flexibility: One of the essential traits of Islamic management is
magnanimity and flexibility. This enables the manager to utilise his employees with
different social, educational backgrounds and personalities for the furtherance of his
organisational objectives. Here magnanimity is used to mean being benevolent, merciful,
and flexible. Furthermore, in Islamic management, compromise is encouraged, as it
enables the manager to manage his organisation in diverse, and sometimes hostile
situations.
In the Qur'an, God instructs the Prophet Muhammad to be magnanimous towards
people so that they are persuaded to accept Islam and adds that magnanimity will enable
him to induce muslin's to work towards the attainment of Islamic values and goals.
Magnanimity is, in fact, a very important aspect of leadership in Islam and the Qur'an,
on several occasions, asks muslim leaders to use it for the spread of Islam and
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advancement of their religious and political goals.
(d)- Open to criticism: In the Islamic management style, the manager must give his
employees the opportunity to question and criticise his decisions and actions regarding
the organisation. Moreover, he must listen to such criticism with patience and, if he
realises it is correct, he should take action to rectify his mistakes. As mentioned earlier,
Islam realises that leaders (or managers) do make mistakes. However, what is important
is the manager's willingness to listen to his employees' criticism and correct those errors.
Islam pays great attention to consultation and regards a competent leader or manager
as the one who consults his subjects or employees on every major decision or matter of
concern. Accordingly, in Islamic management, workers do have the right to participate
in the management and decision making process of their own organisations. This, it is
believed, would reduce the chances of making mistakes and, more crucially, it ensures
that the organisation is run for the benefit of everyone involved in it and not only for
profits of the managers or owners. Islamic management espouses the idea that workers
should have the right to play a role in appointing their organisations' managers and also
be given the opportunity to question their manager's decisions.
With regard to workers' participation, in Islamic management, the organisational
chart unlike other management systems, is horizontal rather than vertical, i.e. there is no
hierarchy in an Islamic organisation. Every one working for such organisation, has the
same status regardless of his position within the organisation. Moreover, in Islamic
management, decision making is down-up, i.e. it is the workers who make the decisions
and it is the responsibility of the management to ensure that they are implemented
according to the wishes of the workers.
In this respect, Imam Ali asks his people to evaluate and criticise his every action
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and decision and, moreover, instructs his governors and administrators to be open to
receiving criticism from people. He believes that just criticism strengthens rather than
weakens the Islamic government and institutions.
Lastly, Islam believes that only people with Islamic values and goals and those
with high moral and intellectual capacity are capable of accepting criticism and
responding to it in a positive and open manner.
In this section, the first principle of Islamic management was discussed in detail.
The following section will briefly review the other four principles. It is, however,
important to note that these four principles, are, to a large extent based on, or derived
from the first one, i.e. mental and intellectual capacity.
2.4.2.2- Ability to Facilitate
A muslim manager, must have the ability to organise the work environment in a
harmonious and appropriate way which would assist employees to realise their potential
and contribute to the attainment of the organisational goals. In Islamic management,
exploitation of workers for the achievement of organisational goals is expressly forbidden,
and workers are required to work to the best of their abilities. In this system of
management, fulfilment of personal goals should be given a high priority, and employees
must not be asked to perform duties which are forbidden by Islam.
2.4.2.3- Ability to Communicate
A muslim manager has to be a good communicator. This is essential not only for
communicating matters regarding the organisation itself or those who work for it, but
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also for propagating Islamic values and teachings. In fact, in Islamic management, a
manager is also the religious leader (Imam) of his own organisation. Furthermore, it is
the religious duty of the manager to set an example as a devout muslim for his
employees and discuss with them religious matters on regular basis. It is for these
reasons that good communications is regarded as one of the principles of Islamic
management.
2.4.2.4- Ability to Choose Appropriate Associates
The ability to choose appropriate associates and employees is a very important
function of a muslim manager. This is not only to ensure that people with the right
expertise and knowledge essential for the efficient running of the organisation are
employed, but rather, a muslim manager must select those people who share and believe
in the objectives of an Islamic organisation. Earlier on, it was stated that the goal of an
Islamic organisation and its management is not materialistic gain but rather the
realisation of equity and justice. Therefore, the management of an Islamic organisation
must only employ those who share these religious aspirations and must avoid hiring those
who want to join the organisation for purposes other than the above two goals.
2.4.2.5- Spiritual Aspirations
This principle has already been explained in the preceding sections. Briefly, in the
Islamic management system, the manager should work towards the realisation of equity
and justice and not for personal or materialistic gains. Moreover, such a manager must
ensure that organisational aims and those of his employees are directed towards the
achievement of such goals.
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In order to do so, the management of an Islamic business organisation should
enter into those lines of activities or produce those goods which will contribute to the
well-being of muslims and the development of the Islamic society. Such organisations
must avoid producing those goods which are either forbidden by Islam or will encourage
excessive consumption, corruption and crime in the society. These products or activities
include luxurious goods, alcoholic drinks, gambling, etc. Moreover, in Islamic
management, marketing for the sake of encouraging conspicuous consumption is not
encouraged and only marketing to the extent that it informs people of the existence and
attributes of the product is permitted.
This style of management is a result of the Islamic economic philosophy which
forbids any economic activity that is undertaken for the sole purpose of making profit
and advocates that business enterprise should only operate for the betterment of human
life and the attainment of equity and justice.' Obviously, in such an economic system,
the role of marketing cannot be the same as in capitalistic economies where it is carried
out for the sole purpose of increasing sales and profit maximisation.
2.4.3- The Implementation of Islamic Management
Generally speaking, the management style of any given country is to some extent,
a function of its economic system.' For instance, as discussed earlier, the Iranian
management style has been heavily influenced by bureaucratic and mercantilistic
demeanour as the both the state and bazaari merchants played a decisive role in the
country's industrialisation. The Islamic management style is also an element or function
of Islamic economic ideology.
It is quite clear from the preceding discussion on the principles of Islamic
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management that in such a style of management, the welfare and rights of workers are
given far more consideration than the rights of the owners or the capital. In fact, in an
Islamic society, business organisations only exist to serve the needs of muslims and are
a means of improving their quality of life as well as helping muslims to achieve their
spiritual goals. It was also stated that the Islamic economic ideology forbids undertaking
any business activity for the sole purpose of profiteering and advocates that all economic
endeavour should be directed towards the attainment of equity and justice.
It is evident from the above argument that Islamic management can only be
implemented in a country with an Islamic economic system. Although a few countries
like Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are Islamic states, none have yet managed to
establish a national economy based on the principles of Islamic economic ideology. All
they have achieved so far is the adaptation of Islamic justice laws (Sharia) in their legal
systems. The sharia does include important and comprehensive provisions for regulating
economic activities and business organisations. But even these laws have been
implemented only half-heartedly for the simple fact that these countries have to trade
with countries (such as in the West) whose judicial systems are vastly different and,
therefore, have had to incorporate some of the latter's laws within their own legal
systems.
The failure to adopt an Islamic economic system is not due to lack of will on the
part of politicians or people ( at least large segments of the population), but rather to
the fact that these countries are only small players in a world economy whose
foundations are based on the capitalistic and free market economic system in which the
main motivation for undertaking any type of economic activity is making profit. As the
experience of socialist countries has shown, it is very difficult, or rather impossible, for
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alternative economic systems to survive in a capitalistic dominated global economy.
The same holds true in the case of countries who want to implement the
principles of Islamic ideology in their national economies. They not only have to operate
within the parameters set by the world economy but also face strong opposition by those
segments of their societies who have a stake in the present economic system and whose
interests are closely linked to those of the international economic order. Two examples
of such obstacles can be seen in the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran which tried to
introduce some elements of Islamic economic principals into the domestic economy.
It is well known that paying and receiving interest (usuary) is forbidden under
Islamic laws. After the Revolution of 1979, the Islamic government of Iran advocated
changing the country's banking system based on interest to one which prohibited paying
or receiving interest by the banks. After a few years of deliberation, the Islamic banking
system was introduced which was not supposed to pay interest on deposits or receive
interest on loans. Instead, banks were instructed to invest their depositors' money in
various economic activities, and distribute their profits, after deducting a certain amount
for their expenses, to the depositors.
The reality is, however, far from what was originally intented. Iranian banks are
still paying interest on deposits and charge interest for the loans that they extend. All the
changes are in fact superficial and only the terms used in the banking system have
changed. This is not because there was no genuine intention on the part of the
government, but rather the realisation of the fact that the Iranian banking system cannot
be fundamentally different from its counterparts in other countries, as they all operate
within the same economic system and according to the same principles, i.e. profit
maximisation. Moreover, in the last few years, the Iranian Ministry of Finance and the
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Central Bank have used interest rates as a tool of their monetary policy to curb inflation.
This shows that the Islamic banking system exists only in name. Other countries which
have introduced the Islamic banking principles have had the same experience as Iran as
they have failed to eliminate interest from their banking systems.
Another example, which demonstrates the difficulties of introducing Islamic
management system in a predominantly capitalist economy is the Islamic Republic's
repeated attempts to introduce labour relation laws based on Islamic principles. The first
labour relations legislation was drawn up during the first term of M. Mussavi's
Premiership (1981-89) by the Ministry of Labour. This legislation, drafted by those with
close connections to the bazaari merchants was so reactionary that it actually proposed
to reduce rather than enhance workers rights. After a few years of intense debate, the
legislation was finally rejected by the Majlis (the Iranian Parliament) and the goverment
had to rely on laws from the Shah's regime to regulate labour relations.
After the election of President Rafsanjani, a new and far more modern labour
relations legislation was drafted and, despite opposition by some traditional Deputies,
was passed by the Majlis. However, the Ministry of Labour, due to strong resistance from
the Iranian Chamber of Commerce, the most powerful economic organisation, has been
having difficulty in implementing the provisions of the Act.
The two above examples, especially the latter one, show that the Islamic
management system cannot be implemented in a country unless the whole of the
economy is based on Islamic economic principles. However, as the present world
economic order has a capitalist structure, it is very unlikely that an alternative economic
system, such as the Islamic, can emerge in the Islamic world in the foreseeable future.
Consequently, it is very unlikely that the Islamic management system will be
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implemented in these countries in a meaningful or practical way.
As the experience of Iran shows, although few Islamic scholars 14 have written on
the subject of Islamic management, neither they nor the Islamic goverment have yet
established a theoretical or practical framework applicable to modern organisations.
Moreover, there is no evidence that Islamic management style has been implemented in
a meaningful or comprehensive way in any Iranian business or state organisation. In
reality, Islamic management has remained a concept without being implemented in a
systematic and scientific manner by Iranian organisations. As a matter of fact, foreign
management styles imported during the 1950s to 1970s, combined with a heavy dose of
bureaucratization have continued to be used by Iranian managers.
Therefore, one can deduct that, despite the wishes of many Islamic countries and
muslims a management style, based on Islamic principles will be very unlikely to
materialise in these countries in the near future and it will remain a concept rather than
a reality. Any attempts in that direction will only be superficial and cosmetic, and will
be seen only as a means of exploiting workers religious beliefs for the benefit of business
owners and the state.
3.0- The History and Organisational Development of NIOC
3.1- NIOC's Management and Organisation Under the Shah
Immediately after the oil nationalisation of 1951, the National Iranian Oil
Company (NIOC) was created to manage the domestic industry thus far run by AIOC.
The new company was denied the share of overseas assets of its predecessor and all it
was left with were the latter's assets within Iran. NIOC did not gain control over the
Policy Making Board stationed in London, top and middle management in Iran, R & D,
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Engineering and Procurement Departments, tanker fleet, worldwide refineries, or
distribution and sales facilities all over the world. 15 All NIOC was left with were assets
within Iran like oilfields, pipelines, refineries, distribution network, filling stations,
buildings, etc.
Although the 1954 Consortium Agreement recognised NIOC's ownership of oil
and gas reserves and all equipment and buildings used in the Iranian oil industry, it
denied the company the right to utilise these assets on its own for the duration of the
Agreement. Under the terms of the Agreement, Consortium members were given total
freedom to exploit all oil reserves within the concession area and employ all equipment
necessary for their operations. In fact, all NIOC was left with was the internal
distribution network and responsibility for the Consortium's non-basic operations such
as housing, health, education, recreation, and general welfare of the employees. These
arrangements were against both the letter and spirit of oil nationalisation which had
advocated total Iranian control over the domestic industry.
However, in the same year (1954) NIOC was granted a new status and was
merged with the Iran Oil Company, which had been formed under the Fist Seven-Year
Development Plan for all operations outside the concession area, and a new Board of
Directors was appointed. The reorganised NIOC had experience only in internal
distribution and oil exploration brought in by the Iran Oil Company.'
The six new Executive Directors of NIOC were all graduates of British
universities. The majority of top and middle management were either graduates from
British educational institutions or from Abadan Technical Institute which itself was an
offshoot of British technical institutions.r This, plus the fact that 1•110C retained all of
the organisational and managerial characteristics of its parent ensured the continuation
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of a British management style in the company which had been practised for nearly fifty
years by AIOC.
Legally, NIOC, is not a public corporation, as may be implied by its name.
According to its Constitution it is a commercial company, paying tax at the rate of 50%
on its net profits. All of its shares are, however, owned by the Iranian government and
are not transferable. The representatives of the shareholders at the General Meeting of
the Company during the Shah's regime were the Prime Minister, Minister of Finance and
Economic Affairs, Minister of Energy, Minister of Industry and Mines, Minister of
Labour and Social welfare, Head of Plan and Budget Organisation, and another Minister
appointed by the Premier.18
The GM was (is) responsible for the appointment of the Board of Directors,
setting the Company's strategy, and approving its plans. The Chairman of NIOC, who
also acts as the Managing Director, was, however, appointed by the Shah and reported
directly to him. The Chairman of NIOC, although not a member of the cabinet,
unofficially had the position of a superminister. This was due to the fact that the
Company supplied more than 90% of the governments annual revenue and country's
foreign exchange earnings.
The appointment of NIOC's Board members and Chairman by politicians made
it susceptible to political and bureaucratic interference in its operations and decision
making process. Some Executive Members of the Board, who themselves had to have at
least ten years of experience in the oil industry to be qualified for such positions,19
considered political appointees, especially the Chairman, to have a negative impact on
the operations of the Company.2° In their view, the political pressures and "influence
peddling"21
 brought about by political appointees and their associates within the regime,
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made it difficult for them to run NIOC as a corruption free and successful oil company.
In order to lessen political influence and strengthen its management, the
Constitution of NIOC was revised in 1974. Under the new rules, the number of Board
Members was raised to ten, including the Managing Director. Five Alternate Directors
were also to be appointed by the Board itself. All Board Members had to have at least
ten years experience in the oil industry and must have occupied an important position
within the Company for five years. Moreover, the Chairmen of the two main
subsidiaries of NIOC, the National Petrochemical Company and the National Iranian
Gas Company were also appointed to the main Board of the Company. In view of the
newly found importance of petrochemicals and gas in the overall export policy of NIOC,
there was the need to involve the heads of these two companies in the overall policy
making machinery of the Company.23 These were the last major changes to NIOC's
organisation in the Shah's regime. After the revolution the Company underwent major
changes which will be discussed in the next section.
Finally, the Shah's goverment several times considered the establishment of a
Ministry of Oil with responsibility for the domestic petroleum industry, but it never
materialised. Although the Chairman of NIOC unofficially had the status of a
superminister, it was the Minister of Finance who represented Iran at OPEC meetings
and other international gatherings related to the oil industry.
3.2- NIOC After the Revolution
Before or immediately after the establishment of the Islamic government, many
of the Board members and other top managers of NIOC and its subsidiaries who feared
for their safety fled from Iran. Those who remained were purged by the new government
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on the grounds of co-operation with the Shah and foreign interests and were replaced
by supporters of the revolution. Moreover, the Islamic goverment considered the
presence of foreign companies in the Iranian oil industry detrimental to the national
interest and therefore ended the last remaining influence of the Consortium over the oil
industry and bought or nationalised the shares of all foreign companies.
In order to bring the petroleum industry under total control, the Islamic
goverment established the Ministry of Oil with responsibility for all oil related activities.
The Minister of Oil also acts as the Chairman and Managing director of NIOC. Initially,
the Ministry sought to dissolve the Company and run the industry like a governmental
department. But, because of strong opposition from NIOC, it shirked the idea, and
instead put the Company under its direct control, and assumed responsibility for decision
making and operations. This new arrangement obviously made NIOC management more
prone to political and bureaucratic interference.
Furthermore, due to political instability in the early years of the revolution, there
were frequent changes to the top management of NIOC and its subsidiaries. As later
chapters will show, these changes prevented the Ministry, NIOC, and NPC from devising
a cohesive strategy towards UPC, with the result that it took nearly nine years to reach
a final decision on the future of the joint venture.
Finally, it is important to note that in reality and contrary to its Constitution,
NIOC is a public corporation. It has no profit maximisation motive and its operations
comply with the overall goverment policy rather than making a profit. 24 The Company
is under the tight control of the government and the presence of cabinet ministers at its
Annual General MeetinE,s ensures that its policies are carried out. Moreover, as NIOC
and its subsidiaries have to get the approval of the Plan and Budget Organisation for
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their investment plans, they are effectively devoid of any freedom to make commercial
decisions without political and bureaucratic interference.
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the National Petrochemical
Company inherited many of the organisational and managerial characteristics of its
parent company, NIOC, and, therefore, the former's organisational characteristics will
not be discussed here. Suffice to say, that NPC was a very small company in terms of
number of employees. In 1973, the Company employed 3,788 people of which only 752
were salaried staff and the rest were either waged, temporary, or contractors' workers.25
This was at a time when the total number of those employed in the Iranian oil industry
was 42,325.26 This shows that NPC was not in a position to undertake a large
petrochemical project, such the proposed joint venture with the Japanese group, without
severely straining its organisational capabilities and putting undue pressure on its small
number of staff.
In the next chapter, the history of the establishment of NPC and its strategy
regarding the expansion of the Iranian petrochemical industry will be discussed in detail.
4.0- Conclusion
This chapter argued that due to the presence of many foreign companies, the
management styles of Britain, the United States, and Japan were imported into Iran from
the 1930s to 1979 respectively, with the second one exerting the greatest influence.
However, these styles of management were conditioned by the peculiar mode of Iran's
industrialisation, namely, state intervention and the role of the bazaari merchants in that
process. As a result, the Iranian management style has developed as a mixture of foreign
management practices with bureaucratic and mercantilist attitudes.
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It was also stated that after the 1979 Revolution, the new government proposed
the implementation of Islamic management practices. Such a managent system is very
much oriented towards the welfare of workers and espouses the idea that the attainment
of Islamic values: equity and justice and not profits, should be the main objective of
Islamic business organisations.
It was argued that the Islamic management style is a function of the Islamic
economic ideology and, therefore, cannot be implemented on its own in the
predominantly capitalistic economic systems which exist in many Islamic countries and
troughouth the world. Anyhow, despite the efforts of a few muslim scholars and wishes
of many muslims, an Islamic management system, applicable to modern organisations has
not yet been developed. So Islamic management has remained a concept without any
scientific and practical foundations. Due to the above two factors, it is believed that a
distinct and Islamic management style will not emerge in the foreseeable future and any
attempts in that direction will be cosmetic rather than genuine intentions.
Finally, the organisational characteristics of the National Iranian Oil Company,
the parent of the National Petrochemical Company were discussed. It was learnt that,
due to the training of many of the managers of the two companies by the Anglo Iranian
Oil Company, and the education of many of their executives and engineers at British
universities, British management styles were adopted by both companies. It was also
stated that, despite its Constitution, NIOC is not a commercial company and is run more
like a governmental department than an oil company. With the establishment of the
Ministry of Oil after the Iranian Revolution, bureaucratic interference in the activities
of both NIOC and NPC increased with the result that both companies were unable to
make sound, economic decisions with respect to their activities. This lack of autonomy,
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prevented both companies from reaching a viable decision regarding the future of LTPC
for nearly 10 years.
In the next chapter, the history of UPC from the exploratory talks in 1968 to its
dissolution in 1990 will be discussed.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE HISTORY OF UPC:
FROM FORMATION TO LIQUIDATION
1.0- Introduction
As stated in the introductory chapter, in order to understand why some joint
ventures are successful and some are not, one needs to look at the managerial style and
organisational characteristics of its parents and also what actually goes on in the
management of the joint venture itself.
In the previous two chapters, the developments, management, and organisations
of Mitsui Bussan and the National Petrochemical Company of Iran were discussed
respectively. It is evident from those analyses that the two companies were vastly
different in every aspect: historical development, organisational and managerial
characteristics, and business philosophy.
The present chapter will examine in detail what actually went on in the creation
and management of the petrochemical joint venture from the exploratory talks in 1968
to its dissolution in 1990 to discover the factors which contributed to it failure.
First, the theories on the reasons for the formation of joint ventures will be
reviewed. Then, the Iranian and Japanese reasons for wanting a petrochemical joint
venture will be examined. Next, the history of the Iran Japan Petrochemical Company
from the exploratory talks between the National Petrochemical Company of Iran (NPC)
and Mitsui & Co. in 1968 right up to the "Friendly Separation Agreement" of 1989 will
be discussed in detail. We will then examine the effects of the two oil shocks of the
1970's, the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Iran-Iraq War, and the sharp drop in oil
prices in 1986 on the joint venture. Accordingly, the chapter will be broken down in the
following manner:
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(1)- The formation and construction period (1968-1978).
(2)- The suspension period (1979-1980).
(3)- The war years (1980-1988).
(4)- The separation and re-construction period (1989-to date ).
Moreover, in order to have a better organisation and a clearer understanding of
various factors which effected the joint venture, these periods will in turn be sub-divided
into the financial details, the organisation and management , and the construction
progress and technical matters of UPC.
The aim of this chapter is to establish why the joint venture was established in the
first place, what were its managerial and organisational characteristics and why it failed.
The next two chapter will analyze in detail the factors which are believed to have led to
the failure of UPC and will try to draw some lessons for the partners and joint ventures.
2.0- Causes of the Establishment of IJPC
In Chapter One, the theoretical framework for analyzing the causes of the
establishment of a joint venture, and the factors which will determine its success or
failure, were laid down. It was expounded in section 3.3 of that chapter that in order to
understand why some joint ventures are successful and some are not, one must look into
the strategy of the parent firms, the reasons for entering into the joint venture in the first
place, the firms' organisational characteristics as well as their industries. Chapters Four
and Five discussed the strategies of NPC and Mitsui & Co and their reasons for wanting
a petrochemical joint venture. Moreover, in Chapter Five the organisational
characteristics of Mitsui & Co. were analyzed and, it was learnt that the company has
always had a decentralised organisation and puts great emphasis on the personal
319
initiative of its employees especially in matters regarding foreign investment.
First, in the next section, the Japanese and Iranian factors which led to the
establishment of UPC will be summarised.
2.1- The Iranian Factors
For various reasons such as gaining added value from her hydrocarbon
reserves, industrialisation, development, security, and national prestige, Iran wanted to
develop her petrochemical industry.
As explained earlier, the gas associated with the production of oil was (and still
is) being needlessly flared, and the Shah always wanted to put this gas to better use.
Moreover, as oil reserves are finite, Iran wanted to use these reserves for the
development of her domestic industries. The best way to achieve this was to use the
associated gas as a feedstock for a petrochemical industry.
Iran could accomplish two objectives by developing her petrochemical industry:
use the wasting gas to produce high added value petrochemical products, and in the
process boost the country's industrialisation efforts.
But why is it that Iran wanted to industrialise in the first place? Well, almost any
developing country dreams of catching up with the industrialised world. But in Iran's
case, there were probably a few specific factors as well.
Iran's population was growing at a very high rate (she still has one of the highest
birth rates in the world). Therefore, new jobs had to be created to absorb this growing
population. And as Chapter Four showed, the creation of new jobs was one of the main
aims of successive development plans. The government of the time reasoned that the
only way to develop the economy and create new jobs was through rapid
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industrialisation. It further believed that the country, being rather arid, could not achieve
the above aims by expanding the agricultural sector which was the main sector of the
economy at the time (an argument forcibly disputed by many experts).
Although the petrochemical industry is a capital intensive industry and, hence,
provides few job opportunities on its own, it has the advantage of creating twenty new
jobs for every job in the industry itself by establishing forward linkages with downstream
industries (the industries which use petrochemicals to produce capital and consumer
goods products). So the petrochemical industry could create the best conditions for
generating jobs throughout the whole economy.
There were probably a few unspoken reasons for the Shah's determination to
industrialise the country. Iran is a socially unstable country and, due to this fact, the
country's political and economic stability have been undermined by revolutions, mini-
revolutions, social unrest, coups, etc. Furthermore, as Iran borders the (old) U.S.S.R, her
politics have always been influenced (at least until recently) by the latter. As a result she
has had the highest number of communist organisations in the region.
The Shah, therefore, believed that the best way to eliminate the above two factors
(i.e. social instability and influence of communists) was for the economy to grow rapidly
so that everyone would have a stake in the stability of the country and his regime.
There was also the question of national prestige. Iran, which was once a great
country, had fallen into poverty, instability, and backwardness since the Sixteenth
Century, and the Shah dreamed of restoring her former glory. He always stated his aim
of making Iran the fifth industrial power in the world by the early 21st Century.
So all these factors (social, political, economic, and personal ambitions) favoured
the rapid industrialisation of Iran, and the only way to do this was through the
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development of hydrocarbon based industries particularly petrochemicals in which she
was perceived to have a "comparative advantage".
Due to these considerations, the Iranian Council of Ministers, on 24 December
1963, founded the Supreme Council of the Petrochemical Industry with the responsibility
for the establishment and development of the Iranian petrochemical industry. 1 Then
under the provisions of the 1964-65 Budget (Iranian financial year), all activities related
to the development of the domestic petrochemical industry were put under the control
of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). 2 One year later the Petrochemical
Industries Development Act was passed by Majlis (the Iranian Parliament) and finally,
on 3 August 1966, the Article of Association of the National Petrochemical Company was
approved by the Council of Ministers. The Act and the Article of Association authorised
NPC to manage all activities related to the domestic petrochemical and related
industries.3
In order to meet the fast expanding domestic demand for petrochemical products,
capture foreign markets and make the most efficient use of resources, NPC decided to
use the latest technology and extensive marketing methods. Moreover, the Iranian
government planned to spend about $11 billion in the Fourth and Fifth Development
Plans for the expansion of the petrochemical industry. This was, however, at a time when
oil revenues, the main source of income, had hardly reached $1 billion a year (see
Chapter Four for details).
To develop the industry, Iran needed five main inputs, raw materials, capital,
technology, manpower, and large domestic and foreign markets. Iran could supply the
required raw materials for the production of petrochemicals like natural gas. salt, and
naphtha at very low prices, but she lacked almost all other inputs for the development
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of the industry as envisaged by the government. As mentioned before, Iran lacked the
advanced technology, adequate capital and trained personnel to develop the
petrochemical industry on a large scale. Moreover, the Iranian domestic market at that
time (in the 1960's/70's) was not large enough and so she needed to export
petrochemical products to foreign markets to justify the establishment of economically
feasible plants (as well as earning foreign exchange). But a major problem with exports
was that the international petrochemical markets were dominated by few large
oligopolistic firms, and it was extremely difficult for a newcomer, especially from a
developing country, to break into that market.
After one year of preliminary studies by NPC, a report was submitted to the
Supreme Council of the Petrochemical Industries.4 The report stated that production of
primary petrochemicals would be uneconomical unless they were processed into higher
value added intermediate and final products. The report also explained that with regard
to technical aspects and economics of the petrochemical industry, the plant capacity for
production of intermediate and final products must be much higher than average. The
conclusions of the report were approved by the Council which authorised NPC to begin
the search for suitable foreign partner(s) who could supply the required technology and
provide export markets for petrochemical products.5
With this authorization, NPC intensified its search for suitable foreign partners
which it had started some time before. 6 During these efforts, lengthy talks had been
held, first with American and then European oil and chemical companies, but for various
reasons none had shown any interest in large scale investments in the Iranian
petrochemical industries. So the only potential partner left for Iran was Japan.
Apart from offering advanced technology, capital, and a large domestic market,
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Japan had the further advantage of offering Iran "technical competence, without the
political baggage". Japan, in contrast to Western powers, has never had a history of
colonialism, domination, or war in Iran. Although Iran had never been a colony, some
European countries and the U.S. (since 1945) dominated her politics from the 18th
century to 1979. Furthermore, Japan was the biggest customer for Iran's oil, importing
around 40% of her oil from there during the 1960's and early 1970's. 7 So, the
consideration of the above factors persuaded Iran to seek Japan's assistance for the
development of her petrochemical industry.
In fact, discussions with the Japanese over Iran's petrochemical ambitions had
started a year before the completion of the report, when a Japanese economic mission
headed by Keiichirou Hirata, Chairman of the National Land Development Deliberative
Council, visited Iran from 5 to 10 November 1968 (1347). 8 The aim of the mission was
to settle a long standing trade dispute between the two countries, and also to learn about
Iran's economic development plans and investment opportunities there.9
One member of this mission was Sueyuld Wakasugi, then Vice President of Mitsui
Bussan [or Mitsui & Co.] who was to become President in 1969. Dr Bacier Mostofi,
Chairman of NPC flew Wakasugi to the Iranian oilfields in southern Iran and showed
him the "associated gas" being needlessly burnt for the want of a better use. Mostofi
asked Wakasugi if Mitsui could help NPC to put the wasting gas to better use by
processing it into petrochemical products. Wakasugi's response was very positive and
promised Mostofi that upon his return to Japan, he would look into the production of
petrochemicals as a joint venture between Mitsui Bussan and NPC. And this is when the
discussions over the petrochemical joint venture began. 10
According to Dr Mostofi, the main factor behind Wakasugi's enthusiasm was his
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and Bussan's desire to have a share in the development of Iranian oil resources, upon
which Japan depended for around 40% of her oil imports, and to expand Mitsui Bussan's
oil business which was the company's Achilles' Heel.'
2.2- The Japanese Factors
The question one needs to ask is why Japan and Mitsui Bussan were interested
in the development of the Iranian petrochemical industry? Was it just access to Iranian
oil or were there other considerations, economic as well as political? It seems that a
multitude of factors favoured the establishment of a petrochemical joint venture with
Iran.
In Chapter Two it learnt that it had been Japan's wish for a long time to have her
own "autonomously developed oil" i.e. oil not under the control of the Major oil
companies. Furthermore, in Chapter Five it was described how Mitsui Bussan felt about
starting late in the oil business in the post-war period and wanting to expand its activities
in that line. So, involvement in the Iranian petrochemical industry, they hoped, would
give them access to the oil resources of the world's biggest exporter of petroleum at the
time.
There were, however, other important factors such as wider geopolitical and
economic considerations on the part of the Japanese government, and commercial
opportunities for Mitsui Bussan.
Iran being located between the (old) U.S.S.R and the Persian Gulf, the source of
more than 70% of Japan's oil imports was (is) of great strategic importance to her. This
importance grew even more when, due to the closure of the Suez Canal during the 1967
Arab-Israeli War, oil supplies to Europe were temporarily cut off. Moreover, on several
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occasions the Shah stated that his country would not take part in an oil embargo against
the West for any reason.
Iran's position regarding flow of oil free of any interruptions increased her
importance in the eyes of the Japanese politicians who were worried about future oil
sanctions or major disruptions in oil supplies. So when Iran asked for Japan's help in her
industrialisation efforts and particularly the establishment of a petrochemical joint
venture, the latter responded positively. In the Japanese officials' view, a developed,
stable Iran was in the interests of Japan. And one way of achieving this aim was to help
Iran to develop her petrochemical industry.
Furthermore, Japan did not have strong historical ties to the Middle East as her
main competitors, European and Americans did. Being a trading nation she was not
happy with mere arms length commercial transactions. She wanted to build deeper and
longer lasting relations with the region, and the best and quickest way was through
investment. And Iran, being more economically developed and having a relatively larger
population, was a prime target for Japanese investments in the region.'
Japan also wanted to have a major role in the industrialisation of Iran. If she
could help the latter to develop her industry many new opportunities would arise for
further investments, export of capital as well as consumer goods and the like.
Environmental concerns in Japan also played a role in deciding to invest in Iran.
In the late 1960s the environment had been heavily polluted due to rapid
industrialisation, and the goverment had restricted the construction of new
petrochemical plants in the main industrial areas. With a small land area in Japan, the
best alternative was to build such plants overseas and import their products.'
Mitsui Bussan too, had its own reasons for wanting to invest in Iran. Access to oil
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and environmental restrictions have already been mentioned, but the availability of cheap
raw materials there, exports of plants and machinery, production of liquid petroleum gas
(LPG), establishing a strong presence in the Iranian market for sales of various products,
and competition with domestic rivals were also important factors.
Due to the Japanese government's pricing policy, the price of the domestically
produced naphtha, an important input for the production of petrochemical products was
25% higher than in Europe, and 40% more than the U.S prices. Hence the Japanese
petrochemical companies were not competitive in the international markets. 14 But,
natural gas, the other essential feedstock for the petrochemical industry was being
needlessly flared in Iran for the want of a better use. The other raw material, salt, was
also freely available there. The availability of cheap raw materials in Iran would have
enabled Mitsui Bussan to strengthen its competitiveness in Japanese and international
petrochemical markets.
There was another factor in Mitsui's calculations regarding the investment
opportunity in Iran, and that was the export of plants and machinery for the construction
of the proposed petrochemical joint venture there. Probably Mitsui Bussan saw an
opportunity to sell plants and machinery to Iran by investing there. As a matter of fact,
one of Mitsui Bussan's own publications puts the UPC under the category of plants
exports and not investment.15
Moreover, due to new environmental regulations introduced in the late 1960s,
demand for LPG which produces a much lower COx emission than oil products, was
rising rapidly from Japanese industries and especially electric utilities. As LPG is a by-
product of processing natural gas into petrochemical products, involvement in Iran's
petrochemical industry would have enabled Mitsui Bussan to produce this product at very
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low cost and sell it at huge profit to Japanese consumers.
In addition, in terms of sales in the Iranian market, Mitsui & Co. was well behind
its rivals like Mitsubishi Corporation and C. Ito and investment in the Iranian
petrochemical industry would have provided Mitsui & Co. with a big opportunity to
establish a strong presence in the fast expanding Iranian market for various industrial
and consumer products.
One other reason for Mitsui Bussan's decision was probably the rivalry between
the major trading companies. At that time (and even now) each trading group (keiretsu)
insisted on having its own petrochemical company. 16 This "Me-tooism" produced intense
competition in the Japanese petrochemical industry, and Mitsui may have reasoned that
by investing in Iran, it would gain a competitive edge over its rivals by producing lower
cost petrochemical products.
Finally, there was a perception in the late 1960s and 1970s that by the end of the
20th Century, the Middle East would become the centre of the world's petrochemical
industry because of the availability of cheap feedstock there and concerns in the
industrialised countries over the state of the environment. 17 So Mitsui Bussan might
have well concluded that is was in its long term interest to be in the Middle East before
it became overcrowded.
3.0- The Start of the Negotiations Over the Petrochemical Joint Venture
After returning to Japan, Wakasugi asked Tomita, the Director of the General
Petrochemicals Department of Mitsui Bussan to investigate whether it would be possible
to undertake petrochemical operations in Iran, and in particular whether ethylene
production would be feasible. Tomita in turn ordered Kenji Tomio and Mitsuo Sato to
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visit Iran and evaluate the situation. Moreover, Mitsui Bussan invited Mitsui Toatsu
Chemical, Mitsui Petrochemical, Bridgestone LPG, and Toyo Engineering (TEC) to
participate in the survey tour. Even before going, Sato doubted whether such a project
would be viable, as at that time costs of petrochemical plants in the Middle and Near
East were twice as high as those of U.S plants. (See Chapter Eight for the reasons for
higher construction costs in the Middle East)
The Survey group consisting of 8 people travelled to Iran in February 1969 to
investigate the feasibility of constructing a 400,000 ton ethylene plant, 300,000 tons of
which would be exported to Japan, and 100,000 tons for use in Iran, which was
equivalent to the country's entire consumption at that time.
The figure of 300,000 tons was related to the boom in Japan at that time for
building 300,000 ton ethylene plants. Moreover, while the group was visiting Iran, eight
Japanese petrochemical companies received permission to build 300,000 ton plants.
The group visited Bandar Shahpour, a port in southwestern Iran, where the
Iranian goverment planned to make the country's petrochemical centre. They also
visited Shahpour Chemical, a joint venture between Allied Chemical of U.S and NPC
which had just been completed. The group considered Bandar Shahpour a feasible site
for a petrochemical plant because of its proximity to the sea. However, they realised that
transporting ethylene would be very difficult and expensive because of the need to use
specialised tankers. So the investigation considered processing the ethylene into vinyl
chloride monomer (VCM) or ethylene dichloride (EDC) to make it easier to transport.
The findings of the survey were not very favourable, as it revealed that
construction and operating costs would be considerably higher than in Japan. The group
returned to Japan to study further the economic viability of such a plant.
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3.1- The Oil Connection
At the end of May 1969, Ardashir Zahedi, the then Iranian Foreign Minister
visited Japan to meet Prime Minister Sato.' At that meeting, Zahedi asked for Japan's
assistance to explore oil in L,orestan, a province in Western Iran, located to the north of
Khuzestan, the major oil producing region of the country. Sato passed the request on to
the Japan Petroleum Development Corporation (JPDC).2° The Corporation sent two
representatives to Iran in October 1969 to learn about Lorestan and off-shore
exploration. The Corporation, which had close relations with the Mitsubishi Group
(especially the Mitsubishi Corporation and Mitsubishi Oil), gave its findings to the
Mitsubishi Corporation and asked the Group to carry out an investigation of how to
obtain the drilling rights to these areas.
In March 1970, an investigation group led by JPDC and including representatives
from Mitsubishi Oil, the Export-Import Bank of Japan, and the Middle East Oil
Company, went to Iran to examine the oil potential of Lorestan and other areas of the
country.
After surveying Lorestan, the group realised that even if the area produced any
oil, a 700km pipeline had to be laid to carry the oil to the sea ports for transportation
to Japan. So the group reached the conclusion that the economic prospects of the
Lorestan oilfields were not good.
After reaching the conclusion that the costs of constructing and operating a
petrochemical plant in Iran would be substantially higher than in Japan, Mitsui Bussan,
in November 1969, sent a team to Iran to negotiate for scaling down the proposed plan
to 100,000 or 150,000 tons. The real intention of the team was to refuse any proieet at
all21 but Hajarizadeh, the Head of Planning at NPC, produced many proposals to keep
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the project alive. Moreover, the team could not ignore the successful completion of
Shahpour Chemical and the potential growth of the Iranian economy, which caused its
members to agree to further negotiations. So upon returning to Japan work on the
feasibility study re-started.
During April and May 1970, Jun Yanaka of Bussan's General Petrochemicals
Department and Sato visited Iran to establish an integrated framework for negotiations.
They also wanted to know whether if 300,000 tons of ethylene were to be produced, its
by-product LPG, would also be available for export to Japan.
During this visit, NPC informed the team that Allied Chemical, the American
partner in Shahpour Chemical was pulling out of the joint venture and asked for
Japanese co-operation in running the plant. In response to this request, Mitsui Toatsu
dispatched a team to Iran in June 1970. The team judged such co-operation possible and
regarded the quality of the operators working there as very high and able to run the
plant on their own. This finding, which went against everything the Japanese had thought
until then, gave a boost to Mitsui Bussan's petrochemical plans in Iran.
At the end of July, an engineering group consisting of representatives from Mitsui
Bussan, Mitsui Toatsu, and Toyo Soda, was sent to Iran to consider the lay-out of a
petrochemical plant. The reason for the inclusion of Toyo Soda, a company from outside
the Mitsui Group, was the reluctance of Mitsui Petrochemical (from the very beginning),
Mitsui Toatsu, and even some among Bussan's Iran team to get involved in a
petrochemical joint venture in Iran, and so the latter had to turn to outside firms for
assistance.
In July Allied Chemical announced that although they were basically pulling out,
they would continue their technical co-operation with Shahpour Chemical. This
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announcement put a stop to the talks between the Iranians and the Japanese over
Shahpour Chemical. But this affair caused some concern in the Japanese team who
wondered why Allied Chemical was pulling out, and cost overruns seemed to have been
a major factor. The Shahpour Chemical plant had originally been planned to cost about
50,000 million yen, but because of the cost of putting in infrastructure and overoptimistic
estimates, the final cost had shot up to 100,000 million yen. According to Dr Mostofi,
however, the main reason for the pull-out was a major change in the global strategy of
Allied Chemical which caused the company to pull-out of many markets and joint
ventures around the world, including Iran.22
Due to the negative findings of the Mitsubishi Group, the Japanese had become
cool towards the idea of participation in the development of Lorestan oilfield.
Disappointed with this response, Iran, on 1 July 1970, advertised in Japanese daily papers
that Lorestan was open to international bidding and many Japanese companies took keen
interest in this offer. One of these companies was Teijin, a textile firm, which due to
poor prospects for textiles, was pursuing a policy of diversification, and expansion into
the oil business was one of the main targets for the company. The Lorestan oil seemed
to offer a good opportunity for entry into that business. But Teijin needed the co-
operation of an experienced oil company to form a consortium with in order to be able
to bid for the Lorestan oil. JPDC, which was quite interested in Teijin's bid,
recommended North Sumatra Oil Exploration. Moreover, Teijin also needed an oil
refinery and wanted to acquire Bussan's subsidiary, Kyokuto Sekiyu (Kyokuto Petroleum
Industries Ltd)23 for that purpose. So Teijin approached the Oil Department of Mitsui
Bussan and offered to buy their oil subsidiary. During these discussions, Bussan learned
for the first time about Lorestan and indicated its interest in participating in the bid.
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As discussed before, Mitsui was weak in the oil business and Wakasugi, after
becoming President in early 1969, had adopted a long-term strategy for the expansion
of Mitsui's participation in oil exploration and production. As a part of this strategy, he
set up Mitsui Oil Development (Mitsui Seldyu Kaihatsu) in July 1969, which brought
together 17 Mitsui Group companies interested in the oil business. Participation in the
bidding for the Lorestan oil was offering the new company its first chance to gain a
foothole in the exploitation of overseas oil resources so far dominated by major Western
oil companies.
So in July 1970, a Japanese consortium consisting of Teijin, North Sumatra Oil,
and Mitsui Oil Development submitted a bid for the Lorestan oil. In November of that
year the Mitsubishi Corporation was also brought into the consortium. The reason for
this inclusion was that the Japan Oil Development Corporation had originally gone to
the Mitsubishi Group with the Lorestan idea and the group had carried out the first
study of the oilfield.
Soon after the submission of a bid by Teijin in July, negotiations over the
proposed petrochemical joint venture re-started. During these negotiations many options
for the production of various derivatives based on a 300,000 ton ethylene plant were
discussed. Wakasugi however, informed the Iranian delegation that Mitsui Bussan had
no preconceived idea or experience in such joint projects and both sides needed to work
together to produce proposals.
During these discussions, the Iranian team informed Mitsui Bussan that Iran, in
order to attract foreign investment into petrochemical and oil industries, would supply
gas at only 2 cents per 1,000 cubic feet, and no import dutws. would be imposed on
machinery imported by NPC related companies. Moreover, NPC related companies
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would not be subject to corporation tax for the first five years of their operations.
Following these discussions, a Japanese technical team left for Iran in February 1971 and
began a comprehensive feasibility study in the following spring. This was at a time when
the world oil market was entering a new phase.
3.1.1- New Developments in the Oil Markets
In February 1971, representatives of the six oil producing countries of the Persian
Gulf and 14 international oil companies met in Tehran, and after lengthy discussions,
signed what came to be known as the "Tehran Agreement". This agreement allowed the
producing nations to set the oil prices for the first time, and limited to some degree the
free reign that the international Majors had enjoyed in the oil markets for a long period.
It was from this meeting onward that OPEC members began to demand greater
participation in the international oil markets and nationalisation of their oil reserves. So
the Tehran Agreement changed the oil markets from a buyer's market to a seller's
market almost overnight.
With this change in the oil markets, the Japanese consortium bidding for the
Lorestan oil perceived that if the rule of international Majors collapsed, Japan had a
chance to forge a direct link with the oil producing countries to ensure stable supplies
of petroleum, and that the Lorestan bidding, if successful, would provide Japan with the
best chance of achieving this.
The deadline for the bid was 30th April 1971 and, apart from the Japanese
consortium, the West German national oil corporation, Denimex, and Mobil Oil were
also competing for the Lot estan concession. Denimex, because of the history of dose
relations between Iran and Germany, was in the strongest position among the bidders.
334
Apart from the main bid, there were some "annex" conditions which were crucial
in determining the success or failure of a bid. The Japanese consortium therefore,
concentrated on finding out what the Iranians wanted and what kind of annexes the
competitors were prepared to offer. In order to obtain such information, President Ooya
of Teijin, a former MITI Minister, asked his close ally and former Prime Minister,
Nubosuke Kishi, for help. 25 Kishi recommended a company called PR Japan which in
turn employed the U.S. consultant, Harry Kahn, who was believed to be close to the
Shah of Iran.
The essence of the information gathered by Kahn was that Iran was pursuing a
policy of integrating upstream (exploration, production) with downstream (refining, sales)
activities, and that if the Lorestan field produced oil, Iran would like to refine and sell
the oil jointly with the successful bidder. With this information, the Japanese consortium
contacted NIOC to gain more insight into the Iranian demands. Dr Mina, a Director of
NIOC, informed the Japanese that the Shah was very keen on direct oil sales to Japan
and, moreover, wanted to establish extensive economic co-operation with that country.
However, after further talks with NIOC, Dr Mina informed the Japanese that the
Shah, in addition to the basic bid and joint oil sales company, wanted the construction
of a petrochemical plant. This was very surprising to the Japanese consortium which had
not thought of offering such an inducement to win the bidding. It seems that neither the
Japanese consortium nor even the Oil Department of Mitsui Bussan were aware of
discussions taking place between the Mitsui Group and NPC on the feasibility of
constructing a petrochemical plant in Iran?6
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3.2- The Involvement of Keidanren
From 12th to 17th April 1971, a high level Keidanren mission, headed by Uemura,
its Chairman, visited Iran. The purpose of the mission was to gain insight into Iranian
industrialisation ambitions under the Fourth Development Plan and explore the
possibility of Japanese investments there. One member of the Mission was President
Ooya of Teijin who was bidding for the Lorestan oil in two weeks time. Before leaving
for Tehran, Ooya had persuaded Uemura and the Japanese goverment to put together
a $100 million loan package so that if the Iranians asked for economic co-operation, the
mission would be able to offer the loan.
During their meetings with Iranian officials and NIOC directors, the mission
members were informed (apparently for the first time) about the negotiations between
NPC and the Mitsui Group over the possibility of establishing a joint petrochemical
company which would use Iran's natural resources and export its products to the
Japanese market. The mission was told repeatedly that Iran attached great importance
to the establishment of this joint venture and needed Japanese capital and technology
for this. When Ooya inquired about the project, Mostofi, Chairman of NPC and a
Director of NIOC, told him that both sides were soon expected to announce the
construction of a plant based on 300,000 to 350,000 of ethylene. He added that the
required capital would be around $300 million which was the main obstacle and he
hoped that the mission could help in such an important project.
At the same time NIOC informed the Japanese team in charge of negotiations
over the Lorestan oil that the offer of a joint sales company was not enough as an annex
and that Iran wanted the construction of a refinery in Japan as well as a petrochemical
plant in Iran. The team replied that it needed to consult the companies concerned and
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went back to Japan at the same time as the Keidanren mission.
After returning to Japan, the Keidanren delivered its report to the government
and informed Mitsui Bussan that Iran was expecting great things from the negotiations
over the petrochemical plant. Moreover, Keidanren put a lot of pressure on Bussan to
reach an agreement with Iran over the petrochemical project as not only the Lorestan
bid but also future investment and trading opportunities for Japan depended on the
construction of this plant.
Time was running out for the submission of the bid and Japan was desperate to
win the L,orestan oil. President Wakasugi, who knew that the best way to win the bidding
was to offer a petrochemical project as an annex, tried to speed up Mitsui's internal
study on the project. So he inquired from the General Chemical Department about the
feasibility study. He was told that there were problems with profitability and that
improvements were being made to the plan which would take until October. After this
inquiry Wakasugi concluded that the project was feasible in principle and that he could
not wait until October. And so he agreed to add the petrochemical project as an annex.
On 20th April the Japanese consortium bidding for the Lorestan oil went to MITI
to discuss their plans. MM informed them that it was impossible to build a new refinery
in Japan with foreign capital as there were already too many international companies
present in the Japanese market, but the establishment of a joint oil sales company would
be approved. Furthermore, MITI approved the construction of a petrochemical plant in
Iran as an annex to the Lorestan bid.
3.3- The Bidding for the Lorestan Oil
On 29th April, the Japanese consortium submitted its bid, signed by the presidents
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of the four companies comprising the consortium including Wakasugi of Mitsui Bussan,
for the Lorestan oil. The submission, apart from the main bid for the oilfield contained
two annexes offering a joint oil sales company and the construction of a petrochemical
plant in Iran. The proposal for the petrochemical project had only been described in
general terms and contained the following features: a plant consisting of a 300,000 ton
ethylene and 400,000 ton aromatic which would begin operations in 1975 with a capital
requirement of around $350 million.
NIOC informed the Japanese consortium that she wanted the construction of a
refinery in Iran to process the Lorestan oil for export to Japan now that the
establishment of a refinery in Japan had been refused. The Japanese agreed to the
building of a refinery in Iran but stressed that export of petroleum products to Japan
would be difficult because of MITI's regulation on the imports of processed products.27
This was of course in addition to the construction of the petrochemical project.
However, after lengthy negotiations, on 30th June, NIOC handed over the Letter
of Award concerning the rights to the Lorestan oilfields to the Japanese side. At the
same time it presented the Japanese with a Letter of Understanding regarding the
petrochemical project asking them to sign it by 27th July.
On 1st July, Mitsui Bussan opened its Iran Chemicals Planning Room with Nagae
as Managing Director, Tomio as the Head of the room and Sato and others as staff.
From then on this group was responsible for all matters regarding the proposed
petrochemical joint venture with Iran.
One of the responsibilities of the new team was to obtain finance for the project
estimated to be around 120,000 million yen from the Japanese government. After some
negotiations, on 26th July the government agreed to finance 70% of ve4wire4 capital by
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offering a loan package of 82,800 million yen at 5.25% interest.28 Now the way was
open for the Japanese to conclude an agreement with the Iranians over the
petrochemical project.
According to Misato, it was a condition of awarding the Lorestan oil that the
Japanese side first sign the agreement for the petrochemical project and only then would
the Iranians sign the oil dea1.29
 According to this account of events Ooya, Ikeda (the
Vice President of Mitsui Bussan), and Miwa, plus the representatives of all the
companies in the Japanese consortium for the Lorestan oil, as well as Tomio and
Ikekami from Mitsui's Iran Chemical Room went to Iran to sign both agreements. On
27th July, Ikeda, Mostofi (the NPC Chairman), and Dr Mina signed the Letter of
Understanding at the NPC headquarters. The Japanese group then went straight to the
NIOC offices, where the Lorestan oil agreement was formally signed.3°
Dr Mostofi however, disputes this accounts of events and states that no such
condition was placed on awarding the Lorestan oil. Moreover, he adds that the Japanese,
from the very beginning, were offering the petrochemical project as an inducement to
win the bidding for the Lorestan oil, and in no way were they forced or tricked into
offering the project as Misato alleges.'
On 4th October, the four companies so far involved in the proposed
petrochemical project, Mitsui Bussan, Toyo Soda, Mitsui Toatso, and Mitsui
Petrochemical, reached an agreement between themselves to set up a new company
which would assume all the rights and responsibilities granted to Mitsui Bussan stipulated
in the Basic Agreement proposed by NPC. The new firm was to be the investing
company on the Japanese side with NPC being the investing arm of the Iranian side.
According to Mi.sato, of the three chemical companies, only Toyo Soda had been
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interested all along in the project, and the other two only agreed to join the project
under pressure from Mitsui Bussan. Bussan, being a general trading company, needed
the co-operation of the three chemical firms to provide manufacturing know-how and
personnel and, in fact, would have been unable to pursue the project alone. The same
was true of the Iranians who had no technology of their own or trained personnel and,
moreover, knew that if only Mitsui Bussan was involved in the project, there was no
possibility that the plant would ever be built. So Iran stipulated in the draft Basic
Agreement that Mitsui Bussan should involve Japanese chemical companies.
The Basic Agreement (B/A) was signed on the 19 October between the four
Japanese companies on one side and NPC on the other. The Agreement provided for the
establishment of a petrochemical company on a 50-50 basis between the two sides under
Iranian laws.
On the 24 December, based on the four Japanese' companies agreement, the Iran
Chemical Development Company (ICDC) was established which was to act as the
investing arm of the Japanese side in the new joint venture with NPC. The capital
participation of ICDC was: Mitsui & Co. 49%, Toyo Soda 31%, Mitsui Toatsu 15%, and
Mitsui Petrochemical 5%. Moreover, it was decided to make 10% (9% from Mitsui &
Co. and 1% from Toyo Soda) available to another company in the future should one
come forward.'
Furthermore, on 28 September, the Iran Oil Company, the new Japanese company
for the Lorestan oilfield, was founded by the Japan Petroleum Development Corporation
and the four other companies who had made the bid, i.e. Teijin, Mitsui & Co., North
Sumatra, and the Mitsubishi Corporation.33
As the Iran Oil Company lacked the required drilling technology, on the
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recommendation of NIOC, Mobil Oil was brought in to carry out the drilling in exchange
for 33% of the Japanese company's profits. Moreover, on 8th November 1971, the new
agreement for the Lorestan oil was signed between NIOC ( which according to Iranian
laws was a party in the joint venture),34 the Iran Oil Company, and Mobil Oil. Finally,
in March 1972, the Iran Nippon Petroleum Exploration Company (INEPC0) was set up
by the three companies to search for oil in Lorestan.
3.4- Details of the Basic Agreement
The Basic Agreement placed certain obligations on both sides, some of the most
important of which were: the Japanese side was to organise long term loans of $230
million from the Japanese government and banks for the joint venture; they were also
required to train Iranian personnel for the project and arrange for the transfer of
technology and, moreover, export the project's products that were surplus to domestic
consumption.
On the other hand, the Iranian side undertook to supply all of the project's raw
material and energy needs like natural gas, LNG, naphtha, and water (a huge amount
of which was required). They also agreed to co-operate with the project in establishing
the necessary infrastructure. Moreover, under the Attraction and Protection of Foreign
Investment Law, the Majlis which ratified the Basic Agreement on 22 October 1972,
granted the joint venture full exemption from import duties and other benefits due to
foreign investment.
The Basic Agreement laid the ground for the establishment of a joint venture
between NPC and the four Japanese companies in the form of a "private limited
company' under Iranian law. According to the Agreement, the ioint company was
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authorised to "produce, transport, market, and export various olefines, aromatics, soda
caustics and their derivatives and by-products".35
3.5- Problems Within the Japanese Side
Even though by signing the Basic Agreement, the Japanese companies had
committed themselves to the joint venture for a minimum period of 30 years, there still
existed some apprehension on their side over profitability of the project, and they were
seeking a revision of the construction p1an. 36 These problems were exacerbated by the
internal differences within Mitsui Bussan over the joint venture.' The main problem
was that the company's department responsible for the project was unenthusiastic about
it. The fact was that the department was at the same time involved in planning another
petrochemical project in Thailand. This project had been conceived within the
department itself and had received approval from the top management. In contrast, the
Iranian project had been imposed upon the department by the top management and
hence, did not enjoy the wholehearted support of the Chemicals Department's personnel.
The attitude of the department, therefore, was to go slow on the Iranian project, while
vigorously promoting the Thailand venture. As a result of this attitude, the staff working
in the Iran Chemical Room were being increasingly isolated within the Chemicals
Department.38
Apart from internal conflict within Mitsui Bussan, there were also disagreements
between the three chemical companies over the production policy of the new joint
venture and the presence of the non-Mitsui Group, Toyo Soda, in the ICDC. 39 These
differences within the Japanese side, especially the former, caused many problems for
the new company and delayed the start of construction for at least a year.
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Along with the confusion brought about by the arguments within the Japanese
side, protracted negotiations between NPC and ICDC over the production policy, price
of natural gas and financing of the joint venture were continued without reaching any
solution. Nonetheless, as required by the Basic Agreement, the Iran Japan Petrochemical
Company (UPC), a joint venture between ICDC and NPC, was established in April 1973.
So UPC was set up even before the above three major issues had been resolved.
Just before the establishment of UPC, the Japan Synthetic Rubber Company
bought 5% of the Shares of ICDC and hence became the fifth Japanese company in the
joint venture. The main reason for the company's participation was that it wanted to
export the intermediate products needed for the production of SBR by LTPC to Iran.
4.0- The Formation of IJPC and the Construction Period
(1973-1978)
The period from 1973 to 1978 were the only years in the entire life of the joint
venture (1968-1989) during which construction of the petrochemical complex took place.
Even so, from 1973 to 1976 no construction, apart from ground levelling and land
reclamation was undertaken. In fact it was from 1976 to 1978 that the actual building of
plants took place. By the end of this period, which was interrupted by the Iranian
Revolution, 85% of the construction and 65% of the work schedule had been completed.
4.1- Capitalization and Financial Arrangements of UPC
The progress of the project during the 1973-1978 period was within the framework
of the Basic Agreement and with the understanding that the project was feasiblel
In this period, the estimates of costs for the implementation of the project were
increased several times, so much so that the initial sum which had been estimated at
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around $358 million in the Basic Agreement reached $2480 million in 1978. The main
factors for this seven-fold increase in the estimated costs were new feasibility studies
which showed that the initial studies had underestimated the true costs, addition of new
plants and facilities, fluctuations in the value currencies (especially U.S$ vs yen), delays
in the completion of the complex, postponement of the start of operations, swelling of
the volume of loans due to delays in their repayment, and the four-fold rise in the oil
prices in 1973.
Moreover, during this period, the only sources of finance for the LTPC was the
shareholder's paid-in capital, loans from the shareholders, and suppliers credits. Lastly,
the main expenditure for this period were payments to the contractors.
4.1.1- Initial Forecasts of the Required Capital (Plan A)42
Under the provisions of the Basic Agreement of 1971, the required capital for the
construction of various plants of the UPC petrochemical complex was estimated to be
around $358 million, equivalent to 128.8 billion yen ($1=Y360). (For the details of the
Plan see Table 7.1). In addition, the main sources of finance, as mentioned above, were
the shareholders and supplier credits as summarised in Table 7.2. Under the provisions
of the Basic Agreement, loans amounting to $230 million (Y82,800 million) were to be
supplied to the joint venture in the following manner: part of the loan was to be secured
through a long-term loan from the Japanese goverment to the Iranian government, and
the other part by a long-term loan from the Export-Import Bank of Japan and other
Japanese banks on the condition that they would be spent on the purchase of Japanese
goods and services. Moreover, another SI8 million in the form of an export credit, was
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to be supplied by Japan with the same condition.
Overall, both partners were to provide loans in equal proportions to the joint
venture with the provision that the Iranian partner would supply the rial part of the loans
and the Japanese partner the foreign currency part. In addition, the latter was to arrange
for the former to receive loans in foreign currency (mainly yen) for its contribution to
the company. Finally, government to government loans were to be considered as the
Iranian side's share of the loans even though they were supplied by the Japanese
government. The rate of exchange for the above loans was to be fixed at $1= Y360, and
$1 =1R75.75.
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Table 7.1: The Production Capacity of Units Under the Four Plans
Plan A
$358m
Y130b
Plan B
$942m
Y330b
Plan C
$1833m
Y550b
Plan D
$2567m
Y655b
Unit/ Capacity Capacity Capacity Capacity
Product Ton/Year Ton/Year Ton/Year Ton/Year
NF
Ethane 184,200
LPG 300,000 1,500,000 1,500,000 1,900,000
Pentane 412,000
Hexane 152,000
OL
Ethylene 300,000 300,000 332,100 320,000
Propylene 128,000 128,000 114,100 120,000
Butane 77,200
By-Pro'ct 70,900
Pentane/mix 57,000 25,000
Buthadene
CA
Chloride 231,900
Soda 240,000 240,000 262,000 250,000
EDC/VCM
EDC 294,000 300,000
VCM 150,000 150,000
SEA SALT 397,000 500,000
LDPE 100,000 100,000 100,000 100,000
HDPE 30,000 60,000 60,000 60,000
PP 50,000 50,000 50,000
BD 24,000 25,000 25,000
SR 40,000 40,000 40,000
AR
Benzene 230,000 145,000 351,000 350,000
Xylene 144,000 140,000
Naphtha 207,000
LPG 98,000
SM 100,000
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CM
Cumin 150,000 150,000
Ethylene
Glycol 50,000
Ethylene
Benzene 200,000 115,000
PX
Para Xylene 100,000
Orth Xylene 20,000 20,000
Source:
Plans A & B: Records of Board of Directors Meeting, 15/7/1992, File I.A.C, p.8
Plan C: Master Budget, 1976, File I.A.K.
Plan D: An Analysis of the Problems of the Iranian Petrochemical Industry, NPC,
(July 1981).
Table 7.2: Sources of Finance
Iranian Partner Japanese Partners
$m Ym % $m Ym %
Paid in Capital 25 9.0 7 25 9.0 7
Shareholder's Loans 25 9.0 7 25 9.0 7
Sub-Total 50 18.0 14 50 18.0 14
Supplier's Credit 80 28.8 22 150 54.0 42
Export Credit
(Japan)
-- --	 -- 28 10.08 8
Total 130 46.8 36 228 82.08 64
Source: Bandar Imam Petrochemical Company, March 1993.
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4.1.2- Cost Increases and the Draft of Plan B (1974)43
Due to the imposition of an oil embargo by the Organisation of Arab Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OAPEC) on the Western oil consuming countries and the
emergence of a sellers' market, petroleum prices rose by nearly four-fold in late
1973/early 1974. This was followed by spiralling inflation in the world particularly in the
industrialised countries. (In fact inflation in the West had been rising steadily since the
late 1960s and was a major factor in OPEC's demands for higher oil prices).
The rising inflation, addition of new facilities and increases in the capacities of
plants, overoptimistic estimates in earlier feasibility studies, and a long delay from the
signing of the Basic Agreement to the establishment of IJF'C, rendered the calculations
of Plan A invalid. New studies showed that construction costs had risen to $942 million
or Y282,500 million ($1=Y300). So a new plan called Plan B was drafted which took
into account the above factors. (See Table 7.1 for details of the Plan). However, for
various reasons this plan was never implemented and, hence, no attempts were made to
find extra sources of finance for the Plan.
4.1.3- Plan C44
In 1974 tender offers for the construction of various plants and facilities were sent
out to qualified contracting companies. When the bids from the contractors were
received, UPC management realised that the bid prices were about three times higher
than their own estimates. After this development, new studies were carried out which
revealed that the total construction costs would be around $2480 million or Y744 billion.
The Japanese partners, however, refused to invest such a huge amount of money in the
project. In order to overcome the Japanese objections, the Iranians agreed that: first, the
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$358 million investment needed for the gathering and transit of natural gas from the
oilfield to the complex site would be carried out by NIOC; and second, the construction
of four plants (PX,CM,SM,VCM), which were a lower priority compared to other plants
and whose total construction cost were about $261.1 million, would be cancelled. With
the elimination of these projects, total construction costs were reduced to Y587,676
million.
With regard to the resolution approved by ITPC's Extraordinary General Meeting
on 1st August 1975 and the agreement between the MITI Minister and Iran's Minister
of Economy in January of that year, the Company's Board of Directors, in its 30th
August 1976 meeting, approved the Y550 billion yen budget for the construction of the
petrochemical complex.45
 Although this budget was actually Y587 billion, it was always
known as the Y550 billion budget (Plan C). (For details of the Plan see Tables 7.1 and
7.3).
4.1.3.1- Sources of Finance
The huge increase in construction costs from Y130 billion (Plan A) to Y550 (in
fact Y587) billion necessitated the finding of new sources of finance for the
implementation of Plan C. So the EGM of 1st August 1975 raised the paid-up capital to
Y100 billion and authorised the Board to borrow up to Y450 billion (total of Y550
billion).
During his visit to Iran in January 1975, the MITI Minister had acquiesced to
providing around Y250 billion for the project. At the same time, the Iranian government
agreed to provide Y200 billion in loans to the joint venture (s.e-e Table 7A for details).
With the provisions of the above loans, a new budget was approved by the Board of
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Directors of IJPC on 30 August 1976.46 The sources of finance for the implementation
of Plan C are shown in Table 7.5. (for technical details of Plan C see Table 7.1).
Table 7.3: Changes in the Budget from 1976 to 1978
Plan C
(1976) (1977)
Plan D
(1978)
Design and
Construction
Costs Million Yen Million Yen Million Yen
NF Unit 29,256 29,256 29,256
OL Unit 48,413 48,413 48,413
CA Unit 53,904 53,904 53,904
LDPE Unit 28,370 28,370 28,370
HDPE Unit 16,765 16,765 16,765
PP Unit 20,180 20,180 20,180
BD Unit 8,189 8,189 8,189
SR Unit 21,060 21,060 21,060
AR Unit 36,740 36,740 36,740
VCM Unit -- 17,432 17,432
Services 47,581 47,581 47,581
Facilities 117,259 120,728 122,259
Sub-Total 427,717 448,618 450,149
Licence Fees 7,093 7,093 7,093
Ground Levelling 47,504 47,504 47,504
Administrative
Expenses
40,706 41,978 49,057
Head Office
Expenses(Teh)
6,200 6,200 12,857
Interest Payments
58,456 61,449 72,277
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Technical
Training
-- 6,340 6,340
Various Expenses -- 1,000 1,000
Trial Operations -- -- 27,570
Less sales of
Products
-- -- 18,267
Total 587,676 620,182 655,580
Note: As mentioned in the text, in December 1977 the budget for Plan C was increased
from Y578 billion to Y620 billion. However, with the addition of new facilities, Plan D
with Y655 billion was executed, and hence the Y620 billion budget was never realised.
Source: BIPC, March 1993.
Table 7.4: New Sources of Finance As Approved by LTI'C GM (1/8/1975)
Billion Yen Million Dollar Million Rial
Yen Loan 28.8 96.0 6,480
Suppliers'
Credit
54.0 180.0 12,150
Direct Loan 117.2 390.6 26,366
ICDC Loan 50.0 166.7 11,252
Total Loans
from Japan
250.0 833.3 56,248
Iranian Loans 200.0 666.7 45,002
Total loans 450.0 1500.0 101,250
Source: BIPC, march 1993.
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Table 7.5: Sources of Finance for Plan C (The Y550 billion Budget, 1975)
Total Iranian Partner Japanese Partners
$m Yb $m Yb
	 % $m Yb	 %
Paid in
Capital
333 100 166.5	 50 9.1 166.5 50 9.1
Shareholde
r's Loans
1083.4 325 666.4 200 36.4 417 125 22.7
Direct
Loan
200.0 60 200	 60 10.9 --	 --	 --
Yen Loan 96 28.8 96	 28.8 5.2
.
--	 --	 --
Export
Credit
120.6 36.2 --	 --	 -- 120.6 36.2 6.6
Total 1833 550 1228.2 338.8 62 704	 211.2 38
Note: In this table the following rates of exchange have been used:
Y100 = IR22.5
$1 = IR67.5
$1 = Y300
Source: BIPC, March 1993.
4.1.4- Plan D (1977)
Just before the start of construction of the complex, NPC informed ICDC that due
to rise in domestic demands for P.V.C, the V.C.M unit which had been dropped in Plan
C should be reinstated. The addition of the new unit plus increases in expenditure for
training, infrastructural facilities and payment of additional interest on loans resulting
from delays in the start of operations, necessitated drawing up a new plan. Therefore,
in December 1977, the total budget was raised from Y550 billion to Y620 billion and,
a year later, in the last full Board meeting (November 1978) during the Shah's regime,
the total budget was increased to Y655 billion (Plan D). Technical and financial details
of this Plan are shown in Tables 7.1 and 7.3.
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4.1.4.1- Sources of Finance for Plan D
In order to meet the increased construction costs due to the addition of new units
and other expenditure mentioned above, in its November 1978 meeting, the Board of
Directors decided to ask shareholders to extend new loans to UPC, raise the paid in
capital, and seek finance from outside sources. The sources of finance for the
implementation of Plan D are shown in Table 7.6.
Table 7.6: Extra Sources of Finance for the Implementation of Plan D (November 1978)
Total
(Ym)
Iranian
Partner
(Ym)
Japanese
Partner
(Ym)
Extra Amount Required 120,226
Increase in Capital 26,504 13,252 13,252
Loans from Various
Sources
50,000 50,000 --
Shareholder's Loans 43,722 21,861 21,861
Total 120,226 85,113 35,113
Note: Records of the Board of Directors of UPC meeting, November 1978.
4.1.5- Sources of Finance from 1973 to 1979
All sources of finance for the period under discussion, i.e. from the establishment
of UPC to 1979, just after the Iranian Revolution, when construction came to a halt, are
summarised in Table 7.7. It is, however, important to mention few points. First during
that period, especially in the earlier years, due to lack of a comprehensive business plan,
Japanese banks and particularly the Export-Import Bank of Japan, were refusing to
extend long-term loans to the joint venture. In order to pay for expenses, NPC extended
loans totalling IR4913 million to UPC on the condition that they would be repaid as
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soon as long-term finance had been secured. Moreover, due to ever increasing costs and
frequent changes in construction plans, LTPC faced constant shortages of funds which
were temporarily alleviated by the provision of bridging loans or short-term loans from
the shareholders. In fact, at the time of the stoppage of construction in early 1979, the
company had completely run out of money and this is believed to have been a major
factor in the Japanese partners' reluctance to resume construction later on that year.
Furthermore, lack of success in securing long-term finance caused long delays in
the start of construction in the mid-1970s. This was not only due to reluctance of
Japanese banks to extend loans, but also because of disagreement between Iranian
government officials over loan guarantees. H. Ansari, the Iranian Finance Minister, was
arguing that although more than half of the finance was to be raised in Japan, Iran was
being asked to carry a higher proportion of liability and, in effect, guarantee the
Japanese partners' share of the loans. 47 This arrangement, in his opinion, was contrary
to the principle of 50-50 participation laid down in the Basic Agreement. Based on this
argument, Ansari refused to provide guarantees for loans which caused delays in the start
of construction for well over a year. The issue was finally resolved when Kawamoto, the
MITI Minister, visited Iran from 5 to 7 January 1976. 48 Ansari's objections appear to
have been a part of personal rivalry between him and Dr Mostofi, the Chairman of NPC
and UPC.
Considering the preceding discussion it becomes clear that neither partners had
a comprehensive strategy towards the joint venture. This is especially true when one
considers the issue of capitalization which should have been settled before the start of
construction and even before signing the Basic Agreement in 1971. This problem was so
acute that the project frequently ran out of money and, as diseusse-d above, UPC had to
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turn to its parent companies for short term funds to continue the construction. This
problem had major consequences for the joint venture in that its completion was delayed
for a few years because of inadequate capital.
Table 7.7: Various Loans Received By LJPC, 1976-1980 (In millions of rials)
Type of
Loan
Interest
Rate
1976 1977 1978 1979 Total 1980
NPC Loan 10.0% 5643 19706 22457 2247 47976 --
ICDC Loan 8.35% 4018.7 8515 14888 11280 38702 --
Yen Creditl 4.0% -- 2372 6005 54.5 8431 --
Direct Loan2 10.3% -- 6719 9687 1109 17515 15.1
Suppliers'
Credit
6.77% -- 2373 9010 301 11684 --
IRNIH 3 11.0% -- -- -- 670 670 --
Short Term
Loan
-- -- -- 9869 -- 9869 --
Total in
Rials
-- 7583 39688 71916 15661 134847 15.1
Total in Yen -- 31612 134113 197049 47656 410430 43
Notes: 1- Loan from the Japanese government to the Iranian government.
2- Loan from the Export-Import bank of Japan to NPC.
3- Loan from Iran Nippon Houses to 11PC.
Source: BIPC, March 1993.
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4.2- The Organisational and Managerial Aspects (1973-1978)
Formally, the organisation and management of UPC throughout its life were
according to the rules laid out in the Article of Association of April 1973 and the Basic
Agreement (B/A) of October 1971. Under these rules, the Board of Directors of UPC
was made up of twelve members,49. The B/A stipulated that both partners would have
equal voting rights on the Board and, therefore, half of its members would be appointed
by NPC and half by Mitsui & Co.(later ICDC). 5° Under the provisions of the B/A, for
the first seven years after its establishment, the Chairman and the Deputy Managing
Director of the Company would be appointed by NPC, and the Deputy Chairman and
the Managing Director by Mitsui & Co. (ICDC). Thereafter, for five year terms, these
appointments would be alternated. Moreover, it was agreed that for the first five year
term after the initial seven year, the Deputy Chairman and the Managing Director would
be appointed by NPC.51
 Table 7.8 shows the names of the 12 persons who were
appointed as President of the joint venture from 1973 to 1990.
The essence of the Basic Agreement and the Article of Association was that both
partners would be equal in all respects and would have an equal say in the running of
the company. But as we shall see later, this was not the way the Japanese perceived it.
They wanted to run the joint venture in a "Japanese Way", with no input or
"interference", as they saw it, from the Iranians.
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Table 7.8: LTPC's Managing Directors since 1973 to date
Name Position Notes
1 K. Tornio M.D From 1352 to
31/2/1358
2 Adachi M.D 31/2/1358 to
16/5/1359
3 H.M. Ghashghaii Deputy M.D *
4 K. Amini Deputy M.D *
N. Koohyaar Minister of Oil's
5 Representative & *
Deputy Chairman
6 H. Dabiri M.D 16/5/1359 to
5/12/1360
7 M. Kamali Taghavi M.D 5/12/1360 to
24/1/1361
8 A. Ahmadi M.D 24/1/1361 to
19/9/1363
9 M. Ehtiati M.D 19/9/1363 to
2/2/1366
10 A. Montazeri M.D 2/2/1366 to
16/7/1366
11 M. Javadian M.D 16/7/1366 to
5/7/1368
12 H. Aminfar M.D 5/7/1368 to
15/8/1368
13 M. Mirmoezi M.D 15/8/1368-
Note: *- Due to prevailing circumstances (the war) the Managing Director's authority
had been greatly limited and the running of the company and decision making
had been vested in a few directors, including those in 3, 4, and 5.
Source: Various announcements by the IJPC (BIPC) in the Official Newspaper of Iran.
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4.2.1- The "Japanese Way" of Management
The institution of Japanese management style at the highest level of the
organisation and for the overall administration of the joint venture was one of the
features of the 1973-78 period. This style of management was supposed to be based on
"mutual confidence" between the two partners with the Japanese side being in full charge
of the construction of the project without any interference from the Iranians. Another
aspect of this method of management was "Consensus Decision Making". This method,
apparently, was not only practiced between the partners for making decisions, but also
throughout the whole organisation from the highest to the lowest levels.'
It is very important to point out at this juncture that during the 1973-78 period,
UPC was essentially a construction company with the sole aim of completing the project
according to various plans drawn up by the partners. In this respect, the department in
charge of construction was the most important department of the Company and this was
the area where the Japanese partners were most insistent upon employing the "Japanese
Way" and hence holding a tight control over the joint venture.
IJPC was to be the biggest petrochemical complex in the world comprising 16
units plus various service and infrastnictural facilities. As such, its construction was too
big to be handled by a single engineering firm. Moreover, neither the Iranian nor
Japanese partners, including the three petrochemical companies, had any experience of
building such large complexes. Furthermore, Mitsui Bussan, according to its President,
Wakasugi, being a trading company, had never handled any project of this size, and
wanted to complete the project with the full co-operation of all partners, including the
Iranians.53
 However, for the reasons discussed below, the Japanese were not prepared
to allow Iranians to have a say in how the construction plans should be executed. And
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this was where some of the most important differences and feelings of ill will between
the two partners emerged which in turn caused many delays in the completion of the
project and the eventual demise of the joint venture. As the construction of the project
was the most important activity that the joint venture undertook in this period and as this
was the area where differences between Japanese and Iranian management styles
emerged, in the next section, we will discuss in detail the contracting system employed
for the construction of the project.
4.2.2- The Construction of the Project in a "Japanese Way"54
As mentioned before, the project was too big to be handled by a single
engineering company and therefore, several firms had to employed to build the complex.
After lengthy negotiations between NPC and ICDC in late 1972 over the mode of
execution of the project, it was decided to employ a "prime contractor" on a turn-key
basis for a lump sum and put it in overall charge of the engineering firms (the sub-
contractors which would be building the complex, as was (is) the norm in the world. The
next consideration was which company to choose as prime contractor. Mostofi favoured
employing the American Bechtel Company, but as most of the individual plant
engineering companies and specialised subcontractors were Japanese, ICDC favoured
using a Japanese prime contractor in the interest of greater harmony and
communications.
In early January ICDC espoused the idea that Mitsui Bussan should become the
prime contractor on the grounds that no other Japanese company was interested as the
risks of cost overruns for such a large project were quite high. There were however two
problems with this idea. First, Bussan was a trading not an engineering company, and
second, there was the possibility of conflict of interests as Bussan would be both the
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owner and contractor. Mitsui Bussan's Chemical Machinery Department, which for
obvious reasons was extremely keen on being appointed as the prime contractor
advocated the idea of "managing contractor" (MC), with the responsibilities of the prime
contractor but whose function would be limited to management. Eventually, as Mitsui
Bussan was the biggest shareholder in ICDC and the project leader, and ICDC wanted
to complete the project in a Japanese way, and Bussan was the only Japanese company
big enough to take on a project on such a large scale on a lump sum basis, no serious
objections were raised from the Japanese partners. NPC also agreed in principal to
Mitsui Bussan acting as the prime contractor. NPC however, demanded that the MC
(Bussan) set up a daily reporting system so that there would be owner control over the
contractors. But probably a more important motive behind this demand was that the
Iranians wanted to learn about building large industrial projects and, in fact they
considered the joint venture not just as a way of developing the petrochemical industry
but as a means of transfer of technology. The latter was their explicit and implicit aim
in coveting foreign investment. But the Japanese were worried that intervention by the
Iranians would upset the smooth progress of the work and that was why they were
insisting on constructing the project in a Japanese way.
The appointment of Mitsui Bussan as the prime contractor (MC), however, not
only did not facilitate better co-operation and communications, but actually became a
source of contention between the partners, even among the Japanese themselves.
The main cause of friction was the attitude of the Chemical Machinery
Department of Bussan which was acting as the MC. The Department's primary concern
as the MC was to make as much profit as possible, and in fact it considered the project
just as a "cash cow to be milked dry". 55
 The MC's behaviour was also causing problems
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with the contractors, as it was directing them to order plants and machinery through the
Department, a job always done by the contractors themselves. In fact the MC was so
preoccupied with profits that in 1974 it predicted it would make as much as Y6000
million profits from the sales of machinery to UPC in the next 2 to 3 years.56 The
conduct of the Chemical Machinery Department towards the joint venture finally
persuaded the partners to drop the idea of Mitsui Bussan as the prime contractor in
March 1975.
Around the same time, Mitsui & Co.'s staff working for UPC and ICDC proposed
the "capital withdrawal" theory by which the company would withdraw from the project
as an investor but would continue as a contractor, a route similar to the one taken by
Allied Chemical in the Shahpour Chemical case. But this course of action was sharply
rejected by President Ikeda of Bussan.57
So nearly two years after being established, UPC was still without a prime
contractor. Literally, doing things in the "Japanese way" meant nothing more than
allowing the Japanese to run the project as they wished and make as much profit from
it as possible. "Bussan's overriding concern in the whole project had been to increase its
business; it thought that it could just second a few people to the project and that
everything would be muddled through after that". 58 This was not only evident in
Bussan's concern with short term gains, but also, in the overall attitude of the company
towards the joint venture. Although the project was the biggest that Mitsui Bussan had
ever participated in, there was no person or department with the overall responsibility
for co-ordinating policy toward the joint venture. And, as mentioned before, the
Chemical Products Department was treating the project with contempt, regarding it not
as their own but as the "President's pet".59
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This attitude of Mitsui Bussan's was not out of character for general trading
companies' towards foreign investment or international joint ventures in general. As
explained in Chapter Five, the main concern of sogo shosha is trading, and all other
functions that they undertake, like manufacturing, foreign investment, etc, serve one
purpose only: to increase their trading volume. Moreover, as noted in Chapter One that
the general trading companies, or other Japanese companies for that matter, undertake
foreign investment in order to acquire the right to sell plants, machinery, and services
to and purchase the output of their overseas subsidiary (whether they are a minor or
major shareholder in the joint venture), and this is the area where they make most of
their profits. As explained in that chapter, the Japanese investors are not concerned with
making profits on their foreign investment in the form of dividends as long as such
ventures provide them with lucrative trading opportunities.
4.2.2.1- Adoption of a New Construction System
After the debacle of the MC system, the Japanese proposed a new construction
system. Under the new system, the Construction Department of IJPC would be
reorganised into various offices responsible for the progress of work on each maker's
manufacturing plant. Then one engineering company would be nominated to head the
construction of each plant unit. 6° The contracts were to be mostly lump sum, with works
for linking the units being on a cost plus fee basis.61
This method of construction would allow the Japanese to determine the
construction system and construction work and therefore, would require Japanese
leadership and shut out the Iranians from the management structure.62 Mostofi,
however, stated that an outside company should be employed as a consultant to keep a
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check on the contractors, as was (is) the practice in Iran, and he suggested the Lummus
of U.S for this purpose. The Japanese, however, rejected this suggestion on the grounds
that in Japan it is the construction department of the owner firm which keeps an eye on
the contractor which is much cheaper than hiring an outside company.
Some Iranian members on the Board of Directors had strong reservations about
the new system, arguing that the Japanese were trying to shut them out of the decision
making and that the "Japanese Way" had not been clearly defined. But Mostofi, who
believed that the project was well behind schedule and time was running out, accepted
the Japanese argument that their way was based on "mutual trust" and agreed to the new
construction system on 4 May 1975. His decision seems to have been prompted by the
Shah who wanted the project to be completed as soon as possible.'
4.2.3- The Organisation of IJPC
The organisational set-up of the joint venture, during the construction period
(1973-78) is shown in Exhibits 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3. In this period, as mentioned before, the
Managing Director and the Senior Executive Director (in charge of construction) were
appointed by the Japanese. However, as these exhibits demonstrate, the influence of the
Japanese partners pervaded the entire organisational structure of the company. Apart
from controlling the Executive Office (the most important department in this period),
the Japanese also controlled almost all other important offices like strategic planning,
marketing, finance, and legal affairs.
During the 1973-78 period there were about 300 managers, engineers, and experts
working in the Chief Executive Office, mainly in the Tokyo Office. Apart from the Senior
Executive Director in charge of the Office, all other senior and even junior positions
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were held by the Japanese. There were only 10 Iranians at this Office with only nominal
positions and no real responsibility [window managers]. What was particularly disturbing
to the Iranians was the fact that these people were some of the most experienced NPC
engineers.TM. Moreover, these engineers were sent back to Iran at the end of 1976 on
the grounds of high costs. This happened just before the start of detailed engineering
studies which was a good opportunity for them to learn about the project.65
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Exhibit 7,2: The Organisational Chart of UPC 
SENIOR EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR, PROJECT
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
IN CHARGE OF CONSTRUCTION
YAMAZAKI
KISHIMOTO
ASST TO EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR
SECRETARY
G.M. CONSTRUCTION
D.G.M.
CONSTRUCTION
ASST.G.M.
	 in
charge of GAS
PROCESSING, OL,
AR, EB/SM, PP
ASST.G.M.
	 in
charge of SALT,
LDPE, CL/AL,
EDC/VCM
ASST.G.M.
	 in
in charge ofSBR
BD/SBR
ASST.G.M. in
charge of HDPE,
PX/OX
ASST.G.M. in
charge of
CONSTRICTION
ADMIN., SAFETY
& SECURITY
Source: National Petrochemical Company, July 1974.
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4.2.3.1- Personnel of the Company and Training Programmes
The total number of employees of LIPC in the 1973-78 period are shown in Table
7.9. It is worth noting that under Clause 18 of the Basic Agreement, the Japanese and
Iranian personnel of the joint venture were employed under the ICDC and NPC
employment regulations respectively and would be seconded to UPC on a non-profit
basis.'
During this period some technical and managerial training programmes were
executed by the Japanese partners for the benefit of the Iranian workers. These included
a short-term technical training course for 182 employees, and management training for
thirty nine staff. Also thirty Iranians were sent to Japan for a five month technical
training course from October 1974 to February 1975. Moreover, a further 129 employees
from various departments of the company received technical training during this
period.'
Finally, in the Y587 billion budget of 1976, a total of Y19,331 million was
provided for training purposes of which Y13,442 million was for the training of Iranian
and the rest for Japanese personnel. However, in the Y620 billion budget, the amount
for the training of Iranian personnel was reduced to Y13,340 million of which Y7,000
million was provided by NPC itself, and the provisions for training of Japanese was
cancelled completely. 68 The inadequate provisions for training of Iranian personnel was
later to become a cause for concern for the UPC partners as later they realised that the
number of available operators capable of running the complex after the start of
operations was inadequate. In August 1978, the Japanese partners were complaining
about this lack of suitable Iranian personnel to operate the complex.69
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Table 7.9: Number of UPC's Employees from 1973-78
Year
Iranian Employees Foreign
Employees Total
1973 200 50 250
1974 300 200 500
1975 350 250 600
1976 570 62 632
1977 746 121 867
1978 1,230 11 1,241
Note:'The figures in this table represent only fulltime employees of UPC and do include
the contractor's workers.
Source: A Collection of statistics on the Make-up of the Company's [UPC] Employees
in the Construction Years, BIPC, July 1992.
4.3- The Construction of the Complex
Up to the summer of 1976 no construction, apart from ground levelling work, had
been carried out. From then onwards, preparations for the start of construction, like
ordering plants and machinery, driving concrete piles into ground were carried out for
a year. Finally, in September 1977, six years after the signing of the Basic Agreement,
the actual building of various units and installation of machinery began.7°
In February 1976, Toyo Soda which had been unhappy about the state of the
project and poor prospects for petrochemical products in the Japanese market announced
that it was reducing its stake in the joint venture from 31% to 15% and withdrew its
representative Yamazaki who was the Senior Executive Director in charge of the
construction.' The shares left by Toyo Soda were "entrusted" to Mitsui Toatsu and
Mitsui Petrochemicals so that they could be sold to other companies should any come
forward. The new share-holding arrangements of ICDC were thus as follows:72
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Mitsui & Co. 45%
Mitsui Toatsu 22%
Toyo Soda 15%
Mitsui Petrochemicals 13%
Japan Synthetic Fibres 5%
The construction of the project started at a time when the Japanese domestic
petrochemical industry was in a deep recession. In the view of pessimistic long-term
demand for petrochemicals, MITI was not willing to allow UPC's output to enter the
Japanese market in large quantities. In fact the Ministry forced ICDC to sign an
undertaking to that effect. This put further pressure on the already strained relations
between the two partners as the Iranians accused Mitsui Bussan of inability to act.73
4.3.1- The Destruction of the Oil Dream
In the summer of 1977 (apparently before the start of construction) Mobil Oil
notified Mitsui Bussan that after digging nine dry wells in Lorestan, there was no chance
of finding any oil there and, therefore, it was leaving the partnership (INEPC0). This
was a disappointing news for Mitsui, as its hopes of finding its own oil had all but
disappeared. Moreover, it was stuck with a petrochemical project with an uncertain
future which had been offered as an inducement to win the Lorestan bidding.
4.3.2- New Problems Facing the Joint Venture
Just as the construction was reaching its peak in the middle of 1978, UPC became
worried about three problems affecting its future viability. These three were currency
fluctuations, sales prospects, and supply of raw materials.
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The financial plans for the establishment of the company in 1973 had been based
on dollars at a time when the rate of exchange was $1=Y360 (IR1= Y3.88). 74 Later on,
with the sharp appreciation of yen against the dollar, the former had become the basis
for calculation. In September 1976 when the project officially started, the rates were
$1=Y308, and IR1= Y4.2. By the summer of 1978, yen had further appreciated
substantially to $1= Y190-200, and IR1= Y2.7. This was of great concern to the UPC
management as most of the loans to UPC were in yen, while the expected future
revenues were to be either in rials (domestic sales) or dollars (exports). This mis-match
in expenditure and revenues in terms of currencies would, UPC management believed,
have serious effects on the future profitability of the company. Moreover, the
appreciating yen was particularly worrisome to the Iranians whose main source of
revenue, oil, was priced in dollars and, moreover, the rial was directly linked to the U.S
currency, while most of the loans to pay for the construction of the projects were in yen.
In order to overcome this problem, UPC (presumably under pressure from the Iranians)
asked the Export-Import Bank of Japan which was in charge of the overall financing for
the joint venture to put the project on a rial basis.
The other problem facing the joint venture was the poor export prospects for
petrochemical products. Ever since the oil crisis of 1973, the market for petrochemicals
was in a recession with huge overcapacities in Japan. U.S, and Europe, the main
potential export markets. These market conditions were expected to last until 1983, when
the UPC complex would be producing at full capacity.
Besides, Iran's underdeveloped industry was unable to absorb a large part of
LIPC's output which meant that it had to be exported at low prices to whatever markets
the company could find. The only solution left was to wait for the growth of the Iranian
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economy so that the domestic market could provide an outlet for the joint venture. This
meant a highly protected domestic market with high tariffs and artificially high prices.
After this development, Mitsui Bussan began to demand that it and not NPC should
handle the Iranian domestic sales. After fervent wrangling between the two partners,
Mostofi, for the sake of harmony, agreed to the latter's demands, and UPC appointed
Bussan as its sole sales agent in the Iranian market.
The other main problem facing UPC was the question of supply and the pricing
of natural gas. In the Basic Agreement of 1971, the natural gas was priced at 2 cents per
1000 cubic feet delivered at wellhead for the first 12 years after the start of production.
UPC however, had to provide the necessary investment to transfer the natural gas from
the wellhead to the complex site. Moreover, in the same agreement the naphtha required
by the aromatic unit was priced at $1.8 per barrel delivered at Bandar Mahshahr.
In order to reduce construction costs which had risen steeply since the oil crisis,
on 28 December 1974 NPC informed IJPC that NIOC would shoulder the necessary
investment to transport the required natural gas from the wellhead to the company's site.
Negotiations over the pricing of natural gas became another area of disagreement
between the partners. NIOC was arguing that it had to invest over $700 million to deliver
the gas to the UPC site in Bandar Shahpour, and it needed to get a fair return on this
investment. 75 The Japanese partners of UPC were, on the other hand, contesting that
they had become involved in the project on the promise of free gas. In the middle of
August 1978 NIOC proposed the price of $80 per ton for liquid gas and, in order to
mollify the Japanese, recommended a financial package for five years should the joint
venture not attain the expected profitability levels.
At the same time NPC submitted another proposal to UPC that for the first 12
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years after the start of operations, natural gas would be priced at 30 cents BTU (British
Thermal Unit), and liquid gas at $40 per tonne for the first five years, and $80 for the
next 7 years. These NPC suggestions were accepted by the Japanese partners of UPC,
but due to the political situation developing in Iran, the agreement was never
implemented.
4.3.3- The Political Developments in Iran
Just as the construction of the UPC complex was reaching its peak in the middle
of 1978, political turmoil engulfed Iran. This unrest was due to popular dissatisfaction
with the Shah's rule and people demanded the replacement of his regime with a
democratic one. In order to weaken the government, many strikes started in all sections
of the economy. The most important of these was the strike by workers in the oil
industry which was the life blood of the country.
At the height of political unrest during early September 1978, the Japanese Prime
Minister, Takeo Fukuda, visited Iran and met with the Shah who praised the LTPC
project as the ideal type of economic co-operation for Iran. Fukuda also visited the
construction site which was at the height of its activities. Yet, three weeks later, the UPC
construction workers joined a nationwide strike called by Ayatollah Khomeini in protest
against the Shah's rule.
Although these strikes and the overall political and economic situations severely
affected UPC, the construction efforts continued according to plan until late
January/early February 1979. At this time, however, the project came to a complete halt
as the revolution was reaching a critical stage. Most of the foreign workers including
Japanese and other nationalities who were working on many projects including the UPC
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began to leave Iran. Consequently, the construction of UPC which was 85% and 60%
complete in terms of plant construction and works schedule respectively was brought to
a halt in February 1979. Some of the Iranian Directors were against the stoppage of
construction as they feared it would never start again. Table 10 shows the actual state
of various plants at the end of 1978.
During late January 1979 the Shah left and in early February Ayatollah Khomeini
returned triumphant to Iran. On 12 February the revolution reached its conclusion with
the overthrow of the Shah's regime and the establishment of an Islamic revolutionary
state with Ayatollah Khomeini as its spiritual leader and Mehdi Bazargan as its Prime
Minister.
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Table 7.10: Rate of Completion of Unit Construction at the End of 1978
Name of the Unit Completion Rate (%)
NF 89
OL 84.5
CA 70
LDPE 74
HDPE 72
PP 73
BD 31
BSR 51
AR 45
VCM 65
UT 88
CF 81
Site Preparation 100
Licensing 80
Mahshahr Camp Development 100
Total (average weight) 73.5
Source: BIPC, March 1993.
5.0- The Suspension Period (1979-80)
5.1- The Political Environment
The effects of the revolution went beyond the Iranian borders as it caused the
Second Oil Shock which doubled the price of oil. It was also to have a decisive impact
on the IJPC. Initially, it delayed the completion of the project for one year, but other
developments resulting from the revolution were to influence the fate of UPC even
further.
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5.1.1- The New Government's Attitude Towards IJPC
The new Prime Minister, Bazargan, who was the director of NIOC during Dr
Mossadegh's premiership in the early 1950s, wanted to get the country on it's feet as
soon as possible.76 So one of his first acts was to ask the oil industry workers to end
their strike and resume the production of oil which was so vital for earning the foreign
currency needed for rehabilitating the economy which had been crippled during the
revolution. Moreover, the new government renamed Bandar Shahpour, the site of UPC
construction, Bandar Imam Khomeini and proclaimed that it wanted to complete the
project as a monument to the revolution.
Before the revolution, the Japanese were certain of the commitment of the
Iranian government and the Shah himself to the petrochemical joint venture.
Notwithstanding the new government's hostile attitude towards foreign investment and
the West, they were sceptical about the future of the company and Iranian/Japanese
relations in general.
Soon after its establishment, the policy of the Provisional Islamic Revolutionary
Government towards Japan and UPC in particular became clear. The new government
wanted to have better relations with Japan which it considered to be a non Western
industrialised country with no history of imperialism or involvement in Iranian affairs.
And it wanted the IJPC to be a symbol of the new relations between the two countries.
In order to signal its friendly attitude, Iran exported its first oil consignment after the
revolution to Japan on 5 March 1979.
In April, Bazargan sent a letter to Prime Minister Ohira expressing his wish to
resume construction of the project. In the same month the Iranian government
nationalised the petrochemical industry but exempted UPC. This attitude greatly
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heartened the Japanese partners who became convinced that the new Iranian regime was
as committed to the joint venture as the old one.
Meanwhile, on 9 April ICDC announced the appointment of Hideaki Yamashita,
a former MITI Vice-Minister as its President (amakudari)7 7 Yamashita who was
unfamiliar with UPC was given the job to enable ICDC to negotiate better with the
Japanese goverment to turn the project into a "national project".
ICDC which by now had run out of money for the completion of UPC, asked the
government of Japan to upgrade the project to a "national project", thus qualifying it for
government financial assistance (see the next section for the financial details). Later on
that month, MITI announced the conditions necessary for the project to become a
national one. ICDC was required to involve the whole of the Mitsui Group and other
petrochemical companies like Mitsubishi and Sumitomo, and give capital participation
to UPC construction companies.
Moreover, the Director of the Economic Co-operation Department proclaimed
that the project was important in strengthening mutual relations between Iran and Japan
and in securing stable oil supplies. He added that the goverment had all along been
financially involved and that the project was of national importance, but greater
involvement by the petrochemical industry was essential.
In order to satisfy these demands, ICDC contacted many Japanese companies and
invited them to participate in the joint venture. By October 1979, they had succeeded in
enlisting the support of 71 companies with a total capital participation of Y51,100
million. Moreover, five new banks joined a banking syndicate to support the project.
Eventually, after intense lobbying by ICDC (mainly by Yamashita), on 12 October
1979 the Japanese government decided to lend Y20 billion to UPC through the Overseas
378
Economic Co-operation Fund. Additionally, ICDC was to receive a total of Y80,000
million in loans from the Exim Bank and commercial banks. The government, however
made it clear that no more money would be forthcoming and asked ICDC not to allow
the project to overrun its budget.79 Once the financial issue had been settled, the
Iranians promised the Japanese to do their best to ensure a stable supply of oil to Japan.
With the new financial arrangement in place, the partners agreed to restart the
construction on the 11 November 1979. Notwithstanding these financial arrangements,
the Japanese and Iranian partners had not yet reached an agreement over the
construction budget. Moreover, the problems of housing, natural gas and water supplies
had also not yet been sorted out.
5.1.2- The Hostage Crisis
In order to celebrate the new beginning of mutual relations and the re-start of the
construction on the project, both countries decided to hold a ceremony. But on the 4
November 1979 a group of students occupied the American Embassy in Tehran and took
its diplomats as hostages. Bazargan, who saw this as an act to undermine his government,
resigned, and the country entered a new phase of revolutionary upheaval. Consequently,
the ceremony and the resumption of work on UPC was yet again delayed.
The hostage crisis created a policy dilemma for Japan. On the one hand they
sympathised with the U.S, but on the other hand, they did not want to offend Iran, who
they considered to be of strategic importance in the Middle East, situated between the
U.S.S.R and the Persian Gulf, and was supplying around 12% of her oil imports, as well
as being host to Japan's single biggest foreign investment (UPC). The Japanese officials
concluded that the stakes were too high for them to gamble on and decided to respond
379
quietly to events in Iran; as an official stated, "UPC was our hostage"w.
By January 1980, the U.S Adminstration was asking its allies in Europe and Japan
to impose economic sanctions against Iran, including the embargo of Iranian oil. But
both Europe and particularly the Japanese flatly refused this request, arguing that it may
complicate the situation further and even create an opportunity for the Soviet Union to
take advantage of the turmoil in Iran. However, the Japanese promised to keep the
purchase of their Iranian oil to pre-November 4 level. The government of Japan also
decided to co-ordinate her policy regarding the hostage crisis with the E.E.C, believing
that both had the same policy dilemmas regarding the situation.
On 7 April 1980, the U.S. unilaterally imposed economic sanctions and broke off
its diplomatic relations with Iran and asked her allies to do the same. Later on in that
month, Japan, in unison with the E.E.C, declared some minimal economic measures
against Iran which included cancelling all contracts signed with Iran since 4 November
1979 and not signing any new ones.
However, the Japanese officials on several occasions made UPC's exemption from
economic sanctions a condition for support of an allied boycott. Tokyo felt that the
project must proceed despite new problem, including the unavailability of raw materials
and the withdrawal of American subcontractors. As one official commented: "certainly,
the economic loss resulting from the UPC failure would be great. But the political cost
of abandoning the project now would be even greater" 81 , and, despite it's reservations,
Washington agreed. As a result Mitsui Bussan's negotiations with Iran continued albeit
at a slow pace.
Furthermore, the Japanese considered UPC as a bridge between Iran and the
West, which prevented the former from falling into the Soviets hands. The Japanese
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policy succeeded as Iran did not dismantle UPC despite threats to turn the project over
to Yugoslavia.
Following the negotiations between Mitsui Bussan and the Iranian officials, in July
1980 the Japanese workers returned to Iran to resume work on LTPC. Thus Japan had
managed to prevent ITF'C from becoming a victim of the hostage crisis.
5.2- The Financial Aspects During the Suspension Period82
In the 1979-80 period, due to the unique circumstances of the Iranian Revolution
and the stoppage of construction of the petrochemical complex, the financial activities
of UPC were very limited, and only two such transactions took place. One was an
increase in the paid in capital by IR12 billion, provided equally by the two partners and
the payment of IR15.1 million as the last instalment of the direct loan by the Japanese
partner which were used to pay the contractors.83
After the revolution, new studies were carried out to determine a new budget for
the resumption of construction. These studies showed that due to delays in the
completion of the project, payment of additional interest, increases in administration,
labour and other costs, destruction of some of the stock, and additional expenses for the
security of the complex, a new total budget of $3 billion (Y750 billion) would be required
for the completion of the project.
In order to finance the extra expenditure, the partners agreed to seek new sources
of finance. As discussed above, the Japanese partners managed to persuade their
government and commercial banks to extend Y80,000 in loans and Y20,000 in grants
(from the OECF which was used to pay for the increase in capital). Moreover, in their
Extraordinary General Meeting of 4 September 1980. the shareholder* of UPC
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authorised the raising of the capital to IR60 billion. Of this amount, IR46.5 billion was
called by the Board of Directors, but because of new developments explained below only
IR44.5 was actually paid in and the remaining IR2 billion was never honoured by the
shareholders.
However, with the start of the Iran Iraq War in September 1980 the new budget
was never implemented and, hence, the Y80,000 was not disbursed. Furthermore, as
Table 7.11 shows, the increase in capital was only partially implemented. Finally, as the
Table demonstrates, the only sources of finance during the 1979-80 period were the
IR12,000 increase in capital and the IR15.1 million remainder from the direct loan
arranged before the revolution.
Table 7.11: Actual Sources of Finance During the Suspension and
War Periods (1980-87) (in millions of rials)
Year *
Accounts Capital
Long-Term
Loans
Short-Term
Loans
Sub-
Total
1980 -- 12,000 15.1 -- 12,015.1
1981 5,697.8 6,000 -- 2,000 13,697.8
1982 16,886.4 -- -- 2,400 19286.4
1983 10,312.1 -- -- 11,462.8 21,774.9
1984 -- -- -- 28,624.8 28,624.8
1985 8,772.7 -- -- 9,430.6 18,203.3
1986 10,045.4 -- -- 1,656 11,701.4
1987 10,838.2 -- -- 2,489.2 13,327.4
Total 62,552.6 18,000 15.1 58,063.4 138,631.1
Note: *- LIPC had current accounts with other Iranian oil and petrochemical companies
from which it could either borrow money or buy goods and services.
Source: BIPC, March 1993.
382
5.3- The Management and Organisation of the Project During the Suspension Period
The Japanese managers who were in full control of the project, brought to a halt
all construction activities in February 1979 on the grounds of the uncertain political
situation and lack of foreign workers who had fled from Iran. In addition, the
organisation and personnel of UPC were affected by events following the general
confusion caused by the removal of the old regime and the establishment of the new
goverment. This was especially true as almost the entire top management of NIOC and
NPC and consequently UPC were replaced by new ones appointed by the Islamic
Government. The immediate impact of the revolution on the joint venture were:
uncertain future for NPC and UPC personnel, frequent changes of top management and
the Managing Director (see Table 7.8) and the resulting chaos in decision making, non-
existence of a coherent and long-term strategy regarding the completion or abandonment
of the project by the Iranian government and, finally, lack of co-operation by the
Japanese partner in the provision of adequate manpower for the maintenance of the
project.
5.3.1- The Organisation of IJPC
The organisational chart of the company during the suspension period of 1979-80
is shown in Exhibit 7.4. As the Figure demonstrates, because of exceptional
circumstances and the halting of construction, the position of Senior Executive Director
with responsibility for construction was changed to that of Chief Manager of the Complex
with the prime responsibility of safeguarding the complex until the re-start of
construction. Moreover as shown in Table 7.8, although the Managing Director was still
Japanese (Adachi), his authority was greatly reduced and Ghashghaii (Deputy MD),
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Amini (Deputy M.D), and (Koohyaar) were, in practice, in charge of the company and
decision making. In particularly, Dr Koohyaar was given full authority by the Oil
Ministerm to run the joint venture and negotiate with the Japanese partners.
4-) W
t3)
4-) CO
0
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5.3.2- Manpower and Training
Towards the end of the suspension period, the company adopted a policy of
simplifying its organisation and reducing costs (related to organisation and manpower).
As a result, the total number of employees which had risen from 1241 in 1978 to 1543
in 1979 was reduced to 1376 in 1980 (see Table 7.12).
Lastly, during the 1979-80 period no technical or managerial training programmes
were carried out by the Japanese partners which became a source of friction between the
two partners as the Iranians complained that the former were not honouring their
obligations under the Basic Agreement.
Table 7.12: Total of UPC Employees During the Suspension Period
Year White-Collar
Employees
Blue-Collar
Employees
Foreign
Employees
Total
1358 728 773 42 1543
1359 612 738 26 1376
Source: BrPC, March 1993.
5.4- The Project's Construction During Suspension Period
As mentioned in Section 4.3, the construction of the petrochemical complex
proceeded as planned up to January 1979. But by the end of that month and the
beginning of February, the Japanese partners and contractors, citing political uncertainty
and lack of security for their employees halted all activities and most of their personnel
left Iran.
However, with the new Iranian government's declaration that it intended to
complete the project with the co-operation of the Japanese. various discussions took
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place between the partners on the resumption of construction.
In July 1979 in a meeting between the representatives of LTPC, NPC, and ICDC
in Tehran, the required budget for the completion of the complex was discussed and the
following decisions were taken:85
(a)- The resumption of the construction of NF, UT, and CF on the basis of Plan C.
(b)- Drawing up of a timetable for the resumption of construction of all other units
(other than those in a) by the end of September 1979.
(c)- Presentation of a new budget by the end of September 1979.
After this agreement, preparatory works for the re-start of the construction of CF,
UF, and NF began.
5.4.1- Lack of Adequate Infrastructure, Raw Materials and Human resources
At the same meeting (July 1979), the problems related to lack of progress in the
completion of infrastructural facilities like housing, industrial water supply, and the
insufficient supply of natural gas and lean gas due to the sharp drop in oil production
were also discussed.86
Another issue facing the company was the unavailability of experienced Iranian
personnel, especially at middle to top management levels required for the completion
and running of the complex. Two factors were causing this shortage. First, the Japanese
partners, on the grounds of inadequate financial resources and spiralling construction
costs had failed to implement appropriate programmes for training managers capable of
running the complex after the start of operations (as required by the Basic Agreement).
Moreover, by carrying out the construction in the "Japanese Way", as discussed in the
previous section, the Iranians were denied the opportunity to learn about the complex.
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Second, after the revolution many experienced managers left or were sacked from NIOC
and NPC, hence exacerbating the above problem.
As a result of the unavailability of Iranian personnel, many Japanese managers
and technicians had to be employed by the company which would have created its own
difficulties. Furthermore, as mentioned previously, one aim of Iran in accepting Japanese
partners for the project was the transfer of petrochemical technology to the country, and
this was only possible with the participation of Iranians in the construction and operation
of the complex. Obviously, by employing Japanese personnel, Iran would never have
fulfilled this goal.
Eventually, as a result of these discussions, it was decided to complete the NF,
UT, and CF units on the basis of Plan D (as opposed to the earlier Plan C), and the
budget for the implementation of the Plan was estimated at Y750 billion and was
presented to the Board on 26 November 1979.87
5.4.2- Other Problems Obstructing the Resumption of Construction88
Following the above agreement, UPC requested contractors to resume the
construction of the above three units. The latter however, believed that due to the
following problems, it was impossible to re-start the construction immediately:
(a)- Spiralling claims by the workers who had been laid off by the contractors because
of the cessation of construction after the revolution.
(b)- Complications resulting from the occupation of the American Embassy (U.S
sanctions and especially unavailability of American sub-contractors working on the
project before the revolution).
(c)- Fundamental changes in the management of NPC and UPC.
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(d)- Sharp devaluation of the rial.
(e)- Occurrence of daily incidents in Iran creating an uncertain political environment,
and the bad publicity given to the country in the international press [in particular making
it very difficult for the contractors to employ foreign workers vital for the construction
of the complex].
Moreover, the contractors asked UPC to meet the following demands before the
construction could be resumed:
(i)- Provision of safety for their employees and property.
(ii)- Arrangements for rapid evacuation of their foreign employees in case of emergency.
(iii)- Settling the claims of sacked workers.
(iv)- Payment of compensation for damages resulting from the suspension of
construction.
(v)-Termination of employer's national insurance contributions to the Iranian Treasury.
These demands, nonetheless, were not accepted by UPC and negotiations with the
contractors were halted.
Eventually, after lengthy negotiations between NPC and ICDC during February
1980, the first group of contractors led by Koyo Iron Works & Construction returned to
the project site on the 25th of that month. However, because of lack of progress in
negotiations over the resumption of construction between Dr Koohyaar and the ICDC
representative which took place from 8th to 12th March, the Iranians took a series of
unilateral decisions including:89
(i) Stopping all payments related to the joint venture excluding salaries, wages, and
essential administrative costs.
(ii) Expulsion of six Japanese employees of UPC from the Tehran Office (20 April 1980).
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(iii)- Refusing to register the paid-in-capital contributed by the Japanese partner until
the resumption of construction (4 May 1980).
(iv)- Expulsion of a further 12 Japanese from Iran (10 May 1980).
In order to resolve their differences, further negotiations between Dr Koohyaar
and ICDC representatives took place between 8th and 18th May 1980. At the end of
these meetings, the partners agreed to resume construction of all units as soon as
possible and on 26th May the contractors were asked to return to the site.
At the end of June three of the contractors, Sanko Engineering, Koyo Iron Works
& Construction, and Chiyoda, returned to the complex site. It was also hoped that the
number of contractors (together with the number of Japanese working at the site) would
rise as their claims were dealt with by a special committee.'
5.4.3- Japanese Concerns Over The Lack of Raw Materials and Profitability of the Joint
Venture
To explain the project's conditions to ICDC's partners, the Japanese government
and banks, and to encourage the contractors to resume construction, a NPC delegation
travelled to Tokyo on the 16th June 1980. In their meetings with the Japanese partners,
the latter declared that for the following reasons they were not willing to resume the
project's construction:91
(1)- With regard to the lack or insufficient supply of LNG, the Japanese explained that
the petrochemical complex had been designed on the basis of the production of 5.7
million barrels a day (b/d) of crude oil, thus enabling NIOC to supply a sufficient
amount of LNG to UPC. However, with the sharp drop in Iranian oil production after
the revolution, the joint venture would not receive adequate supplies of LNG for the
production of LPG for exports to Japan (which was to be the most profitable product of
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the company), and therefore, the project would not be profitable at all.
(2)- The Japanese officials and financial institutions were waiting for the clearance of
laws and regulations for the protection of foreign investment in Iran and the future of
UPC. And until such time, they were not willing to commit further capital to the joint
venture.
(3)- Concerns in Japan over the stopping of payments to contractors by Iran.
(4)- Iran's refusal to register the capital paid in by the Japanese.
(5)- The issue of hostages which was preventing the return of American contractors in
charge of the installation of gas gathering and transportation facilities from oilfields to
the complex site.
(6)- Lack of an agreement over the price of naphtha.
(7)- The Japanese partners were adamant that construction should not resume before
carrying out new feasibility studies to determine whether the project could be profitable
or not.
Ultimately, at the end of this round of negotiations on 26th June, a joint
statement by the two partners was released. The main points of the statement were:
(a)- The Iranian side promised to do its best to find sufficient supplies of LNG for the
complex.
(b)- Both partners would jointly survey and control the technical and financial aspects
of the project, and would constantly review them.
(c)- Some issues, like the expulsion of Japanese employees, and non-registration of
Japanese capital would be resolved as soon as possible. The partners also agreed to a
swift resumption of the construction of the whole complex on the basis of mutual co-
operation and trust.
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After this agreement, a committee composed of Japanese and Iranian experts was
formed to carry out the following:
(i)- Investigate the possibility of obtaining LNG from Units 700 and 800 oilfields in
southwestern Iran.
(ii)- Explore the viability of procuring naphtha and (C5+) from the Abadan Refinery as
a substitute for LNG.
(iii)- Study the feasibility of substituting naphtha and (C5+ ) for LNG as input in the
Olefin and Aromatic units and the resultant change in output if the above two were used.
(iv)- Survey the necessary changes to the plant and machinery for the substitution of the
above two raw materials for LNG.
(v)- Presentation of a detailed profit & loss statement for the whole project to the
shareholders of UPC.
After extensive research and discussions with NIOC officials, the committee
presented its findings to the company:92
(1)- Naphtha and (C5+) could be obtained from the Abadan Refinery and can be
substituted for LNG in the Olefin Unit.
(2)- Minor adjustments to the Units would be necessary to enable them to accept
naphtha and (C5+) instead of LNG.
(3)- Detailed engineering studies would be carried out after the approval of the Board
of Directors of the above findings.
(4)- Procurement of plant machinery for carrying out the above adjustments would be
done after the detailed studies.
(5)- Financial studies would be undertaken after the procurement of plant machinery
needed for the re-adjustment of units.
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5.4.4- The Start of Iran-Iraq War
Just as the Japanese had arrived on the site to re-start the construction of the
petrochemical complex, Iraqi forces, on 22nd September 1980, invaded the Khuzestan
Province, in southwestern Iran, where most of the country's oilfields and the UPC site
are located. The invading forces overran Khorram Shahr, Iran's biggest port, and nearby
Abadan, the home of the one of the world's largest refineries. Within a few days, the two
cities and the Refinery had been reduced to rubble by the Iraqis.
The site of the UPC complex which was only 100 kilometres away from the Iraqi
border became a prime target for Iraqi aircraft and artillery. The site was attacked for
the first time by Iraqi bombers on 24th September and again on the 45th October. With
the start of the bombing, the Japanese working on the site fled to Tehran, where some
of them remained and some returned home. So once again, the construction of the
petrochemical complex was brought to a halt by external factors beyond the control of
its owners or managers.
The inhabitants of the above two cities and other towns and villages who survived
the attack escaped to towns and villages in the east. Among the places where they took
refuge were the IJPC camps in Mahshahr, where they remained for the duration of the
war.
6.0- The War Period (1980-88)
6.1- Japanese Policy Towards the War and IJPC
The Iran-Iraq War as well as creating anxiety regarding the future of UPC posed
another policy dilemma for Japanese officials. They wanted the warring parties to fully
realise Japan's strict neutrality as well as trying to save the project from total destruction.
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For the decision makers in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, and MITI,
UPC represented Tokyo's strongest link to Tehran, as well as being Japan's largest single
overseas investment. As one official commented "the war is tragic, not just for the nations
involved but also for LTPC".93
In late November the debate about the future of the project intensified, with
Mitsui Bussan favouring a pull-out, citing increased completion costs due to delays and
war damages. Bussan was hoping that after the pull-out it could apply for insurance
indemnity to cover its losses. However, MITI refused, arguing that the war was not
sufficient reason for the payment of the insurance, and criticised the company for its
shortsightedness. MITI managed to obtain Mitsui Bussan's agreement to continue with
the project. In the government's opinion, the diplomatic costs of a withdrawal were too
great.94
There were three reasons for the Japanese government's commitment to the
project. First in November 1980, in a meeting with a top Mitsui Bussan executive and
Mohammad Ali Rajai, the Iranian Prime Minister emphasised the diplomatic importance
of this "monument to the revolution". He further stated that "completion of the project
was both the firm policy of his cabinet and the will of the people".
Second, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, Tokyo
officials were worried about the former's intentions in Iran. As mentioned before, Japan
regarded Iran as a strategic country located between the U.S.S.R and the Persian Gulf,
the source of 70% of Japan's oil imports. So the officials were worried that if Mitsui
Bussan pulled out of the project, the Iranian leaders would accuse Japan of bargaining
in bad faith and would ask the Soviets for technical help.
Third, as the influence of the U.S had been weakened in the Middle East
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following the hostage crisis, Japan could look even less to its ally for protection and,
hence, she had to be more sensitive to the conditions and expectations of the region.95
Furthermore, as the government of Japan was backing another petrochemical
project in the Middle East between the Mitsubishi Group and Saudi Arabia, it wanted
to give an impression of its commitment to the region. In addition to these diplomatic
considerations, there were human elements in decisions regarding UPC. The officials in
the Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Finance, and MITI, who had backed the project from
it's inception seemed to have a personal stake in its success or failure.
Meanwhile on 14th October 1980, fearing for their safety, ICDC withdrew its
personnel from the site and stated to the Iranian government that they would return
when a cease-fire between Iran and Iraq was in effect. The Iranian leaders did not object
to this action, but did ask for reassurances about Japan's continued commitment to the
project.
Furthermore, the Japanese officials ordered the Overseas Economic Development
Fund (OEDF) to stop its monthly payment of $6-$8 million to Mitsui Bussan for UPC
expenses. The officials maintained that the decision was purely economic, as there was
no point in spending money on a venture which had been bombarded at least once and
may be hit again as long as the war was on.
The Japanese took a more direct action regarding the bombing of the project. The
Foreign Minister, Ito, in a meeting with an Iraqi official in Tokyo, offered to rebuild all
the Japanese projects damaged during the war in exchange for Iraqi assurances that they
would stop attacking the LTPC site. 96 However, this offer was not taken up by the Iraqis,
they continued to hit the site, and the Japanese were severely criticised by the Iranians
for such an action, as they believed that this offer demonstrated the importance and
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value of the project to the Japanese and hence the Iranians.
The indefinite suspension of the project caused acrimony between the government
and Mitsui Bussan. ICDC was arguing that it had to make payments for wages and
interest on a monthly basis without receiving or even the expectation of receiving any
income from UPC in the future, adding that the cut-off of the monthly payment by
OEDF had worsened its financial position. ICDC wanted the Japanese government to
allow it to stop the monthly interest payment on loans from the Japanese banks, adding
that according to Iranian law the payment of wages had priority over all other outgoings,
so the only way to lessen its financial burden was the suspension of the interest
payments. The government was fiercely opposed to this idea. According to officials,
Mitsui Bussan and ICDC were the two smallest stakeholders in the joint venture and, as
such, must not be allowed to wreck its financial structure.
It is important to note that, in a complex set of four separate agreements, the
Export-Import Bank of Japan, 20 private banks, and 100 Japanese companies had
provided $980 million to Mitsui Bussan and ICDC for UPC. In addition, the Export-
Import Bank and 20 companies had extended another $380 million to the Iranian
government (the Direct Loan) and NPC, thus exposing Japanese institutions to a total
loan of $1.36 billion. The second largest source of capital, loans floated on the
Eurodollar market by NPC, came to $900 million. A distant third were direct Japanese
investments of $302 million by Mitsui Bussan, ICDC, the OEDF and 100 Japanese
companies.97
Even more troublesome for Mitsui Bussan and ICDC was a demand by the
Iranian partner for an increase in the capital of UPC by 3 billion riaLs (about Y9 bn).
This demand was regarded by the Japanese as a reflection of the Iranian view that "there
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is no need for seeking a shelving of interest payments if the Japanese partner simply
complies with a capital increase"." As the Japanese government and financial
organisations were maintaining that the shelving of interest payment which for the year
ahead amounted to Y30 billion "rests on receiving a request from the Iranians"", the
demand for the capital increase dashed all Mitsui Bussan's hopes.
In the first half of 1981, officials started a series of secret joint reviews with all
Japanese parties concerned with UPC. These reviews were based on three assumptions:
first Mitsui Bussan and ICDC should seek private lenders for capital to cover their share
of the $450 million to $1.2 billion for additional costs. Second, both organisations could
proceed with construction only when the goverment was satisfied that peace between
Iran and Iraq was real. Third, they would be allowed to withdraw from UPC in the event
of Tokyo and/or Tehran concluding that the project was no longer financially
feasible.' In the view of the officials from MITI and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MOFA), all business activity on the project had been suspended and, as a matter of
fairness to Mitsui Bussan and ICDC, they had a right to curtail their business expenses.
So these officials concluded that the companies must complete their interest payments,
but rescheduling of the principal payment which was due to start in February 1982 would
be considered if the war lasted beyond 1981. Furthermore, it was decided that Mitsui
Bussan and ICDC could stop their monthly transfers to UPC for wage payments and
other construction costs from April.
Following this consensus on the financing arrangements, Yamashita, the President
of ICDC travelled to Tehran on the 4 March 1981 and met with the Iranian President
Bani-Sadr and NPC management. Yamashita, after reaffirming his company's intention
to complete the project, informed the Iranian side of the decision to stop payments to
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UPC. To his surprise, Bani-Sadr, who was also concerned with the increasing costs of
construction, agreed to the suspension of payments, as the Iranian government itself had
difficulty in meeting its half share of the costs.
Almost at the same time, in a separate but interrelated development, Mitsui &
Co. made an agreement with the NIOC to buy 30,000 barrels a day (b/d) of Iranian
crude. Mitsui managed to buy 50% more oil than it wanted despite the fact that 11 other
Japanese companies failed to get as much oil as they needed.101
This special treatment given to Mitsui Bussan by NIOC was due to the former
being a partner in UPC and was probably an indication of the Iranian desire for the
continued involvement of Mitsui & Co. in the project. MITI, in spite of it's earlier
directives, agreed to the increased oil import in order to help Bussan to strengthen it's
financial position.102
In the spring and summer of 1981 the internal situation in Iran worsened as the
infighting within the government intensified. The anarchy and confusion reached a climax
with the sacking of Bani-Sadr from the Presidency and the death of 72 top officials when
the headquarters of the ruling Islamic Republican Party was destroyed by a bomb. Then
a wave of replacement of liberal elements of the government by Islamic hardliners
followed.
For the Japanese officials, this situation presented an uncomfortable dilemma.
The toppling of the Iranian leaders by bombing and assassination dramatically reinforced
the importance of UPC. In their view it was the last remaining channel of goodwill with
the Iranian government as other tools of diplomacy had been blunted. In their view
Japan had no other major option in keeping relations with Iran open but to support
IJP C.103
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For the Japanese side, the wave of violence and rapid successions of power
created another problem. They were concerned that any discussions and agreements
concluded with Iranian officials may not be recognised by their successors and, therefore,
they would have to start all over again. So the chaotic situation impeded the start of
substantive talks which were so important for the future of INC.
In late July 1981, ICDC representatives travelled to Tehran to have talks with the
Iranian officials. During these meetings, the Japanese proposed the revision of the Basic
Agreement which stated that the costs should be split 50-50 between ICDC and NPC.
They argued that it was unfair to ask ICDC to pay for increased costs due to
delays and war damages, which after all was not of their own making. But the Iranians
rejected the proposal and stated that the war had not invalidated the terms of the
original agreement.1°4
Having failed to establish their position, the ICDC representative returned to
Tokyo. Four weeks later they received the news of the assassination of President Rajai
and Prime Minister Bahonar of Iran. For Mitsui Bussan it was the last straw. In their
view, the continuing instability had rendered the viablity of any discussions with Iran
ineffectual. So on 31 August, Mitsui Bussan's President, Toshikuni Yahiro, citing the
political and economic downturn in Iran, stated that his company could no longer cope
with the situation there.1°5
MITI officials, at this point, believed that the political uncertainties made the
holding of commercial talks between Mitsui Bussan and Iran very difficult, but that this
did not justify abandoning the joint venture. Furthermore, in September, Iran put strong
pressure on Mitsui Bussan for a new round of talks. In MITI's view, this development
meant that the negotiations would have to continue. MITI used the insurance indemnity
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stick to force Bussan back to the negotiating table. They formally informed Mitsui
Bussan that a pull-out by Iran or a withdrawal by the Japanese banks would allow it to
apply for insurance pay-out. They informally added that a withdrawal was out of the
question and only an 'Act of God' would release the company from its commercial
obligations, and that being a disclaimer from Iran. 106 Such a situation could never
occur, for Imam's Petrochemical Project (Imam being the title of Ayatollah Khomeini),
as UPC was known in Iran had both become a political test and a diplomatic
commitment of the regime. So, a decision to quit would be regarded as a defeat for the
revolution.'"
In early October, Dr Hassan Dabiri, the President of UPC, travelled to Tokyo.
During his two weeks stay there, he was informed by the ICDC that they intended not
to invest any more in the project and become mere subcontractors, and he promised to
convey their message to the Iranian officials. However, Mitsui Bussan executives who
believed that the talks had made no progress, were gloomy about the future
prospects.1°8
Meanwhile, the five Japanese partners of ICDC who had guaranteed the Y125
billion loan to IJPC, requested the Export-Import Bank and twenty commercial banks
to agree to a one year deferment of the repayments of principal and interest which was
due in February 1982.109
Following the meeting with Dr Dabiri, ICDC informed NPC that the end of
October was the time limit for the resumption of talks on the future of the project. The
Japanese were especially irritated about the Iranians postponing a mission to Tokyo to
answer a Japanese questionnaire on the feasibility of the joint-venture.'
Almost at the same time, Iraqi bombers attacked the construction site, causing
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further worries in JaparLin Eventually, on 30 October, a seven member Iranian mission
led by Mostafa Taheri, the managing director of NPC arrived in Tokyo to negotiate the
revision of the Basic Agreement as requested by ICDC earlier in the month and hold
talks with MITI officials.112
Mill officials believed that their meeting with Taheri on 2nd November must
accomplish three objectives. First, the technical problems regarding raw materials,
especially the pricing of gas, must be sorted out. The calculations for the pricing of gas
had been made during the Shah's regime and the situation had changed much since then.
Another problem was the availability of gas itself. The oil production and consequently
the production of associated gas that was to feed the petrochemical complex had
dropped by at least 49%, and one MITI official stated that "the whole structure of UPC
rests on the promise of free fuel".113
The second technical problem related to the financial structure of LIPC. 114
 MITI
officials believed that, in fairness to Mitsui, Iran must accept the payment of additional
costs resulting from delays and war damages. Third, the officials wanted Taheri to realise
that the joint venture was a commercial concern and, as such, although backing it
politically, there was little that Tokyo could do to make the project financially successful
and Iran had to depend on itself and Mitsui Bussan for that.
The meeting however, was to be a disappointment for MITI. Taheri, relying on
a feasibility study whose data was from the pre Iran-Iraq war period, stated that the
project would be a major success. /vim officials told him that it was important to make
the project commercially profitable and to do so, a scientific evaluation of UPC as it
existed then was needed, and without such information the project would fail.
Despite the unsuccessful meeting, MITI officials' belief that the Iranians were still
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wholeheartdly committed to the project was reaffirmed. Indeed, so far they had promptly
paid all their share of money owed. They further believed that the political uncertainties
in Iran had not allowed NPC to make an objective analysis of the project, and there was
also no reason that the integrity of the Iranians should be doubted.
Taheri's meetings with Mitsui Bussan executives were very stormy. The executives
told him that the revolution and the war had already undone the joint venture, and
issued an ultimatum. He was told in very explicit terms that Mitsui Bussan was no longer
going to invest in the project, but would be willing to become sub-contractor on a cost-
plus-fee basis. He was given until the 15 December to accept or reject the ultimatum.
From Mitsui Bussan's perspective, the ultimatum provided two alternatives. Refusal by
NPC would mean Iranian withdrawal and insurance money, whereas acceptance would
mean Iranian money and possible UPC success.
The MM officials interpreted the ultimatum as a fundamental shift in the
strategy of Mitsui Bussan towards the joint venture. In their belief, until then they had
had to deal with two Mitsuis: one group which had backed the project, and the other
which had fiercely opposed it, resulting in a breakdown in policy consensus. The
ultimatum, MITI believed, was an indication of the latter group gaining the upper hand,
and the company in general becoming more realistic.
But the Iranians did not respond to the ultimatum the way Mitsui Bussan's
executives had hoped. On 26th November, a cabinet-level Iranian committee indicated
a decision to stay with the project. Within the Iranian government, the Minister of
Energy [who represents NIOC's (NPC parent company) shareholders on its AGM's] on
7th December advocated a pull-out, arguing that the soaring costs had made the project
unfeasible. But the managing director of NPC was fast to reject this as one person's
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opinion and reiterated his government's intention to finish the project.
On 8th December, Tehran issued a statement which emphasised Iran's
determination to stand behind UPC and the importance it placed on Japanese co-
operation. The statement added that, while accepting the principal of paying for all
additional costs, it needed to know how high they would go. In Mitsui Bussan's opinion,
the statement made the acceptance unclear and subject to further negotiations.
Being dissatisfied with Iran's response, Mitsui Bussan's executives decided to send
a more carefully worded ultimatum to Iran which would narrow its range of response to
a clear yes or no, and set a new deadline of 8th January 1982. But Bussan received a
disappointing reply from Iran, which neither accepted or rejected the ultimatum. Mitsui
Bussan extended the deadline to the end of January and demanded that NPC agree to
terminate the project if it failed to recognise the ineffectiveness of the present agreement
by then.
On 25th January, Taheri, responding to Mitsui Bussan's ultimatum, offered to
extend a $540 million loan to UPC to repair the war damage and complete the final
phase of the construction. He added that a decision by Bussan to quit would force NPC
to begin legal proceedings in Iran's Supreme Court.
In MITI's view, Mitsui Bussan's ploy had come to an end and, furthermore, the
offer of a loan had eliminated the possibility of insurance money, thus forcing the
company into a continuing relationship with Iran. MITI also believed that the loan offer
was an indication of Iran's deep political commitment to the project. Having analyzed
the situation, MITI informed Mitsui Bussan that it would not respond to any request for
indemnification. So Bussan had no choice but to negotiate with NPC to reach a mutually
acceptable compromise.
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On 23rd February 1982, representatives of ICDC and NPC began a new round
of negotiations in Tehran. At the meetings the Iranian side agreed to pay all the
remaining costs, but both sides failed to reach any agreement on the profitability of the
venture or the revision of the Basic Agreement as demanded by the Japanese.115
There was also disagreement on the level of cost sharing. The ICDC wanted Iran
to shoulder costs beyond Y620 billion, which the two sides had equally shared, whereas
the Iranians insisted that they were prepared to accept extra costs over Y730 billion.116
(The Y730 billion agreement was reached in March 1980, before the start of the Gulf
War).
The negotiations in Tehran were an indication of the futility of future talks. But
time was not on the joint venture's side. As every day passed, its potential profitability
would recede even further. Many people involved also believed that future talks would
not solve anything because of the basic problems of sharing costs, profitability and the
Basic Agreement. They further believed that Iran, Mitsui Bussan, and the goverment
of Japan should work together and come up with a realistic solution without wasting
time.' Also, MITI officials stated that the negotiations should continue, as any drastic
action may damage the "friendly relations between the two countries".118
In March 1982, Mitsui Bussan announced that it would cut its dividend for the
financial year 1981 due to the losses related to its investment in UPC. The cut in the
dividend was the first of its kind in the history of Bussan since the great merger of
1959, 119 and in April, the Company announced the dismissal of Yoshizo Ikeda as
chairman, holding him responsible for the UPC fiasco. 12° Furthermore, in April, Mitsui
Bussan asked its employees to take an across the board pay-cut of 2%, at a time when
spring wage settlements were resulting in an average increase of 7%.121
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Meanwhile in March, the government of Japan decided to adopt a flexible
approach in the handling of Mitsui Bussan's request for insurance payment. Having seen
little progress in negotiations, and realising the financial difficulties of Bussan, it decided
to shorten the assessment period from 1-2 years to about six months and pay out Y10-12
billion when the company applied for insurance indemnity in Apri1. 122
 However, the
government insisted that it had not ignored Iran's wishes for the completion of the
project and insisted that the insurance payment was for "suspension" of the project. So
Mitsui Bussan would have to pay back the money if the group completed the project.'
The fourth round of talks between Mitsui Bussan and Iran were held at the end
of May 1982 without achieving any compromise.124
Ultimately, after a year of hard negotiations, NPC succeeded in securing ICDC's
promise for assistance in completion of the project after agreeing to pay for all the
additional costs. On 17th May 1983, M. Taheri, the M.D. of NPC, and T. Yahiro, the
President of Mitsui Bussan, concluded a Supplementary Agreement for the resumption
of the construction of UPC."
The new financing arrangement, provided for in the new agreement, freed ICDC
from paying Y10 billion in annual interest as well as the additional financing required
for the completion of the project. In exchange, the five Mitsui companies agreed to send
their engineers and technicians to Iran to first assess the damage and then start the
completion of the project.
In October 1983, ICDC announced that Chiyoda Chemicals and Toyo Engineering
had agreed to become joint managing contractors for UPC. Furthermore, ICDC was at
the same time conducting negotiations with 28 other construction companies to reach
agreement with them on the resumption of work on the project. All these companies
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were planning to send over 100 engineers to Iran to check the damage caused by the
war, and start repairing and constructing at the same time.' However, Iraq warned
Japan twice that they might bomb the site if work was resumed. 127 In response to these
threats against the project, the Japanese Foreign Minister, Abe, at a Japan-Iraq joint
ministerial conference which was held in Tokyo on 22nd November 1983, urged Iraq not
to attack the UPC site.128
In December, ICDC announced that it had appointed Ren Takemura as its new
president to bolster the management of UPC as construction was due to resume in
January 1984. 129 Under the rules of the joint venture, the President of ICDC would
automatically become the vice chairman of UPC.
In late December 1983, Japanese technicians returned to Iran to resume work on
the project. But on Sunday 19th February 1984, Iraqi planes attacked the site. The
bombing caused no casualties among the Japanese workers. However, the Iranian
government and ICDC decided to suspend the construction until the security of workers
could be guaranteed. 13° So the completion of UPC was delayed yet again.
Apparently, the 150 Japanese workers did not leave Iran, but remained there
(probably in Tehran) in order to resume work on the project as soon as conditions
permitted. In September 1984, ICDC decided to send another 200 technicians to Iran to
join the existing workforce there to start construction works scheduled for October.'
On 22nd September, the Iraqis again attacked the construction site and caused
injuries to some Japanese workers who had already started assessing the damage
there. 132 Following the attack, the Japanese workers were evacuated from the site and
returned to Japan. However, ICDC decided to leave 30 technicians in Tehran as a
symbol of its commitment to complete the project.133
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A provisional agreement reached between NPC and ICDC on 18th October 1984,
provided for the return of all Japanese workers (except for the 30 as noted before) home
and, furthermore, all parties agreed to a temporary suspension of work on the project,
and to resume construction when the safety of the site and workers could be
guaranteed.' Having witnessed the problems affecting UPC, a Mitsui Bussan
executive described the project as "neuralgia" which could not be immediately cured.'
This comment showed the sheer frustration of Bussan management with IJF'C's vicious
circle of construction, suspension, and small-scale working on the site.
Although the construction work had been suspended indefinitely pending an end
to the Iran-Iraq War, the fate of UPC was never far from the minds of Iranians and
Japanese officials. In a meeting between the Japanese Prime Minister, Yasuhiro
Nakasone and the Iranian Heavy Industry Minister, Behzad Nabavi, in Tokyo in late
February 1985, the Japanese Premier reiterated his country's commitment to the
completion of the project and stated that only the lack of safety for Japanese workers
was holding the Japanese partners back from finishing the project.136
In April 1985, the Majlis (the Iranian parliament) refused to ratify the
Supplementary Agreement of May 1983 between NPC and ICDC, arguing that the new
agreement was unnecessary, and the joint venture must continue under the Basic
Agreement'37 This meant that any future cost had to be shared equally between NPC
and ICDC, as stipulated under the Basic Agreement. The news was a blow to Mitsui
Bussan which had since 1983 believed that it did not have to shoulder any new costs
related to the completion of UPC.
At a press conference in Tokyo on 3rd July 1985, All Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani,
the then Speaker of Majlis, said that Iran was ready to consider new proposals on the
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future of UPC. 138 In another interview with N.H.K, he explained that the project
should continue as before, and it was in Japan's long term interest to fulfil its
commitments to Iran. He added that his country was interested in the transfer of
Japanese technology through joint ventures such as UPC, and that these types of ventures
were in the long term interests of Japan. 139 Mr Rafsanjani was implicitly implying that
if Mitsui Bussan did not complete the project according to the Basic Agreement, there
would be long term implications for Japan's interests in Iran including supply of oil,
trade, and future investments.
By this time the resumption of work and the completion of the project had
become hypothetical. Both Iran and Iraq had intensified targeting each other's residential
and industrial areas, with UPC being a prime target for Iraqi bombers.
Furthermore, in early 1986, the price of oil collapsed causing severe financial
difficulties for the oil producing countries and especially Iran. As a consequence she
failed to pay Y10.4 billion in principal and interest payments to the Export-Import Bank
of Japan for loans related to UPC.' Iran had also failed to pay interests on a Y125
billion loan from ICDC since May 1984, amounting to Y10.4 billion a year." Citing
the Iranian side's refusal to repay its loam, ICDC was arguing for a total pull-out. In late
1986, Mitsui Bussan demanded a Y30 billion insurance payment from MITI, while the
latter was still for new developments, such as an end to the war."
In August 1987, Mitsui Bussan made provisions of Y125 billion ($947.4 million)
in its accounts for losses related to the UPC.143
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6.2- Financial Position of IJPC During the War
The most important fallout of the war, as we saw in the previous section, was the
Japanese assertion about the unprofitability of the joint venture. As a consequence, they
persistently refused to increase their investment or extend new loans to the joint venture.
So all the financial burdens of UPC fell on the shoulders of the Iranian partner, to whom
the importance of the project went beyond economic considerations. To them, the
petrochemical complex had political, social, and technological as well as economic
significance and, hence, tried to keep the project alive throughout the war by providing
it with the necessary financial resources.
6.2.1- The Sources of Finance in the War Period
During the 1980-88 period in which the construction of the project came to a
complete standstill, the necessary funds for payment of wages, salaries, maintenance
costs, and loan repayments were all supplied by NPC through the extension of short-term
loans.
As Table 3.11 shows, the main sources of funds for UPC during the war years
were various Iranian petrochemical and oil companies, and NPC which provided the
company with IR62,552.6 and IR58,063.4 respectively. The only Japanese financial
contribution was the payment of ER6,000, their share of the increase in paid-in-capital
agreed in 1980 (see section 5.2 for details).
6.2.2- Repayment of Loans
The above mentioned funds provided by Iranian companies to UPC were used to
pay for wages, salaries, administrative expenses, and maintenance of the complex. But
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the main burden on UPC during this period was the repayment of loans received before
the revolution. If the project had been completed as originally planned, revenues
generated by sales of products would have covered these repayments. But the unfinished
complex, under constant Iraqi bombardment, was facing an uncertain future with no
prospects for the start of operations. Coupled with the Japanese partners' refusal to
make any financial contributions, the burden of the repayment of these loans fell on the
shoulder of the Iranian partner.
Tables 7.13 and 7.14 exhibit the agreed timetable between UPC and the banks
and other creditors for repayment of loans received by the company. However, due to
the above mentioned factors, these obligations, as shown in Table 7.15, were only
partially honoured by the provision of short-term loans by NPC throughout the 1980-87
period. As this Table shows, no loan repayments were made in 1987. The reason for this
was the collapse of oil prices in 1986 which deprived Iran from earning adequate foreign
exchange to honour these obligations.
Finally, Table 7.16 illustrates the total repayment and balance of some of these
loans as at the end of 1987. The balance of these loans, as later sections will show, were
settled according to the arrangements made in the "Friendly Separation Agreement" of
1989.
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Table 7.13: The Original Timetable for the Repayment of Loans
Current
Accounts *
Long-Term
Loans
Short-Term
Loans Sub-Total
1979 -- -- 9,868.5 9,868.5
1980 148.8 -- 148.8
1981 74.4 -- 74.4
1982 -- 5,560.5 -- 5,560.5
1983 -- 5,560.5 -- 5,560.5
1984 6,388 5,560.5 -- 11,948.5
1985 -- 5,560.5 -- 5,560.5
1986 -- 74.4 -- 74.4
1987 -- -- -- --
Total 6,388 22,539.6 9,868.5 38,796.1
Note: *- UPC held current accounts with other Iranian oil and petrochemical companies
from which it could draw cash or buy goods and services.
Source: BIPC, March 1993.
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6.3- The Management and Organisation During the War Years
Due to its proximity to the war zone, and its potential importance to the Iranian
economy, the site of the UPC complex was constantly attacked by Iraqi forces. In fact
the site was bombarded 42 times by Iraqi planes. This, apart from damaging the plants
and machinery, had a demoralising effect on the employees, causing their dispersal and
departure from the company. In addition, the settlement of over 20,000 war refugees in
the company's housing complexes in Mahshahr and B Camps, further aggravated the
accommodation shortages and problems, and put UPC employees under further strain.
During the war period, the Board of Directors of UPC granted the Managing
Director special powers and authorised him to spend up to IR100,000 million for
repairing damage caused by bombings.'
6.3.1- The Organisation of IJPC
The war, low morale and dispersal of experienced Iranian employees, coupled
with the general disorganisation precipitated by the revolution, and departure of
Japanese employees, caused confusion in the management and organisation of UPC. As
no construction was taking place and the most important activity of the company was the
maintenance of the complex, the organisation of the company, as illustrated in Exhibit
7.5, was further simplified.
In the re-organisation, the Tokyo Office, which was in charge of planning and
procurement, was closed down and its staff were either transferred back to the ICDC
parent companies or retired. An important organisational feature of the company during
this period was the transfer of the company's documents, totalling 31 tons, from the
Tokyo Office to a newly established Documents Centre in Iran in 1982.145
-W
U
••-I
4-1
4-1
0a)
0
- 4-)
(4-I Z
4-4 a)
0
0
>1
..
e
a)
b.,
0:1
C
0 cc!
E-1 Z
0
•H
P
a)
a
$.4
it
3
a)
.c Z
o
4-)
0
a)
$-1
..-1
c)
d
.
z
4-)
tr
C
.,-1
ni
e
-H
rt$
-
ol
C
• H
t71
-- >,
4-)
fai
W
P 4 rd C3
0
CD
C.) C
rd
Z
a)
u
•H
4-I
4-4
0
W
U
-,-4
4-4 en
4-4 co
0 cA
4-) - .-1
-.-1
'CI
4-)
0
a)
- W
U
C
.4
C)
K4 'In0
a,
It
..-4
44
m
z
416
6.3.2- The Company's Manpower During the War Period
With the prolongation of the Iran-Iraq War, as Table 7.17 demonstrates, almost
all of the Japanese employees left Iran in 1983. Moreover, as mentioned above, with the
general inactivity of the company, simplification of its organisation, and dispersal of
administrators and engineers, the number of white-collar employees, as shown in Table
7.17, was reduced from 602 in 1981 to 339 in 1988. However, during the same period, the
number of blue-collar workers rose from 731 to 1267 (Table 7.17).
Table 7.17: Total Number of Employees During the War Period
Year White-Collar Blue-Collar Foreign Total
1981 602 731 26 1,359
1982 597 1,110 35 1,724
1983 608 1,184 -- 1,729
1984 557 923 1 1,481
1985 452 1,247 1 1,700
1986 395 797 -- 1,192
1987 343 887 1 1,231
_	 1988 339 1,267 1 1,607
Source: BIPC, July 1992.
6.3.3- Training
During the war years no training programmes of any kinds were implemented.
The only exception was the military training provided by the Iranian Armed Forces for
the company employees on a voluntary basis.
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6.4- The State of the Project During the War
As mentioned before, with the start of the Iran-Iraq War, all activities related to
the construction of the project was brought to a complete halt. However, throughout
these years, discussions over the future of the joint venture and resumption of
construction were held on many occations between the partners and the Iranian and
Japanese governments (see Section 6.1).
As explained earlier, with the occupation of the company's camps by more than
20,000 war refugees, the already inadequate housing provisions were put under severe
strain. In addition, with the rapidly increasing number of war casualties and ensuing
shortages, UPC put its hospital, emergency, and other medical facilities at the disposal
of the Iranian Navy. Also all other properties of UPC, like vehicles, heavy trucks, and
construction machinery were either sent to the nearby war front or used by organisations
involved in the fighting.'
In December 1984, a company of soldiers from the Revolutionary Guards
occupied the UPC site in Bandar Imam, and throughout their 11 month stay there,
prevented the company's management from discharging their responsibilities. Moreover,
they, together with 36 other governmental organisations involved in the war, used any
of the complex's properties useful for the war effort either on site or transported them
to the war front. Besides these organisations, NIOC used LIPC facilities to repair oil
installations damaged in the fighting. These facilities, however, were returned to the
company once the war was over.147
On 19th July 1988, UPC was attacked for the last time by the Iraqi Air Force.148
A day before, Iran had accepted U.N Resolution 598, thus ending the eight year old war
which had inflicted so much damage to both sides, especially Iran. It was probably the
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war which effectively killed off UPC, as it caused a long delay (8 years), and at least $1
billion damage to it. 149
 On the same day (19th July), a Mitsui Bussan executive,
reflecting on the new developments, stated that LIPC's future would be discussed with
the Iranians, but there was no question of any further investment in the project by his
company.15°
As this section demonstrated, the war not only brought the construction to a halt,
but also affected all aspects of the joint venture; financing, management, organisation,
and all other activities. Moreover, the bombing raids and corrosion damaged the plants
already installed, adding further costs and delaying the completion of the project.
7.0- The Prospects for IJPC After the War
In late 1988, ICDC sent a team to inspect the site. In its report, the team declared
the UPC a write-off, arguing that it would cost another $2 billion on top of the $4.5
billion (at 1988 prices, and 1000% more than the original estimates) already spent to
repair the war damage and complete the project.
But Ahmad Rahgozar, the Managing Director of NPC, disputed this amount,
saying that only $1 billion would be enough.' Furthermore, the Iranian experts were
arguing that the Japanese had not carried out a thorough study and were being
pessimistic about the future of UPC. They added that all corrosion and damage could
easily be repaired, and the technology, which by then had become obsolete, be
modernised. The Iranian engineers also stated that the first unit could be completed in
18 months and the whole complex comprising of 16 units would be operational in 38
months."2
There was another area of disagreement regarding the future profitability of 1.1PC.
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NPC was contending that LJPC's sales would be at least $2 billion per year, while ICDC
was arguing that, at best, the project's revenues would hardly reach $1 billion annually.
7.1- The Dissolution of IJPC
ICDC, which was in total disagreement with NPC about the completion costs and
the profitability of the project, decided in early 1989 to pull out of UPC. NPC, which for
political, social, and national economic reasons wanted to finish the construction of UPC
as soon as possible, was willing to allow ICDC to pull-out provided the latter accepted
its terms. The terms of NPC were the payment of fair compensation by ICDC and its
agreement to complete the project as a contractor.
In an interview, A. Rahgozar indicated that if ICDC and NPC agreed on the
abrogation of the Basic Agreement of 1971, the approval of the Majlis would not be
required, and even if it was, it would be likely to agree. He added that the 1985 Majlis
rejection was prompted by the withdrawal of Japanese technicians from the site and not
by objections to the Supplementary Agreement itself.153
The negotiations for the "Friendly Separation", as both sides liked to call it,
continued through the first half of 1989, but several issues were prolonging the talks.
These obstacles included NPC's conditions mentioned above, plus Iran's insistence on
linking the liquidation talks to Japan's promise to help her reconstruction efforts and,
finally, Mitsui Bussan's claims for insurance payments from MITI. 154 The last issue was
particularly problematic for ICDC.
ICDC was arguing that, after the signing of the liquidation agreement, the Y330
billion invested up to 1981 would become "uncollectable". And out of that amount, Y200
billion, including ICDC capital subscription and loans to UPC, should be covered by
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MITI's trade insurance. MITI, however, stated that it had no intention of approving any
insurance claim for ICDC's investments made after 1980. Therefore, the upper limit for
its insurance payment would be Y166.2 billion, and Mitsui Bussan had to bear the
difference between Y330 bn and Y166.2 bn (i.e 163.8 bn).155
Fortunately for Mitsui Bussan, several developments in Iran helped to speed up
the negotiations. First, the economic situation in Iran was deteriorating due to the
shortage of foreign currency and high inflation rate. Second, the newly elected
government led by President Hashemi Rafsanjani (August 1989), realised that as long
as the thorny issue of LTPC remained unsettled, no Japanese co-operation for
reconstruction and large scale investments would be forthcoming, and therefore, it was
in Iran's long term interest to allow ICDC to pull out.
Initially in the negotiations of Summer 1989, NPC was asking for Y300 billion
($2.4 bn) as compensation for releasing ICDC from their obligations under the Basic
Agreement, while Mitsui was offering only Y125 billion ($900 bn). However, ICDC
added another Y5 billion as its last offer and this was accepted by NPC (see Appendix
A for financial details of the agreement).
Thus, ICDC agreed to pay Y130 billion (half in cash), and Mitsui Bussan offered
$500 million in credits to Iran and promised to purchase $150 million of oil products
from her with advance payment. 156 It seems that NPC dropped its other condition, that
ICDC must finish the project as a contractor because there was no mention of it in the
final agreement, and the former turned the project over to European companies for
completion. The Iranians also announced that no ratification by the Majlis was required
and the agreement would go into effect immediately.
On the evening of 8th October 1989, after two days of meetings in Tehran
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between the Mitsui Bussan President, Ejiri, and A. Rahgozar, the M.D of NPC, an
agreement called "The Friendly Separation Agreement" was signed which dissolved UPC,
and freed ICDC from nearly 18 years of involvement in the project.' The agreement
stipulated that all shares of UPC held by ICDC would be transferred to NPC.158
Appendix A shows the full details of the Agreement.
Finally, on 8th February 1990, both NPC and Mitsui Bussan announced that by
the transfer of the compensation fund to the Iranian account, the process of Friendly
Separation had been completed. Iran expressed its hope that this would pave the way to
building a new relationship between the two countries. 159 Later on an Iranian
negotiator revealed that it had taken the Iranian government more than thirty meetings
and a decision by President Rafsanjani himself to terminate the joint venture.160
7.2- The State of the Project at the Time of Separation
Just after the signing of the Friendly Separation Agreement of November 1989,
NPC renamed the former joint venture Bandar Imam Petrochemical Company (BIPC)
and appointed Krupp-Lummus-Bandar Imam (ICLBI), a consortium made of Krupp
Koppers GrnBH, and Lummus Crest B.V., to carry out a detailed technical survey
(D.T.S) to determine the extent of the damage caused by the war and corrosion, and to
produce an estimate of the cost of completion of the project.
KLBI presented its comprehensive report in September 1990 to BIPC. The
essence of this report was that during the suspension and war years (1979-88), most of
the heavy, sensitive, and processing machinery belonging to all units had been kept in
exellent condition and could be used for the completion of the complex. The report
added that shortages were mostly of construction machinery like loaders, cranes,
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bulldozers, compressors, and other general items. But almost all of the special plant and
machinery for building the petrochemical complex itself had remained intact in boxes
and containers. Finally, the ICLBI report concluded that the total cost for repairing the
damage, completion and initial operations of the complex would be about DM2489.2
million ($1549.8 million, or IRs104546.4 million, both at 1990 rates of exchange). Table
7.18 displays the ICLBI estimates for the completion of each of the units of the BIPC
complex.
Table 7.18: Estimates of Costs of Repairs and Completion of BrPC's Petrochemical
Complex by KLBI (Sep 1990)
Plant In Millions of DM Percentage %
AR 313.7 12.6
BD/SR 254.0 10.2
CA/SP/DN 390.0 15.7
HDPE 116.0 4.7
LDPE 117.2 7.1
OL 274.8 11.0
PP 126.0 5.1
VC/DC 180.0 7.2
NF-1 73.9 3.0
NF-2, UT-A, CF 140.0 5.6
UT-A (Remaining) 45.7 1.8
UT-B (Remaining) 134.0 5.4
CF-Plant (Remaining) 233.3 9.4
Central Lab. 30.6 1.2
Total Sum 2489.2 100.0
Source: BIPC, March 1993.
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7.3- The Reconstruction of the Petrochemical Project After the Dissolution of IJPC
Apart from producing the D.T.S, KLBI was also commissioned to implement
Phase One of the reconstruction of the BIPC petrochemical complex which included
repairing and completion of NF2, UT (water electricity, and steam), and CF (Common
Facilities) Units. Moreover, in December 1989, BIPC appointed Technip Engineering of
France as the managing contractor (MC) to administer the detailed technical survey and
implement Phase Two of the reconstruction of the petrochemical complex.
7.3.1- Phase One of Reconstruction
The rebuilding and completion of NF2 Unit and parts of the UT and CF Units
under Phase One were completed and became operational in March 1991. The capacity
of the NF2 Unit is 60,000 barrels a day (b/d), and currently is being fed by 36,000 b/d
of LNG from oilfields Number 700 and 800. Moreover, the daily productions of 1,000
tons of propane, 860 tons of Butane, and 670 tons of pentane and heavier liquid gases
are stored in the Unit.
7.3.2- Phase Two of Reconstruction
In the initial survey, KLBI estimated that the reconstruction and completion of
the petrochemical complex would take until September 1994. However, after the
appointment of Technip as the MC for Phase Two, and detailed negotiations with the
eight unit contractors (UC), a new timetable for the completion of the 16 units of the
complex was drawn up. Table 7.19 shows the effective date of agreements between BIPC
and the UCs and the commissioning date for each unit. It is worth mentioning that at the
time of writing, for various reason (mainly shortage of foreign currency), the
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reconstruction of the 16 units have not progressed according to plan.
Finally, after the takeover of UPC by NPC and creation of BIPC, the number of
units and their capacities which was a constant source of dispute between ICDC and
NPC, and caused so many delays and increases in construction costs, were decided and
are shown in Table 7.20.
Table 7.19: The Effective Dates of Agreements for Start of the Reconstruction of
Various Units of BrPC Petrochemical Complex and Their Commissioning Dates.
Unit Effective Date Commissioning Date
AR 29.06.92 21.07.94 - 22.11.94
BD/SR 20.01.92 29.12.93 - 03.05.94
SP/CA/DN 22.11.91 03.11.93 - 07.02.94
HDPE 01.11.91 16.11.93 - 20.04.94
LDPE 01.11.91 23.11.93 - 27.04.94
OL 18.09.91 18.08.93 - 29.11.93
PP 01.11.91 09.12.93 - 12.05.94
DC/VC 23.12.91 28.12.93 - 28.04.94
NF-1 02.12.91 04.10.93 - 28.02.94
UT-A/B 02.12.91 18.03.93 - 20.01.94
CF 02.12.91 08.04.93 - 02.04.94
PVC 23.12.91 29.04.94 - 12.07.94
Source: BIPC, March 1993.
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Table 7.20: Various Units of BIPC Petrochemical Complex, Their Products, and Planned
Capacities (1)
Unit Process/ Final
Product
Capacity
(Ton/Year)
NGL Fractionation
(NF)
Feedstock for the
Olefin Unit, LPG
1,900,000
Olefin (OL) Ethylene, Propylene,
Butadaine
311,000
115,000
25,000
Chloralkali (CA) Chloride
Caustic Soda
230,000
240,000
Ethylene Di Chloride
(EDC)
Ethylene-Di-Chloride
130,000
Vinyl Chloride Monomer
(VCM)
Vinyl-Chloride-
Monomer 175,000
Aromatic (AR) Benzene
Xylene
270,000
140,000
Low Density Polyethylene
(LDPE)
Low-Density-
Polyethylene 100,000
High Density Polyethylene
(HDPE)
High-Density-
Polyethylene 60,000
Poly Propylene (PP) Poly-Propylene 50,000
Synthetic Rubber (SR) Synthetic Rubber 40,000
Salt Reclamation from Sea Salt 500,000
Poly Vinyl Chloride
(PVC)
P.V.0 175,000
Utilities (UT) Water
Electricity
Steam
Note:
(1)-The Common Facilities (CF) Unit consists of all machinery, and facilities
commonly used by other units. These include: harbour facilities, tanks, pipes,
sewage, fire-fighting equipment, buildings, roads, etc.
Source: BIPC, March 1993.
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8.0- Conclusion
In this chapter the history of Iran Japan Petrochemical Company from exploratory
talks in 1968 to its dissolution in 1990 was discussed.
It was espoused that factors such as Japan's and Mitsui Bussan's desire to gain
access to Iranian oil reserves and Iran's ambitions for industrialisation led to the setting
up the joint venture in 1973.
The joint venture, however, faced many problems from the very beginning. These
difficulties mainly stemmed from the different managerial and organisational styles of the
two main partners: Mitsui Bussan and the National Petrochemical Company, their
dissimilar modes of ownership and their contrasting expectations from the joint venture.
These problems which were exacerbated by the two oil shocks of the 1970s, the Iranian
revolution and the Iran-Iraq War precipitated many disagreements between the partners
and caused long delays in the completion of the petrochemical complex.
In 1989, the Japanese partners, believing that after seventeen years of delay in the
completion of the complex and the damage induced by the war, the project was no
longer economical, advocated a pull-out. Iran which needed the co-operation of the
Japanese government and business in rebuilding its war-torn economy agreed to their
demand and so the petrochemical joint venture was finall dissolved in 1990. Since then,
the National Petrochemical Company, with the co-operation of European companies, has
been reconstructing the complex hoping to complete it by 1994.
In the next chapter, the factors which are believed to have led to the failure of
UPC will be discussed.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
WHY UPC FAILED?
1.0- Introduction
In this chapter, the factors which are believed to have led to the failure and the
eventual dissolution of the Iran Japan Petrochemical Company are analyzed. However,
first, the strategies of the Iranian and Japanese partners, and their reasons for entering
into the joint venture in the first place, the organisational characteristics of both firms,
and the petrochemical industry will be briefly reviewed. Finally, the chapter will examine
in detail the factors which, using Franko's terminology, led to the "instability" of the joint
venture, i.e. the pull-out of the Japanese partners and the dissolution of ITPC.
2.0- Reasons for the Establishment of UPC
In Chapter One, section 3.0, the theoretical framework for analyzing the case of
UPC was set up. It was hypothesised that a major cause of the establishment of joint
ventures is resource scarcity' or resource interdependence 2. Moreover, this theory
argues that reducing uncertainty is a very strong factor in the creation of joint ventures.
It was also hypothesised that in order to understand why some joint ventures are
successful and some are not, one must look into the strategy of the parent firms, the
reasons for entering into the joint venture in the first place, and the firms' organisational
characteristics as well as their industries.
Accordingly, in Chapters Two and Three it was argued that the major factor
behind the Japanese enthusiasm for a joint venture with Iran was access to secure and
stable oil supplies. It was stated that due to the fast expansion of heavy and
petrochemical industries after the Second World War, Japan had become almost totally
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dependent on imported oil. More specifically, she was importing up to 80% of her
petroleum needs from the Middle East, especially Iran, which was supplying around 45%
of Japan's imports in the late 1960s/ early 1970s. However, due to the peculiar make-up
of the Japanese oil industry, going back to the origins of the industry in the last century,
Japan did not have any fully integrated oil company active in overseas oil exploration
and development. Moreover, as a result of the U.S policy during the Occupation period,
Japan had to rely on major international oil companies, particularly American, for a
substantial share of her petroleum imports. This situation was causing concern among
some Japanese politicians and businessmen who wanted Japan to have direct access to
overseas oil resources.3
On the other hand Iran, a major oil producer and exporter, was, for social,
political, and economic reasons, looking for ways to develop her industries. And the best
way to achieve this aim was the forward integration of the oil sector by a establishing
petrochemical industry and export refineries. As discussed in Chapter Four, due to the
backwardness of the Iranian economy, small oil revenues and, the total dominance of the
Anglo Iranian Oil Company over Iran's oil industry, she did not have the opportunity to
develop economically. After the nationalisation of the petroleum industry in 1951 and
the subsequent oil agreement of 1954 with the Consortium, Iran gained nominal control
over the industry and her revenues increased substantially. Following these developments,
several laws were enacted to promote the petrochemical industry, and the National
Petrochemical Company of Iran (NPC) was created as a vehicle for the development of
the industry.
At the beginning, NPC concentrated primarily on the domestic market by
establishing several small-scale petrochemical plants. Later on, however, with rapid
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industrialisation becoming the top priority of successive development plans, and the
realisation that domestic oil reserves would soon run out, NPC was instructed to develop
an export oriented petrochemical industry; utilising the wasting associated gas. In order
to implement such a programme, NPC needed a foreign partner(s) which would provide
the required technology, capital, and large international markets. A foreign partner was
also needed in order to reduce the risks associated with building a large and integrated
petrochemical complex industry and the risks involved in entering into foreign markets.
For various reasons discussed in Chapter Seven, Japanese companies were
deemed to be the most suitable partners. And Mitsui Bussan, one of the Japan's largest
trading companies, appeared to fit such criteria.
In Chapter Five, the origins, development, and organisational characteristics of
Mitsui Bussan were discussed in detail. It was learnt that the Mitsui Group had a few
distinct features which set it apart from its nearest rivals, especially the Mitsubishi
Group. First, it had a decentralised organisation and relied on the individual initiative
of its employees, particularly in the foreign investment field. Second, the group was
strong in trading and light industries, but weak in heavy industry. Third, the Group,
especially Bussan, had more overseas investments than any other Japanese group or
general trading company. Finally, in the post-war period it was well behind its rivals in
the fast expanding oil business. This last factor, probably more than any other was
instrumental in persuading Mitsui to consider a joint venture with Iran.
Furthermore, it was explained in Chapters One and Five that the Japanese sogo
shosha's main line of business is trading. They undertake investment in productive
businesses, particulary foreign investment (in the form of joint ventures), to generate
trading opportunities by selling plant and machinery, raw, and intermediate materials to
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the joint venture and buy its output for domestic sales or exports.
So in Chapters Two to Six, the reasons for establishing the joint venture between
Mitsui Bussan and NPC were examined. In Chapter Seven, the history of the company,
from the exploratory talks in 1968 to its dissolution in 1990, was described in detail.
More importantly, the characteristics of the management of the joint venture, during
nearly two decades of its life was analyzed.
In order to complete our analysis of LIPC according to the theoretical framework
of Chapter One, one needs to know what factors caused the joint venture to become
"unstable": i.e. brought about it dissolution.
3.0- Causes of the Dissolution of IJPC
In Chapter One it was hypothesised that a major cause of a joint venture's
instability is a change in the business strategy of its parent companies'. Moreover, it was
elaborated that the purpose of a joint venture is not to last, but rather to contribute to
the fulfilment of the goals of its parents. This chapter will attempt to establish whether
any changes occurred in the business strategies of either NPC and/or Mitsui Bussan
which led to the break-up of LIPC, or whether the joint venture was dissolved after
fulfilling (or failing to fulfil) the goals set by its parents. In addition, the factors, which
in the opinion of the author of this study, caused the partners to consider terminating the
joint venture. Finally, the developments within LJPC from two angles: economic viability
(feasibility), and the management style of its partners (influenced by their modes of
ownership) will be examined.
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3.1- Feasibility
The Japanese partners, from the early discussions in 1969 to the break-up of UPC,
were claiming that a petrochemical plant in Iran would not be feasible: i.e. it would cost
around 40% more to build petrochemical plants in Iran than it would in Japan. In fact,
this claim was a source of constant disagreement between the two partners, causing long
delays in the start-up of the construction, completion, and eventually, the dissolution of
the joint venture. In this section, the cost structure of the petrochemical industry will be
briefly discussed to determine whether the construction costs of petrochemical plants in
Middle East are higher than the similar ones in advanced countries.
The production costs of petrochemical plants vary greatly, depending on the type
of product, the process of production and raw materials used, the plant size, its location
and its investment costs. Wages and the productivity of the manpower employed makes
a very small contribution to the cost of production. The following sub-sections will
examine the contribution some of these factors make to the final cost of petrochemical
products within an international comparison and then will discuss the case of UPC.
3.1.1- Cost of Raw Materials
The share of raw materials in the production costs of various petrochemical
products depends on the energy intensiveness of these products and how far downstream
they are processed. More precisely, the effect of raw material costs decreases for
products further downstream, whose production involves extensive processing before
becoming ready for use as final products. For instance, before the first increase in oil
prices in 1973, the cost of raw materials contributed 40-60% (including 25% ROI) to the
production cost of many petrochemical products, particularly synthetic resins, plastic
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materials,fertilisers, and other intermediate products?
After the rise in oil prices in 1973-74, the share of raw materials escalated to
between 50% and more than 75% (including 25% ROI) of the total cost of the
production of petrochemical products. This situation can perhaps be best explained with
the change in the production cost of ethylene: the most basic of petrochemical products.
As Table 8.1 shows, for a 300,000 tonne per year ethylene cracker (the same as the
UPC's capacity of 300,000 tonne/year), that came on stream in 1977, the cost of raw
materials was 6.13 times that of an equivalent one operating in 1972. In fact, by 1977,
raw materials for ethylene production had become the dominant component of
production costs, rising from 42.2% in 1972 to 71.6% in 1977 (Table 8.1). As a result of
the rise in production costs, the prices of petrochemical products also rose by about 200-
300% in 1974, and increased steadily until 1979. The second oil crisis in that year caused
prices to rise steeply, but not as much as they had done in 1974.
Clearly, this development in 1973-74 tilted the viability of petrochemical
production in favour of oil producing countries like Iran which could supply
petrochemical plants with very low-cost raw materials like natural gas, naphtha, etc.
3.1.2- Construction Costs
After 1974, as a result of the rise in oil prices and worldwide inflation, the
construction costs of petrochemical plants together with raw materials rose relative to
other factors of production. As Table 8.1 shows, fixed capital costs for the 300,000
tonne/year ethylene cracker mentioned above, increased by 1.67 times as compared to
the same plant in 1972. Obviously, the rate of increase in capital cost was well below the
rate for raw materials which had risen by 6.13 times. This caused the share of the capital
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cost to decline in relative terms from 39.5 to 19.3 per cent of total production costs. The
effect of increases in these two factors of production was that the overall costs of
production for petrochemicals had swelled by 3.6 times from 1972 to 1977.6
This disproportionate rise in the costs of the two most important factors of
production for petrochemicals and the steep rise in prices for petrochemical products
does not support ICDC's argument in 1974 that due to a rise in construction costs, the
joint venture would be uneconomic. To be sure, there were others, like Louis Turner
(1979), who were claiming in the later part of the 1970s and early 1980s that
petrochemical plants operating in the Middle East would be unviable.
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Table 8.1: Increase in Olefins Manufacturing Costs
Naphtha* Naphtha* Naphtha*
Capacity t/y
Ethylene
300,000 300,000 300,000
Economic
Conditions
Prevailing in
1972
Prevailing in
1977
Prevailing in
1977
Unit erected in
1972.
Investment in
1972.
Fixed Capital Costs
(US$m)
104 184.3 104
Manufacturing Cost
(US$,000)
Raw Materials
(%)+
21,150
(42.2)
129,600
(71.6)
129,600
(78)
Utilities 1,080 2,200 2,200
Catalysts &
Chemicals 820 1,100 1,000
Manpower 500 1,100 1,100
Other charges 6,750 12,000 12,000
Amortization
& return +
19,800
(39.5)
35,000
(19.3)
19,000
(12)
Total
Manufacturing Cost
50,100
(100)
180,900
(100)
165,700
(100)
Notes:
	
(*)- Naphtha Steam Cracking.
(+)- Percentage of total costs.
Source: UNIDO, " First Worldwide Study on the Petrochemical Industry: 1975-2000",
UNIDO, ICIS.83, December 1978.
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Notwithstanding, the above data applies to petrochemical plants in industrialised
countries, and critics of the oil producing countries' plans for the expansion of their
domestic petrochemical industries do have a case.
In reality, capital investment costs for oil related industries are much higher in the
developing countries than in Japan and the United States, where they are the lowest. In
the oil producing counties of the Middle East, for reasons discussed below, investment
costs are between 50-110 % higher than on the U.S Gulf of Mexico Coast (which is used
as a reference point for international comparisons in the oil processing industry) for
petrochemical plants of the same size.
These higher costs result from a combination of various factors: the delays in
executing projects, insufficient supply of native skilled manpower, almost complete lack
of engineering services, all manufactured materials and equipment having to be imported
from industrialised countries thousands of miles away and assembled under harsh
climatic conditions, and inadequate physical and social infrastructures. The combination
of these factors is referred to as "location factor" 7, which is used by engineering firms
in their calculations for investment costs in various countries around the world. 8 Table
8.2 demonstrates the disadvantageous position of the oil producing developing countries
in investment costs related to location factor for petrochemical plants when compared
to industrialised countries.
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As the Table shows, Japan has the lowest investment cost (0.9) of any country in
the world. Moreover, all oil producing developing countries have higher investment costs
than Japan, U.S (whose value is at unity) and Germany: ranging from 1.25 for Mexico
to 1.5 for Qatar and 2.1 for Indonesia.
The location related higher investment cost in the oil producing countries offsets
the raw materials cost advantage which they enjoy compared to industrialised countries.
More precisely, their cost advantage over the industrialised countries is limited to basic
petrochemical products such as ethylene, methanol, HDPE, VCM, and styrene which
have a higher raw materials content. In fact, the more downstream the petrochemical
product (such as LDPE, PP, and ethylene oxide), the higher the differentials in unit
investment costs (see Table 8.2).
In the above analogy, however, one is not comparing like with like. The data for
industrialised countries relates to private chemical companies or chemical subsidiaries
of oil companies whose only objective is profitability and an adequate return for their
shareholders. Moreover, these firms operate in tax environments which are very different
from those prevailing in oil producing developing countries.
Such companies usually have a large range of other investment opportunities to
consider. Therefore, when they contemplate establishing a petrochemical plant at home
or as a joint venture with oil producing countries, they use certain criteria to appraise
and compare these investment opportunities. These criteria include 25% ROI, 10%
depreciation charges, and working capital at 20% of fixed costs.9
Profitability and return on investment, however, are not the only criteria, or
motivation, for the oil producing countries when they consider the development of their
petrochemical industries. For example as shown in the case of Iran in Chapters Four and
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Seven: social, political, as well as economic factors did play important parts in the
decision to develop the country's petrochemical industry.
In the light of these non-economic considerations, it would be inappropriate to
evaluate the petrochemical plans of these countries with criteria developed for private
companies of industrialised countries with free market economies. Perhaps, cost-benefit
analysis techniques, which give more weight to social factors and give proper
consideration to the effects of such projects on the long-term economic developments of
oil producing countries, should be employed.
If one, or some of the above mentioned assumptions were relaxed for the oil
producing developing countries, their petrochemical plants would be hi . hly competitive
with those of the industrialised countries. For example, as Table 8.3 shows, if the former
were prepared to accept 5% ROI on their petrochemical investments, the downstream
products of such enterprises would be highly competitive with those of the latter.
One is not trying to "fiddle" with the numbers in order to make such investments
to appear attractive. But rather, as mentioned before, the oil producing developing
countries are trying to satisfy non-economic as well as economic objectives, and
moreover, are well behind in their stage of economic and social development compared
to the industrialised countries. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to use purely
commercial criteria formulated for the highly industrialised countries to appraise their
industrialisation plans.w
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3.1.3- Plant Capacity
Another important factor which affects the production costs of petrochemical
products is the size of the ethylene plant. As mentioned before, ethylene is the most
basic petrochemical product from which many downstream products are derived. In 1972,
doubling the size of a 150,000 tonne per year ethylene plant would lead to a 14%
reduction in production costs (including 25% ROI, but not by-products benefits).11 This
doubling of capacity in 1972 would lead to the decline of the share of capital investment
in total production costs from 43.6% for a 150,000 tonne/year plant to 39.5% for the
300,000 tonne/year plant discussed above. This reduction is due to the non-proportional
relation that exists between investment costs and plant size which is characteristic of
petrochemical plants and refineries. The lower production costs achieved by a 300,000
tonne/year plant would lead to a 17% reduction per tonne in the price of ethylene.12
As production costs became less sensitive to capital costs, oil producing
developing countries (like Iran) with small domestic markets, found an opportunity to
establish small to medium sized plants to produce ethylene and other commodity
petrochemical products at competitive prices without the need to invest in large scale
plants. This holds true to some extent in the case of Iran, where almost all of the small
to medium sized petrochemical plants established in the 1960s and 1970s (some of them
as joint ventures with foreign companies, like Farabi Petrochemical", formerly a joint
venture between Mitsubishi Corporation, Nissho Iwai, and NPC) are operating at profit,
and moreover, are satisfying a growing domestic demand for petrochemical products.14
3.1.4- Labour Costs
Labour costs have far less influence on the total costs of production than other
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factors of production. This is due to the low labour costs per unit of production in the
highly capital intensive petrochemical industry. This is not, however, strictly true for
petrochemical companies operating in the oil producing countries of the Middle East.
There, due to the inadequate supply of indigenous work force, expatriate manpower has
to be employed, which apart from being expensive, does not have a long term
commitment to the company. These factors, plus cultural and linguistic problems, make
the employment of foreign workers undesirable on a long term basis. (This issue will be
discussed in the case of UPC in later sections.)
4.0- The Economic Viability of UPC
In this section, the argument developed in Section 3.1 on the feasibility of the
petrochemical industry will be applied to UPC to see whether the joint venture was
viable or not.
As mentioned in Chapter Seven, two feasibility studies carried out in the late
1960s/early 1970s by Mitsui Bussan's Chemicals Division revealed that a large
petrochemical plant in Iran would not be feasible. Moreover, The author of this study
has also been informed by one source' that a feasibility study commissioned by the
Export-Import Bank of Japan in the early 1970s showed that the project was uneconomic,
and on the basis of that study the bank was against involvement in the proposed joint
venture. Nevertheless, the Exim Bank, under political pressure, extended large loans to
the Mitsui Group and NPC.
Unfortunately, it has been impossible to access these feasibility studies. However,
with help of the argument developed in Section 3.1, each factor of production related to
UPC will be examined to find out which of them were in favour of the project and which
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were not. Finally, all these factors will be brought together to establish whether the
project was uneconomic from the beginning, or whether other external factors made the
joint venture unfeasible.
4.1- Raw Materials
As discussed in Chapter Seven, one of the main factors behind the interest of
Mitsui Bussan in a petrochemical joint venture with Iran was the availability of cheap
raw materials, especially natural gas, at very low prices. Moreover, it was explained that
the Japanese petrochemical industry was naphtha based, which is more expensive and
has a lower utility ratio for the production of ethylene, than natural gas. Also, due to the
Japanese government's policy, the price of naphtha was higher in Japan than other
industrialised countries. Furthermore, as explained in the previous section, after the first
oil crisis, the share of raw materials in the production of petrochemical products rose to
between 50-75% of their total costs. Therefore, the Japanese petrochemical companies
had an incentive to build petrochemical plants in oil producing countries which offered
raw materials at low prices.
In fact, in the Basic Agreement of 1971, the Iranians offered the natural gas at
only 2 cents per 1000 cubic feet (or 71 cents per 1000 cubic meter, delivered at the
wellhead), and naphtha at $1.8 per barrel. This was at a time when in 1972, the
international export prices for natural gas and naphtha were $10.81 per 1000 m3, and
$20.02 per tonne respectively.16
Moreover, UPC was a unique petrochemical company in the sense that it was the
only company of its type that could produce industrial salt from its own salt field in hug,e
quantities (500,000 tonne/year) at very low prices for its own requirements (400,000 t/y)
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and sell the rest in the Iranian and overseas markets.
The quadrupling of oil prices in 1973-74, however, changed the pricing of raw
materials for UPC in two ways. First, with the rise in petroleum product prices, the price
of natural and liquid gas also increased. This development probably caused the Iranians
to realise that they could no longer offer the joint venture raw materials at the very low
prices agreed in the Basic Agreement. Now they could put the natural gas to other
equally profitable uses, like re-injection into the aging oil wells for secondary recovery
or export refineries, valuing the natural gas at $1.60 and $1.68 per 1000 f3 respectively.17
These two alternative uses for natural gas could be compared to its value when used for
urea production which would fetch NIOC $1.0-1.20 18 or selling it to UPC for 2 cents
per 1000 f3.
The other factor effecting the pricing of feedstock for UPC after 1973-74 was the
high inflation which followed the rise in oil prices. 19 As discussed in Chapter Seven,
high inflation caused the UPC construction costs to soar from $358 million to $2480
million.' In order to reduce the costs, NIOC agreed to undertake the necessary
investment for gathering and transportation of natural gas from the oilfields to the UPC
site. However, this investment, which by 1978 had escalated to $700 million, forced NIOC
to ask for a fair return on its investment and a more realistic price for the supply of
natural gas. This new development was totally unacceptable to the Japanese partners
who had been attracted to the joint venture on the promise of "free gas". This problem
was temporarily settled in 1978 when NPC proposed to supply the joint venture with
natural gas at 30 cents BTU, and liquid gas at $40 per tonne for the first 12 years of the
operations.
These prices, compared to international ones, were still very attractive. In 1978,
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the export prices for naphtha and natural gas were $146.14 per tonne and $76.79 per
1000 m3 respectively.21
Lastly, it is likely that the increase in the contribution of raw materials to the total
costs of production of petrochemicals which followed the first oil crisis of 1973, caused
the Iranians to believe that they now had a stronger bargaining position vis the Japanese
partners. In fact the former were complaining that the latter were making all the profits
out of the joint venture. With the increase in the importance of raw materials,
presumably, the Iranians found an opportunity to make their own profit out of LTF'C, or
concluded that they had to compensate for the escalation in construction costs by raising
the feedstock prices.
As will be argued in the course of the following sections, ITPC was a raw material
centred petrochemical company (in my opinion, to the detriment of other factors of
production). It was established in Iran, and especially in Bandar Shahpour, to be near
the main sources of raw materials. Natural gas was to be supplied from the Ahvaz and
Marun oilfields, about 100 km to the north of Bandar Shahpour. Naphtha was to be
provided from NIOC's Abadan Refinery less than 100km away, and salt from the sea.
This proximity to the sources of raw materials was supposed to reduce total production
costs and compensate for higher construction costs in Iran. However, as it was learnt in
Chapter Seven, the problem of feedstock and energy supplies and pricing were never
resolved between the IJPC partners. In fact, the much higher feedstock prices demanded
by the Iranians (as compared to the original prices under the 1971 Agreement) and, the
actual unavailability of these feedstocks (due to the fall in oil production after the
revolution and the. war), tog,ether with spiralling construction CO3*s (discusse4 bellow)
undermined the viability of the joint venture.
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The Japanese partners, however, believed that due to the spiralling construction
costs, feedstocks still had to be supplied to the joint venture at very low prices, no matter
how high the international prices were, in order to make the joint venture profitable.
However, once these inputs were no longer available at sufficient quantities and the low
prices promised under the Basic Agreement, the Japanese partners lost one of their most
important reasons for their involvement in the joint venture. As a result, ICDC
advocated a pull-out from the project. Therefore, the high raw material costs and their
unavailability was a major factor in the dissolution of the joint venture in 1989.
4.2- The Construction Costs
In this section, the effect of each component of the "location factor" discussed in
Section 3.1 on the construction cost of UPC will be examined. An attempt will be made
to establish whether, as the Japanese and others claimed, the construction costs in Iran
(or the Middle East in general) were higher than those in industrialised countries, hence
making exports from the joint venture uncompetitive in the international markets. To do
so, Qatar shall be used as a reference point.
The question of "location factor" will be analyzed from two angles: one related to
UPC's site in Bandar Shahpour, and one from the standpoint of Iran as an oil producing
developing country. Although, these two perspectives are in fact inseparable, this is done
in order to examine the chances of success for the joint venture if the complex had been
situated somewhere else in Iran.
4.2.1- The Location of UPC Complex
The choice for IJPC's petrochemical complex site was Bandar Shahpour, a small
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port in the northwest of the Persian Gulf and southwestern Iran. This choice was made
by the Iranians who were planning to make the port the centre of the country's
petrochemical industry. In fact two other petrochemical plants are also located there.
One is Shahpour Petrochemical (the joint venture between Allied Chemical of U.S,
which started operations in the 1960s), and the other IRNIP which became operational
in 1977.
The reason for choosing Bandar Shahpour was proximity to the Persian Guff, thus
allowing large tonnage ships to berth at the especially developed dock to transport
outputs of the complex to foreign markets. n The other factor in favour of locating the
complex there was that Bandar Shahpour was close to major oilfields, hence enabling it
to receive its feedstock (gas and naphtha) with the minimum of investment and costs.23
Moreover, when Mitsui Bussan's team visited Bandar Shahpour in 1969, it considered the
site suitable for a petrochemical plant.
4.2.1.1- The Climate and Infrastructural facilities
Bandar Shahpour (or Bandar Imam Khomeini), is located in an arid area of Iran
which has a very hot and humid climate with the temperature reaching 50° C during
summer. Moreover, the area's indigenous population is very low. (The population of
Bandar Shahpour itself was around 5,000 in the 1970s 25). The expansion of the domestic
oil industry, which is mostly located in the region, had a small effect on the economic
development of the region. Moreover, Bandar Mahshahr, with a population of over
80,000 (late 1970s), is located about 17Iun to the north east of Shahpour, and
accommodates one of Iran's largest oil export terminals.' (One of UPC's camps for its
employees is located in Bandar Mahshahr).
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The infrastructure of Bandar Shahpour was very poor and IJPC had to build
almost all facilities, like housing, hospital, roads, docks, electricity, water, etc itself. The
company even had to construct a town with the capacity for 20,000 with all amenities to
house its staff. All this of course cost money and UPC had to spend large sums of capital
to provide such facilities.
This underdeveloped state of Bandar Shahpour created several problems for the
joint venture. Apart from having to spend huge amounts on the infrastructure with the
resultant increases in capital expenditure, the initial lack of such facilities delayed or
obstructed the construction and smooth progress of the project. For instance, due to
inadequate housing, 10,000 Iranian, Japanese, and other construction workers had to
share cramped accommodation. This situation caused much friction and ill feelings
between Iranian and foreign nationals and created obstacles in the smooth progress of
the project.' Moreover, due to an almost non-existent supply of a skilled or semi-
skilled local workforce, almost all manpower requirements of IJPC had to imported from
other parts of Iran and overseas. 2s These employees had to be paid high wages
(compared to other parts of Iran) in order to entice them to work in such an inhospitable
environment.
One can conclude from the above discussion that from a feasibility point of view,
all factors, apart from the proximity to sources of raw material were against locating the
UPC complex in Bandar Shahpour. In fact, partly because of the harsh environment,
inadequate facilities and the general shortage of skilled manpower prevalent at that time
in Iran, IJPC was facing serious problems in recruiting sufficient numbers of personnel
to work in the complex after the start of operations. Furthermore, the provision of
infrastructural facilities was costing the company huge amounts which it could ill afford,
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The last point can be evidenced from the fact that even after the takeover of the
company by NPC, the company (now called BIPC) is facing the double problem of
deficiency of infrastructure and rising capital costs for provision of such amenities as
housing, medical care, etc. In fact, in July 1992, BEPC's Board of Directors was asking
its shareholders to allow the company to separate the ever increasing capital investments
for infrastructure from direct manufacturing investment because they believed that the
former was seriously undermining the profitability and economic viability of the
company.29 Moreover, the Board was asking the Iranian government for financial
assistance as the latter, for social reasons, had burdened the company with demands for
provision of facilities for its workforce.
4.2.1.2- Proximity to the War Zone
One other "location factor", which although unrelated to the factors discussed
above, nonetheless, had, to some extent, an effect on the viability of the joint venture.
This factor was the proximity of the UPC complex to the war zone, in southwestern Iran.
The Complex site, as discussed in the previous chapter, was attacked more than 42 times
by the Iraqis during the eight year war which caused extensive damage to its plants and
machinery.30
 Moreover, the Iraqis, realising the strategic value of the petrochemical
complex to Iran, threatened to attack it if the construction was resumed by the Japanese
contractors. As discussed in Chapter Seven, Japanese officials on several occasions asked
Iraq not to attack the Complex in exchange for Japan repairing Iraqi installations
damaged during the war. This, in fact increased the strategic value of the project and,
as soon as Japanese contractors resumed construction, the Iraqi planes attacked the site,
forcing the Japanese to abandon the complex_ As a result, no construction took place
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between 1980-88 (the war years). More importantly, the extensive damages caused by the
bombardments and delays due to the war, increased construction costs by at least $1.5
billion (see Table 7.8).
In the opinion of many experts, including Dr Mostofi, it was the delays in the
completion and damage brought about by the constant bombing during the war which
seriously undermined the economic viability of the joint venture and led to its
dissolution. Having said this, it must be stated that even without damage and delays
caused by the war, UPC was in serious financial and organisational trouble. The fall in
oil production and revenues, general disorganisation, economic mis-management,
political instability resulting from the revolution of 1979, the hostage crisis, economic
sanctions, the eight year war, did serious damage to the Iranian economy and, in
particular the oil industry. Due to mis-management, lack of investment and the flee of
experienced staff, the oil industry is at present in a treble shape in Iran. Even if the UPC
complex had not been directly been affected by the war (being bombed) it is doubtful
whether the Iranians, with the full cooperation of Japanese partners, had the managerial
and financial resources to complete the project in time and operate it profitability. There
are several evidences to back up this assertion. Firstly, the Mobarakeh Steel Company,
a major iron and steel complex, conceived in the late 1970s, during the shah's regime,
located near Esfahan. The steel complex, despite being given top priority by both
regimes, has not yet been completed after nearly sixteen years of construction. The
second case, the construction of Tabriz Petrochemical Complex, although being planned
in 1984 and, in spite of all contracts having been awarded, has not yet been started.
Thirdly, the case of LIPC Complex itself. Although the war ended in 19101 and the
Japanese partners pulled out in 1989 and, contracts were awarded in 1990 to European
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engineering companies, the Complex has not yet been completed.
In the two first two cases, the projects were not directly affected by the war, i.e.,
being bombed. However, all three projects have been severely affected by foreign
currency shortages, chaotic economic situation, mis-management, dis-organisation, and
political instability. These three cases are only a few examples of many industrial and
infrastructural projects which have not yet either started or completed because of the
reasons mentioned above.
As would be argued in later sections, even if UPC had not been affected by the
war, and had been completed in mid- 1980s, its chances of profitable operation would
have been greatly reduced for the reasons of high construction costs, high feedstock
prices, and dis-organisation and mis-management prevalent in the Iranian oil industry.
4.2.2- Delays in the Construction of the Project
As discussed in Section 3.1, one cause of higher capital costs in the developing
countries is the delays which occurs in the construction and completion of industrial
plants. These delays affect the investment in two ways. First, they prolong the pay-back
period, hence reducing profitability or feasibility of the enterprise even before the start
of operations. Second, in an inflationary environment, the longer the completion time for
a project, the higher the final capital costs.
The economic viability of UPC was seriously undermined by the delays in the
completion of the petrochemical complex. As mentioned in Chapter Seven, the
worldwide high inflation that followed the 1973 oil crisis, increased the construction costs
of the joint venture by more than six times. Moreover, the implementation of many
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infrastructural and industrial projects during the Revised Fifth Plan (1973-78) put severe
strains on the already overheated Iranian economy which had reached it absorptive
capacity limits (see chapter Four). This high rates of investment not only caused high
inflation rates in the 1970s (around 25% p.a), but also brought about a severe shortage
of many goods and services and manpower. The high international and domestic inflation
rates, plus the shortages mentioned above not only pushed the construction costs of the
Complex, but also caused many delays in the completion of the project as the partners
had to draw up new plans to reduce such costs (see Chapter Seven).
LTPC suffered not only from delays normally associated with the construction of
industrial plants in the Middle East (or other developing regions), but also from delays
peculiar to the joint venture itself. These delays, which lasted first from 1971 to 1976,
and then 1979 to 1989, seriously undermined the feasibility of LTPC, and were a factor
in its eventual dissolution.
Due to the underdeveloped state of the economy and weakness of the local
private sector of the developing countries, large industrial projects are usually undertaken
by the government. The implementation of these projects is put under the supervision
of one or more ministries or government agencies, with their budget provided by the
finance ministry or the planning organisation. Therefore, such projects become subject
to inefficient, corrupt bureaucracies and the power politics prevalent in these countries.
They are also susceptible to becoming sources of personal rivalry between high ranking
officials and their respective organisations vying for greater power and influence over the
country's top leader. These factors, plus inefficient organisational arrangements, and the
generally laid back attitude of natives of such countries towards business matters, are the
main causes of delays in the implementation of industrial projects. Almost all these
463
factors, as observed in Chapter Seven, caused delays in the completion of the UPC
Complex. The most vivid example was the rivalry between the Chairman of NPC and the
Minister of Finance who, for personal reasons, was refusing to provide sovereign
guarantees for loans from the Japanese banks to LIPC.
However, Iran's underdeveloped economy, or bureaucratic inefficiencies and
corruption were not the only sources of delays. The Japanese partners were equally
responsible for delays which contributed to the eventual dissolution of UPC.
As explained in detail in Chapter Seven, the idea of a petrochemical joint venture
was first discussed between NPC and Mitsui Bussan in November 1968. Although NPC
was very enthusiastic for a swift commencement of the project, it took the Mitsui Group
almost three years to finally decide to agree to a petrochemical joint venture. Even then,
it was only forced into action because of its aspiration to win the bidding for the
Lorestan oilfield. The explanations of the Mitsui Group for these delays were that the
petrochemical project was unfeasible and extensive studies needed to be carried out to
make it profitable.
After the signing of the Basic Agreement in October 1971, it took another year
and half to set up UPC and the same amount of time to start work on the ground
levelling for the complex site. So, it was towards the end of 1973, five years after initial
negotiations that preparatory works on the project began.
However, soon after the start of ground levelling works, the joint venture faced
its first major problem. The oil crisis of 1973 precipitated high inflation and economic
recession in the industrialised countries. These developments changed the economics of
the petrochemical industry. Following these developments and the spiralling of
construction costs, the Japanese partners brought work on the site to a halt on the
464
grounds that the project was no longer feasible.
Some partners in ICDC (like Toyo Soda) and a few within Mitsui Bussan itself
were arguing that the increased costs and other factors had made the joint venture
uneconomic and advocated a pull-out. These disagreements between the Japanese
partners, their constant changes to the production policy to suit new market conditions,
revisions of construction plans of UPC, shortage of capital, and the problem that Mitsui
Bussan as the managing contractor was creating for the joint venture, delayed the start
of actual construction of the complex for nearly three years.
However, as discussed in Section 3.1, although in 1974 construction costs had
increased by about 1.76 times, raw materials costs had increased by 6.13 times. This
caused the latter's share in total production costs to rise to over 75%. Obviously, this
development had enhanced the LIF'C chances of success, as it had access to low cost raw
materials. Moreover, the rise in the prices of petrochemical products of between 3-4.5
times (200-350%) after 1974, more than compensated for the total production cost
increases of 3.6 times over the same period.
From the above analysis, it becomes clear that the rise in construction costs after
the first oil crisis did not necessarily undermine the economic viability of UPC, but was
probably enhanced it. In fact, it was the delay in the completion of the project, brought
about by the ICDC's hesitations and, problems associated executing large industrial
projects in Iran (see Chapter Four) which impeded the completion and viability of UPC
before the Iranian Revolution and the start of the Iran-Iraq war. As Table 8.1
demonstrates, if the project had been completed and become operational by 1974 (as
originally hoped by NPC), ITPC would have benefitted from the lower construction costs
of pre-first oil crisis and the very high prices for petrochemical products prevalent in
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post-oil crisis years.
of course, one must not ignore the fact that even if the Complex had been
completed on time, it may have had difficulty in starting operations due to shortage of
skilled operators. Even if it had started production, there would have been problems with
sales of petrochemical products in the Iranian domestic market (due to the lack of large
demand for the outputs of such a large Complex) and the recession in the international
petrochemical markets which followed the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973.
Notwithstanding, it was not until September 1976 that the ICDC became really
committed to the completion of the project, and it took the Japanese another year
(September 1977) to start the actual construction of the complex. Therefore, it took
about nine years after the initial talks of 1968 and six years after the signing of the Basic
Agreement before the construction of the project began.
The overall effect of these delays was that the construction costs rose from $358
million in 1971 to over $2567 in 1978. As a result, the economic viability of the joint
venture was seriously undermined and this became a factor in its eventual demise.
Fr0111 September 1977 until early 1979, the construction of the petrochemical
complex progressed at very high speed, which attests the efficiency of Japanese
organisation. In fact, by February 1979, the project had been 85% and 65% completed
in terms of plant installations and works schedule respectively. However, as learnt in
Chapter Seven, in that month, due to the Iranian revolution, construction was brought
into a halt, and once again ICDC became hesitant about the viability of the project. But
under strong Japanese government pressure, following the second oil crisis and the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, due to concern about the security of oil supplies, ICDC agreed
to the resumption of the construction that had been suspended for nearly 20 months.
466
Before the construction could be resumed, however, the Iran-Iraq War began in
September 1980, and the complex site became the target of Iraqi bombers. This
prompted the indefinite suspension of the project which lasted until 1989. The delays
and, damage caused by the eight year war, high inflation rates prevalent in Iran during
this period due to the effects of the war, had increased the construction costs by at least
another $1.5 billion (see table 7.8). The enormous construction costs, together with other
factors, forced the Japanese partners to ask to be released from their obligations under
the Basic Agreement of 1971. Therefore, the excessive construction costs became another
factor in the liquidation of UPC.
The Japanese partners of UPC certainly cannot be blamed for the suspension of
the project during the war (as NPC tends to claim), as it was pointless to erect plant and
machinery, only for it to be destroyed by Iraqi planes. Understandably, ICDC partners,
being private companies; concerned with profits, were not prepared to invest any further
in a project whose completion had been delayed by at least 17 years and had no
prospects of ever becoming operational.
The expected unprofitability of the UPC was not the only factor in the Japanese
partner's decision to pull out of the joint venture. Other equally important factors,
namely a change in the strategy of ICDC particularly Mitsui Bussan, and the failure of
IJPC to fulfil its goals were also responsible for the "instability" of the joint venture.
These factors will be discussed in later sections.
4.2.3- Insufficient Supply of Indigenous Manpower
Insufficient supply of trained local manpower is a major hinderance to the
industrialisation of developing countries. This problem is even worse in oil producing
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developing countries with small populations like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
Although the petrochemical industry is highly capital intensive and therefore
needs just a small workforce for its operations, such countries find it very difficult to
satisfy the manpower needs of such plants locally, and have to resort to recruiting large
numbers of expatriate workers. This, apart from increasing the labour costs, creates
social problems for these countries whose culture and social code of behaviour is very
different from those of foreign workers.
UPC also faced the dilemma of inadequate supply of skilled local manpower and
the social problems created by employing a large number of expatriates. 31 Iran, which
had no experience in the construction and operation of a large scale petrochemical
complex such as UPC, had to recruit large numbers of expatriates to complete and run
the plant. At the height of its construction, UPC and its contractors employed around
9,000 workers of whom 3,500 were Iranian, 3,000 Japanese, and the rest from various
Asian countries.'
The main problem for the joint venture was recruiting an adequate number of
workers when the plant would become operational. The company needed about 2,000
operators at the time of the start-up of operations. Of these 1,400 were to be Iranians
and 600 Japanese. 33 However Iran, with a population of over 32 million (late 1970s)
had difficulties in supplying such a relatively small workforce. As mentioned in chapter
Four, the PBO had estimated that in the latter part of 1970s (during the Revised Fifth
Plan), there would be a shortage of 721,000 of skilled and semi-skilled workers including
industrial operators, construction workers, etc. In fact the situation was so critical that
in 1978, of 200 Iranian operators (out of the total 1,400) who were needed for the initial
phase of the operations only 20 had been secured?' To alleviate the general shortage
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of skilled manpower, the Basic Agreement of 1971 had required the Japanese partners
to train sufficient number of workers for the operation of the complex. However, due to
spiralling construction costs and lack of adequate finance, the Japanese partners did not
nut the training programmes for the Iranian personnel as required by the Basic
Agreement of 1971. (See Chapter Seven for details).
The problem was not that there was a total lack of skilled manpower in Iran, but
rather that after the huge increase in oil revenues, the country had embarked upon an
ambitious development programme with many infrastructural and industrial projects
being implemented at the same time by both the government and the private sector. The
rate of investment in some years between 1974 and 1978 reached the astonishing rate of
60%, a rate which was obviously very high and unsustainable for a developing country
like Iran, or even industrialised countries for that matter (see Chapter Four). Under
these circumstances, Iran's underdeveloped physical and social infrastructure were put
under severe strain, with shortages occurring in many sectors including supply of
manpower. These shortages were aggravated by un-coordinated planning and lack of a
comprehensive industrial policy. In fact anyone could establish any type of manufacturing
operation, without any consideration to the supply of manpower, availability of
technology, raw and intermediate materials, capital goods, minimum efficient scale of
operation and reap the benefits from a heavily protected domestic market.
The construction of the UPC complex was probably putting more pressure on the
already strained Iranian economy than any other major industrial or infrastructural
project. This was because of the sheer size of the project which at the time was to be
biggest petrochemical complex in the world. Quite clearly, as shall be discussed in the
next chapter, a project of this size was not suitable for conditions prevailing, in In at
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the time, when even the country's most important industrial project (UPC) had difficulty
in securing an adequate supply of trained workforce.
4.2.4- Other Location Factors
In Chapter Four it was explained that the Iranian oil industry, the leading sector
of the economy, was dominated by Major oil companies for most of the 20th century.
These companies imported most of their plants and machinery required for the operation
of the industry from abroad and employed foreign engineering and construction firms for
the construction of oil installations. Because of this situation, and the non-existence of
any engineering or service companies in Iran, the oil industry failed to establish any
backward linkages with the rest of the Iranian economy. As a result, the domestic
manufacturing and engineering service industries did not develop sufficiently to meet
demand for capital goods and services which was growing very rapidly in the 1960s and
1970s.
However, by the 1970s, Iran had managed to establish a small scale machinery
industry which produced (or rather assembled) various heavy, mechanical and electrical
machinery for the domestic market. None of the companies active in this field had any
technology of their own and produced or assembled such machinery under licence from
American, European, and Japanese companies. Although they supplied UPC with a few
pieces of machinery, they were in no position to supply the bulk of sophisticated plant
and machinery required by the complex, and these had to be imported mainly from
Japan. In fact, as discussed in earlier chapters, one of the main reasons for the interest
of Mitsui Bussan in a petrochemical joint venture with Iran was the prospect of exporting
huge amounts of plant and machinery required by such a project.
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One problem with this method of procurement was that no Iranian engineering
or machinery company, or even NPC itself were involved in the design, manufacture or
installation of plants and machinery. This severely reduced the opportunities for transfer
of technology to Iran, one of the objectives of NPC in seeking a foreign partner.
Moreover, it was a condition of Japanese loans to IJPC that all plants and machinery had
to be bought from Japan. Japanese companies producing such goods and Mitsui Bussan
which was in charge of procurement, used this tied market to sell their products and
services at monopoly prices. This situation, as was seen in Chapter Seven, was a source
of disagreement between the Japanese partners, Mitsui Bussan and the contractors, and
Bussan and NPC. Actually, the new management of NPC which was installed by the
Islamic goverment claimed that Dr Mostofi and the Shah had been bribed by the
Japanese partners into agreeing to the "Japanese way" of management so that the latter
could make huge profits from sales of plant and machinery to the joint venture.
Moreover, quite a few construction and engineering firms were also established
in Iran in the 1970s which could carry out small and standardised industrial projects. But
none wert able to construct a petrochemical plant with the size and sophistication of
IJPC. All such contracts, apart from some construction jobs were awarded to Japanese
companies. In fact, the Japanese partners argued that as most of machinery was to be
imported from Japan, Japanese engineering firms should be employed to build the
various petrochemical units.
As a result of buying plant and machinery from Japan, and employing Japanese
engineering firms for the construction of various plants, no transfer of technology to Iran
of any significant value took place. There is evidence that the Japanese partners quite
deliberately prevented the Iranians from learning anything about the construction of
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petrochemical plants (see Chapter Seven).
Finally, the plant and machinery imported from Japan had been mainly developed
for use in the conditions and climate prevalent in Japan. In many cases, extensive re-
specification of such products were necessary to enable them to operate in the hot and
humid climate of southern Iran. Moreover, highly paid Japanese engineers and
technicians had to be employed to install such plant and machinery. This obviously
increased the costs of such products which in turn increased the total construction costs
of the IJPC Complex.
One can therefore conclude that, due to the weakness of Iranian manufacturing
and engineering sectors, most of the plants and machinery needed for building the UPC
Complex had to be imported from Japan. Moreover, Japanese companies were
exclusively put in charge of the construction of the petrochemical complex. This situation
caused a substantial increase in the construction costs and total production costs of
petrochemicals produced by UPC. This obviously reduced the competitiveness of the
joint venture in both domestic and foreign markets. In addition, no meaningful transfer
of techndlogy, which was one of the aims of the Iranians, took place, and the joint
venture, on which the rapid industrialisation of Iran had been planned, failed to establish
strong links with other sectors of the Iranian economy.
42.4.1- Inappropriate Technology
Apart from high costs, the importation of sophisticated plant and machinery and
latest technology from Japan to Iran was bound to create many problems for the joint
venture itself and in general for Iran as a whole. There was clearly a lack of correlation
between the imported technology from Japan and Iran's existing indigenous factor
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endowments. In this regard, Robert Solo explains that the technologies developed in the
advanced countries and being transferred to the developing countries, have evolved in,
and consequently are adapted to a social and physical environment which differs
significantly from that of a developing society. 35 He adds that these technologies have
been developed in the advanced countries for the benefit of their own endowments, and
not for the benefit of those developing countries which are importing such
technologies.36
Solo identifies three factors: the capacity to recognise the feasibility of attempting
directly to transfer or adapt advanced technology; the capacity to adapt technology to the
physical, social and economic context; and the capacity to adopt social and economic
conditions to the requisites of technology. In his opinion, these three factors together
constitute the capacity to assimilate advanced technologies.37
It is due to the differences in these capacities that countries such as Japan and
newly Industrialised Countries, such as Korea and Taiwan have succeeded in assimilating
advanced, imported technologies into their own economic, social and, cultural conditions.
Moreover, it is because of the lack of such capacities, and more crucially, the failure to
expand these capacities that countries such as Iran, despite nearly sixty years of effort
have not yet succeeded in becoming industrialised and developed countries.38
In the opinion of the author of this study, the advanced and the very latest
technology used for the construction of IJPC Complex was quite incompatible with the
social, economic and cultural state of Iran in the 1970s (even today). The Japanese
partners had recognised this mis-match, and wanted to build a plant more suitable to
Iran's conditions (see Chapter Seven). However, for various reasons (see Chapter Seven)
they gave in to the incessant Iranian demands for the latest technology and the
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construction of a very large and fully integrated complex. Arguably, the advanced
technology, together with the size of the complex, which were totally inappropriate to the
conditions prevailing in Iran did pose serious problems in the construction of the project,
and apart from causing delays, resulted in cost over-runs. Therefore one can argue that
the use of 'inappropriate' technology was a factor in the failure of the joint venture.
5.0- The Effect of Different Modes of Ownership of UPC Partners on the Joint Venture
The historical backgrounds, modes of ownership, as well the business strategies
of the UPC partners, particularly NPC and Mitsui Bussan, are believed to have been
important factors in the establishment, as well as the eventual dissolution of the Iran
Japan Petrochemical Company.
In previous chapters, the historical backgrounds, management styles, mode of
ownership of NPC and Mitsui Bussan were discussed in great length. It was also
explained how the business strategies of these two partners led them into believing that
the establishment of a petrochemical joint venture was in the in their mutual interest and
would enable them to fulfil their widely different business goals.
This section will examine how the different mode of ownership of the two partners
became a factor in the dissolution of UPC.
The joint venture was a partnership between the National Petrochemical Company
of Iran (NPC), and the Iran Chemical Development Company Ltd (ICDC) of Japan on
a 50-50 basis. ICDC was in turn composed of Mitsui & Co. (Bussan), Toyo Soda
Manufacturing Co., Mitsui Toatsu Chemicals Inc., Mitsui Petrochemical Industries Ltd,
and Japan Synthetic Rubber Co. Ltd. So in effect there was only one partner on the
Iranian side, but there were five companies representing Japan. One crucial factor which
\
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distinguished the two sides from one another was their modes of ownership.
NPC was established by an Act of Majlis (the Iranian Parliament) in the early
1960s as a vehicle for the development of the domestic petrochemical industry. It is an
autonomous subsidiary of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) which in turn is a
nationalised company. NPC finances its operations and investments in new petrochemical
plants from its own revenues, contributions from NIOC, and most important of all from
the national budget. The Plan and Budget Organisation which is in charge of
development planning and implementation of various projects supplies the bulk of NPC's
budget. Therefore, all expenditure and investments plans of the latter has to be approved
by the former. In this way, NPC is under direct control of the Iranian government which
sets the policy agenda and the business strategy of the company.
Before the revolution, the Shah, who despite constitutional restrictions had
assumed direct control over all aspects of the country's affairs As was shown in Chapter
Four, it was him, who despite advice from the PBO, adopted a "big push" strategy for the
industrialisation of iran in the 1970s. The shah believed that Iran had a natural
advantage in the production of petrochemicals showed keen interest in the development
of Iranian petrochemical industry and directly intervened in the activities of NPC. As a
matter of fact, it was the Shah who first espoused the idea of the development of an
Iranian petrochemical industry and was its strongest supporter. Naturally, he was
interested in the petrochemical joint venture with the Japanese, and it is believed it was
he who first suggested the linking of the award of the Lorestan oilfield to the company
(or companies) which offered the establishment of a petrochemical company as an
annex.39
It becomes quite clear from the above that NPC was not an ordinary
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petrochemical company, but an arm of the Iranian goverment. As such, the company
was less concerned with profitability or immediate commercial success of its operations,
than with the long term development of the Iranian petrochemical industry. To achieve
this goal, NPC could ask for and get financial assistance and protection from the Iranian
government. In addition, NPC had to consider political and social factors in its decision
making and planning.
One negative aspect of this type of ownership was that NPC was subject to
cumbersome, inefficient, and corrupt Iranian bureaucracy, and its decisions were affected
by power play and personal rivalry of the ruling elite.
In contrast, the five ICDC partners were 100% private commercial companies,
and therefore, concerned with short-term as well as long-term performance of their
various investments. The shares of these companies were (are) traded on the Tokyo
Stock Exchange, and a poor performance by these companies would have adverse effects
on their share prices and credit ratings.
Moreover, although a close relationship does exist between the private sector and
the government in Japan, and on many matters, especially in the foreign investment field,
a high degree of co-operation occurs between the two, the nature of their relationship
is very different from those of state companies such as NPC and the government of Iran.
This point was vividly demonstrated throughout the existence of UPC. One could
not distinguish between the actions and policies of NPC and the Iranian government,
because they were in effect one and the same. But, on the contrary, in many instances
serious friction arose between ICDC and the Japanese government. This was especially
so after the start of the Iran-Iraq War, when ICDC, on the grounds of infeasibility of the
project (commercial considerations), wanted to pull out of the joint venture, but the
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government for strategic reasons, was putting pressure on the company to continue. It
should be stressed that the Japanese government, from the very beginning, was a strong
supporter of the joint venture, and provided it with low interest loans.
The periodical friction that did appear from time to time between the two was
due to their different expectations from the joint venture. The government of Japan
considered it as way to establish strong relations with a major oil producing country.
ICDC, on the other hand, was concerned with access to cheap raw materials, as well as
trading opportunities that such a joint venture would create. When such opportunities,
as shall be discussed in the next section, were deemed to be non-existent, ICDC
advocated a pull-out, but the government of Japan, for wider political and economic
considerations forced or induced the Company to stay on.
A fundamental effect of these different modes of ownership of the parent
companies of UPC was the way that they evaluated the economic viability of the joint
venture. ICDC, being a private company, was quite logically concerned with the
profitability and competitiveness of UPC in the international markets, and wanted to
make a profit on its investment in the company. As was shown in Section 3.1, it is normal
practice of petrochemical companies to require a minimum of 25% return on investment
(ROI) when appraising a project. Such companies usually have a few investment
opportunities to consider and will usually accept the one which provides them with the
best ROI. If a company ignores this criteria, it means that it is not putting its resources
to the most profitable use, with the consequence of undermining its overall profitability
and an adverse effect on its share prices.
However, as explained above, NPC had completely different objectives in the
establishment of the joint venture. The company had been assigned the task of
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developing the Iranian petrochemical industry. This implied that it had to use different
criteria for appraising a project than those of a chemical company. It was not concerned
about the profitability of a project in the short to medium term or return on its
investment, but how that project would contribute to the company's goal of expanding
the domestic petrochemical industry and transfer of technology.
This attitude of NPC towards the development of the Iranian petrochemical
industry was clearly stated by Dr Mostofi. When, after the first oil crisis, the Japanese
partners expressed their opinion that the joint venture was no longer feasible, he accused
them of shortsightedness and of being concerned with the figures on the balance sheet,
while NPC was interested in the development of the Iranian petrochemical industry.4°
However, what NPC management (both before and after the revolution) were
forgetting was that their partners in the joint venture were private, commercial companies,
not state owned companies like NPC itself. They should have realised that these
companies would naturally be concerned with the profitability of their investment, and
not with the development of the Iranian petrochemical industry. What was wrong was
the unjustified expectation of NPC from its partners to forgo profitability and help it with
the expansion of the Iranian petrochemical industry. More fundamentally, NPC had
chosen an inappropriate strategy for the development of the domestic industry and its
policy of choosing foreign partners to achieve this goal was at fault. (This point will be
dealt with in the next chapter).
This section, with the help of some data, will try to illustrate why the different
modes of ownership of the two companies (state vs private) made them unsuitable
partners for the petrochemical joint venture. In fact, the joint venture might have been
very profitable (barring events such as the war) if its parents companies were prepared
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to use different criteria for appraising its feasibility than those used by other
petrochemical companies, namely, to accept a lower rate of return on their investment.
To clarify this assertion, Qatar's petrochemical industry will be used as a reference
point to examine the chances of UPC becoming a successful company in the international
markets. The reason for choosing of Qatar is the lack of data for the Iranian
petrochemical industry. Nevertheless, Qatar, which is located on the southern shores of
the Persian Gulf, has almost the same climatic conditions and "location factor" as Iran.
Therefore, data for that country can be used to examine the standing of Iran's
petrochemical industry in an international comparison.
As argued in earlier sections, if oil producing developing countries were prepared
to accept a lower rate of return on their investments, their petrochemical industry would
be highly competitive in the international markets. This assertion can be verified by a
comprehensive study carried out by UNIDO in 1981. 41 Table 8.4 shows the production
costs, including 5% ROI, for a typical petrochemical plant in Qatar. Furthermore, in
order to determine whether the main products of this plant would be competitive in
major foreign markets, shipping costs and tariffs imposed on such products have been
added to the total production costs. Then these landed prices have been compared with
local costs, including 25% ROI for each product in Japan, Europe, and the United
States.
It is quite evident from the Table that exports of LDPE, HDPE, methanol,
ethylene, ammonia, SBR, and styrene from the plant in Qatar would be highly
competitive with the same products produced by similar plants in Japan, northern and
southern Europe, and the U.S.A. The same data can be used to argue that potential
exports of some of these products by UPC which would have had almost the same
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production and shipping costs, and would have attracted the same tariff rates as the
Qatari plant would have been competitive in these major markets.42
However, there is one major problem with such a conclusion. It has been assumed
that UPC partners were prepared to accept a 5% return on their investment. This might
have been the case with NPC if it wholly owned the company. This is because the main
goal of the company was the expansion of the Iranian petrochemical industry. Hence it
may have been prepared to accept a lower return on its investment in order to make
petrochemical products produced in Iran competitive in the international markets and
by doing so provide greater opportunities for the fast expansion of the industry.43
However, the same could not be said for the Japanese partners of UPC. They,
being private companies were quite rationally concerned with the performance of their
investment and would have required the same rate of return on their investment in Iran
as in Japan (25%). And if NPC was expecting its Japanese partners in UPC to accept a
lower rate of return on its investment in the joint venture for the sake of the long term
development of the Iranian petrochemical industry (as sometimes NPC management
appeared . to imply), clearly it had no understanding of how private, commercial
companies operated.
One can therefore conclude that the different modes of ownership of the UPC
partners, state versus private, had a significant influence on their expectations from the
joint venture. These often opposing expectations (economic development vs profits) did
cause some serious friction between the partners and was a factor in the dissolution of
the joint venture. The next chapter will discuss why ICDC was not a suitable partner for
NPC to form a joint venture with and what strategy the latter should have chosen for the
development of the Iranian petrochemical industry.
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6.0- The Effect of the Changes in the Business Strategies of
UPC Partners on the Joint Venture
In Chapter One, it was hypothesised that either a change in the business strategy
of partners of a joint venture, or the fulfilment of the goals of the partners by the joint
venture cause the latter to become "unstable", i.e. to be dissolved. This section will
attempt to establish whether a change in the strategy of ICDC or NPC and/or the
fulfilment of the joint venture's goals precipitated the dissolution of UPC.
6.1- Change in the Strategy of NPC
With regard to various NPC publications and statements made by its management
in the mid to late 1980s, one can detect a change in the overall strategy of NPC with
respect to the expansion of the Iranian petrochemical industry. Having said this, however,
it seems that its policy regarding UPC remained the same until its dissolution.
With respect to the development of the Iranian petrochemical industry, a change
in the strategy of NPC can be observed from the mid-1980s onward. The post-
revolutionary management of NPC had inherited the previous regime's policy of the
•
development of an export oriented petrochemical industry with the co-operation of
foreign companies. In the light of UPC's failure, however, it is reasonable to conjecture
that the new management reached the conclusion that such policy had led to the
underdevelopment of the industry compared to other Middle Eastern oil producing
countries.
This was especially worrying as the company had failed to meet even the domestic
demand, with the result of ever increasing shortages of petrochemical products. This
policy, which had led to the concentration of most of NPC's resource% in UPC. had
created a situation in which, by 1989, Iran could produce only 26,000 tonnes of ethylene,
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the most basic and crucial petrochemical product. 44 While at the same time, other oil
producing countries had managed to build petrochemical plants with capacities of
upwards of 300,000 tonnes of ethylene. (Saudi Arabia had built a total capacity of
2,130,000 tonnes for ethylene production).45
It was in the light of the failure of this policy that from the mid-1980s onwards
NPC seems to have adopted a new strategy: to build domestic oriented petrochemical
complexes near the main centres of consumption,46 and without foreign partners:"
With respect to UPC itself, it is believed that NPC policy remained unchanged.
As discussed in Chapter Seven, NPC made every effort to convince ICDC to remain a
partner in the joint venture. It insisted that the units damaged during the war could be
easily repaired and that the project could be completed in about three years. It also
stressed that the joint venture would be viable and become profitable in the near future.
The reason for NPC's efforts to keep ICDC in the joint venture was that it needed
Japanese technology, and above all, Japanese capital to complete the project as soon as
possible. ICDC, however, was not persuaded by these arguments and refused to invest
any further in the project and began to put pressure on NPC to release it from its
obligations under the Basic Agreement of 1971.
Therefore, the change in the overall strategy of NPC discussed above, together
with wider political and economic considerations led to the Iranians agreeing to the
dissolution of UPC.
As a matter of fact, even in the early years of revolution during which almost 80%
of companies owned by Iranians and foreigners were nationalised, IJPC was expressly
exempted from nationalisation. The new government gave its full support to the joint
venture. They wanted UPC to be a symbol of cooperation between new Iran and Japan,
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a non-Western industrialised country. And as was seen in Chapter Seven, the new
regime, throughout the war, tried to keep the Japanese partners in the joint venture.
However, the Iranians, under strong pressure from the Japanese partners, agreed
to the dissolution of UPC in 1989 for two reasons: first, they probably realised that after
nearly twenty one years (from the initial negotiations in 1968) of association with the
Japanese, they had failed to fulfil their goal of establishing a large and export oriented
petrochemical industry. Furthermore, with ICDC's refusal to contribute any further
capital to UPC and its pessimism regarding the future of the joint venture, they came to
the conclusion that the complex would never be completed as long as ICDC was a
partner.
Second, the Iranian government, sensing the bad reputation UPC had earned in
Japan, and perceiving the general reluctance of the Japanese business and government
for further involvement in the project, reached the conclusion that allowing ICDC to pull
out of the joint venture was in the best interest of the country. Iran, which after the
election of Hashemi Rafsanjani as President, had embarked on a new policy, understood
that it needed the co-operation of Japanese business and government to revive the
economy which had been shattered during the war. The new government realised that
no such co-operation would be forthcoming unless the UPC issue was settled first. In fact
it was President Rafsanjani himself, who, after thirty long meetings, approved the
dissolution of the joint venture.
One can therefore conclude that factors such as the change in the strategy of NPC
regarding the development of the domestic industry, and the double failure of UPC to
fulfil its goals of establishing a large, export oriented petrochemical industry, and to forge
closer ties between Iran and Japan (and actually becoming a source of friction between
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the two countries) led to NPC agreeing to the dissolution of the joint venture in 1989.
6.2- Success of UPC in Fulfilling its Goals and Changes in the Strategy of Mitsui
Bussan
6.2.1- Attainment of Goals
Mitsui Bussan, as discussed in earlier chapters, became interested in a
petrochemical joint venture with Iran for the following reasons:
(1)- Access to Iran's oil resources, and in particular to win the bidding for the Lorestan
oil.
(2)- To use cheap raw materials available in Iran to produce petrochemical products at
competitive prices.
(3)- To sell plants, machinery, and some intermediate products on a huge scale to Iran.
(4)- To obtain the right to sell the products of the world's largest petrochemical plant in
the Iranian, Japanese, and international markets.
(5)- To gain a strong foothold in the fast expanding Iranian economy for other
investment opportunities and sales of various products which the company handled (in
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the 1960s-70s Mitsui Bussan had the smallest share of the Iranian market among the
Japanese general trading companies).
Using the terminology developed in Chapter One, Mitsui Bussan hoped to "fulfil"
the above "goals" by establishing the joint venture with Iran. In the following, the
proposition that after fulfilling these goals UPC had reached the end of its life and
naturally had to be dissolved48 and, that the joint venture had become redundant in the
new strategy of Bussan will be examined.
(1)- As discussed in Chapter Seven, one of the main motives behind Mitsui
Bussan's involvement in the petrochemical joint venture was its desire to win the bidding
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for L,orestan oilfield: the largest remaining oilfield not under the control of major oil
companies.
However, after drilling nine dry wells, Mobil Oil, the partner in 1NEPCO,
declared in 1977 that there was no oil in that field and subsequently pulled out of the
venture. Following this development, Mitsui Bussan, which had failed to accomplish one
of its main goals, considered pulling out of the joint venture. But, it was at a time when
after years of postponement, the construction of the project had finally started. A pull-
out then would have brought charges of bad faith bargaining and, moreover, would have
destroyed the chances of sharing the possible success of UPC. Also, a pull-out would
have strained its relations with Iran, an important oil producing country, with a fast
expanding economy and domestic market.
Later on, however, with the collapse of oil prices in 1986, and availability of vast
quantities of very cheap crude oil on the spot markets, the security of oil supplies was
no longer an issue in Japan (at least temporarily). In fact crude oil available in spot
markets was much cheaper than oil supplied on contract basis (Direct Deal or
Government to Government). This development made Japanese oil traders concentrate
on oil prices rather than security of supplies. One example of this attitude was (or rather
is) the fact that the Mitsubishi Corporation, which is a partner in a petrochemical joint
venture with Saudi Arabia, has not yet exercised its right to lift the quantity of oil
allocated to it under the agreement which established the joint venture. This is because,
Mitsubishi can buy the same oil at lower prices on the spot markets.
One can therefore postulate that, with this development, Bussan no longer saw
any logic in being involved in a troublesome venture for the sake of securing a stable
supply of oil from Iran, when that oil was available from spot markets at lower prices,
487
(2)- After the steep rise in oil prices, and NIOC's acceptance to invest in the gas
gathering and pipelines which supplied natural gas to the complex, the Company
demanded higher prices for the raw materials, particularly natural gas which the Iranians
had initially promised to supply to the complex at very low prices. Subsequently, ICDC
(in which Bussan was the biggest shareholder) lost another of its incentives for further
involvement in the joint venture. As learnt earlier, the issue of the pricing of raw
materials was never resolved between the two partners and was a factor in ICDC's
decision to leave the joint venture.
(3)- It was explained in Chapters One and Five that one of the factors behind the
involvement of Japanese general trading companies in foreign investment, especially
overseas joint ventures, is the trading opportunities such investments create for sales of
plant and machinery to these ventures. And this motive, as argued in Chapter Seven, was
a factor behind the Mitsui Bussan enthusiasm for involvement in UPC.
In fact, by early 1979, Mitsui Bussan had purchased, on a commission basis,
almost all plant and machinery necessary for the construction of the project from Japan,
and shipped them, mainly aboard its own vessels, to Bandar Shahpour. Therefore, the
joint venture had at least fulfilled one of its goals, i.e. providing a major trading
opportunity for Bussan to supply all plants and machinery for the construction of the
complex.
With the fulfilment of this goal, and the uncertainty which followed the Iranian
revolution, Mitsui Bussan lost interest in the joint venture, and advocated a pull-out.
However, the Japanese goverment, for strategic reasons, forced (by the threat of
withholding insurance payment) Mitsui Bussan to remain in the joint venture. One factor
which attests to this behaviour of Bussan is its suggestion throughout the 1980% that it
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should pull out of the joint venture as an investor and complete the project as its
contractor. This was because during the war, the complex had been damaged and new
plants and machinery were needed to repair it, hence creating new trading opportunities.
(4)- One other factor behind Mitsui Bussan's involvement in the joint venture was
the prospects of selling huge quantities of petrochemicals produced by UPC in Iranian
and foreign markets. As discussed in Chapter Seven, Bussan put pressure on NPC to
award it the exclusive right to market the outputs of the joint venture in Iran. NPC, for
the sake of harmony and despite strong objections from its own trading company agreed
to this. Moreover, NPC, at the outset of the establishment of the joint venture, had
agreed to Bussan becoming the sole agent for marketing LTPC products in foreign
markets as it had no experience in that field. In fact, one of the reasons for seeking a
foreign partner was the desire to have access to international markets.
A few developments, however, had made the trading prospects of LTPC rather
gloomy. First, because of delays and damage caused by the war, capital costs had
increased beyond expectations. This factor plus the higher prices for raw materials
demanded by the Iranians would have substantially increased the total production costs,
making UPC products uncompetitive in international markets. This was at a time when
due to the two oil crises, the growth rate of demand for petrochemicals had considerably
slowed down, and such products had become price sensitive. Even more worrying were
developments on the supply side. Throughout the 1980s, oil producing Middle Eastern
countries and NICs49 like Singapore and Korea had built large, export oriented plants
producing petrochemicals at competitive prices. This was especially so in the case of
some countries in the Middle East like Saudi Arabia which by providing cheap raw
materials and low (even free) interest loans had built formidable competitors for LIPC,
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These developments on the demand and supply sides for petrochemicals obviously
reduced the chances of success for UPC in the world markets, and naturally made Mitsui
Bussan apprehensive about its future.5°
Even the chances of profiting from sales of LTPC's products in the Iranian markets
had been greatly reduced for Bussan. Although domestic demand for petrochemicals had
increased substantially in the 1980s, and most of LIPC output would have been consumed
locally, Bussan would have difficulty in making a profit from such sales. First, due to
price controls, Bussan would have been forced to sell these products at artificially low
prices set by the government.' Second, even if the company did make a profit on
domestic sales, it would have had difficulty in remitting these proceeds to Japan. This
was due to severe hard currency shortages in Iran which had forced the government to
put harsh restrictions on foreign currency transactions.52
So one can conclude that due to the above developments, UPC had failed to fulfil
another of its goals and consequently Mitsui Bussan had lost one more incentive to
remain in the joint venture.
(5)- One other reason for Mitsui Bussan's interest in the joint venture was the
exposure that such an involvement would have given to the Company in the fast growing
Iranian market. In fact, Bussan had the smallest share of the Iranian market among
Japanese general trading companies, and it was hoping to use the joint venture as a
means of gaining a strong foothold in that market.53
Unfortunately, it was not possible to obtain data on Mitsui's trading activities for
the 1970s-80s to verify this. But the company, because of its partnership with NPC, a
subsidiary of NIOC, was given special preference for the purchase of Iranian oil from
time to time (see Chapter Seven for details). Therefore, one can infer that Mitsui
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Bussan, because of its involvement in the joint venture, did manage to increase its
volume of trading with Iran. However, the extent to which the company managed to
achieve this goal is unclear, and hence no concrete conclusion can be drawn.
6.2.2- The Change In the Strategy of Bussan
From available information, it can be conjectured that a change in the strategy
of Mitsui Bussan, or at least a re-adjustment of the old one did take place in the mid-
1980's.54
As discussed in Chapter Seven, the Mitsui Group has historically been weak in
heavy industry as it has concentrated on trading, especially trading of standardised goods.
This weakness is especially evident when the Group is compared to its nearest rivals like
the Mitsubishi and Sumitomo Groups.
Although Mitsui Bussan had been involved in many industrial projects in Japan
and other countries, it had mainly assumed the organising, and financing roles usually
performed by a Sogo shosha. 55 But it always avoided direct involvement in the
management and running of such ventures. Instead Bussan concentrated on selling goods
and services to, and buying the outputs of these companies.
Due to this factor, heavy involvement in the establishment, construction, and
management of UPC was a new role for Mitsui Bussan, and was a big departure from
its traditional strategy of emphasising trading over manufacturing. As a matter of fact,
when the establishment of the joint venture became definite, Wakasugi, the then
President of Bussan, told NPC that his Company had never been involved in and had no
knowledge or experience in running such a huge complex, and asked for NPC's co-
operation in running the joint venture. NPC knew this fact and that was why it asked for
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the involvement of Japanese petrochemical companies in the joint venture?6
Moreover, many of the top management of Bussan who regarded the company as
a trader, and not a major manufacturer, were from the very beginning against the direct
involvement of the company in the joint venture. They believed that it was against the
tradition of the Company to commit itself directly to the management and operations of
such a project, as it was not one of the functions that the Bussan as a trader usually
performed. They were not against the involvement of Mitsui Bussan in any joint venture
at all, as the Chemicals Department's enthusiasm for participation in the Thailand
project in the early 1970s (see Chapter Seven) and Bussan's later interest in other
petrochemical projects in China and other countries attest to. But they were specifically
against the participation of Bussan in the joint venture with Iran as they believed it
would be unprofitable and, moreover, entailed the direct involvement of the Company
in the management and operations of the complex, a function normally not performed
by a general trading firm such as Mitsui Bussan.
This lack of experience was such that, although Bussan was the biggest
shareholder in ICDC, the post of Senior Executive Director, and various other important
positions in the Construction Department, the most important post and department in
IJPC respectively, were filled by people from other partners of ICDC, i.e. petrochemical
companies like Toyo Soda. 57
 Bussan people instead occupied positions in the Marketing
and Finance Departments, their areas of speciality.
As explained in detail in Chapter Seven, Bussan concentrated its efforts and
energy on organising the procurement of plants and machinery, the area that it was best
in, and paid little attention to the management of the joint venture. According to Misato
"the primary concern of the Chemicals Machinery Department was to mak*. 24 much
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profit as possible 	 and in fact it considered the project just as a 'cash cow to be milked
dry'".58 He continues that "Bussan's overriding concern in the whole project had been
to increase its business; it thought that it could just second a few people to the project
and that everything would be muddled through after that".59
It is baffling why Mitsui Bussan, an experienced trader in petrochemicals, did not
realise that the developments in the petrochemical industry which followed the first oil
crisie), had swung the pendulum in favour of UPC and did not try to take advantage
of the situation by trying to complete the project as quickly as possible. In fact, the only
concern of Bussan was the total monopolisation of procurement, to the dismay of other
ICDC partners and contractors.61
When everything began to go wrong for UPC, like delays in the construction, the
revolution, the war, shortage of finance, and probably above all the seemingly dire
prospects for the completion and success of the joint venture, those managers who had
opposed the involvement of Bussan in the joint venture started to reassert their authority.
One of their first acts was to oust Ikeda from the presidency of Bussan, as they blamed
him for committing the sogo shosha to the ill fated joint venture in the first place and
then keeping it there against all odds. They believed that involvement of Bussan in UPC,
apart from wasting huge sums of money, had undermined its standing as a top trader,
and damaged its credit-worthiness.62
The new management of Mitsui Bussan adopted a new strategy or rather, re-
instated the old one. It emphasised that trading, not manufacturing (especially heavy
industry), was Bussan's main line of business. Obviously, IJPC had no place in this new
policy and had to be discarded. It was, therefore, as a result of this new strategy that
Bussan's new management notified NPC, despite the latter's objections, of it intention
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to leave the joint venture. NPC probably realised that Bussan's new management was no
longer committed to the joint venture and it was in its own interest to allow the latter
to leave so that it could complete the project as soon as possible.
It needs to be stated once again that the new strategy of Mitsui Bussan did not
and does not mean that the Company will no longer involve itself in manufacturing or
processing industries (like UPC) in foreign countries. But, as stated earlier, because of
the perception of the future unprofitability of UPC and problems created by the direct
involvement of Bussan in the management of that joint venture the new management of
Mitsui Bussan re-emphasised its traditional role as a trader and not a manufacturer and
decided to pull out of the petrochemical joint venture with Iran. As a matter of fact,
Mitsui Bussan is holding discussions with the Chinese over the establishment of a very
large petrochemical complex (like UPC) in that country. Bussan, however will limit its
role to organising the procurement of plant and machinery, transfer of technology,
purchase of crude oil from the Middle East [perhaps Iran] for the joint venture, and sales
of its output in China's domestic market. These are the roles usually performed by a
sogo shosha. However, there is no evidence that Bussan perhaps as a result of its
experience with IJPC, will be involved in the management of the Chinese joint venture.
7.0- Conclusion
In this chapter the factor which are believed to have been responsible for the
failure and eventual dissolution of Iran Japan Petrochemical Company were analyzed.
It was argued that such factors as spiralling construction costs, increases in raw
material prices, delays in the completion of the project, the size of the complex, the use
of inappropriate technology, slow-down in demand for petrochemicals, emergence of new
competitors, and to some extent, the effects of the eight year Iran-Iraq War, were
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responsible for the failure of the joint venture. Moreover, changes in the strategy of both
NPC and Mitsui Bussan, and the failure of the joint venture to fulfil the goals set for it
by its parent companies were identified as the factors for the dissolution of the joint
venture.
Apart from the above factors, which seriously undermined the success of the joint
venture, many of the problems which engulfed the company were precipitated by the
different business cultures, historical backgrounds, modes of ownership (private versus
state), and strategies of the two main partners, and perhaps above all, the incompatibility
of such a large industrial undertaking with the economic, social and political realities of
Iran in the 1970s.
It was particularly emphasised that the large size and the fully integrated nature
of the petrochemical complex, plus use of advanced technology which were totally
incompatible with the realities of the Iranian economy and society were perhaps the root
causes of all difficulties which eventually led to the failure of the joint venture (see
Chapter Nine).
As it was explained in Chapter Four, after the massive increases in Iran's oil
revenues which followed the rise in oil prices of 1973-4, the government embarked upon
a "big push" strategy for the rapid industrialisation of Iran. This policy was adopted at
a time when the Iranian economy had already reached its absorptive capacities limits and
any further investment in fact reduced the total output. When the construction of UPC
Complex started in 1977, the Incremental Capital Output Ratio (ICOR) had already
turned negative. It was inevitable that the Iran's largest industrial project (IJPC) would
be severely affected by the shortages, such as skilled manpower, goods and services,
which had appeared as a result of high investment rates during the mid to late 1970s.
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Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter Seven, lack of adequate finance, high
construction and raw material costs, shortage of skilled operators, deficient infrastructural
facilities, mis-management, arguments between the partners, the state of international
petrochemical markets, etc, (see Chapter Seven) had made the outlook for the profitable
operations of the Complex very bleak. Arguably, even if the joint venture had not been
affected by the revolution of 1979, it is doubtful whether it could have operated
profitably for a considerable number of years.
Additionally, the economic dislocation, general dis-organisation, political
instability, ideological differences between various government officials, major changes
in the management of NIOC and NPC, flight of many experienced staff and engineers
and, chaotic situation that followed the 1979 revolution and the war would have
prevented the smooth running of the petrochemical complex even if it had been
completed on time (1981 as was envisaged under Plan D).
As the present poor state of the Iranian oil industry demonstrates, the joint
venture would have indeed encountered many difficulties and, would have suffered from
mis-management, lack of coherent organisation, insufficient investment and, many other
problems that have beset the industry as a whole. Not only almost all of the NIOC's new
projects (refineries, oil exploration and production) are well behind schedule, but the
company is not even capable of providing sufficient oil products for the domestic market
with the result that chronic shortages of such products occur regularly in Iran. In
addition, two of the NIOC's most important subsidiaries: National Iranian Gas Company
and NPC are facing similar problems, with many of their projects, despite many years of
planning and construction are well behind s.chedule. The mos.t griking exanlipl# Ow**,
problems is the former UPC (now called BIPC) itself. Although the joint venture was
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dissolved in 1989 and NPC's announced that the project would be given top priority, and
after nearly four years of construction, the project is not yet complete. Even if it is
completed, the old problems of high construction costs, high raw material prices, and
more crucially, inadequate supply of feedstocks have not yet been resolved and will
hinder the economic operations of the Complex for many years to come. It is very
probable that the Japanese partners were well aware of these problems and hence
insisted upon the liquidation of the joint venture.
Finally, the chapter tried to demonstrate that, because of the contrasts in their
historical backgrounds, conflicting modes of ownership, business strategies and
philosophy, NPC and Mitsui Bussan should never have become partners in a
petrochemical joint venture, as their expectations from such an undertaking were vastly
different. NPC expected the joint venture to help it develop the Iranian petrochemical
industry, and Mitsui Bussan wanted it to help it expand its trading volume and gain
access to the Iranian oil reserves. When IJPC failed to fulfil these goals, it was natural
that it had to be dissolved.
It may not be very much off the mark to state that considering all the problems
faced by the IJPC partners and the joint venture itself to call it a 'joint mis-adventure'
rather than a joint venture.
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CHAPTER NINE
LESSONS FOR THE PARTICIPANTS
1.0- Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to determine whether any lessons can be drawn by
Japan and Iran from the failure of Iran Japan Petrochemical Company discussed in
Chapter Eight.
This chapter discusses how Iran, Japan and their organisations, private or
governmental, can avoid repeating such costly mistakes again. And how these two
countries can achieve their respective objectives of economic development and stable
supply of petroleum.
Furthermore, the chapter attempts to find out if there are any lessons to be learnt
by future international joint ventures, especially between private companies of the
industrialised world and state owned companies of the developing countries.
2.0- Lessons for Japan
2.1- The Japanese Government
The Japanese government's support for the petrochemical joint venture between
Mitsui and NPC stemmed from its concern over the security of oil supplies from the
Middle East which has been supplying between 70-80% of the former's oil imports since
the 1950s. However, this concern was not shared by all politicians or bureaucrats, even
among MITI officials who were responsible for the Japanese oil industry. As a result no
official policy as such existed. It was rather a few officials and top businessmen who,
being apprehensive about over-reliance on the Major oil cotnpanie, mainly American,
believed that Japan should have direct access to overseas oil reserves. It was largely as
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a result of these people effort's that the Japan Petroleum Exploration Company, the
Japan Petroleum Development Corporation (later renamed the Japan National Oil
Company which absorbed the former) and the Arabian Oil Company were established.
They argued that Japan should extend her overseas economic co-operation
programmes and foreign aid to those countries which possessed large oil reserves in
exchange for guarantees of secure oil supplies to Japan.
As observed in Chapter Seven, when Mitsui Bussan became hesitant about
establishing a petrochemical joint venture with Iran, it was the leaders of Keidanren who
forced the former back to the negotiating table. Moreover, after the first oil crisis when
the security of oil supplies became an issue in Japan, the government adopted a
"resource diplomacy which was mainly concerned with oil more than any other raw
material.
Immediately after this crisis the goverment dispatched Deputy Prime Minister
Abe and MITI Minister Nakasone to the Middle East with the promise of hundreds of
millions of dollars in aid. Moreover, when in 1974 the construction costs of the
petrochemical complex spiralled from $380 million to over $ 2.8 billion, and the Japanese
partners advocated a pull-out, it was the Japanese government which, through the
Export-Import Bank supplied large, low interest loans in order to keep the project alive.
At the same time (1974), the Mitsubishi Group stopped its negotiations with Saudi
Arabia over a petrochemical joint venture which had been going on since 1970. However,
the government, worried about upsetting Saudi Arabia which had by then become the
largest supplier of oil to Japan, compelled the Group back into talks over the joint
venture and extended great financial assistance through the Overseas Econc yrnic Co-
operation Fund (OECF) to the venture.1
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Once again, when after the Iranian Revolution and the ensuing second oil crisis,
ICDC, on the grounds of increased construction costs and unstable political situation in
Iran, advocated a pull-out, it was the Japanese goverment that due to strategical
considerations and security of oil supplies, not only from Iran, but also from the Persian
Gulf, persuaded the Company to stay in Iran by providing it with around 80 billion yen
in soft loans through the OECF.
It can therefore be concluded that the Japanese government and business leaders
believed that by helping Iran and Saudi Arabia with their industrialisation efforts,
especially with the expansion of their petrochemical industries, they would be able to
secure a stable supply of oil from these two countries.
But in the light of the failure of UPC (and the success of the Saudi project) are
such expectations correct? More precisely, has this type of economic assistance been
successful in achieving its aim, or should Japan adopt a new mechanism for helping the
development efforts of these countries for the sake of the stability of the region as well
as the security of her oil supplies? Moreover, are these types of economic co-operation
appropriate for the needs of a country like Iran or should Japan help these countries by
other means?
2.1.2- The Impact of IJPC on Mutual Relations
The two Japanese petrochemical joint ventures which were established in the
Middle East in the 1970s on hopes of a more stable supply of oil have had different
fortunes. IJPC was a total failure but the Mitsubishi Group's venture with Saudi Arabia
has been very successful. So, does it follow that, as a result, Japan's relations with and
oil supplies from Iran were threatened? Moreover, is it true to postulate that oil supplies
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from Saudi Arabia had became even more secure?
The available evidence suggests that at no time did the UPC issue pose any
threats to the diplomatic and trade relations between Iran and Japan or cause disruptions
in oil supplies from the former. According to one expert in Iran-Japan relations "Iran's
oil export volumes to Japan remained amazingly stable in the 1980s [when UPC was
going through its most turbulent period with the survival of the joint venture in doubt]
at lower levels despite violent price changes. This implies that both sides made efforts
to maintain trade relations at the cost of price for their own interests' sake."2
In addition, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2nd August 1990, prompted a mini
oil crisis and doubling of oil prices. The Japanese, once again anxious over the security
of oil supplies from the Persian Gulf, began to search for sources of supplies to
compensate for the loss of Kuwaiti and Iraqi oil. Probably, the only country capable and
willing to satisfy Japan's huge demand was Iran, not Saudi Arabia (which had to meet
the demands of American and, to a lesser extent, European oil companies). Iran, without
regard to the issue of UPC which had been dissolved only few months before, agreed to
supply most of the Japanese extra demands for oil. Of course this was in Iran's self
interest as they badly needed the extra revenue. But this also demonstrates that Iran
never really believed, as the Japanese used to, in linking the fate of the joint venture to
the supply of oil. This point was, as mentioned in Chapter Seven, stressed by Iranian
officials in the 1980s who refused to link the progress of the project to the issue of oil
supplies.
On the other hand, as previously mentioned, the Mitsubishi Group which is
involved in a petrochemical joint venture with the Saudis has so far not exercised its right
to lift the oil allotted to it under the agreement which set up the joint venture.
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These facts demonstrate that the issue of the security of oil supplies from the
Middle East is far more complicated than the Japanese tend to give credit to. They also
show that the establishment of petrochemical joint ventures, and their success or failure
do not necessarily affect the stability of oil supplies. Having said this, the positive effects
that a successful joint venture would have on mutual relations between Japan and an oil
producing country like Iran cannot be underestimated.
The security or availability of oil supplies is mainly dependent upon two factors,
the United States' economic and strategic policies 3 and the economic conditions of the
oil producing countries. It is important at this juncture to point out that the term
"security" does not only refer to the physical availability and secure supplies of oil (or
other commodities for that matter), but also to the stability of oil prices as well. As the
two oil crises of the 1970s showed, the wild fluctuations in oil prices pose as many, if not
more, problems as the physical availability of the oil itself for Japan.4
In the light of the above argument, what should Japan do in order to make the
supplies of her vital oil imports from the Middle East more stable both in terms of
availability and price?
2.1.3- Policy Options for Japan
All the major oil producing Middle Eastern countries are economically
underdeveloped. Consequently, as was explained in the case of Iran in Chapter Four,
they are heavily dependent on the revenues generated by production and exports of their
most valuable asset; oil. These oil revenues enable their governments to implement
various social and economic development plans which would be impossible without such
incomes.
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In fact, in the absence of developed manufacturing and agricultural sectors, the
economic viability, social and political stability of these countries are singularly based
upon the revenues generated by the oil sector. It is therefore, no surprise that they attach
such great importance to their most precious asset which also happens to be in huge
demand by the rest of the world and particularly by the industrialised countries. As a
result, they tend to use it in various degrees for the furtherance of their national
objectives, be they political or economic.
With the failure of industrialised countries to find a reliable and economic
substitute for oil and the environmental concerns over the expansion of nuclear energy,
oil will remain the most important and economic source of energy in the coining years
and decades. What's more, oil supplies from the Persian Gulf region will once again
grow in importance as petroleum reserves of other regions like north America and the
North Sea are depleted or remain uneconomic to exploit. In addition, with the political
instability of the former Soviet Union, and growth of the Chinese economy, oil supplies
from these regions will also become uncertain. As a result, Japan will become even more
dependent on the Middle East from where she already imports over 70% of her
petroleum needs. So what could Japan do to make her vital petroleum supplies from the
politically unstable Middle East more secure, both in terms of physical availability and
price?
The Japanese government's support for petrochemical joint ventures have
obviously been irrelevant in the furtherance of this aim and have had the potential of
having the opposite affect by straining relations between her and oil producing countries
like Iran.
What Japan should do, in my opinion, is to help these countries develop other
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sectors of their economy like agriculture and industry and to assist them in expanding
their social and physical infrastructure. If they manage to do this, their reliance on oil
exports as the sole means of generating revenue will be reduced, and hence also its
relative importance in their national economies. Consequently, the major oil exporting
countries will tend not to use petroleum as a bargaining chip in their dealings with the
outside world as they will have to consider the effects that a reduction in their oil exports
(although unlikely) or sharp price rises will have on other sectors of their economies.
As Iran-Japan relations is the subject of this study, the former will be used as an
example here to discuss what Japan could do with regard to her economic co-operation
policy towards the Middle East.
2.1.3.1- The Development of Light Industry
As discussed extensively in previous chapters, the main aim of Iran in establishing
the petrochemical joint venture with Japan was to develop her petrochemical industry
as a basis for her industrialisation efforts and as a means of achieving social and political
stability. Iran has many advantages to help her achieve this aim and there are many ways
that Japan can help her in this endeavour.
For one, Iran is the most populous (around 60 million) and the most economically
developed country of all Persian Gulf oil producers. These two factors are conducive to
the establishment of mass produced and labour intensive industries like textiles with
efficient scales of operations whose products could be sold in the domestic and foreign
markets. Japan, which has the most advanced technology for the production of textile or
other mass produced goods, can assist Iran establish such industries by the transfer of
appropriate technology to the latter.
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2.1.3.2- The Development of Energy Resources and Processing Industries
Iran has huge resources of oil and gas and many other minerals. Japan again, can
help Iran to develop these resources and establish industries to process such raw
materials into semi-finished or final products for consumption in Iran as well as export
to Japan and other countries. This not only reduces Iran's overt dependence on exports
of crude oil, but will also help Japan to improve her environment, which is heavily
polluted as a result of processing such raw materials at home, as well as to upgrade her
industrial structure.5
The most specific action that Japan can take concerns the Iranian oil industry.
Iran is in dire need of foreign capital and technology to explore and develop new
oilfields. If Japan provides the capital and helps Iran to acquire the necessary technology,
not only will more oil become available for export to Japan, but it will also release Iran's
scarce resources for use in other sectors of her economy.
In addition, if Japan helps Iran to establish export oriented oil refineries, and
allows the importation of their output into her domestic market, not only will she aid the
latter's industrialisation efforts, but will also increase Iran's stakes in the stable
production and exports of petroleum.
Apart from oil, Iran has the second largest natural gas reserves in the world (after
Russia). Japan, as the world's largest importer of liquified natural gas (LNG) is in the
best position to assist Iran develop this huge and clean source of energy. In fact Japan's
co-operation in this regard can be two-fold. First, by the transfer of appropriate
technology, Iran will be able to substitute natural gas for oil products as a source of
energy in domestic, industrial, and transport sectors, thereby making more oil available
for export.6 Moreover, gas liquidification is a very capital intensive industry, well beyond
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Iran's capabilities, and needs large captive markets on a long-term basis. However, with
a very large and growing domestic market for LNG, Japan can assist Iran to establish gas
liquidification plants and import their output.
2.1.3.3- The Agricultural Sector
Another area where Japanese assistance can be very beneficial to the Iranian
economy is agriculture. Iran enjoys a very varied climate (very cold to very hot) which
enables her to produce a wide variety of agricultural products. Moreover, there are vast
tracks of arable land in the country only a fraction of which is being cultivated at present.
Although the country as a whole is rather arid, nevertheless, there exist large water
reserves in some areas of the country which are currently being wasted because of
inadequate reservoir capacity, mis-management and outdated water management and
utilisation techniques.
Japan is in a very strong position to help Iran expand her agricultural sector. With
her long tradition in dam construction she can assist the latter to expand her reservoir
capacity. And with the transfer of suitable technology, Iran's valuable water resources can
be properly utilised for agricultural production. Furthermore, various Japanese
companies with experiences in agribusiness and food processing throughout the world can
provide Iran with the latest farming and food preservation techniques.
Also, Japan can transfer technology for the production of agricultural machinery
and agrochemicals to Iran so that the latter may develop her industry as well as save on
foreign exchange that she spends every year on importation of such products. If Iran
succeeds in increasing her agricultural output, not only will she satisfy the fast rising
domestic demand, but will also be able to export the surplus to neighbouring countries
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or even Japan. This will obviously reduce pressure on the country's foreign exchange
from oil receipts which has to be used to the tune of nearly $4 billion a year for imports
of food from abroad.
2.1.3.4- The Infrastructure and ODA
One last area where Japan's co-operation is crucial is the development of Iran's
physical and social infrastructure, was seen in earlier chapters, the inadequate supply of
local skilled manpower and physical infrastructural facilities posed serious problems for
IJPC and caused huge increases in its capital and construction costs and were a factor
in the joint venture's eventual dissolution. Japanese assistance in this matter is even more
critical than those discussed above. Because without the existence of such vital inputs,
any further investment in industrial or agricultural sectors will put even more pressure
on Iran's already severely strained infrastructure. Obviously it is counter-productive to
invest in the manufacturing sector when there are not sufficient number of indigenous
skilled workers, engineers, or managers to run the factories.
Although at present Iran, being an oil rich country does not qualify for Japan's
Official Development Assistance (ODA), she does receive Japanese technical assistance.
However, with the recent devaluation of the rial (about 20 times compared to the former
official rate), she will meet some of the ODA conditions, and Japan should use this
opportunity to extend technical aid and provide funds for infrastructural projects.-
2.1.3.5- The Form of Japanese Co-operation
In the preceding paragraphs the areas in which Japan can assist Iran to develop
her industry and agriculture in order to reduce her reliance on oil revenues as the sole
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provider for economic development were discussed. However, the crucial question is
what form should this co-operation take, and what methods should be employed for the
transfer of financial, technological, and managerial resources to Iran?
It is believed that, as the case of UPC showed, due to different management styles
and the incompatibility of state and private goals, Japanese direct investments, whether
wholly owned or as joint ventures, are very inappropriate to achieve this aim. Moreover,
with the saga of UPC still fresh in the memory of Japanese companies and businessmen,
it is very unlikely that they will be willing to get involved in Iran's industrialisation efforts
in a massive way in the near future.
In my opinion, the best method is to use other forms of foreign investment like
licensing and long-term loans so as to enable Iranian companies to receive both the
technology and the initial capital for importation of machinery from Japan. The capital
can be provided by both government institutions like the Export-Import Bank or private
Japanese banks. However, the government of Japan should take due care not to over-
extend such loans so as to create repayment problems later on for Iran. Attention should
also be paid as to how these funds are used by the Iranian authorities and extension of
future loans should be made conditional on satisfactory performance of earlier projects
which have received Japanese capital.
Japanese companies can also help Iran by employing the well established develop
and import (D & I) method, whereby they provide Iranian companies with technology
and capital and, in exchange, agree to buy a certain percentage of their output.
It is important to emphasise that Japan should extend loans to those sectors of the
Iranian economy or companies with export potentials. This will clearly not only increase
Iran's foreign exchange earnings, but will also enable her to repay these loans. The
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capital for oil exploration and production, and petrochemicals are a good start. Later on,
such loans can be extended to light and heavy industries, agriculture and so forth.
Finally, funds for the development of Iran's physical and social infrastructure and
some agricultural projects can be provided through ODA which is the most appropriate
form for such purposes.
2.2-Lessons for Mitsui Bussan
Probably, the biggest mistake of Mitsui Bussan, in my opinion, was to link the
establishment of the petrochemical project to acquiring the rights for Lorestan oilfield.
If the company really believed that a petrochemical joint venture with Iran would be
unfeasible, then it should not have gone ahead with it in the hope of gaining access to
Iran's oil reserves to strengthen its oil business. If such a connection did exist, then
Mitsui Bussan's management was intending to use profits from the oil business to
compensate for losses incurred in the construction and operations of UPC: i.e. cross-
subsidisation or transfer pricing. This practice not only would have wasted the company's
resources but also would have resulted in losses to the Japanese government who
provided the joint venture with hundreds of millions of yen in low interest loans and in
insurance indemnity payments. Moreover, NPC also lost hundreds of millions of dollars
as it entrusted the construction of the complex to ICDC when the latter believed that the
joint venture would not be profitable.
Moreover, if Bussan thought that the Iranian economy was unable to
accommodate a large petrochemical complex, then it should have not given into NPC
demands for such a project. Instead, it should have insisted on a medium sized caamplex
as its Chemical Department was suggesting. However, as explained in Chapter Seven,
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Bussan was so preoccupied with winning the bidding for Lorestan, that it was prepared
to accept any demand that the Iranians were making. Mitsui Bussan, a company with 100
years of history and long experience in international business, should not have heeded
the inexperienced NPC's insistence for such a large complex when it knew that it would
be very difficult for the Iranian economy to absorb its impact.
Perhaps one other lesson for Mitsui Bussan would be not to form joint ventures
with state owned companies of the developing countries. This is because, as discussed in
earlier chapters, their objectives for the establishment of such ventures are vastly
different from those of Bussan which is a private, commercial company. As in the case
of UPC, Iran wanted to use the joint venture as a means of expanding the petrochemical
industry and speeding up the country's industrialisation. On the other hand, Mitsui
Bussan was interested in the joint venture to gain access to Iran's oil reserves and expand
its trading volume.
In conclusion, lessons that Mitsui Bussan should learn from the failure of UPC
are: first, it should not enter into joint ventures in the hope of acquiring access to a
developing country's raw materials. It should evaluate each project on its own merits
rather than its desire to win rights to natural resources. Second, it would not be advisable
for Bussan to enter into joint ventures with state owned companies of developing
countries as their expectations from such ventures are greatly different from those of its
own.
3.0- Lessons for Iran
3.1- The Iranian Government
In my opinion, the Iranian government, that is the Shah's regime, made many
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mistakes with regard to the expansion of the domestic petrochemical industry. For one,
it should not have used the granting of oil exploration and production rights in order to
entice foreign companies into establishing petrochemical joint ventures with NPC. Quite
clearly, as the case of UPC showed, companies which enter into such ventures are only
interested in winning the bidding for oil rights and have no interest in the joint venture
itself. As a result, they do not make a whole-hearted commitment to the success of the
joint venture itself. The issues of granting oil exploration and production rights and
establishing a joint venture are two quite different issues and should not be mixed. Of
course, it is understandable that a developing country which has a few advantages may
use whatever inducements it can to attract foreign investment into its manufacturing
sector. But this is quite different from making the awarding of access to natural resources
to foreign companies conditional on entering into joint ventures with the state owned
companies. This way some companies may offer to establish the joint venture so as to
win the rights when they have no knowledge of the sector in which the joint venture is
to be established.
Another problem was the lack of overall industrial and economic development
policies. It has already been discussed in earlier chapters that Iranian governments (both
before and after the revolution) have never formulated a cohesive industrial policy. In
fact, it can be stated that Iran has never had an industrial policy. Any person or company
can establish a manufacturing plant, mainly assembling foreign products, and ask the
government for protection against foreign competition. And the government, without any
regard to economic viability, minimum scale of operation, availability of skilled
manpower and infrastructural facilities, availability of domestic raw and intermediate
products, capital goods, local content requirements, export performance, etc, would grant
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the new company protection from competition. In this way many companies with a small
scale of operations, catering mainly for the then small domestic market were set up from
the late 1950s to 1979. As an example, during this period, about ten car and four
television assembly plants were established. This was at a time when, due to the
smallness of the domestic market, the operation of even one of these companies in each
sector would not have been feasible. Of course, thanks to heavy protection, the owners
of such companies made huge profits out of the domestic market.
The confusion in the industrial policy, creation of many inefficient companies, and
high rate of investment in the manufacturing sector put severe pressure on the
underdeveloped Iranian economy. These pressures in turn caused high inflation rates,
especially in the mid-to late-1970s, shortages of skilled manpower, and decline of the
agricultural sector. The situation was so grave that even UPC, the most important
industrial project, had difficulty in recruiting an adequate number of skilled workers and
had to employ expensive foreign workers. Moreover, the lack of industrial policy was
denying companies with potential for success (like UPC) to procure their inputs at
reasonable costs, hence putting them at a cost disadvantage against their competitors.
The other problem was (or is) the lack of a comprehensive economic development
policy. Although in theory the Plan and Budget Organisation exists to co-ordinate
development policy, judged from the present state of the country's infrastructure, it has
failed in its task. The PBO implemented six development plans during the Shah's regime
and is in the process of executing the first development plan of the Islamic Republic. But
so far, it has failed to solve any of the country's problems like shortages of transport
facilities (roads, railways, ports, airports), communications, education and training
facilities, health, and so on. It has even failed to co-ordinate investment activities within
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the goverment ministries, and between them and the private sector. This has created
confusion, strains on existing facilities, and wastage of scarce resources. One specific
example of this unco-ordinated planning is the provision of infrastructural facilities for
UPC and IRNIP plants in Bandar Shahpour. The government had undertaken to provide
roads, housing, water, and train adequate manpower to meet the demands of these two
companies. However, due to disorganisation, the responsible authorities failed to deliver
them on time and both companies had to spend their own capital to satisfy their needs.
This obviously increased their production costs and, in the case of UPC, became a factor
in the Japanese partners' decision to pull out of the joint venture.
So what does the Iranian government need to do in order not to repeat mistakes
like the UPC and create a conducive environment for the smooth development and
industrialisation of the Iranian economy?
3.1.1- Formulation of an Industrial Policy
In my opinion, the most important issue before the Iranian government regarding
the economic development of the country is the formulation of an appropriate and
cohesive industrial policy. Iran can learn a lot from the Japanese experience in this
matter, as the existence of a sophisticated industrial policy is believed by many to be a
factor in that country's astonishing success.
The Iranian policy makers must recognise the country's limitations and make a
proper assessment of Iran's strengths and weaknesses and develop an industrial policy
which builds on the present and potential advantages of the country.
At present, policy options for Iran are rather limited as she only has a few
advantages that can be drawn upon in her industrialisation efforts: a relatively large
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domestic market, a large and growing population, abundant raw materials (oil, gas, coal,
iron and copper ores,...), vast tracks of arable land, a varied climate, and proximity to
lucrative markets in the Arabian Peninsula and Central Asia. She needs to devise an
industrial policy which promotes the types of industries which use the inputs currently
available in the country to produce goods that can be sold at competitive prices in the
domestic and neighbouring markets mentioned above. With regard to the above
advantages, Iran can only be competitive in light consumer goods industries like textiles,
food processing, and resource and energy intensive ones like petrochemicals.
Every developed economy has had a leading sector or industry upon which its
industrialisation is based. These industries have included textiles, railroads, automobiles,
etc. They have helped the country to industrialise by establishing backward and forward
linkages with other sectors of the economy. A case in point is the Japanese textile
industry which, after the Meiji Restoration, assumed the role of primer for the later
industrialisation of Japan. After the Second World War this role was taken over by the
heavy and chemical industries which acted as a conductor for the development of other
Japanese industries like automobiles, machinery, etc.
Iran too, if she is to succeed in her industrialisation endeavour, needs to choose
a sector of the economy which will act as a locomotive to pull forward other sectors or
industries. Considering the present state of the Iranian economy, and potential
opportunities open to her in foreign markets, I believe that this role should be played
by the agricultural sector. This assertion is made for the following reasons: first, as stated
before, Iran has millions of hectares of arable land which, due to the diverse climate can
produce a wide variety of agricultural products. Moreover, these products have ready and
large markets both within Iran and neighbouring countries. Iran itself imports around $4
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billion worth of agricultural products from abroad. The Arab Gulf states also imported
around $27 billion of food products in 1987 mainly from outside the region. In addition,
many of the former Soviet republics are net food importers, with Russia being one of the
biggest food importers in the world. Undoubtedly, huge markets exist in these countries
for Iranian agricultural products which enjoy a high reputation for good quality and
suitability to local tastes. If Iran manages to develop her agricultural sector she will be
able to capture a sizable share of these markets which, due to high population growth
rates, are expanding very rapidly.
However, producing huge quantities of agricultural products requires massive
input of machinery and chemicals, and that is where the role of the sector as the
promoter of heavy and chemical industries begins. At present, the most important
backward linkage that the agricultural sector can establish is with the domestic
petrochemical industry. The sector needs vast quantities of fertilisers, agricheraicals, and
irrigation pipes (PVC) which the petrochemical industry produces. Moreover, marketing
of food products requires proper packaging whose material is produced by the
petrochemical industry. Therefore, the agricultural sector can create a large market for
petrochemical products, thus allowing the rapid expansion of the industry.
On the other hand, the farming sector and petrochemical industry can supply
cotton and synthetic fibres respectively to the Iranian textile industry which has the
potential of producing goods at competitive prices for both domestic and foreign
markets.
Of course, the process of industrialisation is not static, and the agricultural sector
need not remain the leading sector for ever. With appropriate planninii, and a dynamic
industrial policy, new sectors which produce higher added value goods can take over the
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role of the leading sector, and in the process help the Iranian economy to grow stronger
and more sophisticated.
It is only through such interlinldng of various sectors of the economy that Iran can
hope to industrialise and increase the living standards of its inhabitants. The history of
UPC shows that Iran cannot just create a large company and pour hundreds of millions
of dollars worth of imported plant and machinery and latest technology into it and hope
that it will automatically foster the country's industrialisation. Undoubtedly, linkages
between various sectors of the economy and the contributions that a new industrial
project could to this mechanism must be considered before a new project such as UPC
is undertaken.
3.1.2- Provision of Infrastructural facilities and Formulation of a Regional Policy
As the failure of UPC showed, lack or inadequacy of infrastructural facilities can
pose serious problems for the smooth implementation of industrial projects and hinder
the country's industrialisation. A major flaw in Iran's strategy has so far been the lack
of co-ordination between various elements of economic development policy, particularly
between industrial and regional policies.
More often than not, large industrial projects have been located in
underdeveloped areas without prior provision of infrastructural facilities like housing,
roads, communications, schools, etc. Companies are persuaded to invest in these areas
on the assurance that such provisions will be ready before they commence operations.
However, due to unco-ordinated planning, these facilities are not ready in time, and the
companies themselves have to construct such provisions out of their own caclital, This,
as was the case with both UPC and IRN1P in Bandar Shallpour. resulted in iNuipt vast
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over-runs and partly contributed to the failure of the former and unprofitability of the
latter.
If Iran is serious about economic development, she needs to formulate a regional,
as well as an industrial policy. A thorough survey of the economic potential of various
regions of the country which are vastly different in climate, mineral wealth, agricultural
productivity, and population, needs to be carried out. Then plans should be drawn to
locate industrial plants in such a way that they draw on the strengths of the regions.
Before doing so, however, that region's infrastructure should be fully developed so that
businesses can be located there without them having to spend their scarce capital on the
construction of facilities. In other words, the Iranian government must shoulder the full
social cost of development and let companies concentrate on production and expansion
of their markets.
3.2-Lessons for NPC
There were critical defects in the strategy of NPC regarding the expansion of the
Iranian petrochemical industry. These shortcomings, not only contributed to the failure
of IJPC and wasted hundreds of millions of dollars of capital and many years of valuable
time, but also caused the serious underdevelopment of the domestic petrochemical
industry compared to other Middle Eastern countries. These errors were: seeking foreign
partners for the expansion of the petrochemical industry, insistence on creating large
scale complexes, and lack of attention to linkages with other sectors of the economy and
downstream activities.
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3.2.1- Seeking Foreign Partners
The National Petrochemical Company from the very beginning sought the co-
operation of foreign partners for the development of the Iranian petrochemical industry.
In fact, of nine petrochemical companies that were established before the 1979
revolution, seven were joint ventures (including UPC) with foreign companies mainly on
a 50-50 basis.8
 Co-operation of foreign companies was essential as NPC had no
technology of its own or any experience in operating such high-tech plants.
Up until late the 1960s/early 1970s, major international chemical and some oil
companies held patents for most of the technology for the production of petrochemicals.
Therefore, new companies like NPC which wanted to enter the industry had to either
acquire licences from these firms or enter into joint ventures with them. NPC had to
choose the latter option as even if it could obtain the licences, it was unable to run the
plants on its own.
From then onwards (late 1960s), however, this situation began to change. Major
engineering firms which up to then had been building plants and machinery for chemical
companies, started to develop their own technologies for the production of various
petrochemical products. Now any company with adequate capital could by-pass the
chemical companies and buy petrochemical related technology, plants and machinery
directly from the engineering companies.
By the late 1960s, NPC which had accumulated nearly ten years of experience in
operating small scale plants changed its strategy from catering for the domestic market
to one emphasising the building of export oriented complexes. As it had none of the
necessary inputs like adequate capital, experience in running large petrochemical
complexes, and access to foreign markets, for the massive development of industry. it
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once again had to ask foreign companies for co-operation.
Clearly, the company had not yet gained enough experience to run even small
scale plants, let alone large and complex ones. Moreover, it had not managed to satisfy
the growing domestic demand for petrochemical products and hence, moving into large
scale, export oriented operations was a very big step for the young company.
The involvement of foreign partners in large projects like LTPC was inappropriate
because of differences in business strategies between NPC and foreign companies. The
former had been given the pivotal responsibility for developing the domestic
petrochemical industry, while for foreign firms, any joint venture with Iran would only
have been a piece of the jigsaw of their global business strategies. Naturally, any foreign
company would not have been concerned with the long-term development of the Iranian
industry, but with its own profits and, as a result, would not have paid as much attention
as necessary to the joint venture as the basis for Iran's rapid industrialisation.
Even if NPC had to seek the co-operation of foreign companies, it should have
been very observant about choosing the right partner or partners. The best partner for
NPC would have been international chemical or oil companies with years of experience
in running petrochemical plants. For various reasons, European or American oil and
chemical companies were not interested in a large petrochemical joint venture with Iran,
and the only suitable candidates left were Japanese companies. So in late 1969 NPC
began discussions with Mitsui Bussan over the possibility of establishing a joint venture.
Although NPC states that extensive studies were carried out to find the most appropriate
partner, if the history of UPC is anything to go by, it certainly made a bad job of it. If
NPC had made a thorough study of the functions and historical development of Japanese
trading companies, especially those of Mitsui Bussan. it would have realif.e4 that the
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latter had neither the interest nor the managerial, technical, and organisational ability
to run a large petrochemical complex. Instead, NPC should have involved a major
Japanese petrochemical company as its main partner in the joint venture. Then, if
required, as is customary in Japanese foreign investment, bring in a sogo shosha as a
minor partner to play the organising role and assume responsibility for marketing of the
joint venture's products in international markets. In this way, NPC would have benefitted
from the experience of a large chemical company for the construction and running of the
complex, and from the global network of a general trading company for sales of
petrochemicals.
However, I believe that the best strategy for NPC would have been to develop the
domestic industry on its own and only use foreign companies to build the complex on a
turnkey basis and acquire the necessary licences from. This way, NPC would not have
wasted valuable time in prolonged negotiations with foreign companies over the
establishment of a joint venture and would have been ready to take advantage of new
developments in the international petrochemical industry after the first oil crisis.
3.2.2- Size of the Plant and Downstream Linkages
One other flaw in the NPC strategy was insistence on establishing a large,
integrated petrochemical complex. The adoption of such policy was erroneous as NPC
had difficulty in providing infrastructural facilities and skilled workers for the running of
even small scale plants.
The feasibility studies carried out by the Chemical Department of Mitsui Bussan
showed that the Iranian economy was only capable of absorbing the outputs of a 100,000
tonne ethylene plant But NPC, setting its sights on capturing a share of the huge
525
international market for petrochemicals, insisted on a 300,000 tonne plant. Evidently, the
company was ignoring its own limitations and difficulties it was having in managing the
small plants already built with foreign companies. Presumably, NPC was expecting that
a major foreign partner such as Mitsui Bussan would solve all obstacles associated with
building and operating a large integrated complex like UPC.
NPC's insistence on a large complex looks even more improper when one
considers that from the early 1970s onwards production costs of petrochemicals were
becoming less and less sensitive to capital costs. But at the same time, the share of raw
materials in total production costs were gradually rising until 1974 when, due to the first
oil crisis, it jumped to nearly 75% of total costs. (See Chapter Eight)
In addition, NPC was ignoring the effects that a large scale complex would have
on the underdeveloped state of the Iranian economy: inadequate infrastructure, shortage
of skilled manpower and, especially, lack of indigenous downstream facilities to process
the output into final and consumer products. Moreover, a large, integrated petrochemical
complex such as the one proposed by NPC, did not even exist in the Western
industrialised countries or even Japan itself. In fact, the UPC complex was the first truly
integrated petrochemical plant in the world. It is baffling how the NPC management was
expecting such a mammoth project to succeed against all odds: namely its own
inexperience, and underdeveloped domestic economy, and the monopolistic structure of
the international petrochemical industry.
3.2.3- The Alternative Strategy
If, instead of establishing a large, fully integrated complex such as UPC with the
co-operation of foreign partners, NPC had concentrated on the gradual evansion of the
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industry, surely the Iranian petrochemical industry would have been in a very different
position now.
The pouring of most of NPC's resources and indeed those of the Iranian
government's, into a single large project caused the severe underdevelopment of the
Iranian petrochemical industry. The situation was so critical that by 1989, Iran's capacity
for ethylene production, the most basic petrochemical product, was only 26,000 tonnes
per year, or a mere 0.007% of the total Middle Eastern capacity of 3,755,000 tonnes per
annum.
If NPC had gradually expanded the domestic petrochemical industry by building
medium sized plants, say 150,000 th on a turnkey basis, without foreign partners, and
in tandem with its own organisational development and experience, the growth of the
Iranian economy and downstream industries, Iran would now be enjoying the fruits of
a well developed and sophisticated petrochemical industry.
If NPC had chosen this strategy in 1968, the year that it opened discussions with
Mitsui Bussan, it would have been able to complete, for instance, a 150,000 t/y plant
before 1973, enjoy the benefits of lower construction costs prevalent in pre-first oil crisis
years and sell its products at the highly inflated prices of post-crisis years. Moreover, as
NPC gained more experience and received dividends from the existing plant, it could
build larger and more sophisticated complexes and eventually become a major force in
the international petrochemical markets.
The original NPC strategy seem to have been discarded by the new management
which took over after the 1979 Revolution as it has begun to construct medium to large
sized plants near main centres of consumption away from the Iraqi border such as Arak
and Tabriz in central and northwestern Iran respectively. At present, NPC has seven new
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petrochemical plants (including the above two), from small to large scale, under
construction which will come on stream by the mid-1990s. These are in addition to the
planned completion of the former UPC complex (now BIPC) by 1994 and expansion of
the existing eight plants. These petrochemical complexes have been designed to cater for
the domestic market but with the ability to expand production to enter the foreign
markets in the near future.
3.2.4- The Organisation of NPC
NPC is a state owned company. More precisely, it is an autonomous subsidiary
of NIOC which is a nationalised company. These two plus a few other oil and gas
companies, which are subsidiaries of NIOC, are under the control of the Iranian Ministry
of Oil with the Minister acting as the Chairman and Managing Director of NIOC. In this
manner all these companies are under the firm control of the government which
determines their business strategy and is heavily involved in their affairs. As more than
90% of the government's annual revenue and foreign exchange is provided by the sale
of crude oil, the Ministry and NIOC occupy a central position within the Iranian
government. In fact the new revolutionary government was so concerned with control
over the oil industry that it proposed abolishing the NIOC and putting all its activities
under the newly created Ministry of Oil. However, due to strong objections from the
Company these proposals were not carried out. But nevertheless, all activities of the oil
industry were put under the firm control of the Ministry. In this way NIOC and its
subsidiaries are mere departments of the government with a heavy bureaucratic
character. In fact, they are very different from European state owned oil companies like
ENI of Italy or CFP of France.
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The latter are independent companies whose shares are owned by their respective
governments9 which determines their strategies. But the management of these companies
are given considerable leeway in the running of their firms and implementing of
government policy.
But the situation is quite different with NIOC and its subsidiaries. There the
management are and act more like bureaucrats than businessmen or managers. They are
given no freedom to determine the strategies of their respective companies. What's more,
they do not have even the freedom to execute the policies that are set for them by the
government. In fact they perform their duties within a very tight regulatory framework
set by the state, and are not allowed to take decisions on their own. Obviously, if Iran
intends to develop economically and socially, it needs to modernise its institutional
arrangements, particularly those of its state owned companies which control a very
substantial part of Iran's productive assets.
These organisational arrangements and heavy governmental interference in the
management of state owned companies have prevented the latter growing both
organisationally and economically and they are unable to compete with their respective
foreign competitors both in the domestic and international markets. This state of affairs
has created many inefficient and structurally weak companies which are increasingly
dependent upon heavy government protection and subsidies. The following section will
discuss how NPC should re-arrange its organisation so as to avoid repeating of
misfortunes like UPC.
3.2.5- Organisational Options for NPC
At present NPC owns all the twenty companies active in the Iranian
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petrochemical industry. Sixteen of these are small to large petrochemical complexes,
some of which are operational and some under construction. The remaining four are
trading, engineering and consulting firms. These companies although nominally
independent, are under the strict control of NPC and in reality are its branch offices.
Their management have no say in the running of the companies and only execute the
orders of their parent company.
However, under new government policy, the private sector and foreign companies
will be allowed to own and operate petrochemical plants. At present around eight
projects are proposed by private Iranian and foreign interests, one of which is under
active consideration. Furthermore, as a part of the re-organisation of the Iranian oil
industry, NIOC and its subsidiaries, including NPC, may be required to sell a few of the
companies under their control to the private sector or other state owned companies.°
Under these circumstances, NPC must seek a new role for itself within the emerging
domestic petrochemical industry. But, what role can NPC play in the new environment?
I believe that the Company has two distinct routes for re-organisation to choose from.
NPC can either become an independent but state owned petrochemical company, or it
can become a governmental agency with responsibility for the regulation of the domestic
industry without owning any productive assets of its own.
3.2.5.1- An Independent, State Owned Company Option
The first option requires the company to become totally independent from the
government and be run like a commercial company. The state, as at present, would
wholly own the company, appoint its board of directors, and set its long-term strategy.
However, government involvement would end there and liPC would be allowed to run
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like a commercial concern. The top management would be in charge of the Company
without any interference from the government or the ministry responsible for it.
Moreover, NPC's budget should be taken out of the government's annual or development
budgets with the management being allowed to raise capital from domestic and foreign
sources within a pre-determined framework. In addition, the management should have
full authority to enter into contracts or joint ventures with other companies, Iranian or
foreign, without the need to receive approval from the Council of Ministers or the
Parliament. NPC should also be given total freedom to decide its recruitment and
compensations policy without any pressure from the state and not be subjected to the
rules set for civil servants as is the practice now. Of course, the company would be
required to observe the government's industrial relations laws and minimum wage
guidance. The top management's performance should be evaluated by its ability or
success in implementing the overall strategy agreed with the government. The top
management should be appointed on the merits of their proven managerial abilities and
business acumen and not on the basis of their political connections as has been the case
since the establishment of NF1C.
Finally, all of the NPC subsidiaries should become autonomous companies with
their management being given full responsibility for the running of their firms. NPC
would set a strategy and framework within which these enterprises would be given total
freedom to operate. Moreover, they should be given greater freedom in their sales
policies, raising of capital from domestic and foreign sources, and their recruitment and
compensation policies.
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3.2.5.2- A Regulatory Authority Option
At present NPC has the dual role of a regulatory body responsible for the
development of the Iranian petrochemical industry and the owner of subsidiaries which
are producing petrochemical products. This state of affairs is incompatible with the
government's plans to invite private domestic and foreign capital to invest in the Iranian
petrochemical industry. NPC needs to give up one or other of its roles. Obviously, private
capital is apprehensive about investing in an industry in which one company will be both
its regulator and competitor. This is even more problematic when one realises that the
regulating and competing firm is owned by NIOC, the company which will be supplying
most of the raw materials needed by the private companies. This will raise the question
of giving unfair advantages to the state owned company which will be the biggest
competitor for the private companies. If the Iranian government intends to bring private
capital, in a massive and meaningful way, into the domestic petrochemical industry, it will
need to take away one of the dual functions of NPC.
In this option, NPC will be modelled on the lines of the Japan National Oil
Corporation. NPC will be required to dispose of all its subsidiaries which are producing
various petrochemicals and become a government agency in charge of regulating and
facilitating the expansion of the Iranian petrochemical industry. The new NPC will set
an overall strategy for the development of the industry and the regulations for the
participation of private capital in it. Moreover, it would be able to co-ordinate
investment activity within the industry by having the authority to issue licences, and
allocate production capacity on a pre-determined basis to prospective candidates. The
new company would also be given adequate funds so that it could offer low-interest,
long-term capital to qualifying companies for investment in productive assets. Finally the
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new company would, through various incentives and regulations, encourage vast
participation of private interests and greater competition within the industry.
This last option is far more radical than the Iranian authorities or even NPC
management may be willing to accept. But, as the history of UPC showed, private and
state goals and interests are incompatible, and partnerships between bureaucratic state
owned companies and private commercial ones are more likely to fail than those
between firms in the private sector. Therefore, if they are truly concerned with the
development of the industry and the general industrialisation of Iran, they should adopt
measures to create a more dynamic and competitive petrochemical industry which is
more willing to accommodate private capital and fresh ideas than the present
bureaucratic and inefficient NPC.
4.0- Lessons for Joint Ventures
This section will examine the lessons that can be drawn by international joint
ventures, especially those between companies from industrialised countries and the
developing world, from the UPC experience. However, it is important to point out that
UPC was not a typical joint venture in the sense that, throughout its life, it remained in
the construction stage and never became operational. Therefore, one can only make
reccomendations related to the initial stages of the formation of a joint venture, i.e.
finding suitable partners, preliminary negotiations, and for the drawing up of a business
plan and the joint venture agreement.
4.1- Finding a Suitable Partner(s)
A joint venture between two enterprises can be likened to a marriage between
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two human beings. The more the prospective marriage partners know about each other's
background, up- bringing, current status, and future plans, the more likely it is that they
make a sounder decision about the suitability of the other person as a marriage partner.
Moreover, the more the prospective partners know about and share one another's future
plans and goals in life, the more stable and fruitful their marriage will be.
The same reasoning applies equally to two companies which are considering
establishing a joint venture. Obviously, the more the two companies know about each
other's historical background, business philosophy, line of business, strengths and
weaknesses, organisational set-up and managerial style, the better their evaluation of the
other as a suitable partner in the joint venture. More importantly, if the two firms have
a similar business strategy, the more likely the chances of success and survival of the
joint venture.
In order to illustrate how two firms, one a state owned company from a
developing country and the other a private one from the industrialised world, can search
for and find a prospective partner for a joint venture, NPC and Mitsui Bussan will be
used as examples.
4.1.1- The State Owned Company's search for a Partner
Let us first take the point of view of a state owned company from a developing
country (like NPC) which plans to establish a manufacturing or processing plant in a
certain industry and needs a foreign partner to provide it with capital, technology and
access to overseas markets. If no apparent partner is available, then the company should
advertise its business plan in appropriate journals or through other mediums and ask
interested firms to send their own business plans and bidding s for the proposed venture,
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Although, after further negotiations these business plans and biddings may change, at
least they show which of these companies have plans nearest to its own and have the best
proposals for their participation in the joint venture.
Next, those companies with the most promising plans and proposals can be asked
to demonstrate what qualifications they have for participation in the proposed joint
venture and what contributions they can make to fulfilling the goals of the state owned
company and the proposed venture. By this process, the companies with ulterior motives
(those that want to use the proposed joint venture as a vehicle for the advancement of
their other commercial interests: like access to the developing country's natural
resources) can be identified and eliminated. Then, a short list of the most suitable
partners can be drawn up.
The next stage would be to learn as much as possible about the historical
background, business philosophy, past performance, future plans, and most critically of
all, the credibility of those companies on the short list.
The state owned company may not have the personnel or resources to carry out
such a demanding task on its own. But because of its connection with the state (which
presumably is backing the company's plans) it can utilise government resources like
diplomatic channels, the intelligence service, other state owned companies and banks
with overseas branches, to carry out a detailed search on the firms under study.
By sending its own personnel or through the above mentioned channels, the state
owned company can contact banks, customers, competitors and other industrial and
academic sources to gain first hand knowledge about the companies under study. If the
prospective partners have joint ventures in other parts of the world, their partners should
be contacted to learn about their experiences in dealing with these companies. These
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comprehensive studies will help build a profile of companies under investigation which
will enable the state owned company to gain a real understanding of the strengths and
weaknesses of each company and discover potential pitfalls that may arise in the future.
Then it can isolate the company (or companies) which has the business plan nearest to
its own and would make the best partner in the proposed joint venture. It is only then
that direct discussions over the proposed venture should start with the targeted company.
NPC states in its publications that an extensive search for potential partners for
a petrochemical joint venture were carried out in the late 1960s. As a result, Japanese
companies, especially Mitsui Bussan, was deemed to make the most suitable partner. But,
if the saga of UPC is anything to go by, it becomes obvious that this search was not
extensive enough.
If NPC had carried out the exhaustive research suggested above on the operations
and functions of Japanese trading companies, it would have realised that the latter were
not the most suitable partners for a petrochemical joint venture. More specifically, if
NPC had researched the historical development of the Mitsui Group, and Mitsui Bussan
in particular, it would have realised that the Group as a whole had a historical weakness
in heavy industry, making it unable to manage a huge petrochemical complex (as the
President of Mitsui Bussan admitted after the establishment of the joint venture). Also,
NPC would have learned that a sogo shosha's main line of business is trading, not
manufacturing, and that their real motives behind extensive foreign investments are the
trading opportunities (exports of plants and machinery and purchase of the outputs) that
such investments create, not the profitability of the investment itself.
Moreover, if NPC had studied joint ventures that Mitsui Bussan had entered into
around the world and had contacted their local partner, it would have realised that,
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irrespective of the size of Bussan's (or any other sogo shosha) equity, it exercise effective
control over the operations of the joint venture, leaving little room for local participation.
Having considered the above discussion and many other problems which UPC
faced, one can safely assume that despite NPC's statements, the company never really
searched for a suitable partner and entered into the joint venture with the first company
that showed the slightest interest in the idea. The best choice, as suggested earlier, would
have been a major Japanese petrochemical company as the main foreign partner in
charge of the construction and operation of the complex, and a Japanese general trading
company, such as Mitsui Bussan, responsible for selling the joint venture's products in
overseas markets through its extensive international network.
4.1.2- The Private Company's Search For a Partner
The criteria by which a commercial company from an industrialised country (such
as Mitsui Bussan) chooses a partner from a developing country are not necessarily the
same as those discussed above. Apart from seeking a partner which will help it expand
its business in the local and regional markets and one whose business plan and strategy
is similar to those of its own, it needs to investigate some other aspects as well.
Multinational companies, with their worldwide networks and business connections
do not face the same obstacles as companies from the developing world, in carrying out
an extensive study on the suitability of potential partners in the developing world. This
is especially true in the case of Japanese general trading companies whose information
gathering capabilities rival those of intelligence agencies of the Western world.
Therefore, the speed with which they can conduct these searches enables them to identify
potential partners from developing countries much quicker than the other way round,
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Moreover, the quality of the information they gather allows them to make a sound
judgement of the strengths, weaknesses, and contributions that the targeted company can
make to the proposed joint venture.
The most important factors that the private company must consider are the degree
of independence that the state owned company enjoys from government interference, the
calibre of its management, and its financial capability. The first factor is of great
importance. If the company is run more like a goverment department, rather than as
an independent enterprise, then it is very likely that its management will act more like
bureaucrats, with all its implications, rather than businessmen. Furthermore, this will
mean that all decisions of the partner and the proposed joint venture will be subject to
the approval by government and possibly the national parliament. This will also mean
interference by often corrupt and inefficient bureaucrats in every aspect of the decision
making.
Financial strength and the degree of financial independence of the state owned
company are also crucial factors. If the company has to seek the approval of the
government for every investment plan, then obviously such plans will be subject to delays
to get permission from the relative authorities. In addition, personal rivalries between
the top management of the state company and some high ranking officials and politicians
may further impede the rapid approval of loans or financial guarantees needed for the
implementation of investment plans. This point was vividly demonstrated in the case of
UPC when the then Finance Minister for personal reasons, refused to provide the
financial guarantees needed for receiving loans from Japan, and by doing so delayed the
start of construction by at least a year.
If Mitsui Bussan had carried out a thorough search on the background and
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organisation of NPC, it would have realised that the latter was more like a government
department than an independent business enterprise, heavily dependent on the state for
its financial resources. It would also have discovered that every decision of NPC was
subject to the approval of the Iranian government, Parliament and, above all, the Shah,
implying heavy bureaucratic interference and control in the affairs of NPC and
consequently the joint venture. Having understood the implications of the bureaucratic
nature of NPC, Mitsui Bussan may never have entered into a joint venture with the
latter, or would have asked for assurances that such interference would be kept to a
minimum.
Having identified the most suitable partner, the state owned company and the
private firm need to discuss in detail their expectations from the joint venture and the
contribution that each can make towards fulfilling their respective business goals. In
order to so, the prospective partners need to draw up a business plan for the proposed
joint venture which, apart from bringing together the expectations of the partners, will
spell out the business strategy of the venture.
4.2- The Business Plan and the Joint Venture Agreement 11
It is important at this juncture to state that the business plan of the proposed joint
venture must be drawn up and agreed upon before the legal agreement establishing the
company is signed. This is because, as the case of UPC showed, the partners will bind
themselves into a legal framework which they will find very difficult to amend should it
become necessary to make changes to the joint venture.
In negotiating the business plan, the partners should involve their managerial.
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technical, and financial personnel to discuss such matters as business strategy,
management style, product mix, production plans, financial policy, etc. It is unnecessary,
even wrong, to discuss the legal matters related to the joint venture at this stage, as the
business plan should not be viewed as a legal document, but rather as a discussion paper
between the personnel who will be involved in the running of the venture. The aim of
these discussions over the business plan is to crystallize the expectations of the
prospective partners from the joint venture at an early stage so that any mismatches
between those expectations can be identified and, if possible, reconciled.
The detailed negotiations over the business plan may also help expose any ulterior
motives, if any, of the potential partners so that the other side can take appropriate
measures before signing of the legal agreement. When all matters regarding strategy,
management style, production policy, and finance have been sorted out, the final draft
of the business plan can be drawn up and forwarded to the top management of the
companies concerned.
The final draft of the business plan, and the joint venture agreement, however,
must contain several essential elements including: rules for the dissolution of the joint
venture, rules for making changes in the production policy and business plan itself, and
contingency plans.
Earlier on in this section it was stated that a business joint venture is like a
marriage between two people. However, in Chapter One it was hypothesised that a joint
venture is not made to last but rather, after fulfilling the goals of its parents, it will
eventually be dissolved. And this is the crucial difference between a joint venture and
marriage. Consequently, as the eventual dissolution of the venture is foreseen or
expected, the business plan and the joint venture agreement must contain provisions to
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deal with that eventuality. They must specify under what conditions, and how, the joint
venture is to be dissolved. For instance, partners may want to stipulate that if the joint
venture does not begin operations or achieve a certain production target or profit rate
after a specified number of years, one of the partners will have the option of buying out
the shares of the other party or seeking another partner. The agreement must also state
at what value, book value or certain multiplier of earnings, the equities of the other
partner should be bought.
The business plan and the agreement must also recognise that the fast changing
and dynamic business environment will inevitably affect the joint venture. Thus they need
to contain provisions which would allow for the regular revision of the strategy,
management style, and production policy of the joint venture.
Finally, the business plan and the joint venture agreement must contain
contingency plans to deal with unforseen situations or events on a predetermined basis.
These situations include war or revolution in the country where the joint venture is
based, or a fundamental change in the policy of the host government or the local partner.
It could also include a situation where the parent company of the foreign partner is
taken over by another company which the local partner does not deem to be a suitable
partner.
4.3- The Experience of IJPC
Unfortunately, the IJPC partners not only did not try to learn about one another
before going into partnership, but also signed the Basic Agreement before drawing up
a comprehensive business plan. In fact, NPC and Mitsui Bussan, using Misato's12 phrase
"put the cart before the horse". They committed themselves to a legal straight iarket even
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before substantive negotiations over the joint venture's business plan had started. This
created several problems for the joint venture as well as the partners themselves.
First, after hurriedly signing the Agreement in order to win the bidding for
Lorestan oil, Mitsui Bussan found itself involved in a joint venture which did not have
the whole-hearted support of the entire Company. Specifically, when INEPCO failed to
find any oil in Lorestan, Mitsui Bussan, whose interest in the petrochemical company
venture had stemmed from its desire to increase its oil business, found itself unable to
leave the joint venture. Moreover, NPC had entered into a venture with a reluctant
partner who used every opportunity to delay the start of the construction.
Second, the partners found themselves arguing over the business plan for at least
four years after the signing of the Basic Agreement. This not only caused a long delay
in the start of construction, but also created an unfriendly environment because of
protracted and often hostile discussions over the production policy, style of management,
and appointment of managing contractor. They also used the lack of a final business plan
as an excuse to make at least four major alterations to the production policy.
Furthermore, the Japanese banks and the Plan and Budget Organisation of Iran refused
to extend large loans to the joint venture on the ground that no finalised business plan
existed. Consequently, as a result of the lack of a business plan, the start of the
construction of the petrochemical complex was delayed by about six years after the
signing of the Basic Agreement.
Third, as a result of lack of separation clauses and contingency plans, the UPC
partners found themselves trapped in a joint venture whose construction had lasted
nearly seventeen years without ever becoming operational. If such provisions had been
included in the Basic Agreement, Mitsui Bussan, for example, could have invoked them
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after the Iranian Revolution or the Iran-Iraq war, arguing that due to changed
circumstances it was no longer interested in continuing its partnership in the joint
venture. Similarly, NPC could have argued that due to delays caused by ICDC
hesitations, and the resultant incompletion of the project, it wanted to buy out the shares
of the latter in the joint venture and continue on its own or with another partner.
The history of UPC does confirm the assertion made earlier that the business plan
of a joint venture must be drawn up and agreed upon by the partners before the signing
of the joint venture agreement.
5.0- Conclusion
In this chapter it was argued that establishment of petrochemical joint ventures
with Middle Eastern oil producing countries do not necessarily contribute to a stable
supply of petroleum from these countries to Japan. If the latter is really concerned about
her security of supply of this vital commodity, she must help to raise the overall
economic development of these countries by providing technology, training, and easy
term loans. By doing so, they will become less reliant on oil revenues for their
development and will be more integrated in the world economy, and therefore, less likely
to use oil supplies or prices as a weapon whenever a sellers' market appears.
It was also stated that Iran needs to formulate an appropriate industrial policy and
concentrate on those industries or sectors of the economy in which she has a comparative
advantage. Moreover, she needs to develop her infrastructure before embarking on any
industrial project in the future.
The National Petrochemical Company also needs to modernise its organisation
and either become an independent state owned company or become a regulatory
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authority for the domestic petrochemical industry.
Finally, it was argued that companies seeking partners for a joint venture must
carry out an extensive search to find the right partner who has similar business plans and
strategy and one whose organisation and management style matches those of its own. It
was stated that it is imperative to draw up a comprehensive business plan for the
proposed joint venture before the legal agreement is signed, and cited the problems that
UPC partners faced when they ignored this crucial sequence.
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EPILOGUE
As observed in this study, Iran Japan Petrochemical Company which started as
a symbol of co-operation between Iran and Japan, a means of boosting the former's
industrialisation efforts, and as a way of realising Japan's and Mitsui Bussan's dreams of
having their own oil production, turned into a subject of intense argument between the
two governments and a possible flash point.
However, the available information does not suggest that at any time the UPC
issue seriously threatened diplomatic and trade relations between the two countries.
Quite the reverse, UPC was an anchor which prevented both sides from taking short
term and ill-tempered decisions regarding their mutual areas of interest.
This could be attributed to a large extent to the Japanese government's policy in
the Middle East, particularly the Persian Gulf, the source of more than 70% of her oil
supplies.
Iranians also exercised a great deal of far-sightedness when it came to dealing
with issues related to UPC. Indeed UPC was the only foreign investment which was not
nationalised after the revolution.
As a result of this attitude, Mitsui Bussan is still doing business in Iran. Other
Japanese companies are also doing a brisk trade with the country, and Japan is now
Iran's second biggest trading partner.
As discussed in Chapter Seven, after the separation, the Iranians renamed UPC
The Bandar Imam Petrochemical Company (BIPC), and are rebuilding it with the help
of some European firms, hoping to complete it by 1994.
As for Mitsui Bussan, after nearly two decades of trouble and losses related to
UPC, it is fast rebuilding its business empire worldwide, and is determined to catch up
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and surpass its arch rival, the Mitsubishi Trading Corporation as soon as possible.
Finally, in September 1990, almost one year after the dissolution of the joint
venture, the Iranian newspapers reported that NIOC had discovered oil in Lorestan.13
This was the same area where Mitsui Bussan's affiliate, INEPCO, had failed to find any
oil after nearly six years of exploration in the 1970s.
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1.The main reason for the Mitsubishi Groups's hesitation was, as
in the case of Mitsui Bussan in Iran, the unfeasibility of the
proposed joint venture with Saudi Arabia. However, as explained
in Chapter Eight, contrary to the Mitsubishi argument, this joint
venture which began operations in 1986 has turned out to be very
successful.
2.Hamauzu, T., "Japan's Economic Relations with Iran: Trade and
Private Direct Investments", Institute of Developing Economies,
1991, p.28.
3.Although the United States; due to the existence of huge
indigenous oil reserves, is far less dependent upon imported oil
than any other industrialised country, it nonetheless has, for
two reasons, a major stake in the international oil industry.
First, of the world's six largest oil companies, four are U.S
based with implications for American economic interests worldwide
and her tax revenues. Second, oil is a strategic commodity upon
which most of the Western industrialised countries, including
Japan, are dependent for their economic progress and survival.
Consequently, the United States in her role as the protector of
these countries and of the international capitalist (or free
market) system against the now defunct Soviet threat or
nationalism of resource rich developing countries, has assumed
responsibility for ensuring the availability of plentiful oil
supplies for herself and her allies. This can be attested to by
the heavy involvement of the United States in the politics of the
Middle East, and the U.S. Adminstration's intense efforts after
the 1973 oil crisis in creating the International Energy Agency.
The most recent example of the American strategic interest in the
security of oil supplies is her massive and decisive involvement
in the international efforts to reverse the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait which had great implications for the world petroleum
industry.
This point, however, which is related to the political
economy and geopolitical issues, is outside the scope of this
study, and will not be discussed here.
4.The sharp rise in oil prices which followed the first oil
crisis of 1973 brought to a halt the high economic growth period
which had started in the early 1960s and pushed Japan into a deep
recession which lasted three years. Moreover, it turned the
surplus in foreign trade into a huge deficit. The second oil
crisis of 1979 caused the same problems for Japan, but because
of the lessons learned from the first one, she managed to cope
better with the situation and recover from the recession much
faster.
5.This action may bring the charges of transferring dirty aud
polluting industries to less developed countries. However, the
fact is that these countries, considering their present state of
547
industrialisation, are unable to set up the less polluting high-
tech and knowledge intensive industries. Therefore, they will
have to start with the industries in which they have a
comparative advantage, like processing. Moreover, Japan which is
a leader in pollution control technologies, can help to reduce
the environmental effect of such industries.
Furthermore, the concept of comparative advantage is a
dynamic process. As the process of industrialisation gains
momentum in the developing countries, they will gain new
advantages and will be able to establish more high-tech and less
polluting industries.
6.Iran was one of the first countries in the world which began
using natural gas in urban transportation. After the revolution,
these efforts were largely halted. However, recently the
government has taken steps to expand the use of natural gas in
vehicles, and is seeking the co-operation of Japanese companies
to develop natural gas burning engines. (National Iranian Gas
Company publications).
7.For a comprehensive discussion of the Japanese aid programme
for the Middle East see M. Mizutani and Y. Fuwa, in Sugihara and
Allan (1993) op cit, chapters 6 and 7.
8.NPC, " Iran's Petrochemical Complexes and Future Plans", Public
Relations Office, National Petrochemical Company, Spring 1991.
Two of these joint ventures were with Japanese (IJPC and IRNIP),
and the rest mainly with American chemical and oil companies.
9.ENI is wholly owned by the Italian government, but the French
government controls around 70% of the shares of CPF.
10.Financial Times, 25 March 1992.
11.This section draws from Richard H. Holton,
International Joint Ventures Work", in Otterbeck, L.
pp.255-267.
12.Misato (1981) op cit.
13.Iran Times (Washington DC), 21 September 1990.
"Making
(1981),
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Appendix A'
Financial Details of the Separation Agreement
The financial obligations of Iran Chemical Development Company and the
National Petrochemical Company of Iran, the two partners in the Iran Japan
Petrochemical Company under the Friendly Separation Agreement of 1989 were as
follows:
1.0- The Financial Obligations of NPC
(1)- The Direct Loan: NPC would assume responsibility for the repayment of the
principal and interest on the direct loan. The remaining principal of this loan was fixed
at equivalent to 18,891,889,053 yen, and the interest rate was set at 7.75% until the end
of its term.
(2)- the Yen Loan: NPC would undertake to reimburse the remainder of the
principal and interest of the yen loan. The balance of this loan's principal was set at
21,120,000,000 yen as of 31/12/1988, with an interest rate of 4% for the rest of its term.
(3)- Suppliers' Credit: NPC would repay the remaining principal and interest of
the suppliers' credit loan. The balance of the principal of this loan was 12,054,571,120
yen as of 31/12/1988 and the accumulated interest until that date was 2,743,818,544 yen.
The interest rate until the full clearance of the loan was set at 6.7%.
(4)- The Iranian Loan s : NPC would relinquish all its claims regarding the
remaining principal of and interest on the Iranian loan. The position of the loan as of
31/12/1988 was:
(a)- Remaining balance of the principal of the dollar loan: $340,136,000.
(b)- Remaining balance of the principal of the rial loan: IR24,000,000,000.
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(c)- Interest on the dollar loan: $190,013,947.97.
(d)- Interest on the rial loan: IR13,407,386,301.
The interest on the loan would be set at 7.2% until the end of its term.
(*)- The Iranian loan was composed of two portions: a dollar loan and a rial loan. See
next paragraph for details.
(5)- Sundry Creditors: NPC would clear the accounts of all sundry creditors on
behalf of UPC. The total balance of accounts with these creditors as of 31/12/1988 was
IR2201.8 million.
(6)- NPC would forgo all claims to its short-term loans extended to UPC until
31/12/1988. The aggregate balance of these loans as of that date was 1R60,070,902, 133.
2.0- The Financial Obligations of ICDC
(1)- ICDC Loan: ICDC would waive all its claims regarding the remaining
principal and interest of the ICDC loan to UPC for the benefit of the latter. The
remaining principal and interest of the loan as of 31/12/1988 were 125,000,000,000 yen
and 73,997,301,369 yen respectively. The interest rate would be set at 8.349% for the
duration of the loan.
(2)- ICDC Payment: ICDC would pay NPC a fixed sum of 130,000,000,000 yen as
its share for the reimbursement of the loans mentioned in Section 1.0 (NPC obligations).
This amount is final and will not be altered under any circumstances, including currency
fluctuations.
Table A.1 shows a summary of the financial obligations of NPC and ICDC under
the terms of the Separation Agreement of November 1988.
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3.0- Method of Settlement
NPC and ICDC agreed to appoint a bank as an intermediary for the settlement
of all financial matters related to LTPC. ICDC would pay the 130 billion yen to an
account at the same bank, and the latter would settle all outstanding claims assumed by
NPC under the Separation Agreement. Any remaining balance, after the clearance of
these claims will be forwarded to NPC. Moreover, the bank undertook to transfer all of
ICDC shares in LTPC (50%) to NPC, and deliver the letters of resignation of all of the
directors of UPC appointed by ICDC.
ICDC agreed to transfer all of its 50% share in the Iran Japan petrochemical
Company; equivalent to half of the uncompleted petrochemical complex in Iran, to NPC.
A joint valuation survey carried out by the two partners in October 1988, put the value
of the complex at nearly zero.
4.0- The Balance Sheet of UPC at the Time of Dissolution
In the Separation Agreement, the loss (liabilities - assets) related to the
investment of the two partners in the UPC was estimated to be IR44,494,303,830,
assuming that both would discharge their obligations. Accordingly, the Balance Sheet and
the Profit & Loss Account of UPC were adjusted for financial year 1988 (1 January to
31 December 1988) to take account of the loss (see Table A.2).
* Note: This appendix is based on data supplied by BIPC, March 1993.
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Table A.1: A Summary of the Financial Obligations of the Two IJPC Partners Under the
"Separation Agreement"
NPC NPC ICDC ICDC
Type of Loan Millions of
Rials
Millions of
Yens
Millions of
Rials
Millions of
Yens
1-Direct Loan
Principal
Interest
5,623.3
2,722.1
18,891.9
2,772.1
2-Yen Loan
Principal
Interest
6,183.3
1,570.6
21,120.0
2,870.0
3-Suppliers'
Credit
Principal
Interest
3,894.7
1,501.6
12,054.6
2,743.8
4-Iranian Loan
Principal
$
IR
Interest
$
IR
23,976.4
24,000.0
13,075.6
13,407.4
$340,1m
$190m
5-Sundry
Creditors 2,201.8 --
6-Short-Term
Loans (1) 60,070.9
7-ICDC Loan
Principal
Interest
38,702.1
40,495.7
125,000
73,997.3,
8-ICDC Payment
(2)
130,000 130,000
Total 158,227.7 Y62,654.3
$530m
79,197.8 328,997.3
Notes: (1)- NPC short-term loans to LTPC.
(2)- ICDC one-off payment to NPC under the Separation Agreement.
Source: BIPC, March 1993.
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Table A.2: The Balance Sheet of Iran Japan Petrochemical Company as of 31 December
1988 (10/10/1367) (in rials)
Assets 1988 1987
Current Assets
Cash 1,612,541,218 1,320,084,790
Contractors
Current
Accounts
329,522 4,863,249
Prepayments
to
Contractors
-- 680,245,811
Sundry Debtors
5,429,011 35,184,215
Oil
Companiesl 553,555,910
Stocks 12,748,288 20,707,575
Prepayments 79,290
Sundry
Deposits 277,201,871 268,676,381
Total of
Current Assets 2,461,805,850 2,329,841,311
Fixed Assets
Fixed Assets
(at cost) 3,422,249,904 3,428,720,276
Less Deprecia-
tion Reserves
2,964,049,083 2,819,406,336
Net Total of
Fixed Assets
458,200,821 609,313,940
Project's Costs
1,570,706,126 256,058,209,233
Pre-Operation
Expenses -- 108,028,114
Total of Assets
4,490,712,797 268,105,392,598
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Table A.2: (continued)
Liabil-ities 1988 1987
Current
Liabil-ities
Contra-
ctors
Current
Accounts
23,979,918 1,604,116,432
Contra-
ctors
Deposits
1,098,126,285 1,040,369,774
Sundry
Credit-ors 1,240,401,559 3,457,193,940
Oil
Compan-ies
1
2,014,840,734 56,239,680,596
Delayed
Expenses
Reserves
33,264,581 746,699,868
Short-Term
Loans -- 58,063,402,133
Portion of
Long-Term
Loans
Used
74,403,550 97,957,174,993
Total of
Current
Liabil-ities 4,485,016,627 219,108,637,736
Long-Term
Loans
Long-Term
Loans 2 8,196,249,600
Unrealised
Profit
(Loss) 3 -- (3,699,494,738)
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Long-Term
Loans 4 4,496,754,862
Authorised
Capital 60,000,000,000 60,000,000,000
Called-in
Capital 46,500,000,000 46,500,000,000
Less Share-
holders'
Pledges 2,000,000,000 2,000,000,000
Paid-in-
Capital 44,500,000,000 44,500,000,000
Losses
Resulting
From
Invest-ment
(44,494,303,830)
Net Share-
holders'
Worth 5,696,170 --
Total
Liabilities 4,490,712,797 268,105,392,598
Note: 1- UPC current accounts with Iranian oil and petrochemical companies.
2- The value of long-term loans in rials, calculated at the end of the year's rates
of exchange.
3- The unrealised profit (loss) from fluctuations in the rates of exchange.
4- The value of long-term loans in rials, calculated at the rates of exchange at the
time of issue.
Source: Accounts of UPC at the end of Financial Year 1988.
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